path: root/doc/rfc/rfc3039.txt

Network Working Group                                       S. Santesson
Request for Comments: 3039                                      AddTrust
Category: Standards Track                                        W. Polk
                                                                    NIST
                                                               P. Barzin
                                                                  SECUDE
                                                              M. Nystrom
                                                            RSA Security
                                                            January 2001


                Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
                     Qualified Certificates Profile

Status of this Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document forms a certificate profile for Qualified Certificates,
   based on RFC 2459, for use in the Internet.  The term Qualified
   Certificate is used to describe a certificate with a certain
   qualified status within applicable governing law.  Further, Qualified
   Certificates are issued exclusively to physical persons.

   The goal of this document is to define a general syntax independent
   of local legal requirements.  The profile is however designed to
   allow further profiling in order to meet specific local needs.

   It is important to note that the profile does not define any legal
   requirements for Qualified Certificates.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.







Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                     [Page 1]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


Table of Contents

   1  Introduction ................................................    2
   2  Requirements and Assumptions ................................    3
   2.1  Properties ................................................    4
   2.2  Statement of Purpose ......................................    5
   2.3  Policy Issues .............................................    5
   2.4  Uniqueness of names .......................................    5
   3  Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile ..............    6
   3.1  Basic Certificate Fields ..................................    6
   3.1.1  Issuer ..................................................    6
   3.1.2  Subject .................................................    6
   3.2  Certificate Extensions ....................................    9
   3.2.1  Subject Directory Attributes ............................    9
   3.2.2  Certificate Policies ....................................   10
   3.2.3  Key Usage ...............................................   10
   3.2.4  Biometric Information ...................................   11
   3.2.5  Qualified Certificate Statements ........................   12
   4  Security Considerations .....................................   14
   5  References ..................................................   15
   6  Intellectual Property Rights ................................   16
   A  ASN.1 definitions ...........................................   17
   A.1  1988 ASN.1 Module .........................................   17
   A.2  1993 ASN.1 Module .........................................   19
   B  A Note on Attributes ........................................   24
   C.  Example Certificate ........................................   24
   C.1  ASN.1 Structure ...........................................   25
   C.1.1 Extensions ...............................................   25
   C.1.2 The certificate ..........................................   27
   C.2  ASN.1 Dump ................................................   29
   C.3  DER-encoding ..............................................   32
   C.4  CA's public key ...........................................   33
   Authors' Addresses .............................................   34
   Full Copyright Statement .......................................   35

1  Introduction

   This specification is one part of a family of standards for the X.509
   Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet.  It is based on RFC
   2459, which defines underlying certificate formats and semantics
   needed for a full implementation of this standard.

   The standard profiles the format for a specific type of certificates
   named Qualified Certificates.  The term Qualified Certificates and
   the assumptions that affects the scope of this document are discussed
   in Section 2.





Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                     [Page 2]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


   Section 3 defines requirements on information content in Qualified
   Certificates.  This profile addresses two fields in the basic
   certificate as well as five certificate extensions.  The certificate
   fields are the subject and issuer fields.  The certificate extensions
   are subject directory attributes, certificate policies, key usage, a
   private extension for storage of biometric data and a private
   extension for storage of statements related to Qualified
   Certificates.  The private extensions are presented in the 1993
   Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1), but in conformance with RFC
   2459 the 1988 ASN.1 module in Appendix A contains all normative
   definitions (the 1993 module in Appendix A is informative).

   In Section 4, some security considerations are discussed in order to
   clarify the security context in which Qualified Certificates are
   assumed to be utilized.  Section 5 contains the references.

   Appendix A contains all relevant ASN.1 [X.680] structures that are
   not already defined in RFC 2459.  Appendix B contains a note on
   attributes.  Appendix C contains an example certificate.  Appendix D
   contains authors' addresses and Appendix E contains the IETF
   Copyright Statement.

   It should be noted that this specification does not define the
   specific semantics of Qualified Certificates, and does not define the
   policies that should be used with them.  That is, this document
   defines what information should go into Qualified Certificates, but
   not what that information means.  A system that uses Qualified
   Certificates must define its own semantics for the information in
   Qualified Certificates.  It is expected that laws and corporate
   policies will make these definitions.

2  Requirements and Assumptions

   The term "Qualified Certificate" has been used by the European
   Commission to describe a certain type of certificates with specific
   relevance for European legislation.  This specification is intended
   to support this class of certificates, but its scope is not limited
   to this application.

   Within this standard the term "Qualified Certificate" is used more
   generally, describing the format for a certificate whose primary
   purpose is identifying a person with high level of assurance in
   public non-repudiation services.  The actual mechanisms that will
   decide whether a certificate should or should not be considered to be
   a "Qualified Certificate" in regard to any legislation are outside
   the scope of this standard.





Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                     [Page 3]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


   Harmonization in the field of Qualified Certificates is essential
   within several aspects that fall outside the scope of RFC 2459.  The
   most important aspects that affect the scope of this specification
   are:

   -  Definition of names and identity information in order to identify
      the associated subject in a uniform way.

   -  Definition of information which identifies the CA and the
      jurisdiction under which the CA operates when issuing a particular
      certificate.

   -  Definition of key usage extension usage for Qualified
      Certificates.

   -  Definition of information structure for storage of biometric
      information.

   -  Definition of a standardized way to store predefined statements
      with relevance for Qualified Certificates.

   -  Requirements for critical extensions.

2.1  Properties

   A Qualified Certificate as defined in this standard is assumed to
   have the following properties:

   -  The certificate is issued by a CA that makes a public statement
      that the certificate serves the purpose of a Qualified
      Certificate, as discussed in Section 2.2

   -  The certificate indicates a certificate policy consistent with
      liabilities, practices and procedures undertaken by the CA, as
      discussed in 2.3

   -  The certificate is issued to a natural person (living human
      being).

   -  The certificate contains an identity based on a pseudonym or a
      real name of the subject.










Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                     [Page 4]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


2.2  Statement of Purpose

   For a certificate to serve the purpose of being a Qualified
   Certificate, this profile assumes that the CA will have to include in
   the certificate information that explicitly defines this intent.

   The function of this information is thus to assist any concerned
   entity in evaluating the risk associated with creating or accepting
   signatures that are based on a Qualified Certificate.

   This profile defines two complementary ways to include this
   information:

   -  As information defined by a certificate policy included in the
      certificate policies extension, and

   -  As a statement included in the Qualified Certificates Statements
      extension.

2.3  Policy Issues

   Certain policy aspects define the context in which this profile is to
   be understood and used.  It is however outside the scope of this
   profile to specify any policies or legal aspects that will govern
   services that issue or utilize certificates according to this
   profile.

   It is however assumed that the issuing CA will undertake to follow a
   publicly available certificate policy that is consistent with its
   liabilities, practices and procedures.

2.4  Uniqueness of names

   Distinguished name is originally defined in X.501 [X.501] as a
   representation of a directory name, defined as a construct that
   identifies a particular object from among the set of all objects.  An
   object can be assigned a distinguished name without being represented
   by an entry in the Directory, but this name is then the name its
   object entry could have had if it were represented in the Directory.
   In the context of qualified certificates, a distinguished name
   denotes a set of attribute values [X.501] which forms a name that is
   unambiguous within a certain domain that forms either a real or a
   virtual DIT (Directory Information Tree)[X.501].  In the case of
   subject names the domain is assumed to be at least the issuing domain
   of the CA.  The distinguished name MUST be unique for each subject
   entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field,
   during the whole life time of the CA.




Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                     [Page 5]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


3  Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile

   This section defines a profile for Qualified Certificates.  The
   profile is based on the Internet certificate profile RFC 2459 which
   in turn is based on the X.509 version 3 format.  For full
   implementation of this section implementers are REQUIRED to consult
   the underlying formats and semantics defined in RFC 2459.

   ASN.1 definitions relevant for this section that are not supplied by
   RFC 2459 are supplied in Appendix A.

3.1  Basic Certificate Fields

   This specification provides additional details regarding the contents
   of two fields in the basic certificate.  These fields are the issuer
   and subject fields.

3.1.1  Issuer

   The issuer field SHALL identify the organization responsible for
   issuing the certificate.  The name SHOULD be an officially registered
   name of the organization.

   The identity of the issuer SHALL be specified using an appropriate
   subset of the following attributes:

         domainComponent;
         countryName;
         stateOrProvinceName;
         organizationName;
         localityName; and
         serialNumber.

   Additional attributes MAY be present but they SHOULD NOT be necessary
   to identify the issuing organization.

   Attributes present in the issuer field SHOULD be consistent with the
   laws under which the issuer operates.

   A relying party MAY have to consult associated certificate policies
   and/or the issuer's CPS, in order to determine the semantics of name
   fields and the laws under which the issuer operates.

3.1.2  Subject

   The subject field of a certificate compliant with this profile SHALL
   contain a distinguished name of the subject (see 2.4 for definition
   of distinguished name).



Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                     [Page 6]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


   The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the
   following attributes:

      countryName;
      commonName;
      surname;
      givenName;
      pseudonym;
      serialNumber;
      organizationName;
      organizationalUnitName;
      stateOrProvinceName
      localityName and
      postalAddress.

   Other attributes may be present but MUST NOT be necessary to
   distinguish the subject name from other subject names within the
   issuer domain.

   Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include at least one of
   the following:

      Choice   I:  commonName
      Choice  II:  givenName
      Choice III:  pseudonym

   The countryName attribute value specifies a general context in which
   other attributes are to be understood.  The country attribute does
   not necessarily indicate the subject's country of citizenship or
   country of residence, nor does it have to indicate the country of
   issuance.

   Note: Many X.500 implementations require the presence of countryName
   in the DIT.  In cases where the subject name, as specified in the
   subject field, specifies a public X.500 directory entry, the
   countryName attribute SHOULD always be present.

   The commonName attribute value SHALL, when present, contain a name of
   the subject.  This MAY be in the subject's preferred presentation
   format, or a format preferred by the CA, or some other format.
   Pseudonyms, nicknames and names with spelling other than defined by
   the registered name MAY be used.  To understand the nature of the
   name presented in commonName, complying applications MAY have to
   examine present values of the givenName and surname attributes, or
   the pseudonym attribute.






Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                     [Page 7]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


   Note: Many client implementations presuppose the presence of the
   commonName attribute value in the subject field and use this value to
   display the subject's name regardless of present givenName, surname
   or pseudonym attribute values.

   The surname and givenName attribute types SHALL, if present, contain
   the registered name of the subject, in accordance with the laws under
   which the CA prepares the certificate.  These attributes SHALL be
   used in the subject field if the commonName attribute is not present.
   In cases where the subject only has a single name registered, the
   givenName attribute SHALL be used and the surname attribute SHALL be
   omitted.

   The pseudonym attribute type SHALL, if present, contain a pseudonym
   of the subject.  Use of the pseudonym attribute MUST NOT be combined
   with use of any of the attributes surname and/or givenName.

   The serialNumber attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to
   differentiate between names where the subject field would otherwise
   be identical.  This attribute has no defined semantics beyond
   ensuring uniqueness of subject names.  It MAY contain a number or
   code assigned by the CA or an identifier assigned by a government or
   civil authority.  It is the CA's responsibility to ensure that the
   serialNumber is sufficient to resolve any subject name collisions.

   The organizationName and the organizationalUnitName attribute types
   SHALL, when present, be used to store the name and relevant
   information of an organization with which the subject is associated.
   The type of association between the organization and the subject is
   beyond the scope of this document.

