path: root/doc/rfc/rfc3126.txt

Network Working Group                                          D. Pinkas
Request for Comments: 3126                                      Integris
Category: Informational                                          J. Ross
                                                                 N. Pope
                                                    Security & Standards
                                                          September 2001


                      Electronic Signature Formats
                  for long term electronic signatures

Status of this Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
   memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document defines the format of an electronic signature that can
   remain valid over long periods.  This includes evidence as to its
   validity even if the signer or verifying party later attempts to deny
   (i.e., repudiates the validity of the signature).

   The format can be considered as an extension to RFC 2630 and RFC
   2634, where, when appropriate additional signed and unsigned
   attributes have been defined.

   The contents of this Informational RFC is technically equivalent to
   ETSI TS 101 733 V.1.2.2. The ETSI TS is under the ETSI Copyright (C).
   Individual copies of this ETSI deliverable can be downloaded from
   http://www.etsi.org















Pinkas, et al.               Informational                      [Page 1]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction                                                    4
   2  Overview                                                         5
   2.1  Aim                                                            5
   2.2  Basis of Present Document                                      5
   2.3  Major Parties                                                  6
   2.4  Electronic Signatures and Validation Data                      7
   2.5  Forms of Validation Data                                       8
   2.6  Extended Forms of Validation Data                             11
   2.7  Archive Validation Data                                       13
   2.8  Arbitration                                                   15
   2.9  Validation Process                                            15
   2.10  Example Validation Sequence                                  16
   2.11  Additional optional features                                 21
   3. Data structure of an Electronic Signature                       22
   3.1  General Syntax                                                22
   3.2  Data Content Type                                             22
   3.3  Signed-data Content Type                                      22
   3.4  SignedData Type                                               22
   3.5  EncapsulatedContentInfo Type                                  23
   3.6  SignerInfo Type                                               23
   3.6.1  Message Digest Calculation Process                          23
   3.6.2  Message Signature Generation Process                        24
   3.6.3  Message Signature Verification Process                      24
   3.7  CMS Imported Mandatory Present Attributes                     24
   3.7.1  Content Type                                                24
   3.7.2  Message Digest                                              24
   3.7.3  Signing Time                                                24
   3.8  Alternative Signing Certificate Attributes                    24
   3.8.1  ESS Signing Certificate Attribute Definition                25
   3.8.2  Other Signing Certificate Attribute Definition              25
   3.9  Additional Mandatory Attributes                               26
   3.9.1  Signature policy Identifier                                 26
   3.10  CMS Imported Optional Attributes                             28
   3.10.1  Countersignature                                           29
   3.11  ESS Imported Optional Attributes                             29
   3.11.1  Content Reference Attribute                                29
   3.11.2  Content Identifier Attribute                               29
   3.11.3  Content Hints Attribute                                    29
   3.12   Additional Optional Attributes                              30
   3.12.1  Commitment Type Indication Attribute                       30
   3.12.2  Signer Location attribute                                  32
   3.12.3  Signer Attributes attribute                                33
   3.12.4  Content Time-Stamp attribute                               34
   3.13  Support for Multiple Signatures                              34
   3.13.1  Independent Signatures                                     34
   3.13.2  Embedded Signatures                                        34



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                      [Page 2]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   4.  Validation Data                                                35
   4.1  Electronic Signature Time-Stamp                               36
   4.1.1  Signature Time-Stamp Attribute Definition                   36
   4.2  Complete Validation Data                                      37
   4.2.1  Complete Certificate Refs Attribute Definition              38
   4.2.2  Complete Revocation Refs Attribute Definition               38
   4.3  Extended Validation Data                                      40
   4.3.1  Certificate Values Attribute Definition                     40
   4.3.2  Revocation Values Attribute Definition                      41
   4.3.3  ES-C Time-Stamp Attribute Definition                        42
   4.3.4  Time-Stamped Certificates and CRLs Attribute Definition     42
   4.4  Archive Validation Data                                       43
   4.4.1  Archive Time-Stamp Attribute Definition                     43
   5.  Security Considerations                                        44
   5.1  Protection of Private Key                                     44
   5.2  Choice of Algorithms                                          44
   6.  Conformance Requirements                                       45
   6.1  Signer                                                        45
   6.2  Verifier using time-stamping                                  46
   6.3  Verifier using secure records                                 46
   7. References                                                      47
   8. Authors' Addresses                                              48
   Annex A (normative): ASN.1 Definitions                             49
   A.1  Definitions Using X.208 (1988) ASN.1 Syntax                   49
   A.2  Definitions Using X.680 1997 ASN.1 Syntax                     57
   Annex B (informative): General Description                         66
   B.1  The Signature Policy                                          66
   B.2  Signed Information                                            67
   B.3  Components of an Electronic Signature                         68
   B.3.1  Reference to the Signature Policy                           68
   B.3.2  Commitment Type Indication                                  69
   B.3.3  Certificate Identifier from the Signer                      69
   B.3.4.  Role Attributes                                            70
   B.3.4.1  Claimed Role                                              71
   B.3.4.2  Certified Role                                            71
   B.3.5  Signer Location                                             72
   B.3.6  Signing Time                                                72
   B.3.7  Content Format                                              73
   B.4  Components of Validation Data                                 73
   B.4.1  Revocation Status Information                               73
   B.4.2  CRL Information                                             74
   B.4.3  OCSP Information                                            74
   B.4.4  Certification Path                                          75
   B.4.5  Time-Stamping for Long Life of Signature                    76
   B.4.6  Time-Stamping before CA Key Compromises                     77
   B.4.6.1  Time-Stamping the ES with Complete validation data        77
   B.4.6.2  Time-Stamping Certificates and Revocation Information     78
   B.4.7  Time-Stamping for Long Life of Signature                    79



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                      [Page 3]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   B.4.8  Reference to Additional Data                                80
   B.4.9  Time-Stamping for Mutual Recognition                        80
   B.4.10  TSA Key Compromise                                         81
   B.5  Multiple Signatures                                           81
   Annex C (informative):  Identifiers and roles                      82
   C.1  Signer Name Forms                                             82
   C.2  TSP Name Forms                                                82
   C.3  Roles and Signer Attributes                                   83
   Full Copyright Statement                                           84

1.  Introduction

   This document is intended to cover electronic signatures for various
   types of transactions, including business transactions (e.g.,
   purchase requisition, contract, and invoice applications) where long
   term validity of such signatures is important.  This includes
   evidence as to its validity even if the signer or verifying party
   later attempts to deny (i.e., repudiates, see [ISONR]) the validity
   of the signature).

   Electronic signatures can be used for any transaction between an
   individual and a company, between two companies, between an
   individual and a governmental body, etc.  This document is
   independent of any environment.  It can be applied to any environment
   e.g., smart cards, GSM SIM cards, special programs for electronic
   signatures etc.

   An electronic signature produced in accordance with this document
   provides evidence that can be processed to get confidence that some
   commitment has been explicitly endorsed under a signature policy, at
   a given time, by a signer under an identifier, e.g., a name or a
   pseudonym, and optionally a role.

   The European Directive on a community framework for Electronic
   Signatures defines an electronic signature as: "data in electronic
   form which is attached to or logically associated with other
   electronic data and which serves as a method of authentication".  An
   electronic signature as used in the current document is a form of
   advanced electronic signature as defined in the Directive.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
   "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document (in uppercase,
   as shown) are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].








Pinkas, et al.               Informational                      [Page 4]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


2  Overview

2.1  Aim

   The aim of this document is to define an Electronic Signature (ES)
   that remains valid over long periods.  This includes evidence as to
   its validity even if the signer or verifying party later attempts to
   deny (repudiates) the validity of the signature.

   This document specifies the use of trusted service providers (e.g.,
   Time-Stamping Authorities (TSA)), and the data that needs to be
   archived (e.g., cross certificates and revocation lists) to meet the
   requirements of long term electronic signatures.  An electronic
   signature defined by this document can be used for arbitration in
   case of a dispute between the signer and verifier, which may occur at
   some later time, even years later.  This document uses a signature
   policy, referenced by the signer, as the basis for establishing the
   validity of an electronic signature.

2.2  Basis of Present Document

   This document is based on the use of public key cryptography to
   produce digital signatures, supported by public key certificates.

   A Public key certificate is a public keys of a user, together with
   some other information, rendered unforgeable by encipherment with the
   private key of the Certification Authority (CA) which issued it
   (ITU-T Recommendation X.509 [1]).

   This document also specifies the uses of time-stamping services to
   prove the validity of a signature long after the normal lifetime of
   critical elements of an electronic signature and to support non-
   repudiation.  It also, as an option, defines the use of additional
   time-stamps to provide very long-term protection against key
   compromise or weakened algorithms.

   This document builds on existing standards that are widely adopted.
   This includes:

      *  RFC 2459 [RFC2459] Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
         Certificate and CRL Profile (PKIX);
      *  RFC 2630 [CMS] Crytographic Message Syntax (CMS);
      *  RFC 2634 [ESS] Enhanced Security Services (ESS);
      *  RFC 2439 [OCSP] One-line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP);
      *  ITU-T Recommendation X.509 [1] Authentication framework;
      *  RFC (to be published) [TSP] PKIX Time Stamping protocol (TSP).

   NOTE:  See clause 8 for a full set of references.



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                      [Page 5]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


2.3  Major Parties

   The following are the major parties involved in a business
   transaction supported by electronic signatures as defined in this
   document:

      *  the Signer;
      *  the Verifier;
      *  the Arbitrator;
      *  Trusted Service Providers (TSP).

   A Signer is an entity that initially creates the electronic
   signature. When the signer digitally signs over data using the
   prescribed format, this represents a commitment on behalf of the
   signing entity to the data being signed.

   A verifier is an entity that verifies an evidence.  (ISO/IEC 13888-1
   [13]).  Within the context of this document this is an entity that
   validates an electronic signature.
   An arbitrator, is an entity which arbitrates disputes between a
   signer and a verifier when there is a disagreement on the validity of
   a digital signature.

   Trusted Service Providers (TSPs) are one or more entities that help
   to build trust relationships between the signer and verifier.  Use of
   some specific TSP services MAY be mandated by signature policy.  TSP
   supporting services may provide the following information: user
   certificates, cross-certificates, time-stamping tokens, CRLs, ARLs,
   OCSP responses.

   The following TSPs are used to support the validation or the
   verification of electronic signatures:

      *  Certification Authorities;
      *  Registration Authorities;
      *  Repository Authorities (e.g., a Directory);
      *  Time-Stamping Authorities;
      *  One-line Certificate Status Protocol responders;
      *  Attribute Authorities;
      *  Signature Policy Issuers.

   Certification Authorities provide users with public key certificates.

   Registration Authorities allows the registration of entities before a
   CA generates certificates.






