path: root/doc/rfc/rfc3125.txt

Network Working Group                                            J. Ross
Request for Comments: 3125                          Security & Standards
Category: Experimental                                         D. Pinkas
                                                                Integris
                                                                 N. Pope
                                                    Security & Standards
                                                          September 2001


                     Electronic Signature Policies

Status of this Memo

   This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
   community.  It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.
   Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested.
   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document defines signature policies for electronic signatures. A
   signature policy is a set of rules for the creation and validation of
   an electronic signature, under which the validity of signature can be
   determined.  A given legal/contractual context may recognize a
   particular signature policy as meeting its requirements.

   A signature policy has a globally unique reference, which is bound to
   an electronic signature by the signer as part of the signature
   calculation.

   The signature policy needs to be available in human readable form so
   that it can be assessed to meet the requirements of the legal and
   contractual context in which it is being applied.

   To allow for the automatic processing of an electronic signature
   another part of the signature policy specifies the electronic rules
   for the creation and validation of the electronic signature in a
   computer processable form.  In the current document the format of the
   signature policy is defined using ASN.1.

   The contents of this document is based on the signature policy
   defined in ETSI TS 101 733 V.1.2.2 (2000-12) Copyright (C).
   Individual copies of this ETSI deliverable can be downloaded from
   http://www.etsi.org.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction                                                    3
   2.  Major Parties                                                   3
   3.  Signature Policy Specification                                  5
   3.1  Overall ASN.1 Structure                                        5
   3.2  Signature Validation Policy                                    6
   3.3  Common Rules                                                   7
   3.4  Commitment Rules                                               8
   3.5  Signer and Verifier Rules                                      9
   3.5.1  Signer Rules                                                 9
   3.5.2  Verifier Rules                                              11
   3.6  Certificate and Revocation Requirements                       11
   3.6.1  Certificate Requirements                                    11
   3.6.2  Revocation Requirements                                     13
   3.7  Signing Certificate Trust Conditions                          14
   3.8  Time-Stamp Trust Conditions                                   15
   3.9  Attribute Trust Conditions                                    16
   3.10  Algorithm Constraints                                        17
   3.11  Signature Policy Extensions                                  18
   4.  Security Considerations                                        18
   4.1  Protection of Private Key                                     18
   4.2  Choice of Algorithms                                          18
   5.  Conformance Requirements                                       19
   6.  References                                                     19
   7. Authors' Addresses                                              20
   Annex A (normative):                                               21
   A.1  Definitions Using X.208 (1988) ASN.1 Syntax                   21
   A.2  Definitions Using X.680 (1997) ASN.1 Syntax                   27
   Annex B (informative):                                             34
   B.1  Signature Policy and Signature Validation Policy              34
   B.2  Identification of Signature Policy                            36
   B.3  General Signature Policy Information                          36
   B.4  Recognized Commitment Types                                   37
   B.5  Rules for Use of Certification Authorities                    37
   B.5.1  Trust Points                                                38
   B.5.2  Certification Path                                          38
   B.6  Revocation Rules                                              39
   B.7  Rules for the Use of Roles                                    39
   B.7.1  Attribute Values                                            39
   B.7.2  Trust Points for Certified Attributes                       40
   B.7.3  Certification Path for Certified Attributes                 40
   B.8  Rules for the Use of Time-Stamping and Timing                 40
   B.8.1  Trust Points and Certificate Paths                          41
   B.8.2  Time-Stamping Authority Names                               41
   B.8.3  Timing Constraints - Caution Period                         41
   B.8.4  Timing Constraints - Time-Stamp Delay                       41
   B.9  Rules for Verification Data to be followed                    41



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   B.10  Rules for Algorithm Constraints and Key Lengths              42
   B.11  Other Signature Policy Rules                                 42
   B.12  Signature Policy Protection                                  42
   Full Copyright Statement                                           44

1.  Introduction

   This document is intended to cover signature policies which can be
   used with electronic signatures for various types of transactions,
   including business transactions (e.g., purchase requisition,
   contract, and invoice applications).  Electronic signatures can be
   used for any transaction between an individual and a company, between
   two companies, between an individual and a governmental body, etc.
   This document is independent of any environment.  It can be applied
   to any environment e.g., smart cards, GSM SIM cards, special programs
   for electronic signatures etc.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
   "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document (in uppercase,
   as shown) are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Major Parties

   The document uses the following terms:

      *  the Signature Policy Issuer;
      *  the Signer;
      *  the Verifier;
      *  the Arbitrator;
      *  Trusted Service Providers (TSP);

   The Signature Policy Issuer (which is a Trusted Service Provider
   (TSP)) issues signatures policies that define the technical and
   procedural requirements for electronic signature creation, and
   validation/ verification, in order to meet a particular business
   need.

   The Signer is the entity that creates the electronic signature.  When
   the signer digitally signs over an signature policy identifier, it
   represents a commitment on behalf of the signing entity that the data
   being signed is signed under the rules defined by the signature
   policy.

   The Verifier is the entity that validates the electronic signature,
   it may be a single entity or multiple entities.  The verifier MUST
   validate the electronic signature under the rules defined by the
   electronic signature policy for the signature to be valid.




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   An arbitrator, is an entity which arbitrates disputes between a
   signer and a verifier.  It acts as verifier when it verifies the
   electronic signature after it has been previously validated.

   The Trusted Service Providers (TSPs) are one or more entities that
   help to build trust relationships between the signer and verifier.
   Use of TSP specific services MAY be mandated by signature policy.
   TSP supporting services include: user certificates, cross-
   certificates, time-stamping tokens,CRLs, ARLs, OCSP responses.

   A Trusted Service Providers (TSPs) MAY be a Signature Policy Issuer,
   as Such, the TSP MUST define the technical and procedural
   requirements for electronic signature creation and validation, in
   order to meet a particular business need.

   The following other TSPs are used to support the functions defined in
   this document:

      *  Certification Authorities;
      *  Registration Authorities;
      *  Repository Authorities (e.g., a Directory);
      *  Time-Stamping Authorities;
      *  One-line Certificate Status Protocol responders;
      *  Attribute Authorities.

   Certification Authorities provide users with public key certificates.

   Registration Authorities allows the registration of entities before a
   CA generates certificates.

   Repository Authorities publish CRLs issued by CAs, , cross-
   certificates (i.e., CA certificates) issued by CAs, signature
   policies issued by Signature Policy Issuers and optionally public key
   certificates (i.e., leaf certificates) issued by CAs.

   Time-Stamping Authorities attest that some data was formed before a
   given trusted time.

   One-line Certificate Status Protocol responders (OSCP responders)
   provide information about the status (i.e., revoked, not revoked,
   unknown) of a particular certificate.

   Attributes Authorities provide users with attributes linked to public
   key certificates

   An Arbitrator is an entity that arbitrates disputes between a signer
   and a verifier.




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3.  Signature Policy Specification

   A signature policy specification includes general information about
   the policy, the validation policy rules and other signature policy
   information.

   This document mandates that:

      *  an electronic signature must be processed by the signer and
         verifier in accordance with the signature policy referenced by
         the signer;
      *  the signature policy referenced by the signer must be
         identifiable by an Object Identifier;
      *  there must exist a specification of the signature policy;
      *  for a given signature policy there must be one definitive form
         of the specification which has a unique binary encoding;
      *  a hash of the definitive specification, using an agreed
         algorithm, must be provided by the signer and checked by the
         verifier.

   This document defines but does not mandate the form of the signature
   policy specification.  The signature policy may be specified either:

      *  in a free form document for human interpretation; or
      *  in a structured form using an agreed syntax and encoding.

   This document defines an ASN.1 based syntax that may be used to
   define a structured signature policy.  Future versions of this
   document may include structured a signature policy specification
   using XML.

3.1  Overall ASN.1 Structure

   The overall structure of a signature policy defined using ASN.1 is
   given in this section.  Use of this ASN.1 structure is optional.

   This ASN.1 syntax is encoded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules
   (DER).

   In this structure the policy information is preceded by an identifier
   for the hashing algorithm used to protect the signature policy and
   followed by the hash value which must be re-calculated and checked
   whenever the signature policy is passed between the issuer and
   signer/verifier.

   The hash is calculated without the outer type and length fields.