   The postalAddress, the stateOrProvinceName and the localityName
   attribute types SHALL, when present, be used to store address and
   geographical information with which the subject is associated.  If an
   organizationName value also is present then the postalAddress,
   stateOrProvinceName and localityName attribute values SHALL be
   associated with the specified organization.  The type of association
   between the postalAddress, stateOrProvinceName and the localityName
   and either the subject or the organizationName is beyond the scope of
   this document.

   Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the attributes
   named in this section.








Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                     [Page 8]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


3.2  Certificate Extensions

   This specification provides additional details regarding the contents
   of five certificate extensions.  These extensions are the subject
   directory attributes, certificate policies, key usage, private
   extension for biometric information and private extension for
   Qualified Certificate statements.

3.2.1  Subject Directory Attributes

   The subjectDirectoryAttributes extension MAY contain additional
   attributes, associated with the subject, as complement to present
   information in the subject field and the subject alternative name
   extension.

   Attributes suitable for storage in this extension are attributes,
   which are not part of the subject's distinguished name, but which MAY
   still be useful for other purposes (e.g., authorization).

   This extension MUST NOT be marked critical.

   Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the following
   attributes:

      title;
      dateOfBirth;
      placeOfBirth;
      gender;
      countryOfCitizenship; and
      countryOfResidence.

   Other attributes MAY be included according to local definitions.

   The title attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to store a
   designated position or function of the subject within the
   organization specified by present organizational attributes in the
   subject field.  The association between the title, the subject and
   the organization is beyond the scope of this document.

   The dateOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of
   the date of birth of the subject.  The manner in which the date of
   birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this
   document.

   The placeOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of
   the place of birth of the subject.  The manner in which the place of
   birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this
   document.



Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                     [Page 9]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


   The gender attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of the
   gender of the subject.  For females the value "F" (or "f") and for
   males the value "M" (or "m") have to be used.  The manner in which
   the gender is associated with the subject is outside the scope of
   this document.

   The countryOfCitizenship attribute SHALL, when present, contain the
   identifier of at least one of the subject's claimed countries of
   citizenship at the time that the certificate was issued.  If the
   subject is a citizen of more than one country, more than one country
   MAY be present.  Determination of citizenship is a matter of law and
   is outside the scope of this document.

   The countryOfResidence attribute SHALL, when present, contain the
   value of at least one country in which the subject is resident.  If
   the subject is a resident of more than one country, more than one
   country MAY be present.  Determination of residence is a matter of
   law and is outside the scope of this document.

3.2.2 Certificate Policies

   The certificate policies extension SHALL contain the identifier of at
   least one certificate policy which reflects the practices and
   procedures undertaken by the CA.  The certificate policy extension
   MAY be marked critical.

   Information provided by the issuer stating the purpose of the
   certificate as discussed in Section 2.2 SHOULD be evident through
   indicated policies.

   The certificate policies extension SHOULD include all policy
   information needed for validation of the certificate.  If policy
   information is included in the QCStatements extension (see 3.2.5),
   then this information SHOULD also be defined by indicated policies.

   Certificate policies MAY be combined with any qualifier defined in
   RFC 2459.

3.2.3  Key Usage

   The key usage extension SHALL be present.  If the key usage
   nonRepudiation bit is asserted then it SHOULD NOT be combined with
   any other key usage , i.e., if set, the key usage non-repudiation
   SHOULD be set exclusively.

   The key usage extension MAY be marked critical.





Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 10]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


3.2.4  Biometric Information

   This section defines an extension for storage of biometric
   information.  Biometric information is stored in the form of a hash
   of a biometric template.

   The purpose of this extension is to provide means for authentication
   of biometric information.  The biometric information that corresponds
   to the stored hash is not stored in this extension, but the extension
   MAY include an URI pointing to a location where this information can
   be obtained.  If included, this URI does not imply that this is the
   only way to access this information.

   It is RECOMMENDED that biometric information in this extension is
   limited to information types suitable for human verification, i.e.,
   where the decision of whether the information is an accurate
   representation of the subject is naturally performed by a person.
   This implies a usage where the biometric information is represented
   by, for example, a graphical image displayed to the relying party,
   which MAY be used by the relying party to enhance identification of
   the subject.

   This extension MUST NOT be marked critical.

      biometricInfo  EXTENSION ::= {
          SYNTAX             BiometricSyntax
          IDENTIFIED BY      id-pe-biometricInfo }

      id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= {id-pe 2}

      BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData

      BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
          typeOfBiometricData  TypeOfBiometricData,
          hashAlgorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier,
          biometricDataHash    OCTET STRING,
          sourceDataUri        IA5String OPTIONAL }

      TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
          predefinedBiometricType    PredefinedBiometricType,
          biometricDataID            OBJECT IDENTIFIER }

      PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER { picture(0),
          handwritten-signature(1)} (picture|handwritten-signature,...)







Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 11]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


   The predefined biometric type picture, when present, SHALL identify
   that the source picture is in the form of a displayable graphical
   image of the subject.  The hash of the graphical image SHALL only be
   calculated over the image data excluding any labels defining the
   image type.

   The predefined biometric type handwritten-signature, when present,
   SHALL identify that the source data is in the form of a displayable
   graphical image of the subject's handwritten signature.  The hash of
   the graphical image SHALL only be calculated over the image data
   excluding any labels defining the image type.

3.2.5  Qualified Certificate Statements

   This section defines an extension for inclusion of defined statements
   related to Qualified Certificates.

   A typical statement suitable for inclusion in this extension MAY be a
   statement by the issuer that the certificate is issued as a Qualified
   Certificate in accordance with a particular legal system (as
   discussed in Section 2.2).

   Other statements suitable for inclusion in this extension MAY be
   statements related to the applicable legal jurisdiction within which
   the certificate is issued.  As an example this MAY include a maximum
   reliance limit for the certificate indicating restrictions on CA's
   liability.

   Each statement SHALL include an object identifier for the statement
   and MAY also include optional qualifying data contained in the
   statementInfo parameter.