Pinkas, et al.               Informational                      [Page 6]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   Repository Authorities publish CRLs issued by CAs, cross-certificates
   (i.e., CA certificates) issued by CAs, signature policies issued by
   Signature Policy Issuers and optionally public key certificates
   (i.e., leaf certificates) issued by CAs.

   Time-Stamping Authorities attest that some data was formed before a
   given trusted time.

   One-line Certificate Status Protocol responders (OSCP responders)
   provide information about the status (i.e., revoked, not revoked,
   unknown) of a particular certificate.

   A Signature Policy Issuer issues signatures policies that define the
   technical and procedural requirements for electronic signature
   creation, validation and verification, in order to meet a particular
   business need.

   Attributes Authorities provide users with attributes linked to public
   key certificates

2.4  Electronic Signatures and Validation Data

   Validation of an electronic signature in accordance with this
   document requires:

      *  The electronic signature; this includes:

         -  the signature policy;
         -  the signed user data;
         -  the digital signature;
         -  other signed attributes provided by the signer;
         -  other unsigned attributes provided by the signer.

   Validation data which is the additional data needed to validate the
   electronic signature; this includes:

         -  certificates references;
         -  certificates;
         -  revocation status information references;
         -  revocation status information;
         -  time-stamps from Time Stamping Authorities (TSAs).

      *  The signature policy specifies the technical requirements on
         signature creation and validation in order to meet a particular
         business need.  A given legal/contractual context may recognize
         a particular signature policy as meeting its requirements.





Pinkas, et al.               Informational                      [Page 7]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   For example: a specific signature policy may be recognized by court
   of law as meeting the requirements of the European Directive for
   electronic commerce.  A signature policy may be written using a
   formal notation like ASN.1 or in an informal free text form provided
   the rules of the policy are clearly identified.  However, for a given
   signature policy there shall be one definitive form which has a
   unique binary encoded value.

   Signed user data is the user's data that is signed.

   The Digital Signature is the digital signature applied over the
   following attributes provided by the signer:

      *  hash of the user data (message digest);
      *  signature Policy Identifier;
      *  other signed attributes

   The other signed attributes include any additional information which
   must be signed to conform to the signature policy or this document
   (e.g., signing time).

   According to the requirements of a specific signature policy in use,
   various Validation Data shall be collected and attached to or
   associated with the signature structure by the signer and/or the
   verifier.  The validation data includes CA certificates as well as
   revocation status information in the form of certificate revocation
   lists (CRLs) or certificate status information provided by an on-line
   service.  Additional data also includes time-stamps and other time
   related data used to provide evidence of the timing of given events.
   It is required, as a minimum, that either the signer or verifier
   obtains a time-stamp over the signer's signature or a secure time
   record of the electronic signature must be maintained.  Such secure
   records must not be undetectably modified and must record the time
   close to when the signature was first validated.

2.5  Forms of Validation Data

   An electronic signature may exist in many forms including:

      *  the Electronic Signature (ES), which includes the digital
         signature and other basic information provided by the signer;

      *  the ES with Time-Stamp (ES-T), which adds a time-stamp to the
         Electronic Signature, to take initial steps towards providing
         long term validity;






Pinkas, et al.               Informational                      [Page 8]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


      *  the ES with Complete validation data (ES-C), which adds to the
         ES-T references to the complete set of data supporting the
         validity of the electronic signature (i.e., revocation status
         information).

   The signer must provide at least the ES form, but in some cases may
   decide to provide the ES-T form and in the extreme case could provide
   the ES-C form.  If the signer does not provide ES-T, the verifier
   must either create the ES-T on first receipt of an electronic
   signature or shall keep a secure time record of the ES.  Either of
   these two approaches provide independent evidence of the existence of
   the signature at the time it was first verified which should be near
   the time it was created, and so protects against later repudiation of
   the existence of the signature.  If the signer does not provide ES-C
   the verifier must create the ES-C when the complete set of revocation
   and other validation data is available.

   The ES satisfies the legal requirements for electronic signatures as
   defined in the European Directive on electronic signatures, see Annex
   C for further discussion on relationship of this document to the
   Directive.  It provides basic authentication and integrity protection
   and can be created without accessing on-line (time-stamping)
   services. However, without the addition of a time-stamp or a secure
   time record the electronic signature does not protect against the
   threat that the signer later denies having created the electronic
   signature (i.e., does not provide non-repudiation of its existence).

   The ES-T time-stamp or time record should be created close to the
   time that ES was created to provide protection against repudiation.
   At this time all the data needed to complete the validation may not
   be available but what information is readily available may be used to
   carry out some of the initial checks.  For example, only part of the
   revocation information may be available for verification at that
   point in time.  Generally, the ES-C form cannot be created at the
   same time as the ES, as it is necessary to allow time for any
   revocation information to be captured.  Also, if a certificate is
   found to be temporarily suspended, it will be necessary to wait until
   the end of the suspension period.

   The signer should only create the ES-C in situations where it was
   prepared to wait for a sufficient length of time after creating the
   ES form before dispatching the ES-C.  This, however, has the
   advantage that the verifier can be presented with the complete set of
   data supporting the validity of the ES.

   Support for ES-C by the verifier is mandated (see clause 6 for
   specific conformance requirements).




Pinkas, et al.               Informational                      [Page 9]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   An Electronic Signature (ES), with the additional validation data
   forming the ES-T and ES-C is illustrated in Figure 1:

+------------------------------------------------------------ES-C-----+
|+--------------------------------------------ES-T-----+              |
||+------Elect.Signature (ES)----------+ +------------+| +-----------+|
|||+---------+ +----------+ +---------+| |Time-Stamp  || |Complete   ||
||||Signature| |  Other   | | Digital || |over digital|| |certificate||
||||Policy ID| |  Signed  | |Signature|| |signature   || |and        ||
||||         | |Attributes| |         || +------------+| |revocation ||
|||+---------+ +----------+ +---------+|               | |references ||
||+------------------------------------+               | +-----------+|
|+-----------------------------------------------------+              |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+

         Figure 1: Illustration of an ES, ES-T and ES-C

   The verifiers conformance requirements of an ES with a time-stamp of
   the digital signature is defined in subclause 6.2.

   The ES on its own satisfies the legal requirements for electronic
   signatures as defined in the European Directive on electronic
   signatures.  The signers conformance requirements of an ES are
   defined in subclause 6.1, and are met using a structure as indicated
   in figure 2:

               +------Elect.Signature (ES)-----------|
               |+---------+ +----------+ +---------+ |
               ||Signature| |  Other   | | Digital | |
               ||Policy ID| |  Signed  | |Signature| |
               ||         | |Attributes| |         | |
               |+---------+ +----------+ +---------+ |
               |+-----------------------------------+|

                  Figure 2: Illustration of an ES
















Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 10]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   Where there are requirements for long term signatures without time-
   stamping the digital signature, then a secure record is needed of the
   time of verification in association with the electronic signature
   (i.e., both must be securely recorded).  In addition the certificates
   and revocation information used at the time of verification should to
   be recorded as indicated in figure 3 as an ES-C(bis).

   +-------------------------------------------------------ES-C-----+
   |                                                                |
   | +------Elect.Signature (ES)----------+|           +-----------+|
   | |+---------+ +----------+ +---------+||           |Complete   ||
   | ||Signature| |  Other   | | Digital |||           |certificate||
   | ||Policy ID| |  Signed  | |Signature|||           |and        ||
   | ||         | |Attributes| |         |||           |revocation ||
   | |+---------+ +----------+ +---------+||           |references ||
   | +------------------------------------+|           +-----------+|
   |                                                                |
   +----------------------------------------------------------------+

                Figure 3: Illustration of an ES-C(bis)

   The verifiers conformance requirements of an ES-C(bis) is defined in
   subclause 6.3.

   Note: A time-stamp attached to the electronic signature or a secure
   time record helps to protect the validity of the signature even if
   some of the verification data associated with the signature become
   compromised AFTER the signature was generated.  The time-stamp or a
   secure time record provides evidence that the signature was generated
   BEFORE the event of compromise; hence the signature will maintain its
   validity status.

2.6  Extended Forms of Validation Data

   The complete validation data (ES-C) described above may be extended
   to form an ES with eXtended validation data (ES-X) to meet following
   additional requirements.

   Firstly, when the verifier does not has access to,

      *  the signer's certificate,
      *  all the CA certificates that make up the full certification
         path,
      *  all the associated revocation status information, as referenced
         in the ES-C.






Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 11]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   then the values of these certificates and revocation information may
   be added to the ES-C.  This form of extended validation data is
   called a X-Long.

   Secondly, if there is a risk that any CA keys used in the certificate
   chain may be compromised, then it is necessary to additionally time-
   stamp the validation data by either:

      *  time-stamping all the validation data as held with the ES(ES-
         C), this eXtended validation data is called a Type 1 X-Time-
         Stamp; or
      *  time-stamping individual reference data as used for complete
         validation.

   This form of eXtended validation data is called a Type 2 X-Time-
   Stamp.

   NOTE:  The advantages/drawbacks for Type 1 and Type 2 X-Time-Stamp
   are discussed in this document (see clause B.4.6.)

   If all the above conditions occur then a combination of the two
   formats above may be used.  This form of eXtended validation data is
   called a X-Long-Time-Stamped.

   Support for the extended forms of validation data is optional.

   An Electronic Signature (ES) , with the additional validation data
   forming the ES-X long is illustrated in Figure 4:

  +-------------------------------------------------------- ES-X Long--+
  |+---------------------------------------- EC-C --------+            |
  ||+---- Elect.Signature (ES)----+             +--------+| +--------+ |
  |||+-------+-+-------+-+-------+| +----------+|Complete|| |Complete| |
  ||||Signa- | |Other  | |Digital|| |Time-Stamp||certi-  || |certi-  | |
  ||||ture   | |Signed | |Signa- || |over      ||ficate  || |ficate  | |
  ||||Policy | |Attri- | |ture   || |digital   ||and     || |and     | |
  ||||ID     | |butes  | |       || |signature ||revoc.  || |revoc.  | |
  |||+-------+ +-------+ +-------+| +----------+|refs    || |data    | |
  ||+-----------------------------+             +--------+| +--------+ |
  |+------------------------------------------------------+            |
  +--------------------------------------------------------------------+

          Figure 4: Illustration of an ES and ES-X long.








Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 12]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   An Electronic Signature (ES) , with the additional validation data
   forming the eXtended Validation Data - Type 1 is illustrated in
   Figure 5:

  +----------------------------------------------------------- ES-X 1 -+
  |+----------------------------------------- EC-C --------+           |
  || +---- Elect.Signature (ES)----+             +--------+| +-------+ |
  || |+-------+ +-------+ +-------+| +----------+|Complete|| |       | |
  || ||Signa- | |Other  | |Digital|| |Time-Stamp||certifi-|| | Time- | |
  || ||ture   | |Signed | |Signa- || |over      ||cate and|| | stamp | |
  || ||Policy | |Attri- | |ture   || |digital   ||revoc.  || | over  | |
  || ||ID     | |butes  | |       || |signature ||refs    || | CES   | |
  || |+-------+ +-------+ +-------+| +----------+|        || |       | |
  || +-----------------------------+             +--------+| +-------+ |
  |+-------------------------------------------------------+           |
  +--------------------------------------------------------------------+

          Figure 5: Illustration of ES with ES-X Type 1

   An Electronic Signature (ES) , with the additional validation data
   forming the eXtended Validation Data - Type 2 is illustrated in
   Figure 6:

  +--------------------------------------------------------- ES-X 2 ---+
  |+---------------------------------------- EC-C --------+            |
  ||+---- Elect.Signature (ES)----+             +--------+| +--------+ |
  |||+-------+ +-------+ +-------+| +----------+|Complete|| |Times   | |
  ||||Signa- | |Other  | |Digital|| |Time-Stamp||certs   || |Stamp   | |
  ||||ture   | |Signed | |Signa- || |over      ||and     || |over    | |
  ||||Policy | |Attri- | |ture   || |digital   ||revoc.  || |Complete| |
  ||||ID     | |butes  | |       || |signature ||refs    || |certs   | |
  |||+-------+ +-------+ +-------+| +----------+|        || |and     | |
  ||+-----------------------------+             +--------+| |revoc.  | |
  ||                                                      | |refs    | |
  |+------------------------------------------------------+ +--------+ |
  +--------------------------------------------------------------------+

          Figure 6: Illustration of ES with ES-X Type 2

2.7  Archive Validation Data

   Before the algorithms, keys and other cryptographic data used at the
   time the ES-C was built become weak and the cryptographic functions
   become vulnerable, or the certificates supporting previous time-
   stamps expires, the signed data, the ES-C and any additional
   information (ES-X) should be time-stamped.  If possible this should
   use stronger algorithms (or longer key lengths) than in the original
   time-stamp.



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 13]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   This additional data and time-stamp is called Archive Validation Data
   (ES-A).  The Time-Stamping process may be repeated every time the
   protection used to time-stamp a previous ES-A become weak.  An ES-A
   may thus bear multiple embedded time stamps.

   An example of an Electronic Signature (ES), with the additional
   validation data for the ES-C and ES-X forming the ES-A is illustrated
   in Figure 7.

         +-------------------------------- ES-A --------- ----------+
         |  +-------------------- ES-A -----------------+           |
         |  |  +--------- ES-X -------------- +         |           |
         |  |  |..............................| +-----+ |  +-----+  |
         |  |  |..............................| |Time | |  |Time |  |
         |  |  |..............................| |Stamp| |  |Stamp|  |
         |  |  |                              | +-----+ |  +-----+  |
         |  |  +----------------------------- +         |           |
         |  +-------------------------------------------+           |
         +----------------------------------------------------------+

                      Figure 7: Illustration of ES -A

   Support for ES-A is optional.




























Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 14]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


2.8  Arbitration

   The ES-C may be used for arbitration should there be a dispute
   between the signer and verifier, provided that:

      *  a copy of the signature policy referenced by the signer is
         available;

      *  the arbitrator knows where to retrieve the signer's certificate
         (if not already present), all the cross-certificates and the
         required CRLs and/or OCSPs responses referenced in the ES-C;

      *  none of the issuing key from the certificate chain have ever
         been compromised;

      *  the cryptography used at the time the ES-C was built has not
         been broken at the time the arbitration is performed.

   When the second condition is not met, then the plaintiff must provide
   an ES-X Long.

   When it is known by some external means that the third condition is
   not met, then the plaintiff must provide an ES-X Time-Stamped.

   When the two previous conditions are not met, the plaintiff must
   provide the two above information (i.e., an ES-X Time-Stamped and
   Long).

   When the last condition is not met, the plaintiff must provide an
   ES-A.

   It should be noticed that a verifier may need to get two time stamps
   at two different instants of time: one soon after the generation of
   the ES and one soon after some grace period allowing any entity from
   the certification chain to declare a key compromise.

2.9  Validation Process

   The Validation Process validates an electronic signature in
   accordance with the requirements of the signature policy.  The output
   status of the validation process can be:

      *  valid;
      *  invalid;
      *  incomplete verification.

   A Valid response indicates that the signature has passed verification
   and it complies with the signature validation policy.



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 15]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   A signature validation policy is a part of the signature policy which
   specifies the technical requirements on the signer in creating a
   signature and verifier when validating a signature.

   An Invalid response indicates that either the signature format is
   incorrect or that the digital signature value fails verification
   (e.g., the integrity checks on the digital signature value fails or
   any of the certificates on which the digital signature verification
   depends is known to be invalid or revoked).

   An Incomplete Validation response indicates that the format and
   digital signature verifications have not failed but there is
   insufficient information to determine if the electronic signature is
   valid under the signature policy.  This can include situations where
   additional information, which does not effect the validity of the
   digital signature value, may be available but is invalid.

   In the case of Incomplete Validation, it may be possible to request
   that the electronic signature be checked again at a later date when
   additional validation information might become available.  Also, in
   the case of incomplete validation, additional information may be made
   available to the application or user, thus allowing the application
   or user to decide what to do with partially correct electronic
   signatures.

   The validation process may also output validation data:

      *  a signature time-stamp;
      *  the complete validation data;
      *  the archive validation data.

2.10  Example Validation Sequence

   Figure 8, and subsequent description, describes how the validation
   process may build up a complete electronic signature over time.

   Soon after receiving the electronic signature (ES) from the signer
   (1), the digital signature value may be checked,  the validation
   process must at least add a time-stamp (2), unless the signer has
   provided one which is trusted by the verifier.  The validation
   process may also validate the electronic signature, as required under
   the identified signature policy, using additional data (e.g.,
   certificates, CRL, etc.) provided by trusted service providers.  If
   the validation process is not complete then the output from this
   stage is the ES-T.






Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 16]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   When all the additional data (e.g., the complete certificate and
   revocation information) necessary to validate the electronic
   signature first becomes available, then the validation process:

      *  obtains all the necessary additional certificate and revocation
         status information;

      *  completes all the validation checks on the ES, using the
         complete certificate and revocation information  (if a time-
         stamp is not already present, this may be added at the same
         stage combining ES-T and ES-C process);

      *  records the complete certificate and revocation references (3);

      *  indicates the validity status to the user (4).

         +----------------------------------------- ES-C ----------+
         |+----------------------------- ES-T --------+            |
         ||+--- Elect.Signature (ES) ----+            | +--------+ |
         |||+-------+ +-------+ +-------+|+----------+| |Complete| |
         ||||Signa- | |Other  | |Digital|||Time-Stamp|| |certifi-| |
         ||||ture   | |Signed | |Signa- |||over      || |cate and| |
         ||||Policy | |Attri- | |ture   |||digital   || |revoca- | |
         ||||ID     | |butes  | |       |||signature || |tion    | |
         |||+-------+ +-------+ +-------+|+----------+| |referen-| |
         ||+------------\----------------+    ^       | |ces     | |
         ||              \                    |       | +--------+ |
         ||               \ 1                /        |      ^     |
         |+----------------\----------------/---------+      |     |
         +------------------\--------------/--------------- /------+
                             \            /2    ----3------/
          +----------+        |          /     /
          | Signed   |\       v         /     |
          |User data | \     +--------------------+     +------------+
          +----------+  \--->| Validation Process |---> |- Valid     |
                             +---|--^-------|--^--+ 4   |- Invalid   |
                                 |  |       |  |        |- Validation|
                                 v  |       v  |        |  Incomplete|
                             +---------+ +--------+     +------------+
                             |Signature| |Trusted |
                             | Policy  | |Service |
                             | Issuer  | |Provider|
                             +---------+ +--------+

   Figure 8: Illustration of an ES with Complete validation data (ES-C)






Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 17]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   At the same time as the validation process creates the ES-C, the
   validation process may provide and/or record the values of
   certificates and revocation status information used in ES-C, called
   the ES-X Long (5).  This is illustrated in figure 9:

  +----------------------------------------------------- ES-X ---------+
  |+---------------------------------------- ES-C --------+ +--------+ |
  ||+--- Elect.Signature (ES) ----+            +--------+ | |Complete| |
  |||+-------+ +-------+ +-------+|+----------+|Complete| | |certifi-| |
  ||||Signa- | |Other  | |Digital|||Time-Stamp||certifi-| | |cate    | |
  ||||ture   | |Signed | |Signa- |||over      ||cate and| | |and     | |
  ||||Policy | |Attri- | |ture   |||digital   ||revoca- | | |revoca- | |
  ||||ID     | |butes  | |       |||signature ||tion    | | |tion    | |
  |||+-------+ +---|---+ +-------+|+----------+|referen-| | |Data    | |
  ||+--------------\--------------+    ^       |ces     | | +--------+ |
  ||                \                  |       +--------+ |      ^     |
  ||                 \ 1             2/           ^       |      |     |
  |+------------------\--------------/------------|-------+     /      |
  +--------------------\------------/------------/-------------/-------+
                        \          /    ---3----/             /
   +----------+          |        /    /   ------------5-----/
   | Signed   |\         v       |     |  /
   |User data | \     +--------------------+     +-----------+
   +----------+  \--->| Validation Process |---> | - Valid   |
                      +---|--^-------|--^--+ 4   | - Invalid |
                          |  |       |  |        +-----------+
                          v  |       v  |
                      +---------+ +--------+
                      |Signature| |Trusted |
                      | Policy  | |Service |
                      | Issuer  | |Provider|
                      +---------+ +--------+

    Figure 9: Illustration ES with eXtended validation data (Long)

   When the validation process creates the ES-C it may also create
   extended forms of validation data.  A first alternative is to time-
   stamp all data forming the Type 1 X-Time-Stamp (6).  This is
   illustrated in figure 10:












Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 18]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   +----------------------------------------------------- ES-X -------+
   |+---------------------------------------- ES-C --------+ +------+ |
   ||+--- Elect.Signature (ES) ----+            +--------+ | |Time- | |
   |||+-------+ +-------+ +-------+|+----------+|Complete| | |Stamp | |
   ||||Signa- | |Other  | |Digital|||Time-Stamp||certifi-| | |over  | |
   ||||ture   | |Signed | |Signa- |||over      ||cate and| | |CES   | |
   ||||Policy | |Attri- | |ture   |||digital   ||revoca- | | +------+ |
   ||||ID     | |butes  | |       |||signature ||tion    | |     ^    |
   |||+-------+ +--|----+ +-------+|+----------+|referen-| |     |    |
   ||+-------------|---------------+     ^      |ces     | |     |    |
   ||              |                     |      +--------+ |     |    |
   ||               \ 1                 2/         ^       |     |    |
   |+----------------\------------------/----------|-------+     |    |
   +------------------\----------------/-----------/-------------/----+
                       \              /   ----3---/             /
    +----------+        |            /   /  ---------------6---/
    | Signed   |\       v           |   |  /
    |User data | \     +--------------------+     +-----------+
    +----------+  \--->| Validation Process |---> | - Valid   |
                       +---|--^-------|--^--+ 4   | - Invalid |
                           |  |       |  |        +-----------+
                           v  |       v  |
                       +---------+ +--------+
                       |Signature| |Trusted |
                       | Policy  | |Service |
                       | Issuer  | |Provider|
                       +---------+ +--------+

      Figure 10: Illustration of ES with eXtended validation data -
                 Type 1 X-Time-Stamp





















Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 19]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   Another alternative is to time-stamp the certificate and revocation
   information references used to validate the electronic signature (but
   not the signature) (6'); this is called Type 2 X-Time-Stamped.  This
   is illustrated in figure 11:

  +----------------------------------------------------- ES-X -----------+
  |+---------------------------------------- ES-C --------+ +----------+ |
  ||+--- Elect.Signature (ES) ----+            +--------+ | |Time-Stamp| |
  |||+-------+ +-------+ +-------+|+----------+|Complete| | |over      | |
  ||||Signa- | |Other  | |Digital|||Time-Stamp||certifi-| | |Complete  | |
  ||||ture   | |Signed | |Signa- |||over      ||cate and| | |Certifi-  | |
  ||||Policy | |Attri- | |ture   |||digital   ||revoc.  | | |cate and  | |
  ||||ID     | |butes  | |       |||signature ||refs    | | |revoc.    | |
  |||+-------+ +---^---+ +-------+|+----^-----++---^----+ | |refs      | |
  ||+--------------\--------------+     |          |      | +----------+ |
  |+----------------\------------------/-----------|------+      ^       |
  +----------------1-\----------------/-----------/--------------|-------+
                      \              /  -----3---/               |
   +----------+        |           2/  /   ---------------6'-----/
   | Signed   |\       v           |  |   /
   |User data | \     +--------------------+     +-----------+
   +----------+  \--->| Validation Process |---> | - Valid   |
                      +---|--^-------|--^--+ 4   | - Invalid |
                          |  |       |  |        +-----------+
                          v  |       v  |
                      +---------+ +--------+
                      |Signature| |Trusted |
                      | Policy  | |Service |
                      | Issuer  | |Provider|
                      +---------+ +--------+

    Figure 11: Illustration of ES with eXtended validation data -
               Type 2 X-Time-Stamp

   Before the algorithms used in any of electronic signatures become or
   are likely, to be compromised or rendered vulnerable in the future,
   it is necessary to time-stamp the entire electronic signature,
   including all the values of the validation and user data as an ES
   with Archive validation data (ES-A)












Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 20]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   An ES-A is illustrated in figure 12:

-------------------------------------------- ES-A --------------------+
----------------------------------------------------------------+     |
+------------------------------- EC-C --------++-----+          |     |
|                                             ||Time-|          |     |
|+-- Elect.Signature (ES) -+        +--------+||Stamp|  +-------+     |
||+------++-------++-------|+------+|Complete|||over |  Complete|     |
|||Signa-||Other  ||Digital||Time- ||certifi-|||CES  |  |certi- |+----|
|||ture  ||Signed ||Signa- ||Stamp ||cate and||+-----+  |ficate |Arch-|
|||Policy||Attri- ||ture   ||over  ||revoca- ||+------+ |and    |ive  |
|||ID    ||butes  ||       ||digit.||tion    |||Time- | |revoca-|Time |
||+------++---|---++-------||signa-||referen-|||Stamp-| |tion   |stamp|
|+------------|------------+|ture  ||ces     |||over  | |data   |+----|
|             |             +------++--------+|Complete\+-------+  ^  |
|             |                ^         ^    ||cert.  |        |  |  |
+-------------|----------------|---------|----+|and rev|        |  |  |
               \               |         /     |refs.  |        |  |  |
                \              |        /      +-------+        |  |  |
-----------------\-------------|-------/------------------------+  |  |
+----------+      \            |      /                            /  |
| Signed   |       \2          |3    /     /--------------7-------/   |
|User data |        \          |    |     /                           |
+-------\--+         \         |    |    /                            |
---------\------------|--------|----|---/-----------------------------+
          \           v        |    |   |
          1\        +--------------------+     +-----------+
            \------>| Validation Process |---> | - Valid   |
                    +---|--^-------|--^--+ 4   | - Invalid |
                        |  |       |  |        +-----------+
                        v  |       v  |
                    +---------+ +--------+
                    |Signature| |Trusted |
                    | Policy  | |Service |
                    | Issuer  | |Provider|
                    +---------+ +--------+

   Figure 12: Illustration of an ES with Archive validation data (ES-A)

2.11  Additional optional features of an ES

   This document also defines additional optional features of an
   electronic signature to:

      *  indicate a commitment type being made by the signer;
      *  indicate the role under which a signature was created;
      *  support multiple signatures.




Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 21]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


3. Data structure of an Electronic Signature

   This clause uses and builds upon the Cryptographic Message Syntax
   (CMS), as defined in RFC 2630 [CMS], and Enhanced Security Services
   (ESS), as defined in RFC 2634 [ESS].  The overall structure of
   Electronic Signature is as defined in [CMS].  The Electronic
   Signature (ES) uses attributes defined in [CMS], [ESS] and this
   document.  This document defines in full the ES attributes which it
   uses and are not defined elsewhere.

   The mandated set of attributes and the digital signature value is
   defined as the minimum Electronic Signature (ES) required by this
   document.  A signature policy MAY mandate other signed attributes to
   be present.

3.1  General Syntax

   The general syntax of the ES is as defined in [CMS].

3.2  Data Content Type

   The data content type of the ES is as defined in [CMS].

   The data content type is intended to refer to arbitrary octet
   strings, such as ASCII text files; the interpretation is left to the
   application.  Such strings need not have any internal structure
   (although they could have their own ASN.1 definition or other
   structure).

3.3  Signed-data Content Type

   The Signed-data content type of the ES is as defined in [CMS].

   The signed-data content type consists of a content of any type and
   zero or more signature values.  Any number of signers in parallel can
   sign any type of content.  The typical application of the signed-data
   content type represents one signer's digital signature on content of
   the data content type.

   To make sure that the verifier uses the right certificate, this
   document mandates that the hash of the signers certificate is always
   included in the Signing Certificate signed attribute.

3.4  SignedData Type

   The syntax of the SignedData type of the ES is as defined in [CMS].





Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 22]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   The fields of type SignedData have the meanings defined [CMS] except
   that:

      *  version is the syntax version number.  The value of version
         must be 3.

      *  The identification of signer's certificate used to create the
         signature is always present as a signed attribute.

      *  The degenerate case where there are no signers is not valid in
         this document.

3.5  EncapsulatedContentInfo Type

   The syntax of the EncapsulatedContentInfo a type of the ES is as
   defined in [CMS].

   For the purpose of long term validation as defined by this document,
   it is advisable that either the eContent is present, or the data
   which is signed is archived in such as way as to preserve the any
   data encoding. It is important that the OCTET STRING used to generate
   the signature remains the same every time either the verifier or an
   arbitrator validates the signature.

   The degenerate case where there are no signers is not valid in this
   document.

3.6  SignerInfo Type

   The syntax of the SignerInfo a type of the ES is as defined in [CMS].

   Per-signer information is represented in the type SignerInfo.  In the
   case of multiple independent signatures, there is an instance of this
   field for each signer.

   The fields of type SignerInfo have the meanings defined in [CMS]
   except that signedAttributes must, as a minimum, contain the
   following attributes:

      *  ContentType as defined in clause 3.7.1.
      *  MessageDigest as defined in clause 3.7.2.
      *  SigningTime as defined in clause 3.7.3.
      *  SigningCertificate as defined in clause 3.8.1.
      *  SignaturePolicyId as defined in clause 3.9.1.

3.6.1  Message Digest Calculation Process

   The message digest calculation process is as defined in [CMS].



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 23]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


3.6.2  Message Signature Generation Process

   The input to the digital signature generation process is as defined
   in [CMS].

3.6.3  Message Signature Verification Process

   The procedures for CMS signed data validation are as defined in [CMS]
   and enhanced in this document.

   The input to the signature verification process includes the signer's
   public key verified as correct using either the ESS Signing
   Certificate attribute or the Other Signing Certificate attribute.

3.7  CMS Imported Mandatory Present Attributes

   The following attributes MUST be present with the signed-data defined
   by this document.  The attributes are defined in [CMS].

3.7.1  Content Type

   The syntax of the content-type attribute type of the ES is as defined
   in [CMS].

3.7.2  Message Digest

   The syntax of the message-digest attribute type of the ES is as
   defined in [CMS].

3.7.3  Signing Time

   The syntax of the message-digest attribute type of the ES is as
   defined in [CMS] and further qualified by this document.

   The signing-time attribute type specifies the time at which the
   signer claims to have performed the signing process.

   This present document recommends the use of GeneralizedTime.

3.8  Alternative Signing Certificate Attributes

   One, and only one, of the following two alternative attributes MUST
   be present with the signed-data defined by this document to identify
   the signing certificate.  Both attributes include an identifier and a
   hash of the signing certificate.  The first, which is adopted in
   existing standards, may be only used with the SHA-1 hashing
   algorithm.  The other shall be used when other hashing algorithms are
   to be supported.



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 24]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   The signing certificate attribute is designed to prevent the simple
   substitution and re-issue attacks, and to allow for a restricted set
   of authorization certificates to be used in verifying a signature.

3.8.1  ESS Signing Certificate Attribute Definition

   The syntax of the signing certificate attribute type of the ES is as
   defined in [ESS], and further qualified and profile in this document.

   The ESS signing certificate attribute must be a signed attribute.

   This document mandates the presence of this attribute as a signed CMS
   attribute, and the sequence must not be empty.  The certificate used
   to verify the signature must be identified in the sequence, the
   Signature Validation Policy may mandate other certificate references
   to be present, that may include all the certificates up to the point
   of trust.  The encoding of the ESSCertID for this certificate must
   include the issuerSerial field.

   The issuerAndSerialNumber present in the SignerInfo must be
   consistent with issuerSerial field.  The certificate identified must
   be used during the signature verification process.  If the hash of
   the certificate does not match the certificate used to verify the
   signature, the signature must be considered invalid.

   The sequence of policy information field is not used in this
   document.