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SignaturePolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
        signPolicyHashAlg      AlgorithmIdentifier,
        signPolicyInfo         SignPolicyInfo,
        signPolicyHash         SignPolicyHash     OPTIONAL }

SignPolicyHash ::= OCTET STRING

SignPolicyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        signPolicyIdentifier            SignPolicyId,
        dateOfIssue                     GeneralizedTime,
        policyIssuerName                PolicyIssuerName,
        fieldOfApplication              FieldOfApplication,
        signatureValidationPolicy       SignatureValidationPolicy,
        signPolExtensions               SignPolExtensions
                                                   OPTIONAL
                                                         }

SignPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

PolicyIssuerName ::= GeneralNames

FieldOfApplication ::= DirectoryString

   The policyIssuerName field identifies the policy issuer in one or
   more of the general name forms.

   The fieldofApplication is a description of the expected application
   of this policy.

   The signature validation policy rules are fully processable to allow
   the validation of electronic signatures issued under that form of
   signature policy.  They are described in the rest of this section.

   The signPolExtensions is a generic way to extend the definition of
   any sub-component of a signature policy.

3.2  Signature Validation Policy

   The signature validation policy defines for the signer which data
   elements must be present in the electronic signature he provides and
   for the verifier which data elements must be present under that
   signature policy for an electronic signature to be potentially valid.

   The signature validation policy is described as follows:







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SignatureValidationPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
        signingPeriod          SigningPeriod,
        commonRules            CommonRules,
        commitmentRules        CommitmentRules,
        signPolExtensions      SignPolExtensions        OPTIONAL
                                                }

   The signingPeriod identifies the date and time before which the
   signature policy SHOULD NOT be used for creating signatures, and an
   optional date after which it should not be used for creating
   signatures.

SigningPeriod ::= SEQUENCE {
        notBefore       GeneralizedTime,
        notAfter        GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }

3.3  Common Rules

   The CommonRules define rules that are common to all commitment types.
   These rules are defined in terms of trust conditions for
   certificates, time-stamps and attributes, along with any constraints
   on attributes that may be included in the electronic signature.

CommonRules  ::= SEQUENCE {
        signerAndVeriferRules          [0]  SignerAndVerifierRules
                                                        OPTIONAL,
        signingCertTrustCondition      [1]  SigningCertTrustCondition
                                                        OPTIONAL,
        timeStampTrustCondition        [2]  TimestampTrustCondition
                                                        OPTIONAL,
        attributeTrustCondition        [3]  AttributeTrustCondition
                                                        OPTIONAL,
        algorithmConstraintSet         [4]  AlgorithmConstraintSet
                                                        OPTIONAL,
        signPolExtensions              [5]  SignPolExtensions
                                                         OPTIONAL
                                                       }

   If a field is present in CommonRules then the equivalent field must
   not be present in any of the CommitmentRules (see below).  If any of
   the following fields are not present in CommonRules then it must be
   present in each CommitmentRule:

      *  signerAndVeriferRules;
      *  signingCertTrustCondition;
      *  timeStampTrustCondition.





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3.4  Commitment Rules

   The CommitmentRules consists of the validation rules which apply to
   given commitment types:

   CommitmentRules ::= SEQUENCE OF CommitmentRule

   The CommitmentRule for given commitment types are defined in terms of
   trust conditions for certificates, time-stamps and attributes, along
   with any constraints on attributes that may be included in the
   electronic signature.

CommitmentRule  ::= SEQUENCE {
        selCommitmentTypes                  SelectedCommitmentTypes,
        signerAndVeriferRules          [0]  SignerAndVerifierRules
                                                          OPTIONAL,
        signingCertTrustCondition      [1]  SigningCertTrustCondition
                                                          OPTIONAL,
        timeStampTrustCondition        [2]  TimestampTrustCondition
                                                          OPTIONAL,
        attributeTrustCondition        [3]  AttributeTrustCondition
                                                          OPTIONAL,
        algorithmConstraintSet         [4]  AlgorithmConstraintSet
                                                          OPTIONAL,
        signPolExtensions              [5]  SignPolExtensions
                                                          OPTIONAL
                                                       }

SelectedCommitmentTypes ::= SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
        empty                        NULL,
        recognizedCommitmentType     CommitmentType }


   If the SelectedCommitmentTypes indicates "empty" then this rule
   applied when a commitment type is not present  (i.e., the type of
   commitment is indicated in the semantics of the message).  Otherwise,
   the electronic signature must contain a commitment type indication
   that must fit one of the commitments types that are mentioned in
   CommitmentType.

   A specific commitment type identifier must not appear in more than
   one commitment rule.

CommitmentType ::= SEQUENCE {
        identifier                      CommitmentTypeIdentifier,
        fieldOfApplication      [0] FieldOfApplication OPTIONAL,
        semantics               [1] DirectoryString OPTIONAL }




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   The fieldOfApplication and semantics fields define the specific use
   and meaning of the commitment within the overall field of application
   defined for the policy.

3.5  Signer and Verifier Rules

   The following rules apply to the format of electronic signatures
   defined using [ES-FORMATS].

   The SignerAndVerifierRules consists of signer rule and verification
   rules as defined below:

SignerAndVerifierRules ::= SEQUENCE {
        signerRules      SignerRules,
        verifierRules    VerifierRules }

3.5.1  Signer Rules

   The signer rules identify:

      *  if the eContent is empty and the signature is calculated using
         a hash of signed data external to CMS structure.

      *  the CMS signed attributes that must be provided by the signer
         under this policy;

      *  the CMS unsigned attribute that must be provided by the signer
         under this policy;

      *  whether the certificate identifiers from the full certification
         path up to the trust point must be provided by the signer in
         the SigningCertificate attribute;

      *  whether a signer's certificate, or all certificates in the
         certification path to the trust point must be by the signer in
         the *  certificates field of SignedData.

SignerRules ::= SEQUENCE {
        externalSignedData         BOOLEAN      OPTIONAL,
                   -- True if signed data is external to CMS structure
                        -- False if signed data part of CMS structure
                        -- Not present if either allowed
        mandatedSignedAttr         CMSAttrs,
                                 -- Mandated CMS signed attributes
        mandatedUnsignedAttr       CMSAttrs,
                                 -- Mandated CMS unsigned attributed
        mandatedCertificateRef     [0] CertRefReq DEFAULT signerOnly,
                                 -- Mandated Certificate Reference



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        mandatedCertificateInfo    [1] CertInfoReq DEFAULT none,
                                 -- Mandated Certificate Info
        signPolExtensions          [2] SignPolExtensions        OPTIONAL
                                                }

CMSattrs ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   The mandated SignedAttr field must include the object identifier for
   all those signed attributes required by this document as well as
   additional attributes required by this policy.

   The mandatedUnsignedAttr field must include the object identifier for
   all those unsigned attributes required by this document as well as
   additional attributes required by this policy.  For example, if a
   signature time-stamp <see section 1.1) is required by the signer the
   object identifier for this attribute must be included.

   The mandatedCertificateRef identifies whether just the signer's
   certificate, or all the full certificate path must be provided by the
   signer.

CertRefReq ::= ENUMERATED {
                                signerOnly (1),
           -- Only reference to signer cert mandated
                                fullpath (2)

           -- References for full cert path up to a trust point required
                                        }

   The mandatedCertificateInfo field identifies whether a signer's
   certificate, or all certificates in the certification path to the
   trust point must be provided by the signer in the certificates field
   of SignedData.

CertInfoReq ::= ENUMERATED {
                                none (0)        ,
                        -- No mandatory requirements
                                signerOnly (1)  ,
                        -- Only reference to signer cert mandated
                                fullpath (2)
                        -- References for full cert path up to a
                        -- trust point mandated
                                                   }








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3.5.2  Verifier Rules

   The verifier rules identify:

      *  The CMS unsigned attributes that must be present under this
         policy and must be added by the verifier if not added by the
         signer.

VerifierRules ::= SEQUENCE {
                mandatedUnsignedAttr    MandatedUnsignedAttr,
                signPolExtensions           SignPolExtensions  OPTIONAL
                                                                   }

MandatedUnsignedAttr ::=  CMSAttrs
                                   -- Mandated CMS unsigned attributed

3.6  Certificate and Revocation Requirement

   The SigningCertTrustCondition, TimestampTrustCondition and
   AttributeTrustCondition (defined in subsequent sub-sections) make use
   of two ASN1 structures which are defined below: CertificateTrustTrees
   and CertRevReq.

3.6.1  Certificate Requirements

   The certificateTrustTrees identifies a set of self signed
   certificates for the trust points used to start (or end) certificate
   path processing and the initial conditions for certificate path
   validation as defined RFC 2459 [7] section 4.  This ASN1 structure is
   used to define policy for validating the signing certificate, the
   TSA's certificate and attribute certificates.