   If the statementInfo parameter is included then the object identifier
   of the statement SHALL define the syntax and SHOULD define the
   semantics of this parameter.  If the object identifier does not
   define the semantics, a relying party may have to consult a relevant
   certificate policy or CPS to determine the exact semantics.

   This extension may be critical or non-critical.  If the extension is
   critical, this means that all statements included in the extension
   are regarded as critical.

      qcStatements  EXTENSION ::= {
          SYNTAX             QCStatements
          IDENTIFIED BY      id-pe-qcStatements }

      id-pe-qcStatements     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3 }




Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 12]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


      QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement

      QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
          statementId   QC-STATEMENT.&Id({SupportedStatements}),
          statementInfo QC-STATEMENT.&Type
          ({SupportedStatements}{@statementId}) OPTIONAL }

      SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= { qcStatement-1,...}

3.2.5.1 Predefined Statements

   This profile includes one predefined object identifier (id-qcs-
   pkixQCSyntax-v1), identifying conformance with syntax and semantics
   defined in this profile.  This Qualified Certificate profile is
   referred to as version 1.

      qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation
          IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 }
      --  This statement identifies conformance with syntax and
      --  semantics defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
      --  (Version 1). The SemanticsInformation may optionally contain
      --  additional semantics information as specified.

      SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
          semanticsIdentifier        OBJECT IDENTIFIER   OPTIONAL,
          nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities
                                                          OPTIONAL }
          (WITH COMPONENTS {..., semanticsIdentifier PRESENT}|
           WITH COMPONENTS {..., nameRegistrationAuthorities PRESENT})

      NameRegistrationAuthorities ::=  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
          GeneralName

   The SementicsInformation component identified by id-qcs-
   pkixQCSyntax-v1 MAY contain a semantics identifier and MAY identify
   one or more name registration authorities.

   The semanticsIdentifier component, if present, SHALL contain an OID,
   defining semantics for attributes and names in basic certificate
   fields and certificate extensions.  The OID may define semantics for
   all, or for a subgroup of all present attributes and/or names.

   The NameRegistrationAuthorities component, if present, SHALL contain
   a name of one or more name registration authorities, responsible for
   registration of attributes or names associated with the subject.  The
   association between an identified name registration authority and
   present attributes MAY be defined by a semantics identifier OID, by a
   certificate policy (or CPS) or some other implicit factors.



Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 13]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


   If a value of type SemanticsInformation is present in a QCStatement
   then at least one of the fields semanticsIdentifier and
   nameRegistrationAuthorities must be present, as indicated.

4  Security Considerations

   The legal value of a digital signature that is validated with a
   Qualified Certificate will be highly dependent upon the policy
   governing the use of the associated private key.  Both the private
   key holder as well as the relying party should make sure that the
   private key is used only with the consent of the legitimate key
   holder.

   Since the public keys are for public use with legal implications for
   involved parties, certain conditions should exist before CAs issue
   certificates as Qualified Certificates.  The associated private keys
   must be unique for the subject, and must be maintained under the
   subject's sole control.  That is, a CA should not issue a qualified
   certificate if the means to use the private key is not protected
   against unintended usage.  This implies that the CA have some
   knowledge about the subject's cryptographic module.

   The CA must further verify that the public key contained in the
   certificate is legitimately representing the subject.

   CAs should not issue CA certificates with policy mapping extensions
   indicating acceptance of another CA's policy unless these conditions
   are met.

   Combining the nonRepudiation bit in the keyUsage certificate
   extension with other keyUsage bits may have security implications and
   this specification therefore recommends against such practices.

   The ability to compare two qualified certificates to determine if
   they represent the same physical entity is dependent on the semantics
   of the subjects' names.  The semantics of a particular attribute may
   be different for different issuers.  Comparing names without
   knowledge of the semantics of names in these particular certificates
   may provide misleading results.

   This specification is a profile of RFC 2459.  The security
   considerations section of that document applies to this specification
   as well.








Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 14]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


5 References

   [RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC 2247] Kille, S., Wahl, M., Grimstad, A., Huber, R. and S.
              Sataluri, "Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished
              Names", RFC 2247, January 1998.

   [RFC 2459] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W. and D. Solo, "Internet
              X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and CRL
              Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999.

   [RFC 2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
              Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
              November 2000.

   [X.501]    ITU-T Recommendation X.501: Information Technology - Open
              Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Models, June
              1993.

   [X.509]    ITU-T Recommendation X.509: Information Technology - Open
              Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication
              Framework, June 1997.

   [X.520]    ITU-T Recommendation X.520: Information Technology - Open
              Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Selected
              Attribute Types, June 1993.

   [X.680]    ITU-T Recommendation X.680: Information Technology -
              Abstract Syntax Notation One, 1997.

   [ISO 3166] ISO Standard 3166: Codes for the representation of names
              of countries, 1993.

















Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 15]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


6 Intellectual Property Rights

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
   has made any effort to identify any such rights.  Information on the
   IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
   standards related documentation can be found in BCP-11.  Copies of
   claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
   licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
   obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
   proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
   be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF Executive
   Director.






























Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 16]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


A. ASN.1 definitions

   As in RFC 2459, ASN.1 modules are supplied in two different variants
   of the ASN.1 syntax.

   Appendix A.1 is in the 1988 syntax, and does not use macros.
   However, since the module imports type definitions from modules in
   RFC 2459 which are not completely in the 1988 syntax, the same
   comments as in RFC 2459 regarding its use applies here as well; i.e.,
   Appendix A.1 may be parsed by an 1988 ASN.1-parser by removing the
   definitions for the UNIVERSAL types and all references to them in RFC
   2459's 1988 modules.

   Appendix A.2 is in the 1993 syntax.  However, since the module
   imports type definitions from modules in RFC 2459 which are not
   completely in the 1993 syntax, the same comments as in RFC 2459
   regarding its use applies here as well; i.e., Appendix A.2 may be
   parsed by an 1993 ASN.1-parser by removing the UTF8String choice from
   the definition of DirectoryString in the module PKIX1Explicit93 in
   RFC 2459.  Appendix A.2 may be parsed "as is" by an 1997 ASN.1
   parser, however.