   NOTE: Where an attribute certificate is used by the signer to
   associate a role, or other attributes of the signer, with the
   electronic signature this is placed in the Signer Attribute attribute
   as defined in clause 3.12.3.

3.8.2  Other Signing Certificate Attribute Definition

   The following attribute is identical to the ESS SigningCertificate
   defined above except that this attribute can be used with hashing
   algorithms other than SHA-1.

   This attribute must be used in the same manner as defined above for
   the ESS SigningCertificate attribute.

   The following object identifier identifies the signing certificate
   attribute:

   id-aa-ets-otherSigCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
       member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
       smime(16) id-aa(2) 19 }



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 25]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   The signing certificate attribute value has the ASN.1 syntax
   OtherSigningCertificate

   OtherSigningCertificate ::=  SEQUENCE {
       certs        SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID,
       policies     SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
                    -- NOT USED IN THIS DOCUMENT
   }

   OtherCertID ::= SEQUENCE {
        otherCertHash            OtherHash,
        issuerSerial             IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
   }

   OtherHash ::= CHOICE {
       sha1Hash OtherHashValue,  -- This contains a SHA-1 hash
       otherHash OtherHashAlgAndValue
   }

   OtherHashValue ::= OCTET STRING

   OtherHashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
     hashAlgorithm  AlgorithmIdentifier,
     hashValue      OtherHashValue
   }

3.9  Additional Mandatory Attributes

3.9.1  Signature policy Identifier

   This document mandates that a reference to the signature policy, is
   included in the signedData, this reference is either explicitly
   identified or implied by the semantics of the signed content and
   other external data.  A signature policy defines the rules for
   creation and validation of an electronic signature, is included as a
   signed attribute with every signature.  The signature policy
   identifier must be a signed attribute.

   The following object identifier identifies the signature policy
   identifier attribute:

   id-aa-ets-sigPolicyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
       member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
       smime(16) id-aa(2) 15 }

   Signature-policy-identifier attribute values have ASN.1 type
   SignaturePolicyIdentifier.




Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 26]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   SignaturePolicyIdentifier ::= CHOICE{
            SignaturePolicyId          SignaturePolicyId,
            SignaturePolicyImplied     SignaturePolicyImplied }


   SignaturePolicyId ::= SEQUENCE {
           sigPolicyIdentifier   SigPolicyId,
           sigPolicyHash         SigPolicyHash,
           sigPolicyQualifiers   SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                 SigPolicyQualifierInfo      OPTIONAL
                                                                    }

   SignaturePolicyImplied ::= NULL

   The presence of the NULL type indicates that the signature policy is
   implied by the semantics of the signed data and other external data.

   The sigPolicyId field contains an object-identifier which uniquely
   identifies a specific version of the signature policy.  The syntax of
   this field is as follows:

      SigPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   The sigPolicyHash field contains the identifier of the hash algorithm
   and the hash of the value of the signature policy.

   If the signature policy is defined using a computer processable
   notation like ASN.1, then the hash is calculated on the value without
   the outer type and length fields and the hashing algorithm must be as
   specified in the field signPolicyHshAlg.

   If the signature policy is defined using another structure, the type
   of structure and the hashing algorithm must be either specified as
   part of the signature policy, or indicated using a signature policy
   qualifier.

      SigPolicyHash ::= OtherHashAlgAndValue

   A signature policy identifier may be qualified with other information
   about the qualifier.  The semantics and syntax of the qualifier is as
   associated with the object-identifier in the sigPolicyQualifierId
   field.  The general syntax of this qualifier is as follows:

      SigPolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
           sigPolicyQualifierId  SigPolicyQualifierId,
           sigQualifier          ANY DEFINED BY sigPolicyQualifierId
   }




Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 27]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   This document specifies the following qualifiers:

      *  spuri: This contains the web URI or URL reference to the
         signature policy

      *  spUserNotice: This contains a user notice which should be
         displayed whenever the signature is validated.

   -- sigpolicyQualifierIds defined in this document

   SigPolicyQualifierId ::=  OBJECT IDENTIFIER

       id-spq-ets-uri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
       member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
       smime(16) id-spq(5) 1 }

      SPuri ::= IA5String

       id-spq-ets-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
       member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
       smime(16) id-spq(5) 2 }

      SPUserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {
           noticeRef        NoticeReference OPTIONAL,
           explicitText     DisplayText OPTIONAL
   }

      NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
           organization     DisplayText,
           noticeNumbers    SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
   }

      DisplayText ::= CHOICE {
           visibleString    VisibleString  (SIZE (1..200)),
           bmpString        BMPString      (SIZE (1..200)),
           utf8String       UTF8String     (SIZE (1..200))
   }

3.10  CMS Imported Optional Attributes

   The following attributes MAY be present with the signed-data defined
   by this document.  The attributes are defined in ref [CMS] and are
   imported into this specification and were appropriate qualified and
   profiling by this document.







Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 28]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


3.10.1  Countersignature

   The syntax of the countersignature attribute type of the ES is as
   defined in [CMS].  The countersignature attribute must be an unsigned
   attribute.

3.11  ESS Imported Optional Attributes

   The following attributes MAY be present with the signed-data defined
   by this document.  The attributes are defined in ref [ESS] and are
   imported into this specification and were appropriate qualified and
   profiling by this document.

3.11.1 Content Reference Attribute

   The content reference attribute is a link from one SignedData to
   another.  It may be used to link a reply to the original message to
   which it refers, or to incorporate by reference one SignedData into
   another.

   The content reference attribute MUST be used as defined in [ESS].
   The content reference MUST be a signed attribute.

   The syntax of the content reference attribute type of the ES is as
   defined in [ESS].

3.11.2  Content Identifier Attribute

   The content identifier attribute provides an identifier for the
   signed content for use when reference may be later required to that
   content, for example in the content reference attribute in other
   signed data sent later.

   The content identifier must be a signed attribute.

   The syntax of the content identifier attribute type of the ES is as
   defined in [ESS].

   The minimal signedContentIdentifier should contain a concatenation of
   user-specific identification information (such as a user name or
   public keying material identification information), a GeneralizedTime
   string, and a random number.

3.11.3  Content Hints Attribute

   The content hints attribute provides information that describes the
   format of the signed content.  It may be used by the signer to
   indicate to a verifier the precise format that MUST be used to



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 29]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   present the data (e.g., text, voice, video) to a verifier.  This
   attribute MUST be present when it is mandatory to present the signed
   data to human users on verification.

   The syntax of the content hints attribute type of the ES is as
   defined in ESS (RFC 2634, section 2.9 [9]).

   When used to indicate the precise format of the data to be presented
   to the user the following rules apply:

   The contentType (defined in RFC 2630 [8]) indicates the type of the
   associated content.  It is an object identifier (i.e., a unique
   string of integers) assigned by an authority that defines the content
   type.

   The UTF8String shall define the presentation format.  The format may
   be defined by MIME types as indicated below.

   Note 1: The contentType can be id-data defined in CMS (RFC 2630 [8]).
   The UTF8String can be used to indicate the encoding of the data, like
   MIME type.  RFC 2045 [25] provides a common structure for encoding a
   range of electronic documents and other multi-media types, see annex
   B for further information, a system supporting verification of
   electronic signature may present information to users in the form
   identified by the MIME type.

   id-data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
   rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 1 }

3.12   Additional Optional Attributes

3.12.1  Commitment Type Indication Attribute

   There may be situation were a signer wants to explicitly indicate to
   a verifier that by signing the data, it illustrates a type of
   commitment on behalf of the signer.  The commitmentTypeIndication
   attribute conveys such information.

   The commitmentTypeIndication attribute must be a signed attribute.

   The commitment type may be:

      *  defined as part of the signature policy, in which case the
         commitment type has precise semantics that is defined as part
         of the signature policy.






Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 30]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


      *  be a registered type, in which case the commitment type has
         precise semantics defined by registration, under the rules of
         the registration authority.  Such a registration authority may
         be a trading association or a legislative authority.

   The signature policy specifies a set of attributes that it
   "recognizes".  This "recognized" set includes all those commitment
   types defined as part of the signature policy as well as any
   externally defined commitment types that the policy may choose to
   recognize.  Only recognized commitment types are allowed in this
   field.

   The following object identifier identifies the commitment type
   indication attribute:

id-aa-ets-commitmentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 16}

Commitment-Type-Indication attribute values have ASN.1 type
CommitmentTypeIndication.

CommitmentTypeIndication ::= SEQUENCE {
   commitmentTypeId            CommitmentTypeIdentifier,
   commitmentTypeQualifier     SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                               CommitmentTypeQualifier      OPTIONAL
}

CommitmentTypeIdentifier ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

CommitmentTypeQualifier ::= SEQUENCE {
    commitmentTypeIdentifier   CommitmentTypeIdentifier,
    qualifier                  ANY DEFINED BY
                               commitmentTypeIdentifier
}

   The use of any qualifiers to the commitment type is outside the scope
   of this document.

   The following generic commitment types are defined in this document:

      id-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-
      body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
      cti(6) 1}

      id-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-
      body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
      cti(6) 2}




Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 31]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


      id-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
      member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
      smime(16) cti(6) 3}

      id-cti-ets-proofOfSender OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-
      body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
      cti(6) 4}

      id-cti-ets-proofOfApproval OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
      member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
      smime(16) cti(6) 5}

      id-cti-ets-proofOfCreation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
      member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
      smime(16) cti(6) 6}

   These generic commitment types have the following meaning:

   Proof of origin indicates that the signer recognizes to have created,
   approved and sent the message.

   Proof of receipt indicates that signer recognizes to have received
   the content of the message.

   Proof of delivery indicates that the TSP providing that indication
   has delivered a message in a local store accessible to the recipient
   of the message.

   Proof of sender indicates that the entity providing that indication
   has sent the message (but not necessarily created it).

   Proof of approval indicates that the signer has approved the content
   of the message.

   Proof of creation indicates that the signer has created the message
   (but not necessarily approved, nor sent it).

3.12.2  Signer Location attribute

   The signer-location attribute is an attribute which specifies a
   mnemonic for an address associated with the signer at a particular
   geographical (e.g., city) location.  The mnemonic is registered in
   the country in which the signer is located and is used in the
   provision of the Public Telegram Service (according to ITU-T
   Recommendation F.1 [PTS]).

   The signer-location attribute must be a signed attribute.




Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 32]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   The following object identifier identifies the signer-location
   attribute:

id-aa-ets-signerLocation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 17}

Signer-location attribute values have ASN.1 type SignerLocation.