CertificateTrustTrees ::=   SEQUENCE OF CertificateTrustPoint

CertificateTrustPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
        trustpoint                              Certificate,
                               -- self-signed certificate
        pathLenConstraint       [0] PathLenConstraint   OPTIONAL,
        acceptablePolicySet     [1] AcceptablePolicySet OPTIONAL,
                                -- If not present "any policy"
        nameConstraints         [2] NameConstraints     OPTIONAL,
        policyConstraints       [3] PolicyConstraints   OPTIONAL }


   The trustPoint field gives the self signed certificate for the CA
   that is used as the trust point for the start of certificate path
   processing.




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   The pathLenConstraint field gives the maximum number of CA
   certificates that may be in a certification path following the
   trustpoint.  A value of zero indicates that only the given trustpoint
   certificate and an end-entity certificate may be used.  If present,
   the pathLenConstraint field must be greater than or equal to zero.
   Where pathLenConstraint is not present, there is no limit to the
   allowed length of the certification path.

   PathLenConstraint    ::=   INTEGER (0..MAX)

   The acceptablePolicySet field identifies the initial set of
   certificate policies, any of which are acceptable under the signature
   policy.  AcceptablePolicySet ::= SEQUENCE OF CertPolicyId

   CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   The nameConstraints field indicates a name space within which all
   subject names in subsequent certificates in a certification path must
   be located.  Restrictions may apply to the subject distinguished name
   or subject alternative names.  Restrictions apply only when the
   specified name form is present.  If no name of the type is in the
   certificate, the certificate is acceptable.

   Restrictions are defined in terms of permitted or excluded name
   subtrees.  Any name matching a restriction in the excludedSubtrees
   field is invalid regardless of information appearing in the
   permittedSubtrees.

NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
          permittedSubtrees       [0]     GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL,
          excludedSubtrees        [1]     GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL }

     GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree

     GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE {
          base                    GeneralName,
          minimum         [0]     BaseDistance DEFAULT 0,
          maximum         [1]     BaseDistance OPTIONAL }

     BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)

   The policyConstraints extension constrains path processing in two
   ways. It can be used to prohibit policy mapping or require that each
   certificate in a path contain an acceptable policy identifier.

   The policyConstraints field, if present specifies requirement for
   explicit indication of the certificate policy and/or the constraints
   on policy mapping.



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PolicyConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
        requireExplicitPolicy           [0] SkipCerts OPTIONAL,
        inhibitPolicyMapping            [1] SkipCerts OPTIONAL }

SkipCerts ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)

   If the inhibitPolicyMapping field is present, the value indicates the
   number of additional certificates that may appear in the path
   (including the trustpoint's self certificate) before policy mapping
   is no longer permitted.  For example, a value of one indicates that
   policy mapping may be processed in certificates issued by the subject
   of this certificate, but not in additional certificates in the path.

   If the requireExplicitPolicy field is present, subsequent
   certificates must include an acceptable policy identifier.  The value
   of requireExplicitPolicy indicates the number of additional
   certificates that may appear in the path (including the trustpoint's
   self certificate) before an explicit policy is required.  An
   acceptable policy identifier is the identifier of a policy required
   by the user of the certification path or the identifier of a policy
   which has been declared equivalent through policy mapping.

3.6.2  Revocation Requirements

   The RevocRequirements field specifies minimum requirements for
   revocation information, obtained through CRLs and/or OCSP responses,
   to be used in checking the revocation status of certificates.  This
   ASN1 structure is used to define policy for validating the signing
   certificate, the TSA's certificate and attribute certificates.

CertRevReq ::= SEQUENCE {
        endCertRevReq   RevReq,
        caCerts     [0] RevReq
                                            }

   Certificate revocation requirements are specified in terms of checks
   required on:

      *  endCertRevReq: end certificates (i.e., the signers certificate,
         the attribute certificate or the time-stamping authority
         certificate).

      *  caCerts: CA certificates.

            RevReq ::= SEQUENCE  {
             enuRevReq  EnuRevReq,
             exRevReq    SignPolExtensions OPTIONAL}




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   An authority certificate is certificate issued to an authority (e.g.,
   either to a certification authority or to an attribute authority
   (AA)).

   A Time-Stamping Authority (TSA) is a trusted third party that creates
   time-stamp tokens in order to indicate that a datum existed at a
   particular point in time.  See [TSP].

EnuRevReq  ::= ENUMERATED {
        clrCheck        (0),
                   --Checks must be made against current CRLs
                   -- (or authority revocation lists (ARL))
        ocspCheck       (1), -- The revocation status must be checked
                  -- using the Online Certificate Status Protocol
                  -- (OCSP),RFC 2450.
        bothCheck       (2),
                  -- Both CRL and OCSP checks must be carried out
        eitherCheck     (3),
                  -- At least one of CRL or OCSP checks must be
                  -- carried out
        noCheck         (4),
                  -- no check is mandated
        other           (5)
                  -- Other mechanism as defined by signature policy
                  -- extension
          }

   Revocation requirements are specified in terms of:

      *  clrCheck: Checks must be made against current CRLs (or
         authority revocation lists);
      *  ocspCheck: The revocation status must be checked using the
         Online Certificate Status Protocol (RFC 2450);
      *  bothCheck: Both OCSP and CRL checks must be carried out;
      *  eitherCheck: Either OCSP or CRL checks must be carried out;
      *  noCheck: No check is mandated.

3.7  Signing Certificate Trust Conditions

   The SigningCertTrustCondition field identifies trust conditions for
   certificate path processing used to validate the signing certificate.

SigningCertTrustCondition ::=   SEQUENCE {
     signerTrustTrees              CertificateTrustTrees,
     signerRevReq                  CertRevReq
                                             }





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3.8  Time-Stamp Trust Conditions

   The TimeStampTrustCondition field identifies trust conditions for
   certificate path processing used to authenticate the timstamping
   authority and constraints on the name of the time-stamping authority.
   This applies to the time-stamp that must be present in every ES-T.

TimestampTrustCondition ::= SEQUENCE {
    ttsCertificateTrustTrees    [0]     CertificateTrustTrees
                                           OPTIONAL,
    ttsRevReq                   [1]             CertRevReq
                                           OPTIONAL,
    ttsNameConstraints          [2]             NameConstraints
                                           OPTIONAL,
    cautionPeriod               [3]             DeltaTime
                                           OPTIONAL,
    signatureTimestampDelay     [4]             DeltaTime
                                           OPTIONAL }

DeltaTime ::= SEQUENCE {
        deltaSeconds    INTEGER,
        deltaMinutes    INTEGER,
        deltaHours      INTEGER,
        deltaDays       INTEGER }

   If ttsCertificateTrustTrees is not present then the same rule as
   defined in certificateTrustCondition applies to certification of the
   time-stamping authorities public key.

   The tstrRevReq specifies minimum requirements for revocation
   information, obtained through CRLs and/or OCSP responses, to be used
   in checking the revocation status of the time-stamp that must be
   present in the ES-T.

   If ttsNameConstraints is not present then there are no additional
   naming constraints on the trusted time-stamping authority other than
   those implied by the ttsCertificateTrustTrees.

   The cautionPeriod field specifies a caution period after the signing
   time that it is mandated the verifier must wait to get high assurance
   of the validity of the signer's key and that any relevant revocation
   has been notified.  The revocation status information forming the ES
   with Complete validation data must not be collected and used to
   validate the electronic signature until after this caution period.

   The signatureTimestampDelay field specifies a maximum acceptable time
   between the signing time and the time at which the signature time-
   stamp, as used to form the ES Time-Stamped, is created for the



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   verifier.  If the signature time-stamp is later that the time in the
   signing-time attribute by more than the value given in
   signatureTimestampDelay, the signature must be considered invalid.

3.9  Attribute Trust Conditions

   If the attributeTrustCondition field is not present then any
   certified attributes may not considered to be valid under this
   validation policy.  The AttributeTrustCondition field is defined as
   follows:

AttributeTrustCondition ::= SEQUENCE {
      attributeMandated            BOOLEAN,
                                   -- Attribute must be present
      howCertAttribute             HowCertAttribute,
      attrCertificateTrustTrees   [0] CertificateTrustTrees  OPTIONAL,
      attrRevReq                  [1] CertRevReq             OPTIONAL,
      attributeConstraints        [2] AttributeConstraints   OPTIONAL }

   If attributeMandated is true then an attribute, certified within the
   following constraints, must be present.  If false, then the signature
   is still valid if no attribute is specified.

   The howCertAttribute field specifies whether attributes uncertified
   attributes "claimed" by the signer, or certified attributes (i.e.,
   Attribute Certificates) or either using the signer attributes
   attribute defined in [ES-FORMATS] section 3.12.3.