   In case of discrepancies between these modules, the 1988 module is
   the normative one.

A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module

PKIXqualified88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
    internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
    id-mod-qualified-cert-88(10) }

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN

-- EXPORTS ALL --

IMPORTS

GeneralName
    FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
    internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
    id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)}

AlgorithmIdentifier, DirectoryString, Attribute, AttributeType,
    id-pkix, id-pe, id-at
    FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
    internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)



Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 17]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


    id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)};

-- Locally defined OIDs

-- Arc for QC personal data attributes
id-pda  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 9 }
-- Arc for QC statements
id-qcs  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 11 }

-- Attributes

id-at-serialNumber          AttributeType ::= { id-at 5 }
SerialNumber ::=            PrintableString (SIZE(1..64))

id-at-postalAddress         AttributeType ::= { id-at 16 }
PostalAddress ::=           SEQUENCE SIZE (1..6) OF DirectoryString

id-at-pseudonym             AttributeType ::= { id-at 65 }
Pseudonym ::=               DirectoryString

domainComponent             AttributeType ::=
                            { 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 25 }
DomainComponent ::=         IA5String

id-pda-dateOfBirth          AttributeType ::= { id-pda 1 }
DateOfBirth ::=             GeneralizedTime

id-pda-placeOfBirth         AttributeType ::= { id-pda 2 }
PlaceOfBirth ::=            DirectoryString

id-pda-gender               AttributeType ::= { id-pda 3 }
Gender ::=                  PrintableString (SIZE(1))
                            -- "M", "F", "m" or "f"

id-pda-countryOfCitizenship AttributeType ::= { id-pda 4 }
CountryOfCitizenship ::=    PrintableString (SIZE (2))
                            -- ISO 3166 Country Code

id-pda-countryOfResidence   AttributeType ::= { id-pda 5 }
CountryOfResidence ::=      PrintableString (SIZE (2))
                            -- ISO 3166 Country Code

-- Private extensions

-- Biometric info extension

id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= {id-pe 2}




Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 18]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData

BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
    typeOfBiometricData  TypeOfBiometricData,
    hashAlgorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier,
    biometricDataHash    OCTET STRING,
    sourceDataUri        IA5String OPTIONAL }

TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
    predefinedBiometricType   PredefinedBiometricType,
    biometricDataOid          OBJECT IDENTIFIER }

PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER {
    picture(0),handwritten-signature(1)}
    (picture|handwritten-signature)

-- QC Statements Extension

id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3}

QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement

QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
    statementId        OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    statementInfo      ANY DEFINED BY statementId OPTIONAL}

-- QC statements
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 1 }

--  This statement identifies conformance with syntax and
--  semantics defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
--  (Version 1). This statement may optionally contain
--  additional semantics information as specified below.

SemanticsInformation  ::= SEQUENCE {
    semanticsIndentifier        OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
    nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities OPTIONAL
    } -- At least one field shall be present

NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName

END

A.2 1993 ASN.1  Module

PKIXqualified93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
    internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
    id-mod-qualified-cert-93(11) }



Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 19]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN

-- EXPORTS ALL --

IMPORTS

authorityKeyIdentifier, subjectKeyIdentifier, keyUsage,
    extendedKeyUsage, privateKeyUsagePeriod, certificatePolicies,
    policyMappings, subjectAltName, issuerAltName, basicConstraints,
    nameConstraints, policyConstraints, cRLDistributionPoints,
    subjectDirectoryAttributes, authorityInfoAccess, GeneralName,
    OTHER-NAME
    FROM PKIX1Implicit93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
    internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
    id-pkix1-implicit-93(4)}

id-pkix, AlgorithmIdentifier, ATTRIBUTE, Extension, EXTENSION,
    DirectoryString{}, ub-name, id-pe, id-at, id-at-commonName,
    id-at-surname, id-at-countryName, id-at-localityName,
    id-at-stateOrProvinceName, id-at-organizationName,
    id-at-organizationalUnitName, id-at-givenName, id-at-dnQualifier,
    pkcs9email, title, organizationName, organizationalUnitName,
    stateOrProvinceName, localityName, countryName,
    generationQualifier, dnQualifier, initials, givenName, surname,
    commonName, name
    FROM PKIX1Explicit93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
    internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
    id-pkix1-explicit-93(3)};

-- Object Identifiers

-- Externally defined OIDs
id-at-serialNumber  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-at 5}
id-at-postalAddress OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-at 16 }
id-at-pseudonym     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-at 65 }
id-domainComponent  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 25 }

-- Locally defined OIDs

-- Arc for QC personal data attributes

id-pda  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 9 }
-- Arc for QC statements
id-qcs  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 11 }

-- Private extensions



Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 20]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


id-pe-biometricInfo         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 2 }
id-pe-qcStatements          OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3 }

-- Personal data attributes
id-pda-dateOfBirth          OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 1 }
id-pda-placeOfBirth         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 2 }
id-pda-gender               OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 3 }
id-pda-countryOfCitizenship OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 4 }
id-pda-countryOfResidence   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 5 }

-- QC statements
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 1 }

-- Object Sets

-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the
-- set of legal certificate extensions. Note that this set is an
-- extension of the ExtensionSet defined in RFC 2459.
ExtensionSet EXTENSION ::= {
    authorityKeyIdentifier |
    subjectKeyIdentifier |
    keyUsage |
    extendedKeyUsage |
    privateKeyUsagePeriod |
    certificatePolicies |
    policyMappings |
    subjectAltName |
    issuerAltName |
    basicConstraints |
    nameConstraints |
    policyConstraints |
    cRLDistributionPoints |
    subjectDirectoryAttributes |
    authorityInfoAccess |
    biometricInfo |
    qcStatements, ... }

-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the
-- set of attributes applications are required to recognize in
-- distinguished names. The set may of course be augmented to meet
-- local requirements.  Note that deleting members of the set may
-- prevent interoperability with conforming implementations, and that
-- this set is an extension of the SupportedAttributes set in RFC 2459.