   SignerLocation ::= SEQUENCE {
        -- at least one of the following must be present
      countryName          [0] DirectoryString      OPTIONAL,
        -- as used to name a Country in X.500
      localityName         [1] DirectoryString      OPTIONAL,
         -- as used to name a locality in X.500
      postalAdddress       [2] PostalAddress        OPTIONAL
}

   PostalAddress ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..6) OF DirectoryString

3.12.3  Signer Attributes attribute

   The signer-attributes attribute is an attribute which specifies
   additional attributes of the signer (e.g., role).

   It may be either:

      *  claimed attributes of the signer; or
      *  certified attributes of the signer;

   The signer-attributes attribute must be a signed attribute.

   The following object identifier identifies the signer-attribute
   attribute:

   id-aa-ets-signerAttr OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
       us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 18}

   signer-attribute attribute values have ASN.1 type SignerAttribute.

      SignerAttribute ::= SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
         claimedAttributes      [0]  ClaimedAttributes,
         certifiedAttributes    [1]  CertifiedAttributes
   }

   ClaimedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE OF Attribute

   CertifiedAttributes ::= AttributeCertificate
            -- as defined in X.509 : see section 10.3



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 33]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   NOTE:  The claimed and certified attribute are imported from ITU-T
   Recommendations X.501 [16] and ITU-T Recommendation X.509:Draft
   Amendment on Certificate Extensions, October 1999.

3.12.4  Content Time-Stamp attribute

   The content time-stamp attribute is an attribute which is the time-
   stamp of the signed data content before it is signed.

   The content time-stamp attribute must be a signed attribute.

   The following object identifier identifies the signer-attribute
   attribute:

      id-aa-ets-contentTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
      member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
      smime(16) id-aa(2) 20}

   Content time-stamp attribute values have ASN.1 type ContentTimestamp:
   ContentTimestamp::= TimeStampToken

   The value of messageImprint field within TimeStampToken must be a
   hash of the value of eContent field within encapContentInfo within
   the signedData.

   For further information and definition of TimeStampToken see [TSP].

3.13  Support for Multiple Signatures

3.13.1  Independent Signatures

   Multiple independent signatures are supported by independent
   SignerInfo from each signer.

   Each SignerInfo must include all the attributes required under this
   document and must be processed independently by the verifier.

3.13.2  Embedded Signatures

   Multiple embedded signatures are supported using the counter-
   signature unsigned attribute (see clause 3.10.1).  Each counter
   signature is carried in Countersignature held as an unsigned
   attribute to the SignerInfo to which the counter-signature is
   applied.







Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 34]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


4.  Validation Data

   This clause specifies the validation data structures which builds on
   the electronic signature specified in clause 3.  This includes:

      *  Time-Stamp applied to the electronic signature value.

      *  Complete validation data which comprises the time-stamp of the
         signature value, plus references to all the certificates and
         revocation information used for full validation of the
         electronic signature.

   The following optional eXtended forms of validation data are also
   defined:

      *  X-timestamp: There are two types of time-stamp used in extended
         validation data defined by this document.

         -  Type 1 -Time-Stamp which comprises a time-stamp over the ES
            with Complete validation data (ES-C).

         -  Type 2 X-Time-Stamp which comprises of a time-stamp over the
            certification path references and the revocation information
            references used to support the ES-C.

            *  X-Long: This comprises a  Complete validation data plus
               the actual values of all the certificates and revocation
               information used in the ES-C.

            *  X-Long-Time-Stamp: This comprises a Type 1 or Type 2 X-
               Timestamp plus the actual values of all the certificates
               and revocation information used in the ES-C.

   This clause also specifies the data structures used in Archive
   validation data:

      *  Archive validation data comprises a  Complete validation data,
         the certificate and revocation values (as in a X-Long
         validation data), any other existing X-timestamps, plus the
         Signed User data and an additional archive time-stamp over all
         that data.  An archive time-stamp may be repeatedly applied
         after long periods to maintain validity when electronic
         signature and timestamping algorithms weaken.

   The additional data required to create the forms of electronic
   signature identified above is carried as unsigned attributes
   associated with an individual signature by being placed in the




Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 35]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   unsignedAttrs field of SignerInfo.  Thus all the attributes defined
   in clause 4 are unsigned attributes.

   NOTE:  Where multiple signatures are to be supported, as described in
   clause 3.13, each signature has a separate SignerInfo.  Thus, each
   signature requires its own unsigned attribute values to create ES-T,
   ES-C etc.

4.1  Electronic Signature Timestamp

   An Electronic Signature with Timestamp is an Electronic Signature for
   which part, but not all, of the additional data required for
   validation is available (e.g., some certificates and revocation
   information is available but not all).

   The minimum structure Timestamp validation data is the Signature
   Timestamp Attribute as defined in clause 4.1.1 over the ES signature
   value.

4.1.1  Signature Timestamp Attribute Definition

   The Signature Timestamp attribute is timestamp of the signature
   value. It is an unsigned attribute.  Several instances of this
   attribute from different TSAs may occur with an electronic signature.

   The Signature Validation Policy specifies, in the
   signatureTimestampDelay field of TimestampTrustConditions, a maximum
   acceptable time difference which is allowed between the time
   indicated in the signing time attribute and the time indicated by the
   Signature Timestamp attribute.  If this delay is exceeded then the
   electronic signature must be considered as invalid.

   The following object identifier identifies the Signature Timestamp
   attribute:

      id-aa-signatureTimeStampToken OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
      member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
      id-aa(2) 14}

   The Signature timestamp attribute value has ASN.1 type
   SignatureTimeStampToken.

   SignatureTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken

   The value of messageImprint field within TimeStampToken must be a
   hash of the value of signature field within SignerInfo for the
   signedData being timestamped.




Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 36]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   For further information and definition of TimeStampToken see [TSP].

4.2  Complete Validation Data

   An electronic signature with complete validation data is an
   Electronic Signature for which all the additional data required for
   validation (i.e., all certificates and revocation information) is
   available. Complete validation data (ES-C) build on the electronic
   signature Time-Stamp as defined above.

   The minimum structure of a Complete validation data is:

      *  the Signature Time-Stamp Attribute, as defined in clause 4.1.1;
      *  Complete Certificate Refs, as defined in clause 4.2.1;
      *  Complete Revocation Refs, as defined in clause 4.2.2.

   The Complete validation data MAY also include the following
   additional information, forming a X-Long validation data, for use if
   later validation processes may not have access to this information:

      *  Complete Certificate Values, as defined in clause 4.2.3;
      *  Complete Revocation Values, as defined in clause 4.2.4.

   The  Complete validation data MAY also include one of the following
   additional attributes, forming a X-Time-Stamp validation data, to
   provide additional protection against later CA compromise and provide
   integrity of the validation data used:

      *  ES-C Time-Stamp, as defined in clause 4.2.5; or
      *  Time-Stamped Certificates and CRLs references, as defined in
           clause 4.2.6.

   NOTE 1: As long as the CA's are trusted such that these keys cannot
   be compromised or the cryptography used broken, the ES-C provides
   long term proof of a valid electronic signature.

   A valid electronic signature is an electronic signature which passes
   validation according to a signature validation policy.

   NOTE 2: The ES-C provides the following important property for long
   standing signatures; that is having been found once to be valid, must
   continue to be so months or years later.  Long after the validity
   period of the certificates have expired, or after the user key has
   been compromised.







Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 37]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


4.2.1  Complete Certificate Refs Attribute Definition

   The Complete Certificate Refs attribute is an unsigned attribute.  It
   references the full set of CA certificates that have been used to
   validate a ES with Complete validation data (ES-C) up to (but not
   including) the signer's certificate.  Only a single instance of this
   attribute must occur with an electronic signature.

   Note: The signer's certified is referenced in the signing certificate
   attribute (see clause 3.1).

id-aa-ets-certificateRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 21}

   The complete certificate refs attribute value has the ASN.1 syntax
   CompleteCertificateRefs.

   CompleteCertificateRefs ::=  SEQUENCE OF OTHERCertID

   OTHERCertID is defined in clause 3.8.2.

   The IssuerSerial that must be present in OTHERCertID.  The certHash
   must match the hash of the certificate referenced.

   NOTE:  Copies of the certificate values may be held using the
   Certificate Values attribute defined in clause 4.3.1.

4.2.2  Complete Revocation Refs Attribute Definition

   The Complete Revocation Refs attribute is an unsigned attribute.
   Only a single instance of this attribute must occur with an
   electronic signature.  It references the full set of the CRL or OCSP
   responses that have been used in the validation of the signer and CA
   certificates used in ES with Complete validation data.

   The following object identifier identifies the CompleteRevocationRefs
   attribute:

id-aa-ets-revocationRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 22}

   The complete revocation refs attribute value has the ASN.1 syntax
   CompleteRevocationRefs.

   CompleteRevocationRefs ::=  SEQUENCE OF CrlOcspRef






Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 38]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   CrlOcspRef ::= SEQUENCE {
       crlids           [0] CRLListID        OPTIONAL,
       ocspids          [1] OcspListID       OPTIONAL,
       otherRev         [2] OtherRevRefs     OPTIONAL
   }

   CompleteRevocationRefs must contain one CrlOcspRef for the signing
   certificate, followed by one for each OTHERCertID in the
   CompleteCertificateRefs attribute.  The second and subsequent
   CrlOcspRef fields must be in the same order as the OTHERCertID to
   which they relate.  At least one of CRLListID or OcspListID or
   OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" CA of the
   certificate path.

   CRLListID ::=  SEQUENCE {
       crls        SEQUENCE OF CrlValidatedID}

   CrlValidatedID ::=  SEQUENCE {
        crlHash                   OtherHash,
        crlIdentifier             CrlIdentifier OPTIONAL}

   CrlIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
       crlissuer                 Name,
       crlIssuedTime             UTCTime,
       crlNumber                 INTEGER OPTIONAL
                                               }

   OcspListID ::=  SEQUENCE {
       ocspResponses        SEQUENCE OF OcspResponsesID}

   OcspResponsesID ::=  SEQUENCE {
       ocspIdentifier              OcspIdentifier,
       ocspRepHash                 OtherHash    OPTIONAL
                                               }

   OcspIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
        ocspResponderID    ResponderID,
                          -- As in OCSP response data
        producedAt      GeneralizedTime
                          -- As in OCSP response data
                                                }

   When creating an crlValidatedID, the crlHash is computed over the
   entire DER encoded CRL including the signature.  The crlIdentifier
   would normally be present unless the CRL can be inferred from other
   information.





Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 39]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   The crlIdentifier is to identify the CRL using the issuer name and
   the CRL issued time which must correspond to the time "thisUpdate"
   contained in the issued CRL.  The crlListID attribute is an unsigned
   attribute.  In the case that the identified CRL is a Delta CRL then
   references to the set of CRLs to provide a complete revocation list
   must be included.