HowCertAttribute ::= ENUMERATED {
        claimedAttribute       (0),
        certifiedAttribtes     (1),
        either                 (2) }

   The attrCertificateTrustTrees specifies certificate path conditions
   for any attribute certificate.  If not present the same rules apply
   as in certificateTrustCondition.

   The attrRevReq specifies minimum requirements for revocation
   information, obtained through CRLs and/or OCSP responses, to be used
   in checking the revocation status of Attribute Certificates, if any
   are present.

   If the attributeConstraints field is not present then there are no
   constraints on the attributes that may be validated under this
   policy. The attributeConstraints field is defined as follows:






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AttributeConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
        attributeTypeConstarints        [0] AttributeTypeConstraints
                                                 OPTIONAL,
        attributeValueConstarints       [1] AttributeValueConstraints
                                                 OPTIONAL }

   If present, the attributeTypeConstarints field specifies the
   attribute types which are considered valid under the signature
   policy.  Any value for that attribute is considered valid.

   AttributeTypeConstraints ::= SEQUENCE OF AttributeType

   If present, the attributeTypeConstraints field specifies the specific
   attribute values which are considered valid under the signature
   policy.

   AttributeValueConstraints ::= SEQUENCE OF AttributeTypeAndValue

3.10  Algorithm Constraints

   The algorithmConstrains fields, if present, identifies the signing
   algorithms (hash, public key cryptography, combined hash and public
   key cryptography) that may be used for specific purposes and any
   minimum length.  If this field is not present then the policy applies
   no constraints.

AlgorithmConstraintSet ::= SEQUENCE {   -- Algorithm constrains on:
signerAlgorithmConstraints      [0]     AlgorithmConstraints OPTIONAL,
                                -- signer
eeCertAlgorithmConstraints      [1]     AlgorithmConstraints OPTIONAL,
                                -- issuer of end entity certs.
caCertAlgorithmConstraints      [2]     AlgorithmConstraints OPTIONAL,
                                -- issuer of CA certificates
aaCertAlgorithmConstraints      [3]     AlgorithmConstraints OPTIONAL,
                                -- Attribute Authority
tsaCertAlgorithmConstraints     [4]     AlgorithmConstraints OPTIONAL
                                -- Time-Stamping Authority
                                                            }

AlgorithmConstraints ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgAndLength

AlgAndLength ::= SEQUENCE {
        algID                   OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        minKeyLength    INTEGER         OPTIONAL,
       -- Minimum key length in bits
        other           SignPolExtensions OPTIONAL
                 }




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   An Attribute Authority (AA)is authority which assigns privileges by
   issuing attribute certificates

3.11  Signature Policy Extensions

   Additional signature policy rules may be added to:

      *  the overall signature policy structure, as defined in section
         3.1;
      *  the signature validation policy structure, as defined in
         section 3.2;
      *  the common rules, as defined in section 3.3;
      *  the commitment rules, as defined in section 3.4;
      *  the signer rules, as defined in section 3.5.1;
      *  the verifier rules, as defined in section 3.5.2;
      * the revocation requirements in section 3.6.2;
      *  the algorithm constraints in section 3.10.

   These extensions to the signature policy rules must be defined using
   an ASN.1 syntax with an associated object identifier carried in the
   SignPolExtn as defined below:

SignPolExtensions ::= SEQUENCE OF SignPolExtn

SignPolExtn ::= SEQUENCE {
                extnID      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                extnValue   OCTET STRING  }

   The extnID field must contain the object identifier for the
   extension. The extnValue field must contain the DER (see ITU-T
   Recommendation X.690 [4]) encoded value of the extension.  The
   definition of an extension, as identified by extnID must include a
   definition of the syntax and semantics of the extension.

4.  Security Considerations

4.1  Protection of Private Key

   The security of the electronic signature mechanism defined in this
   document depends on the privacy of the signer's private key.
   Implementations must take steps to ensure that private keys cannot be
   compromised.

4.2  Choice of Algorithms

   Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms become
   weaker with time.  As new cryptoanalysis techniques are developed and
   computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular



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   cryptographic algorithm will reduce.  Therefore, cryptographic
   algorithm implementations should be modular allowing new algorithms
   to be readily inserted.  That is, implementers should be prepared for
   the set of mandatory to implement algorithms to change over time.

5.  Conformance Requirements

   Signer and verifier systems shall be able to process an electronic
   signature in accordance with the specification of the signature
   policy signature policy referenced identifiable by an Object
   Identifier, see section 3.

6.  References

   [TS101733]   ETSI Standard TS 101 733 V.1.2.2 (2000-12) Electronic
                Signature Formats. Note: copies of ETSI TS 101 733 can
                be freely download from the ETSI web site www.etsi.org.

   [ES-FORMATS] Pinkas, D., Ross, J. and N. Pope, "Electronic Signature
                Formats for Long Term Electronic Signatures", RFC 3126,
                June 2001.

   [TSP]        Adams, C, Pinkas, D., Zuccherato, R. and P. Cain,
                "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp
                Protocol (TSP)", RFC 3161, August 2001.

   [OCSP]       Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, R., Galperin, S. and C.
                Adams, "On-line Status Certificate Protocol", RFC 2560,
                June 1999.

   [RFC2119]    Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [ESS]        Hoffman, P., "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME",
                RFC 2634, June 1999.

   [CMS]        Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 2630,
                June 1999.

   [RFC2459]    Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W. and D. Solo, "Internet
                X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and CRL
                Profile," RFC 2459, January 1999.

   [PKCS9]      RSA Laboratories, "The Public-Key Cryptography Standards
                (PKCS)", RSA Data Security Inc., Redwood City,
                California, November 1993 Release.





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   [ISONR]      ISO/IEC 10181-5:  Security Frameworks in Open Systems.
                Non-Repudiation Framework. April 1997.

7.  Authors' Addresses

   This Experimental RFC has been produced in ETSI TC-SEC.

      ETSI
      F-06921 Sophia Antipolis, Cedex - FRANCE
      650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis
      Valbonne - FranceTel: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16
      secretariat@etsi.fr
      http://www.etsi.org

   Contact Point

      Harri Rasilainen
      ETSI
      650 Route des Lucioles
      F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex
      FRANCE

      EMail: harri.rasilainen@etsi.fr

      John Ross
      Security & Standards
      192 Moulsham Street
      Chelmsford, Essex
      CM2 0LG
      United Kingdom

      EMail: ross@secstan.com

      Denis Pinkas
      Integris, Bull.
      68, Route de Versailles
      78434 Louveciennes CEDEX
      FRANCE

      EMail: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net

      Nick Pope
      Security & Standards
      192 Moulsham Street
      Chelmsford, Essex
      CM2 0LG
      United Kingdom
      EMail: pope@secstan.com



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Annex A (normative):

   ASN.1 Definitions This annex provides the reference definition of the
   ASN.1 syntax signature policies definitions for new syntax defined in
   this document.

A.1  Definitions Using X.208 (1988) ASN.1 Syntax

   NOTE: The ASN.1 Module defined in section A.1 has precedence over
   that defined in Annex A-2 in the case of any conflict.

   ETS-ElectronicSignaturePolicies-88syntax { iso(1) member-body(2)
           us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-mod(0)
       7}

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS All

IMPORTS

-- Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
 - Certificate and CRL Profile: RFC 2560
        Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier, CertificateList, Name,
        GeneralNames, GeneralName, DirectoryString,Attribute,
        AttributeTypeAndValue, AttributeType, AttributeValue,
         PolicyInformation, BMPString, UTF8String

  FROM PKIX1Explicit88
        {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
        security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
        id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)}
                                                ;

-- Signature Policy Specification
-- ==============================

SignaturePolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
        signPolicyHashAlg      AlgorithmIdentifier,
        signPolicyInfo         SignPolicyInfo,
        signPolicyHash         SignPolicyHash     OPTIONAL }

SignPolicyHash ::= OCTET STRING

SignPolicyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        signPolicyIdentifier            SignPolicyId,
        dateOfIssue                     GeneralizedTime,
        policyIssuerName                PolicyIssuerName,



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        fieldOfApplication              FieldOfApplication,
        signatureValidationPolicy       SignatureValidationPolicy,
        signPolExtensions               SignPolExtensions
                                              OPTIONAL
                                                      }

PolicyIssuerName ::= GeneralNames

FieldOfApplication ::= DirectoryString

SignatureValidationPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
        signingPeriod          SigningPeriod,
        commonRules            CommonRules,
        commitmentRules        CommitmentRules,
        signPolExtensions       SignPolExtensions
                                        OPTIONAL
                                                }