SupportedAttributes ATTRIBUTE ::= {
    countryName | commonName | surname | givenName | pseudonym |
    serialNumber | organizationName | organizationalUnitName |
    stateOrProvinceName | localityName | postalAddress |



Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 21]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


    pkcs9email | domainComponent | dnQualifier,
    ... -- For future extensions -- }

-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the
-- set of attributes applications are required to recognize in
-- subjectDirectoryAttribute extensions. The set may be augmented to
-- meet local requirements.  Note that deleting members of the set
-- may prevent interoperability with conforming implementations.
PersonalDataAttributeSet ATTRIBUTE ::= {
    title | dateOfBirth | placeOfBirth | gender | countryOfCitizenship |
    countryOfResidence, ... }

-- Attributes

-- serialNumber from X.520
serialNumber ATTRIBUTE ::= {
    WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE(1..64))
    ID          id-at-serialNumber }

-- postalAddress from X.520
postalAddress ATTRIBUTE ::= {
    WITH SYNTAX SEQUENCE SIZE (1..6) OF DirectoryString { 30 }
    ID          id-at-postalAddress }

-- pseudonym from (forthcoming) X.520)
pseudonym ATTRIBUTE ::= {
    WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString { ub-name }
    ID          id-at-pseudonym }

-- domainComponent from RFC 2247
domainComponent ATTRIBUTE ::= {
    WITH SYNTAX IA5String
    ID          id-domainComponent }

dateOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {
    WITH SYNTAX GeneralizedTime
    ID          id-pda-dateOfBirth }

placeOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {
    WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString { ub-name }
    ID          id-pda-placeOfBirth }

gender ATTRIBUTE ::= {
    WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE(1) ^ FROM("M"|"F"|"m"|"f"))
    ID          id-pda-gender }

countryOfCitizenship ATTRIBUTE ::= {
    WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2))



Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 22]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


        (CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- })
    ID          id-pda-countryOfCitizenship }

countryOfResidence ATTRIBUTE ::= {
    WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2))
        (CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- })
    ID          id-pda-countryOfResidence }

-- Private extensions

-- Biometric info extension

biometricInfo  EXTENSION ::= {
    SYNTAX             BiometricSyntax
    IDENTIFIED BY      id-pe-biometricInfo }

BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData

BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
    typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,
    hashAlgorithm       AlgorithmIdentifier,
    biometricDataHash   OCTET STRING,
    sourceDataUri       IA5String OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions -- }

TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
    predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,
    biometricDataOid        OBJECT IDENTIFIER }

PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER { picture(0),
    handwritten-signature(1)} (picture|handwritten-signature,...)

-- QC Statements Extension

qcStatements  EXTENSION ::= {
    SYNTAX        QCStatements
    IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-qcStatements }

QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement

QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
    statementId   QC-STATEMENT.&id({SupportedStatements}),
    statementInfo QC-STATEMENT.&Type
    ({SupportedStatements}{@statementId}) OPTIONAL }

QC-STATEMENT ::= CLASS {
    &id   OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
    &Type OPTIONAL }



Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 23]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


WITH SYNTAX {
    [SYNTAX &Type] IDENTIFIED BY &id }

qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation
    IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1}
    --  This statement identifies conformance with syntax and
    --  semantics defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
    --  (Version 1). The SemanticsInformation may optionally contain
    --  additional semantics information as specified.

SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
    semanticsIdentifier         OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
    nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities OPTIONAL
    }(WITH COMPONENTS {..., semanticsIdentifier PRESENT}|
      WITH COMPONENTS {..., nameRegistrationAuthorities PRESENT})

NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName

-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the
-- set of attributes applications are required to recognize as QCSs.
SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= {
    qcStatement-1, ... -- For future extensions -- }

END

B. A Note on Attributes

   This document defines several new attributes, both for use in the
   subject field of issued certificates and in the
   subjectDirectoryAttributes extension.  In the interest of conformity,
   they have been defined here using the ASN.1 ATTRIBUTE definition from
   RFC 2459, which is sufficient for the purposes of this document, but
   greatly simplified in comparison with ISO/ITU's definition.  A
   complete definition of these new attributes (including matching
   rules), along with object classes to support them in LDAP-accessible
   directories, can be found in [PKCS 9].

C. Example Certificate

   This section contains the ASN.1 structure, an ASN.1 dump, and the
   DER-encoding of a certificate issued in conformance with this
   profile.  The example has been developed with the help of the OSS
   ASN.1 compiler.  The certificate has the following characteristics:

      1.  The certificate is signed with RSA and the SHA-1 hash
          algorithm
      2.  The issuer's distinguished name is O=GMD - Forschungszentrum
          Informationstechnik GmbH; C=DE



Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 24]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


      3.  The subject's distinguished name is CN=Petra M.  Barzin, O=GMD
          - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH, C=DE
      4.  The certificate was issued on May 1, 2000 and will expire on
          November 1, 2000
      5.  The certificate contains a 1024 bit RSA key
      6.  The certificate includes a critical key usage extension
          exclusively indicating non-repudiation
      7.  The certificate includes a certificate policy identifier
          extension indicating the practices and procedures undertaken
          by the issuing CA (object identifier 1.3.36.8.1.1).  The
          certificate policy object identifier is defined by TeleTrust,
          Germany.  It is required to be set in a certificate conformant
          to the German digital signature law.
      8.  The certificate includes a subject directory attributes
          extension containing the following attributes:

          surname:               Barzin
          given name:            Petra
          date of birth:         October, 14th 1971
          place of birth:        Darmstadt
          country of citizenship:Germany
          gender:                Female

      9.  The certificate includes a qualified statement private
          extension indicating that the naming registration authority's
          name as "municipality@darmstadt.de".
      10. The certificate includes, in conformance with RFC 2459, an
          authority key identifier extension.