   The OcspIdentifier is to identify the OSCP response using the issuer
   name and the time of issue of the OCSP response which must correspond
   to the time "producedAt" contained in the issued OCSP response.
   Since it may be needed to make the difference between two OCSP
   responses received within the same second, then the hash of the
   response contained in the OcspResponsesID may be needed to solve the
   ambiguity.

   NOTE: Copies of the CRL and OCSP responses values may be held using
   the Revocation Values attribute defined in clause 4.3.2.

   OtherRevRefs ::= SEQUENCE {
      otherRevRefType      OtherRevRefType,
      otherRevRefs         ANY DEFINED BY otherRevRefType
   }

   OtherRevRefType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   The syntax and semantics of other revocation references is outside
   the scope of this document.  The definition of the syntax of the
   other form of revocation information is as identified by
   OtherRevRefType.

4.3  Extended Validation Data

4.3.1  Certificate Values Attribute Definition

   The Certificate Values attribute is an unsigned attribute.  Only a
   single instance of this attribute must occur with an electronic
   signature.  It holds the values of certificates referenced in the
   CompleteCertificateRefs attribute.

   Note: If an Attribute Certificate is used, it is not provided in this
   structure but must be provided by the signer as a signer-attributes
   attribute (see clause 12.3).

   The following object identifier identifies the CertificateValues
   attribute:

   id-aa-ets-certValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
       us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 23}



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 40]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   The certificate values attribute value has the ASN.1 syntax
   CertificateValues.

   CertificateValues ::=  SEQUENCE OF Certificate

   Certificate is defined in RFC2459 and ITU-T Recommendation X.509 [1])

4.3.2  Revocation Values Attribute Definition

   The Revocation Values attribute is an unsigned attribute.  Only a
   single instance of this attribute must occur with an electronic
   signature.  It holds the values of CRLs and OCSP referenced in the
   CompleteRevocationRefs attribute.

   The following object identifier identifies the Revocation Values
   attribute:

      id-aa-ets-revocationValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-
      body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
      id-aa(2) 24}

   The revocation values attribute value has the ASN.1 syntax
   RevocationValues.

   RevocationValues ::=  SEQUENCE {
      crlVals           [0] SEQUENCE OF CertificateList     OPTIONAL,
      ocspVals          [1] SEQUENCE OF BasicOCSPResponse   OPTIONAL,
      otherRevVals      [2] OtherRevVals
   }

   OtherRevVals ::= SEQUENCE {
      otherRevValType       OtherRevValType,
      otherRevVals          ANY DEFINED BY otherRevValType
   }

   OtherRevValType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   The syntax and semantics of the other revocation values is outside
   the scope of this document.  The definition of the syntax of the
   other form of revocation information is as identified by
   OtherRevRefType.

   CertificateList is defined in RFC 2459 [RFC2459] and in ITU-T
   Recommendation X.509 [X509]).

   BasicOCSPResponse is defined in RFC 2560 [OCSP].





Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 41]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


4.3.3  ES-C Time-Stamp Attribute Definition

   This attribute is used for the Type 1 X-Time-Stamped validation data.
   The ES-C Time-Stamp attribute is an unsigned attribute.  It is time-
   stamp of a hash of the electronic signature and the complete
   validation data (ES-C).  It is a special purpose TimeStampToken
   Attribute which time-stamps the ES-C.  Several instances instance of
   this attribute may occur with an electronic signature from different
   TSAs.

   The following object identifier identifies the ES-C Time-Stamp
   attribute:

      id-aa-ets-escTimeStamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-
      body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
      id-aa(2) 25}

   The ES-C time-stamp attribute value has the ASN.1 syntax
   ESCTimeStampToken.

   ESCTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken

   The value of messageImprint field within TimeStampToken must be a
   hash of the concatenated values (without the type or length encoding
   for that value) of the following data objects as present in the ES
   with Complete validation data (ES-C):

   *  signature field within SignerInfo;

   *  SignatureTimeStampToken attribute;

   *  CompleteCertificateRefs attribute;

   *  CompleteRevocationRefs attribute.

   For further information and definition of the Time Stamp Token see
   [TSP].

4.3.4  Time-Stamped Certificates and CRLs Attribute Definition

   This attribute is used for the Type 2 X-Time-Stamp validation data.
   A TimestampedCertsCRLsRef attribute is an unsigned attribute.  It is
   a list of referenced certificates and OCSP responses/CRLs which are
   been time-stamped to protect against certain CA compromises.  Its
   syntax is as follows:

   The following object identifier identifies the
   TimestampedCertsCRLsRef attribute:



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 42]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


      id-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-
      body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
      id-aa(2) 26}

   The attribute value has the ASN.1 syntax TimestampedCertsCRLs.

   TimestampedCertsCRLs ::= TimeStampToken

   The value of messageImprint field within TimeStampToken must be a
   hash of the concatenated values (without the type or length encoding
   for that value) of the following data objects as present in the ES
   with Complete validation data (ES-C):

      *  CompleteCertificateRefs attribute;
      *  CompleteRevocationRefs attribute.

4.4  Archive Validation Data

   Where an electronic signature is required to last for a very long
   time, and a the time-stamp on an electronic signature is in danger of
   being invalidated due to algorithm weakness or limits in the validity
   period of the TSA certificate, then it may be required to time-stamp
   the electronic signature several times.  When this is required an
   archive time-stamp attribute may be required.  This time-stamp may be
   repeatedly applied over a period of time.

4.4.1  Archive Time-Stamp Attribute Definition

   The Archive Time-Stamp attribute is time-stamp of the user data and
   the entire electronic signature.  If the Certificate values and
   Revocation Values attributes are not present these attributes must be
   added to the electronic signature prior to the time-stamp.  The
   Archive Time-Stamp attribute is an unsigned attribute.  Several
   instances of this attribute may occur with on electronic signature
   both over time and from different TSAs.

   The following object identifier identifies the Nested Archive Time-
   Stamp attribute:

      id-aa-ets-archiveTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-
      body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
      id-aa(2) 27}

   Archive time-stamp attribute values have the ASN.1 syntax
   ArchiveTimeStampToken

   ArchiveTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken




Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 43]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   The value of messageImprint field within Time-StampToken must be a
   hash of the concatenated values (without the type or length encoding
   for that value) of the following data objects as present in the
   electronic signature:

      *  encapContentInfo eContent OCTET STRING;
      *  signedAttributes;
      *  signature field within SignerInfo;
      *  SignatureTimeStampToken attribute;
      *  CompleteCertificateRefs attribute;
      *  CompleteRevocationData attribute;
      * CertificateValues attribute
         (If not already present this information must be included in
         the ES-A);
      *  RevocationValues attribute
         (If not already present this information must be included in
         the ES-A);
      *  ESCTimeStampToken attribute if present;
      *  TimestampedCertsCRLs attribute if present;
      *  any previous ArchiveTimeStampToken attributes.

   For further information and definition of TimeStampToken see [TSP]

   The time-stamp should be created using stronger algorithms (or longer
   key lengths) than in the original electronic signatures.

5.  Security Considerations

5.1  Protection of Private Key

   The security of the electronic signature mechanism defined in this
   document depends on the privacy of the signer's private key.
   Implementations must take steps to ensure that private keys cannot be
   compromised.

5.2  Choice of Algorithms

   Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms become
   weaker with time.  As new cryptoanalysis techniques are developed and
   computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular
   cryptographic algorithm will reduce.  Therefore, cryptographic
   algorithm implementations should be modular allowing new algorithms
   to be readily inserted.  That is, implementers should be prepared for
   the set of mandatory to implement algorithms to change over time.







Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 44]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


6.  Conformance Requirements

   This document only defines conformance requirements up to a ES with
   Complete validation data (ES-C).  This means that none of the
   extended and archive forms of Electronic Signature (ES-X, ES-A) need
   to be implemented to get conformance to this standard.

   This document mandates support for elements of the signature policy.

6.1  Signer

   A system supporting signers according to this document must, at a
   minimum, support generation of an electronic signature consisting of
   the following components:

      *  The general CMS syntax and content type as defined in RFC 2630
         (see clauses 4.1 and 4.2).

      *  CMS SignedData as defined in RFC 2630 with version set to 3 and
         at least one SignerInfo must be present (see clauses 4.3, 4.4,
         4.5, 4.6).

      *  The following CMS Attributes as defined in RFC 2630:

         -  ContentType; This must always be present
            (see clause 3.7.1);

         -  MessageDigest; This must always be present
            (see clause 3.7.2);

         -  SigningTime; This must always be present
            (see clause 3.7.3).

      *  The following ESS Attributes as defined in RFC 2634:

         -  SigningCertificate: This must be set as defined in clauses
            3.8.1 and 3.8.2.

      *  The following Attributes as defined in clause 3.9:

         -  SignaturePolicyIdentifier; This must always be present.

      *  Public Key Certificates as defined in ITU-T Recommendation
         X.509 [1] and profiled in RFC 2459 [7] (see clause 9.1).







Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 45]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


6.2  Verifier using time-stamping

   A system supporting verifiers according to this document with time-
   stamping facilities must, at a minimum, support:

      *  Verification of the mandated components of an electronic
         signature, as defined in clause 5.1.

      *  Signature Time-Stamp attribute, as defined in clause 4.1.1.

      *  Complete Certificate Refs attribute, as defined in clause
         4.2.1.

      *  Complete Revocation Refs Attribute, as defined in clause
         4.2.2.

      *  Public Key Certificates, as defined in ITU-T Recommendation
         X.509 and profiled in RFC 2459.

      *  Either of:

         -  Certificate Revocation Lists, as defined in ITU-T
            Recommendation X.509 [1] and profiled in RFC 2459 [7]; or

         -  On-line Certificate Status Protocol responses, as defined in
            RFC 2560.

6.3     Verifier using secure records

   A system supporting verifiers according to the present document
   shall, at a minimum, support:

      *  Verification of the mandated components of an electronic
         signature, as defined in subclause 5.1.

      *  Complete Certificate Refs attribute, as defined in subclause
         4.2.1.

      *  Complete Revocation Refs Attribute, as defined in subclause
         9.2.2.

      *  A record shall be maintained, which cannot be undetectably
         modified, of the electronic signature and the time when the
         signature was first validated using the referenced certificates
         and revocation information.

      *  Public Key Certificates, as defined in ITU-T Recommendation
         X.509 [1] and profiled in RFC 2459 [7] (see subclause 10.1).



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 46]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


      *  Either of:

         -  Certificate Revocation Lists, as defined in ITU-T
            Recommendation X.509 [1] and profiled in RFC 2459 [7] Or

         -  On-line Certificate Status Protocol, as defined in RFC 2560
            [8] (see subclause 10.3).

7. References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [ESS]      Hoffman, P., "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME", RFC
              2634, June 1999.

   [CMS]      Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 2630,
              June 1999.