SigningPeriod ::= SEQUENCE {
        notBefore       GeneralizedTime,
        notAfter        GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }


CommonRules  ::= SEQUENCE {
        signerAndVeriferRules          [0]  SignerAndVerifierRules
                                                          OPTIONAL,
        signingCertTrustCondition      [1]  SigningCertTrustCondition
                                                          OPTIONAL,
        timeStampTrustCondition        [2]  TimestampTrustCondition
                                                        OPTIONAL,
        attributeTrustCondition        [3]  AttributeTrustCondition
                                                        OPTIONAL,
        algorithmConstraintSet         [4]  AlgorithmConstraintSet
                                                         OPTIONAL,
        signPolExtensions              [5]  SignPolExtensions
                                                         OPTIONAL
                                                                 }

CommitmentRules ::= SEQUENCE OF CommitmentRule

CommitmentRule  ::= SEQUENCE {
        selCommitmentTypes                  SelectedCommitmentTypes,
        signerAndVeriferRules          [0]  SignerAndVerifierRules
                                                           OPTIONAL,
        signingCertTrustCondition      [1]  SigningCertTrustCondition
                                                           OPTIONAL,
        timeStampTrustCondition        [2]  TimestampTrustCondition
                                                           OPTIONAL,



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        attributeTrustCondition        [3]  AttributeTrustCondition
                                                           OPTIONAL,
        algorithmConstraintSet         [4]  AlgorithmConstraintSet
                                                           OPTIONAL,
        signPolExtensions              [5]  SignPolExtensions
                                                            OPTIONAL
                                                                  }
SelectedCommitmentTypes ::= SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
        empty                        NULL,
        recognizedCommitmentType     CommitmentType }

CommitmentType ::= SEQUENCE {
        identifier                      CommitmentTypeIdentifier,
        fieldOfApplication      [0] FieldOfApplication OPTIONAL,
        semantics                       [1] DirectoryString OPTIONAL }

SignerAndVerifierRules ::= SEQUENCE {
        signerRules      SignerRules,
        verifierRules    VerifierRules }


SignerRules ::= SEQUENCE {
        externalSignedData         BOOLEAN      OPTIONAL,
                     -- True if signed data is external to CMS structure
                      -- False if signed data part of CMS structure
                      -- not present if either allowed
        mandatedSignedAttr         CMSAttrs,
                      -- Mandated CMS signed attributes
        mandatedUnsignedAttr       CMSAttrs,
                      -- Mandated CMS unsigned attributed
        mandatedCertificateRef     [0] CertRefReq DEFAULT signerOnly,
                      -- Mandated Certificate Reference
        mandatedCertificateInfo    [1] CertInfoReq DEFAULT none,
                      -- Mandated Certificate Info
        signPolExtensions                [2] SignPolExtensions
                                                OPTIONAL}

CMSAttrs ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER

CertRefReq ::= ENUMERATED {
                                signerOnly (1),
-- Only reference to signer cert mandated
                                fullPath (2)
-- References for full cert path up to a trust point required

                                                  }

CertInfoReq ::= ENUMERATED {



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                                none (0),
-- No mandatory requirements
                                signerOnly (1),
-- Only reference to signer cert mandated
                                fullPath (2)
-- References for full cert path up to a trust point mandated
                                                  }

VerifierRules ::= SEQUENCE {
                mandatedUnsignedAttr    MandatedUnsignedAttr,
                signPolExtensions       SignPolExtensions   OPTIONAL
                                                  }

MandatedUnsignedAttr ::=  CMSAttrs
-- Mandated CMS unsigned attributed

CertificateTrustTrees ::=   SEQUENCE OF CertificateTrustPoint

CertificateTrustPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
        trustpoint                              Certificate,
                            -- self-signed certificate
        pathLenConstraint       [0] PathLenConstraint   OPTIONAL,
        acceptablePolicySet     [1] AcceptablePolicySet OPTIONAL,
                            -- If not present "any policy"
        nameConstraints         [2] NameConstraints     OPTIONAL,
        policyConstraints       [3] PolicyConstraints   OPTIONAL }

PathLenConstraint    ::=   INTEGER (0..MAX)

AcceptablePolicySet ::= SEQUENCE OF CertPolicyId

CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
           permittedSubtrees       [0]     GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL,
           excludedSubtrees        [1]     GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL }

      GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree

      GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE {
           base                    GeneralName,
           minimum         [0]     BaseDistance DEFAULT 0,
           maximum         [1]     BaseDistance OPTIONAL }

      BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)

PolicyConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
        requireExplicitPolicy           [0] SkipCerts OPTIONAL,



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        inhibitPolicyMapping            [1] SkipCerts OPTIONAL }

SkipCerts ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)

CertRevReq ::= SEQUENCE {
        endCertRevReq   RevReq,
        caCerts   [0] RevReq
                             }

RevReq ::= SEQUENCE  {
    enuRevReq  EnuRevReq,
    exRevReq    SignPolExtensions OPTIONAL}

EnuRevReq  ::= ENUMERATED {
        clrCheck        (0), --Checks must be made against current CRLs
        -- (or authority revocation lists)
        ocspCheck       (1), -- The revocation status must be checked
        -- using the Online Certificate Status Protocol (RFC 2450)
        bothCheck       (2),
      -- Both CRL and OCSP checks must be carried out
        eitherCheck     (3),
      -- At least one of CRL or OCSP checks must be carried out
        noCheck         (4),
      -- no check is mandated
        other           (5)
      -- Other mechanism as defined by signature policy extension
                                                }

SigningCertTrustCondition ::=   SEQUENCE {
     signerTrustTrees              CertificateTrustTrees,
     signerRevReq                  CertRevReq
                                               }

TimestampTrustCondition ::= SEQUENCE {
    ttsCertificateTrustTrees    [0]             CertificateTrustTrees
                                                        OPTIONAL,
    ttsRevReq                   [1]             CertRevReq
                                                        OPTIONAL,
    ttsNameConstraints          [2]             NameConstraints
                                                        OPTIONAL,
    cautionPeriod               [3]             DeltaTime
                                                        OPTIONAL,
    signatureTimestampDelay     [4]             DeltaTime
                                                       OPTIONAL }

DeltaTime ::= SEQUENCE {
        deltaSeconds    INTEGER,
        deltaMinutes    INTEGER,



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        deltaHours      INTEGER,
        deltaDays       INTEGER }

AttributeTrustCondition ::= SEQUENCE {
        attributeMandated            BOOLEAN,
                                -- Attribute must be present
        howCertAttribute             HowCertAttribute,
        attrCertificateTrustTrees   [0] CertificateTrustTrees OPTIONAL,
        attrRevReq                  [1] CertRevReq            OPTIONAL,
        attributeConstraints        [2] AttributeConstraints  OPTIONAL }

HowCertAttribute ::= ENUMERATED {
        claimedAttribute    (0),
        certifiedAttribtes  (1),
        either              (2) }

AttributeConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
        attributeTypeConstarints        [0] AttributeTypeConstraints
                                                        OPTIONAL,
        attributeValueConstarints       [1] AttributeValueConstraints
                                                       OPTIONAL }


AttributeTypeConstraints ::= SEQUENCE OF AttributeType

AttributeValueConstraints ::= SEQUENCE OF AttributeTypeAndValue


AlgorithmConstraintSet ::= SEQUENCE {   -- Algorithm constrains on:
signerAlgorithmConstraints      [0]     AlgorithmConstraints OPTIONAL,
                                 -- signer
eeCertAlgorithmConstraints      [1]     AlgorithmConstraints OPTIONAL,
                                 -- issuer of end entity certs.
caCertAlgorithmConstraints      [2]     AlgorithmConstraints OPTIONAL,
                                 -- issuer of CA certificates
aaCertAlgorithmConstraints      [3]     AlgorithmConstraints OPTIONAL,
                                 -- Attribute Authority
tsaCertAlgorithmConstraints     [4]     AlgorithmConstraints OPTIONAL
                                 -- Time-Stamping Authority
                                                    }

AlgorithmConstraints ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgAndLength

AlgAndLength ::= SEQUENCE {
        algID                   OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        minKeyLength    INTEGER         OPTIONAL,
                             -- Minimum key length in bits other
                SignPolExtensions OPTIONAL



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                 }

SignPolExtensions ::= SEQUENCE OF SignPolExtn

SignPolExtn ::= SEQUENCE {
        extnID      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                extnValue   OCTET STRING  }


END -- ETS-ElectronicSignaturePolicies-88syntax --

A.2  Definitions Using X.680 1997 ASN.1 Syntax

   NOTE:   The ASN.1 module defined in section A.1 has precedence over
   that defined in section A.2 in the case of any conflict.