C.1 ASN.1 Structure

C.1.1 Extensions

   Since extensions are DER-encoded already when placed in the structure
   to be signed, they are for clarity shown here in the value notation
   defined in [X.680].

C.1.1.1 The subjectDirectoryAttributes extension

   petrasSubjDirAttrs AttributesSyntax ::= {
       {
           type id-pda-countryOfCitizenship,
           values {
               PrintableString : "DE"
           }
       },
       {
           type id-pda-gender,



Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 25]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


           values {
               PrintableString : "F"
           }
       },
       {
           type id-pda-dateOfBirth,
           values {
               GeneralizedTime : "197110140000Z"
           }
       },
       {
           type id-pda-placeOfBirth,
           values {
               DirectoryString : utf8String : "Darmstadt"
           }
       }
   }

C.1.1.2 The keyUsage extension

   petrasKeyUsage KeyUsage ::= {nonRepudiation}

C.1.1.3 The certificatePolicies extension

   petrasCertificatePolicies CertificatePoliciesSyntax ::= {
       {
           policyIdentifier {1 3 36 8 1 1}
       }
   }

C.1.1.4 The qcStatements extension

   petrasQCStatement QCStatements ::= {
       {
           statementId   id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1,
           statementInfo SemanticsInformation : {
               nameRegistrationAuthorities {
                   rfc822Name : "municipality@darmstadt.de"
               }
          }
       }
   }

C.1.1.5 The authorityKeyIdentifier extension

   petrasAKI AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= {
       keyIdentifier '000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0FFEDCBA98'H
   }



Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 26]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


C.1.2 The certificate

   The signed portion of the certificate is shown here in the value
   notation defined in [X.680].  Note that extension values are already
   DER encoded in this structure.  Some values has been truncated for
   readability purposes.

   {
     version v3,
     serialNumber 1234567890,
     signature
     {
       algorithm { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 },
       parameters RSAParams : NULL
     },
     issuer rdnSequence :
       {
         {
           {
             type { 2 5 4 6 },
             value PrintableString : "DE"
           }
         },
         {
           {
             type { 2 5 4 10 },
             value UTF8String :
               "GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"
           }
         }
       },
     validity
     {
       notBefore utcTime : "000501100000Z",
       notAfter utcTime : "001101100000Z"
     },
     subject rdnSequence :
       {
         {
           {
             type { 2 5 4 6 },
             value PrintableString : "DE"
           }
         },
         {
           {
             type { 2 5 4 10 },
             value UTF8String :



Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 27]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


               "GMD Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"
           }
         },
         {
           {
             type { 2 5 4 4 },
             value UTF8String : "Barzin"
           },
           {
             type { 2 5 4 42 },
             value UTF8String : "Petra"
           }
         }
       },
     subjectPublicKeyInfo
     {
       algorithm
       {
         algorithm { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 },
         parameters RSAParams : NULL
       },
       subjectPublicKey '00110000 10000001 10000111 00000010 1000 ...'B
     },
     extensions
     {
       {
         extnId { 2 5 29 9 },  -- subjectDirectoryAttributes
         extnValue '305B301006082B06010505070904310413024445300F0 ...'H
       },
       {
         extnId { 2 5 29 15 }, -- keyUsage
         critical TRUE,
         extnValue '03020640'H
       },
       {
         extnId { 2 5 29 32 }, -- certificatePolicies
         extnValue '3009300706052B24080101'H
       },
       {
         extnId { 2 5 29 35 }, -- authorityKeyIdentifier
         extnValue '30168014000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0FFEDCBA98'H
       },
       {
         extnId { 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 3 }, -- qcStatements
         extnValue '302B302906082B06010505070B01301D301B81196D756 ...'H
       }
     }
   }



Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 28]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


C.2 ASN.1 dump

   This section contains an ASN.1 dump of the signed portion of the
   certificate.  Some values has been truncated for readability
   purposes.

   TBSCertificate SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
     length = 631
     version : tag = [0] constructed; length = 3
       Version INTEGER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 2] primitive; length = 1
         2
     serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber INTEGER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 2]
       primitive; length = 4
       1234567890
     signature AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
       constructed; length = 13
       algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
         length = 9
         { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 }
       parameters OpenType: NULL: tag = [UNIVERSAL 5] primitive;
         length = 0
         NULL
     issuer Name CHOICE
       rdnSequence RDNSequence SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
         constructed; length = 72
         RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
           constructed; length = 11
           AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
             constructed; length = 9
             type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
               length = 3
               { 2 5 4 6 }
             value OpenType: PrintableString: tag = [UNIVERSAL 19]
               primitive; length = 2
               "DE"
         RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
           constructed; length = 57
           AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
           constructed; length = 55
             type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
               length = 3
               { 2 5 4 10 }
             value OpenType : UTF8String: tag = [UNIVERSAL 12]
               primitive; length = 48
               0x474d44202d20466f72736368756e67737a656e7472756d2049...
     validity Validity SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
       length = 30
       notBefore Time CHOICE



Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 29]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


         utcTime UTCTime: tag = [UNIVERSAL 23] primitive; length = 13
           000501100000Z
       notAfter Time CHOICE
         utcTime UTCTime: tag = [UNIVERSAL 23] primitive; length = 13
           001101100000Z
     subject Name CHOICE
       rdnSequence RDNSequence SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
         constructed; length = 101
         RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
           constructed; length = 11
           AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
             constructed; length = 9
             type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
               length = 3
               { 2 5 4 6 }
             value OpenType: PrintableString: tag = [UNIVERSAL 19]
               primitive; length = 2
               "DE"
         RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
           constructed; length = 55
           AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
             constructed; length = 53
             type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
               length = 3
               { 2 5 4 10 }
             value OpenType: UTF8String: tag = [UNIVERSAL 12]
               primitive; length = 46
               0x474d4420466f72736368756e67737a656e7472756d20496e66...
         RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
           constructed; length = 29
           AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
             constructed; length = 13
             type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
               length = 3
               { 2 5 4 4 }
             value OpenType: UTF8String: tag = [UNIVERSAL 12]
               primitive; length = 6
               0x4261727a696e
           AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
             constructed; length = 12
             type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
               length = 3
               { 2 5 4 42 }
             value OpenType: UTF8String: tag = [UNIVERSAL 12]
               primitive; length = 5
               0x5065747261
     subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE: tag =
       [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed; length = 157



Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 30]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


       algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
         constructed; length = 13
         algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
           length = 9
           { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 }
         parameters OpenType: NULL: tag = [UNIVERSAL 5] primitive;
           length = 0
           NULL
       subjectPublicKey BIT STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 3] primitive;
         length = 139
         0x0030818702818100b8488400d4b6088be48ead459ca19ec717aaf3d1d...
     extensions : tag = [3] constructed; length = 233
       Extensions SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
         length = 230
         Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
           length = 100
           extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
             length = 3
             { 2 5 29 9 }
           extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4] primitive;
             length = 93
             0x305b301006082b06010505070904310413024445300f06082b060...
         Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
           length = 14
           extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
             length = 3
             { 2 5 29 15 }
           critical BOOLEAN: tag = [UNIVERSAL 1] primitive; length = 1
             TRUE
           extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4] primitive;
             length = 4
             0x03020640
         Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
           length = 18
           extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
             length = 3
             { 2 5 29 32 }
           extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4] primitive;
             length = 11
             0x3009300706052b24080101
         Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
           length = 31
           extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
             length = 3
             { 2 5 29 35 }
           extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4] primitive;
             length = 24
             0x30168014000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0ffedcba98



Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 31]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


         Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
           length = 57
           extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
             length = 8
             { 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 3 }
           extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4] primitive;
             length = 45
             0x302b302906082b06010505070b01301d301b81196d756e6963697...

C.3 DER-encoding

   This section contains the full, DER-encoded certificate, in hex.

   3082030E30820277A0030201020204499602D2300D06092A864886F70D010105
   05003048310B300906035504061302444531393037060355040A0C30474D4420
   2D20466F72736368756E67737A656E7472756D20496E666F726D6174696F6E73
   746563686E696B20476D6248301E170D3030303530313130303030305A170D30
   30313130313130303030305A3065310B30090603550406130244453137303506
   0355040A0C2E474D4420466F72736368756E67737A656E7472756D20496E666F
   726D6174696F6E73746563686E696B20476D6248311D300C060355042A0C0550
   65747261300D06035504040C064261727A696E30819D300D06092A864886F70D
   010101050003818B0030818702818100B8488400D4B6088BE48EAD459CA19EC7
   17AAF3D1D4EE3ECCA496128A13597D16CC8B85EB37EFCE110C63B01E684E5CF6
   32291EAC60FD153C266EAAC36AD4CEA92319F9BFDD261AD2BFE41EAB4E17FE67
   8341EE52D9A0A8B4DEC07B7ACC76762514045CEE9994E0CF37BAE05F8DE33B35
   FF98BCE77742CE4B12273BD122137FE9020105A381E93081E630640603551D09
   045D305B301006082B06010505070904310413024445300F06082B0601050507
   09033103130146301D06082B060105050709013111180F313937313130313430
   30303030305A301706082B06010505070902310B0C094461726D737461647430
   0E0603551D0F0101FF04040302064030120603551D20040B3009300706052B24
   080101301F0603551D23041830168014000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
   FEDCBA98303906082B06010505070103042D302B302906082B06010505070B01
   301D301B81196D756E69636970616C697479406461726D73746164742E646530
   0D06092A864886F70D01010505000381810048FD14D9AFE961E4321D9AA40CC0
   1C12893550CF76FBECBDE448926B0AE6F904AB89E7B5F808666FB007218AC18D
   28CE1E2D40FBF8C16B275CBA0547D7885B74059DEC736223368FC1602A510BC1
   EB31E39F3967BE6B413D48BC743A0AB19C57FD20F3B393E8FEBD8B05CAA5007D
   AD36F9D789AEF636A0AC0F93BCB3711B5907













Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 32]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


C.4 CA's public RSA key

   This section contains the DER-encoded public RSA key of the CA who
   signed the example certificate.  It is included with the purpose of
   simplifying verifications of the example certificate.

   30818902818100ad1f35964b3674c807b9f8a645d2c8174e514b69a4b46a7382
   915abbc44eccede914dae8fcc023abcea9c53380e641795cb0dda664b872fc10
   9f9bbb852bf42d994f634c681608e388dce240b558513e5b60027bd1a07cef9c
   9b6db37c7e1f1abd238eed96e4b669056b260f55e83f14e6027127c9deb3ad18
   afcd3f8a5f5bf50203010001








































Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 33]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


Authors' Addresses

   Stefan Santesson
   AddTrust AB
   P.O. Box 465
   S-201 24 Malmo
   Sweden

   EMail: stefan@addtrust.com


   Tim Polk
   NIST
   Building 820, Room 426
   Gaithersburg, MD 20899, USA

   EMail: wpolk@nist.gov


   Petra Barzin
   SECUDE - Sicherheitstechnologie Informationssysteme GmbH
   Landwehrstrasse 50a
   D-64293 Darmstadt
   Germany

   EMail: barzin@secude.com


   Magnus Nystrom
   RSA Security AB
   Box 10704
   S-121 29 Stockholm
   Sweden

   EMail: magnus@rsasecurity.com
















Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 34]
^L
RFC 3039             Qualified Certificates Profile         January 2001


Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
   copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
   English.

   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
   BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.



















Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 35]
^L