ETS-ElectronicSignaturePolicies-97Syntax { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-mod(0) 8}

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS All -

IMPORTS

-- Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
-- Certificate and CRL Profile: RFC 2560
        Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier, CertificateList, Name,
        GeneralNames, GeneralName, DirectoryString, Attribute,
        AttributeTypeAndValue, AttributeType, AttributeValue,
        PolicyInformation

  FROM PKIX1Explicit93
        {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
        security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
        nid-pkix1-explicit-88(1)}
;

-- S/MIME Object Identifier arcs used in the present document
-- ==================================================================

-- S/MIME  OID arc used in the present document
-- id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
--             us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 16 }

-- S/MIME Arcs
-- id-mod  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 0 }
-- modules



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-- id-ct   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }
-- content types
-- id-aa   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 2 }
-- attributes
-- id-spq  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 5 }
-- signature policy qualifier
-- id-cti  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 6 }
-- commitment type identifier
-- Signature Policy Specification
-- ==============================

SignaturePolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
        signPolicyHashAlg      AlgorithmIdentifier,
        signPolicyInfo         SignPolicyInfo,
        signPolicyHash         SignPolicyHash     OPTIONAL }

SignPolicyHash ::= OCTET STRING

SignPolicyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        signPolicyIdentifier            SignPolicyId,
        dateOfIssue                     GeneralizedTime,
        policyIssuerName                PolicyIssuerName,
        fieldOfApplication              FieldOfApplication,
        signatureValidationPolicy       SignatureValidationPolicy,
        signPolExtensions               SignPolExtensions
                                                        OPTIONAL
                                                               }

SignPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

PolicyIssuerName ::= GeneralNames

FieldOfApplication ::= DirectoryString

SignatureValidationPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
        signingPeriod          SigningPeriod,
        commonRules            CommonRules,
        commitmentRules        CommitmentRules,
        signPolExtensions      SignPolExtensions   OPTIONAL
                                                       }

SigningPeriod ::= SEQUENCE {
        notBefore       GeneralizedTime,
        notAfter        GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }

CommonRules  ::= SEQUENCE {
        signerAndVeriferRules          [0]  SignerAndVerifierRules
                                                         OPTIONAL,



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        signingCertTrustCondition      [1]  SigningCertTrustCondition
                                                         OPTIONAL,
        timeStampTrustCondition        [2]  TimestampTrustCondition
                                                         OPTIONAL,
        attributeTrustCondition        [3]  AttributeTrustCondition
                                                         OPTIONAL,
        algorithmConstraintSet         [4]  AlgorithmConstraintSet
                                                         OPTIONAL,
        signPolExtensions              [5]  SignPolExtensions
                                                         OPTIONAL
                                                        }

CommitmentRules ::= SEQUENCE OF CommitmentRule

CommitmentRule  ::= SEQUENCE {
        selCommitmentTypes                  SelectedCommitmentTypes,
        signerAndVeriferRules          [0]  SignerAndVerifierRules
                                                         OPTIONAL,
        signingCertTrustCondition      [1]  SigningCertTrustCondition
                                                         OPTIONAL,
        timeStampTrustCondition        [2]  TimestampTrustCondition
                                                         OPTIONAL,
        attributeTrustCondition        [3]  AttributeTrustCondition
                                                         OPTIONAL,
        algorithmConstraintSet         [4]  AlgorithmConstraintSet
                                                         OPTIONAL,
        signPolExtensions                    [5]  SignPolExtensions
                                                         OPTIONAL
                                                              }

SelectedCommitmentTypes ::= SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
        empty                        NULL,
        recognizedCommitmentType     CommitmentType }

CommitmentType ::= SEQUENCE {
        identifier                      CommitmentTypeIdentifier,
        fieldOfApplication      [0] FieldOfApplication OPTIONAL,
        semantics               [1] DirectoryString OPTIONAL }

SignerAndVerifierRules ::= SEQUENCE {
        signerRules      SignerRules,
        verifierRules    VerifierRules }

SignerRules ::= SEQUENCE {
        externalSignedData         BOOLEAN      OPTIONAL,
                     -- True if signed data is external to CMS structure
                        -- False if signed data part of CMS structure
                        -- not present if either allowed



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        mandatedSignedAttr         CMSAttrs,
                  -- Mandated CMS signed attributes
        mandatedUnsignedAttr       CMSAttrs,
                  -- Mandated CMS unsigned attributed
        mandatedCertificateRef     [0] CertRefReq DEFAULT signerOnly,
                        -- Mandated Certificate Reference
        mandatedCertificateInfo    [1] CertInfoReq DEFAULT none,
                        -- Mandated Certificate Info
        signPolExtensions                [2] SignPolExtensions  OPTIONAL
                                                      }

CMSAttrs ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER

CertRefReq ::= ENUMERATED {
                                signerOnly (1),
                   -- Only reference to signer cert mandated
                                fullPath (2)
                   -- References for full cert path up to a trust
                   -- point required
                                                                       }

CertInfoReq ::= ENUMERATED {
                                none (0)        ,
                   -- No mandatory requirements
                                signerOnly (1)  ,
                   -- Only reference to signer cert mandated
                                fullPath (2)
                         -- References for full cert path up to a
                   -- trust point mandated
                                                          }

VerifierRules ::= SEQUENCE {
                mandatedUnsignedAttr    MandatedUnsignedAttr,
                signPolExtensions       SignPolExtensions  OPTIONAL
                }
MandatedUnsignedAttr ::=  CMSAttrs
                          -- Mandated CMS unsigned attributed

CertificateTrustTrees ::=   SEQUENCE OF CertificateTrustPoint

CertificateTrustPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
        trustpoint                              Certificate,
                          -- self-signed certificate
        pathLenConstraint               [0] PathLenConstraint  OPTIONAL,
        acceptablePolicySet     [1] AcceptablePolicySet OPTIONAL,
                          -- If not present "any policy"
        nameConstraints         [2] NameConstraints     OPTIONAL,
        policyConstraints               [3] PolicyConstraints OPTIONAL }



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PathLenConstraint    ::=   INTEGER (0..MAX)

AcceptablePolicySet ::= SEQUENCE OF CertPolicyId

CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
           permittedSubtrees       [0]     GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL,
           excludedSubtrees        [1]     GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL }

      GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree

      GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE {
           base                    GeneralName,
           minimum         [0]     BaseDistance DEFAULT 0,
           maximum         [1]     BaseDistance OPTIONAL }

      BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)

PolicyConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
        requireExplicitPolicy           [0] SkipCerts OPTIONAL,
        inhibitPolicyMapping            [1] SkipCerts OPTIONAL }

SkipCerts ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)

CertRevReq ::= SEQUENCE {
        endCertRevReq   RevReq,
        caCerts      [0] RevReq
                                          }

RevReq ::= SEQUENCE  {
    enuRevReq  EnuRevReq,
    exRevReq    SignPolExtensions OPTIONAL}

EnuRevReq  ::= ENUMERATED {
        clrCheck        (0),
                   -- Checks must be made against current CRLs
                   -- (or authority revocation lists)
        ocspCheck       (1),
                   -- The revocation status must be checked using
                   -- the Online Certificate Status Protocol (RFC 2450)
        bothCheck       (2),
                   -- Both CRL and OCSP checks must be carried out
        eitherCheck     (3),
                   -- At least one of CRL or OCSP checks must be
                   -- carried out
        noCheck         (4),
                   -- no check is mandated



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        other           (5)
                   -- Other mechanism as defined by signature policy
                   -- extension
                                              }

SigningCertTrustCondition ::=   SEQUENCE {
     signerTrustTrees              CertificateTrustTrees,
     signerRevReq                  CertRevReq
                                              }


TimestampTrustCondition ::= SEQUENCE {
    ttsCertificateTrustTrees    [0]             CertificateTrustTrees
                                                       OPTIONAL,
    ttsRevReq                   [1]             CertRevReq
                                                       OPTIONAL,
    ttsNameConstraints          [2]             NameConstraints
                                                       OPTIONAL,
    cautionPeriod                       [3]             DeltaTime
                                                       OPTIONAL,
    signatureTimestampDelay     [4]             DeltaTime
                                                      OPTIONAL }

DeltaTime ::= SEQUENCE {
        deltaSeconds    INTEGER,
        deltaMinutes    INTEGER,
        deltaHours      INTEGER,
        deltaDays       INTEGER }

AttributeTrustCondition ::= SEQUENCE {
        attributeMandated            BOOLEAN,
                               -- Attribute must be present
        howCertAttribute             HowCertAttribute,
        attrCertificateTrustTrees   [0] CertificateTrustTrees OPTIONAL,
        attrRevReq                  [1] CertRevReq            OPTIONAL,
        attributeConstraints        [2] AttributeConstraints  OPTIONAL }

HowCertAttribute ::= ENUMERATED {
        claimedAttribute        (0),
        certifiedAttribtes      (1),
        either                  (2) }

AttributeConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
        attributeTypeConstarints        [0] AttributeTypeConstraints
                                                       OPTIONAL,
        attributeValueConstarints       [1] AttributeValueConstraints
                                                       OPTIONAL }




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AttributeTypeConstraints ::= SEQUENCE OF AttributeType

AttributeValueConstraints ::= SEQUENCE OF AttributeTypeAndValue

AlgorithmConstraintSet ::= SEQUENCE {
                               -- Algorithm constrains on:
signerAlgorithmConstraints      [0]     AlgorithmConstraints OPTIONAL,
                                -- signer
eeCertAlgorithmConstraints      [1]     AlgorithmConstraints OPTIONAL,
                                -- issuer of end entity certs.
caCertAlgorithmConstraints      [2]     AlgorithmConstraints OPTIONAL,
                                -- issuer of CA certificates
aaCertAlgorithmConstraints      [3]     AlgorithmConstraints OPTIONAL,
                                -- Attribute Authority
tsaCertAlgorithmConstraints     [4]     AlgorithmConstraints OPTIONAL
                                -- Time-Stamping Authority
                                                         }

AlgorithmConstraints ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgAndLength

AlgAndLength ::= SEQUENCE {
        algID           OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        minKeyLength    INTEGER         OPTIONAL,
                               -- Minimum key length in bits
        other           SignPolExtensions OPTIONAL
                                                         }

SignPolExtensions ::= SEQUENCE OF SignPolExtn

SignPolExtn ::= SEQUENCE {
        extnID      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        extnValue   OCTET STRING  }

END                           -- ETS-ElectronicPolicies-97Syntax

















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Annex B (informative):

B.1  Signature Policy and Signature Validation Policy

   The definition of electronic signature mentions: "a commitment has
   been explicitly endorsed under a "Signature Policy", at a given time,
   by a signer under an identifier, e.g., a name or a pseudonym, and
   optionally a role."

   Electronic signatures are commonly applied within the context of a
   legal or contractual framework.  This establishes the requirements on
   the electronic signatures and any special semantics (e.g., agreement,
   intent).  These requirements may be defined in very general abstract
   terms or in terms of detailed rules.  The specific semantics
   associated with an electronic signature implied by a legal or
   contractual framework are outside the scope of this document.

   If the signature policy is recognized, within the legal/contractual
   context, as providing commitment, then the signer explicitly agrees
   with terms and conditions which are implicitly or explicitly part of
   the signed data.

   When two independent parties want to evaluate an electronic
   signature, it is fundamental that they get the same result.  It is
   therefore important that the conditions agreed by the signer at the
   time of signing are indicated to the verifier and any arbitrator.  An
   aspect that enables this to be known by all parties is the signature
   policy. The technical implications of the signature policy on the
   electronic signature with all the validation data are called the
   "Signature Validation Policy".  The signature validation policy
   specifies the rules used to validate the signature.

   This document does not mandate the form and encoding of the
   specification of the signature policy.  However, for a given
   signature policy there must be one definitive form that has a unique
   binary encoded value.

   This document includes, as an option, a formal structure for
   signature validation policy based on the use of Abstract Syntax
   Notation 1 (ASN.1).

   Given the specification of the signature policy and its hash value an
   implementation of a verification process must obey the rules defined
   in the specification.

   This document places no restriction on how it should be implemented.
   Provide the implementation conforms to the conformance requirements
   as define in section 5 implementation options include:



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   A validation process that supports a specific signature policy as
   identified by the signature policy OID.  Such an implementation
   should conform to a human readable description provided all the
   processing rules of the signature policy are clearly defined.
   However, if additional policies need to be supported, then such an
   implementation would need to be customized for each additional
   policy.  This type of implementation may be simpler to implement
   initially, but can be difficult to enhance to support numerous
   additional signature policies.

   A validation process that is dynamically programmable and able to
   adapt its validation rules in accordance with a description of the
   signature policy provided in a computer-processable language.  This
   present document defines such a policy using an ASN.1 structure (see
   6.1).  This type of implementation could support multiple signature
   policies without being modified every time, provided all the
   validation rules specified as part of the signature policy are known
   by the implementation.  (i.e., only requires modification if there
   are additional rules specified).

   The precise content of a signature policy is not mandated by the
   current document.  However, a signature policy must be sufficiently
   definitive to avoid any ambiguity as to its implementation
   requirements.  It must be absolutely clear under which conditions an
   electronic signature should be accepted.  For this reason, it should
   contain the following information:

   *  General information about the signature policy which includes:
      -  a unique identifier of the policy;
      -  the name of the issuer of the policy;
      -  the date the policy was issued;
      -  the field of application of the policy.

   *  The signature verification policy which includes:
      -  the signing period,
      -  a list of recognized commitment types;
      -  rules for Use of Certification Authorities;
      -  rules for Use of Revocation Status Information;
      -  rules for Use of Roles;
      -  rules for use of Time-Stamping and Timing;
      -  signature verification data to be provided by the
         signer/collected by verifier;
      -  any constraints on signature algorithms and key lengths.
   *  Other signature policy rules required to meet the objectives of
      the signature.

   Variations of the validation policy rules may apply to different
   commitment types.



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B.2  Identification of Signature Policy

   When data is signed the signer indicates the signature policy
   applicable to that electronic signature by including an object
   identifier for the signature policy with the signature.  The signer
   and verifier must apply the rules specified by the identified policy.
   In addition to the identifier of the signature policy the signer must
   include the hash of the signature policy, so it can be verified that
   the policy selected by the signer is the identical to the one being
   used the verifier.

   A signature policy may be qualified by additional information.  This
   can includes:

      *  A URL where a copy of the Signature Policy may be obtained;
      *  A user notice that should be displayed when the signature is
         verified;

   If no signature policy is identified then the signature may be
   assumed to have been generated/verified without any policy
   constraints, and hence may be given no specific legal or contractual
   significance through the context of a signature policy.

   A "Signature Policy" will be identifiable by an OID (Object
   Identifier) and verifiable using a hash of the signature policy.

B.3  General Signature Policy Information

   General information should be recorded about the signature policy
   along with the definition of the rules which form the signature
   policy as described in subsequent subsections.  This should include:

      *  Policy Object Identifier: The "Signature Policy" will be
         identifiable by an OID (Object Identifier) whose last component
         (i.e., right most) is an integer that is specific to a
         particular version issued on the given date.
      *  Date of issue: When the "Signature Policy" was issued.
      *  Signature Policy Issuer name: An identifier for the body
         responsible for issuing the Signature Policy.  This may be used
         by the signer or verifying in deciding if a policy is to be
         trusted, in which case the signer/verifier must authenticate
         the origin of the signature policy as coming from the
         identified issuer.
      *  Signing period: The start time and date, optionally with an end
         time and date, for the period over which the signature policy
         may be used to generate electronic signatures.





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      *  Field of application: This defines in general terms the general
         legal/contract/application contexts in which the signature
         policy is to be used and the specific purposes for which the
         electronic signature is to be applied.

B.4  Recognized Commitment Types

   The signature validation policy may recognize one or more types of
   commitment as being supported by electronic signatures produced under
   the security policy.  If an electronic signature does not contain a
   recognized commitment type then the semantics of the electronic
   signature is dependent on the data being signed and the context in
   which it is being used.

   Only recognized commitment types are allowed in an electronic
   signature.

   The definition of a commitment type includes:

      *  the object identifier for the commitment;
      *  the contractual/legal/application context in which the
         signature may be used (e.g., submission of messages);
      *  a description of the support provided within the terms of the
         context (e.g., proof that the identified source submitted the
         message if the signature is created when message submission is
         initiated).

   The definition of a commitment type can be registered:

      *  as part of the validation policy;
      *  as part of the application/contract/legal environment;
      *  as part of generic register of definitions.

   The legal/contractual context will determine the rules applied to the
   signature, as defined by the signature policy and its recognized
   commitment types, make it fit for purpose intended.

B.5  Rules for Use of Certification Authorities

   The certificate validation process of the verifier, and hence the
   certificates that may be used by the signer for a valid electronic
   signature, may be constrained by the combination of the trust point
   and certificate path constraints in the signature validation policy.








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B.5.1  Trust Points

   The signature validation policy defines the certification authority
   trust points that are to be used for signature verification.  Several
   trust points may be specified under one signature policy.  Specific
   trust points may be specified for a particular type of commitment
   defined under the signature policy.  For a signature to be valid a
   certification path must exists between the Certification Authority
   that has granted the certificate selected by the signer (i.e., the
   used user-certificate) and one of the trust point of the "Signature
   Validation Policy".

B.5.2  Certification Path

   There may be constraints on the use of certificates issued by one or
   more CA(s) in the certificate chain and trust points.  The two prime
   constraints are certificate policy constraints and naming
   constraints:

      *  Certificate policy constraints limit the certification chain
         between the user certificate and the certificate of the trusted
         point to a given set of certificate policies, or equivalents
         identified through certificate policy mapping.
      *  The naming constraints limit the forms of names that the CA is
         allowed to certify.

   Name constraints are particularly important when a "Signature policy"
   identifies more than one trust point.  In this case, a certificate of
   a particular trusted point may only be used to verify signatures from
   users with names permitted under the name constraint.

   Certificate Authorities may be organized in a tree structure, this
   tree structure may represent the trust relationship between various
   CA(s) and the users CA.  Alternatively, a mesh relationship may exist
   where a combination of tree and peer cross-certificates may be used.
   The requirement of the certificate path in this document is that it
   provides the trust relationship between all the CAs and the signers
   user certificate.  The starting point from a verification point of
   view, is the "trust point".  A trust point is usually a CA that
   publishes self-certified certificates, is the starting point from
   which the verifier verifies the certificate chain.  Naming
   constraints may apply from the trust point, in which case they apply
   throughout the set of certificates that make up the certificate path
   down to the signer's user certificate.

   Policy constraints can be easier to process but to be effective
   require the presence of a certificate policy identifier in the
   certificates used in a certification path.



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   Certificate path processing, thus generally starts with one of the
   trust point from the signature policy and ends with the user
   certificate.  The certificate path processing procedures defined in
   RFC 2459 section 6 identifies the following initial parameters that
   are selected by the verifier in certificate path processing:

      *  acceptable certificate policies;
      *  naming constraints in terms of constrained and excluded naming
         subtree;
      *  requirements for explicit certificate policy indication and
         whether certificate policy mapping are allowed;
      *  restrictions on the certificate path length.

   The signature validation policy identifies constraints on these
   parameters.

B.6  Revocation Rules

   The signature policy should defines rules specifying requirements for
   the use of certificate revocation lists (CRLs) and/or on-line
   certificate status check service to check the validity of a
   certificate. These rules specify the mandated minimum checks that
   must be carried out.

   It is expected that in many cases either check may be selected with
   CRLs checks being carried out for certificate status that are
   unavailable from OCSP servers.  The verifier may take into account
   information in the certificate in deciding how best to check the
   revocation status (e.g., a certificate extension field about
   authority information access or a CRL distribution point) provided
   that it does not conflict with the signature policy revocation rules.

B.7  Rules for the Use of Roles

   Roles can be supported as claimed roles or as certified roles using
   Attribute Certificates.

B.7.1  Attribute Values

   When signature under a role is mandated by the signature policy, then
   either Attribute Certificates may be used or the signer may provide a
   claimed role attribute.  The acceptable attribute types or values may
   be dependent on the type of commitment.  For example, a user may have
   several roles that allow the user to sign data that imply commitments
   based on one or more of his roles.






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B.7.2  Trust Points for Certified Attributes

   When a signature under a certified role is mandated by the signature
   policy, Attribute Authorities are used and need to be validated as
   part of the overall validation of the electronic signature.  The
   trust points for Attribute Authorities do not need to be the same as
   the trust points to evaluate a certificate from the CA of the signer.
   Thus the trust point for verifying roles need not be the same as
   trust point used to validate the certificate path of the user's key.

   Naming and certification policy constraints may apply to the AA in
   similar circumstance to when they apply to CA.  Constraints on the AA
   and CA need not be exactly the same.

   AA(s) may be used when a signer is creating a signature on behalf of
   an organization, they can be particularly useful when the signature
   represents an organizational role.  AA(s) may or may not be the same
   authority as CA(s).

   Thus, the Signature Policy identifies trust points that can be used
   for Attribute Authorities, either by reference to the same trust
   points as used for Certification Authorities, or by an independent
   list.

B.7.3  Certification Path for Certified Attributes

   Attribute Authorities may be organized in a tree structure in similar
   way to CA where the AAs are the leafs of such a tree.  Naming and
   other constraints may be required on attribute certificate paths in a
   similar manner to other electronic signature certificate paths.

   Thus, the Signature Policy identify constraints on the following
   parameters used as input to the certificate path processing:

      *  acceptable certificate policies, including requirements for
         explicit certificate policy indication and whether certificate
         policy mapping is allowed;
      *  naming constraints in terms of constrained and excluded naming
         subtrees;
      *  restrictions on the certificate path length.

B.8  Rules for the Use of Time-Stamping and Timing

   The following rules should be used when specifying, constraints on
   the certificate paths for time-stamping authorities, constraints on
   the time-stamping authority names and general timing constraints.





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B.8.1  Trust Points and Certificate Paths

   Signature keys from time-stamping authorities will need to be
   supported by a certification path.  The certification path used for
   time-stamping authorities requires a trustpoint and possibly path
   constraints in the same way that the certificate path for the
   signer's key.

B.8.2  Time-Stamping Authority Names

   Restrictions may need to be placed by the validation policy on the
   named entities that may act a time-stamping authorities.

B.8.3  Timing Constraints - Caution Period

   Before an electronic signature may really be valid, the verifier has
   to be sure that the holder of the private key was really the only one
   in possession of key at the time of signing.  However, there is an
   inevitable delay between a compromise or loss of key being noted, and
   a report of revocation being distributed.  To allow greater
   confidence in the validity of a signature, a "cautionary period" may
   be identified before a signature may be said to be valid with high
   confidence.  A verifier may revalidate a signature after this
   cautionary signature, or wait for this period before validating a
   signature.

   The validation policy may specify such a cautionary period.

B.8.4  Timing Constraints - Time-Stamp Delay

   There will be some delay between the time that a signature is created
   and the time the signer's digital signature is time-stamped.
   However, the longer this elapsed period the greater the risk of the
   signature being invalidated due to compromise or deliberate
   revocation of its private signing key by the signer.  Thus the
   signature policy should specify a maximum acceptable delay between
   the signing time as claimed by the signer and the time included
   within the time-stamp.

B.9  Rules for Verification Data to be followed

   By specifying the requirements on the signer and verifier the
   responsibilities of the two parties can be clearly defined to
   establish all the necessary information.







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   These verification data rules should include:

      *  requirements on the signer to provide given signed attributes;
      *  requirements on the verifier to obtain additional certificates,
         CRLs, results of on line certificate status checks and to use
         time-stamps (if no already provided by the signer).

B.10  Rules for Algorithm Constraints and Key Lengths

   The signature validation policy may identify a set of signing
   algorithms (hashing, public key, combinations) and minimum key
   lengths that may be used:

      *  by the signer in creating the signature;
      *  in end entity public key Certificates;
      *  CA Certificates;
      *  attribute Certificates;
      *  by the time-stamping authority.

B.11  Other Signature Policy Rules

   The signature policy may specify additional policy rules, for example
   rules that relate to the environment used by the signer.  These
   additional rules may be defined in computer processable and/or human
   readable form.

B.12  Signature Policy Protection

   When signer or verifier obtains a copy of the Signature Policy from
   an issuer, the source should be authenticated (for example by using
   electronic signatures).  When the signer references a signature
   policy the Object Identifier (OID) of the policy, the hash value and
   the hash algorithm OID of that policy must be included in the
   Electronic Signature.

   It is a mandatory requirement of this present document that the
   signature policy value computes to one, and only one hash value using
   the specified hash algorithm.  This means that there must be a single
   binary value of the encoded form of the signature policy for the
   unique hash value to be calculated.  For example, there may exist a
   particular file type, length and format on which the hash value is
   calculated which is fixed and definitive for a particular signature
   policy.








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   The hash value may be obtained by:

      the signer performing his own computation of the hash over the
      signature policy using his preferred hash algorithm permitted by
      the signature policy, and the definitive binary encoded form.

      the signer, having verified the source of the policy, may use both
      the hash algorithm and the hash value included in the computer
      processable form of the policy (see section 6.1).










































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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
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   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
   English.

   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
   BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.



















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