   [OCSP]     Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S. and C.
              Adams, "On-line Status Certificate Protocol", RFC 2560,
              June 1999.

   [TSP]      Adams, C., Cain, P., Pinkas, D. and R. Zuccherato,
              "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp
              Protocol (TSP)", RFC 3161, August 2001.

   [PTS]      Public Telegram Service. ITU-T Recommendation F1.

   [RFC2459]  Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W. and D. Solo, "Internet
              X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and CRL
              Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999.

   [PKCS9]    RSA Laboratories, "The Public-Key Cryptography Standards
              (PKCS)", RSA Data Security Inc., Redwood City, California,
              November 1993 Release.

   [ISONR]    ISO/IEC 10181-5:  Security Frameworks in Open Systems.
              Non-Repudiation Framework. April 1997.

   [TS101733] ETSI Standard TS 101 733 V.1.2.2 (2000-12) Electronic
              Signature Formats.  Note: copies of ETSI TS 101 733 can be
              freely downloaded from the ETSI web site www.etsi.org.








Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 47]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


8. Authors' Addresses

   This Informational RFC has been produced in ETSI TC-SEC.

      ETSI
      F-06921 Sophia Antipolis, Cedex - FRANCE
      650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis
      Valbonne - France
      Tel: +33 4 92 94 42 00  Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16
      secretariat@etsi.fr
      http://www.etsi.org

   Contact Point

      Harri Rasilainen
      ETSI
      650 Route des Lucioles
      F-06921 Sophia Antipolis, Cedex
      FRANCE

      EMail: harri.rasilainen@etsi.fr

      Denis Pinkas
      Integris
      68, Route de Versailles
      78434 Louveciennes CEDEX
      FRANCE

      EMail: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net

      John Ross
      Security & Standards
      192 Moulsham Street
      Chelmsford, Essex
      CM2 0LG
      United Kingdom

      EMail: ross@secstan.com

      Nick Pope
      Security & Standards
      192 Moulsham Street
      Chelmsford, Essex
      CM2 0LG
      United Kingdom

      EMail: pope@secstan.com




Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 48]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


Annex A (normative): ASN.1 Definitions

   This annex provides a summary of all the ASN.1 syntax definitions for
   new syntax defined in this document.

A.1  Definitions Using X.208 (1988) ASN.1 Syntax

   NOTE:  The ASN.1 module defined in clause A.1 has precedence over
   that defined in Annex A-2 in the case of any conflict.

      ETS-ElectronicSignatureFormats-88syntax { iso(1) member-body(2)
      us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-mod(0) 5}

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN

-- EXPORTS All -

IMPORTS

-- Crypographic Message Syntax (CMS): RFC 2630

  ContentInfo, ContentType, id-data, id-signedData, SignedData,
  EncapsulatedContentInfo, SignerInfo, id-contentType,
  id-messageDigest, MessageDigest, id-signingTime, SigningTime,
  id-countersignature, Countersignature

  FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax
    { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
      smime(16) modules(0) cms(1) }

-- ESS Defined attributes: RFC 2634
-- (Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME)

  id-aa-signingCertificate, SigningCertificate, IssuerSerial,
  id-aa-contentReference, ContentReference,
  id-aa-contentIdentifier, ContentIdentifier

  FROM ExtendedSecurityServices
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
       pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) ess(2) }

-- Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
-- Certificate and CRL Profile: RFC 2459

  Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier, CertificateList, Name,
  GeneralNames, GeneralName, DirectoryString,Attribute,



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 49]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


  AttributeTypeAndValue, AttributeType, AttributeValue,
  PolicyInformation, BMPString, UTF8String

  FROM PKIX1Explicit88
  {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
   security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-
   88(1)}

-- X.509 '97 Authentication Framework

AttributeCertificate

  FROM AuthenticationFramework
  {joint-iso-ccitt ds(5) module(1) authenticationFramework(7) 3}

-- The imported AttributeCertificate is defined using the X.680 1997
-- ASN.1 Syntax,
-- an equivalent using the 88 ASN.1 syntax may be used.


-- OCSP 2560

BasicOCSPResponse, ResponderID

  FROM OCSP {-- OID not assigned -- }

-- Time Stamp Protocol Work in Progress

TimeStampToken

  FROM PKIXTSP
  {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
  security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-tsp(13)}

-- S/MIME Object Identifier arcs used in this document
-- ===================================================

-- S/MIME  OID arc used in this document
-- id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
--             us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 16 }

-- S/MIME Arcs
-- id-mod  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 0 }
-- modules
-- id-ct   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }
-- content types
-- id-aa   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 2 }
-- attributes



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 50]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


-- id-spq  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 5 }
-- signature policy qualifier
-- id-cti  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 6 }
-- commitment type identifier

-- Definitions of Object Identifier arcs used in this document
-- ===========================================================

-- The allocation of OIDs to specific objects are given below with the
-- associated ASN.1 syntax definition

-- OID used referencing electronic signature mechanisms based on this
-- standard for use with the IDUP API (see annex D)

id-etsi-es-IDUP-Mechanism-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0)
     electronic-signature-standard (1733) part1 (1)
         idupMechanism (4)etsiESv1(1) }

-- CMS Attributes Defined in this document
-- =======================================

-- Mandatory Electronic Signature Attributes

-- OtherSigningCertificate

    id-aa-ets-otherSigCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
    smime(16) id-aa(2) 19 }

OtherSigningCertificate ::=  SEQUENCE {
    certs        SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID,
    policies     SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
                 -- NOT USED IN THIS DOCUMENT
}

OtherCertID ::= SEQUENCE {
     otherCertHash            OtherHash,
     issuerSerial             IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
}

OtherHash ::= CHOICE {
    sha1Hash     OtherHashValue,  -- This contains a SHA-1 hash
    otherHash    OtherHashAlgAndValue
}

OtherHashValue ::= OCTET STRING




Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 51]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


OtherHashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
  hashAlgorithm    AlgorithmIdentifier,
  hashValue        OtherHashValue
}

-- Signature Policy Identifier

    id-aa-ets-sigPolicyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
    smime(16) id-aa(2) 15 }

"SignaturePolicy CHOICE {
         SignaturePolicyId          SignaturePolicyId,
         SignaturePolicyImplied     SignaturePolicyImplied
}

SignaturePolicyId ::= SEQUENCE {
        sigPolicyIdentifier   SigPolicyId,
        sigPolicyHash         SigPolicyHash,
        sigPolicyQualifiers   SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                              SigPolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL
}

SignaturePolicyImplied ::= NULL

SigPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

SigPolicyHash ::= OtherHashAlgAndValue

SigPolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        sigPolicyQualifierId  SigPolicyQualifierId,
        sigQualifier          ANY DEFINED BY sigPolicyQualifierId
}

SigPolicyQualifierId ::=
        OBJECT IDENTIFIER

    id-spq-ets-uri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
    smime(16) id-spq(5) 1 }

   SPuri ::= IA5String

    id-spq-ets-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
    smime(16) id-spq(5) 2 }

   SPUserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 52]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


        noticeRef        NoticeReference   OPTIONAL,
        explicitText     DisplayText       OPTIONAL
}

   NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
        organization     DisplayText,
        noticeNumbers    SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
}

   DisplayText ::= CHOICE {
        visibleString    VisibleString  (SIZE (1..200)),
        bmpString        BMPString      (SIZE (1..200)),
        utf8String       UTF8String     (SIZE (1..200))
}

-- Optional Electronic Signature Attributes

-- Commitment Type

id-aa-ets-commitmentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 16}

CommitmentTypeIndication ::= SEQUENCE {
  commitmentTypeId                 CommitmentTypeIdentifier,
  commitmentTypeQualifier          SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                   CommitmentTypeQualifier   OPTIONAL
}

CommitmentTypeIdentifier ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

CommitmentTypeQualifier ::= SEQUENCE {
    commitmentTypeIdentifier   CommitmentTypeIdentifier,
    qualifier                  ANY DEFINED BY commitmentTypeIdentifier
}

    id-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-
    body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
    cti(6) 1}

    id-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-
    body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
    cti(6) 2}

    id-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-
    body(2)  us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
    cti(6) 3}

    id-cti-ets-proofOfSender OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 53]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


    body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
   cti(6) 4}

    id-cti-ets-proofOfApproval OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-
    body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
    cti(6) 5}

    id-cti-ets-proofOfCreation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-
    body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
    cti(6) 6}

-- Signer Location

   id-aa-ets-signerLocation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-
   body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
   id-aa(2) 17}

SignerLocation ::= SEQUENCE {
       -- at least one of the following must be present
      countryName      [0]  DirectoryString    OPTIONAL,
       -- as used to name a Country in X.500
      localityName     [1]  DirectoryString    OPTIONAL,
       -- as used to name a locality in X.500
      postalAdddress   [2]  PostalAddress      OPTIONAL
}

  PostalAddress ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..6) OF DirectoryString

-- Signer Attributes

    id-aa-ets-signerAttr OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 18}

SignerAttribute ::= SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
      claimedAttributes     [0] ClaimedAttributes,
      certifiedAttributes   [1] CertifiedAttributes
}

ClaimedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE OF Attribute

CertifiedAttributes ::= AttributeCertificate  -- as defined in X.509 :
see section 10.3

-- Content Time-Stamp

    id-aa-ets-contentTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-
    body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
    id-aa(2) 20}



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 54]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


ContentTimestamp::= TimeStampToken

-- Validation Data

-- Signature Time-Stamp

    id-aa-signatureTimeStampToken OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
    id-aa(2) 14}

SignatureTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken

-- Complete Certificate Refs.

id-aa-ets-certificateRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 21}

CompleteCertificateRefs ::=  SEQUENCE OF OTHERCertID

-- Complete Revocation Refs

   id-aa-ets-revocationRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-
   body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
   id-aa(2) 22}

CompleteRevocationRefs ::=  SEQUENCE OF CrlOcspRef

CrlOcspRef ::= SEQUENCE {
    crlids           [0] CRLListID      OPTIONAL,
    ocspids          [1] OcspListID     OPTIONAL,
    otherRev         [2] OtherRevRefs   OPTIONAL
}

CRLListID ::=  SEQUENCE {
    crls        SEQUENCE OF CrlValidatedID}

CrlValidatedID ::=  SEQUENCE {
     crlHash                   OtherHash,
     crlIdentifier             CrlIdentifier OPTIONAL
}

CrlIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
    crlissuer                 Name,
    crlIssuedTime             UTCTime,
    crlNumber                 INTEGER OPTIONAL
}

OcspListID ::=  SEQUENCE {



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 55]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


    ocspResponses        SEQUENCE OF OcspResponsesID}

OcspResponsesID ::=  SEQUENCE {
    ocspIdentifier              OcspIdentifier,
    ocspRepHash                 OtherHash    OPTIONAL
}

OcspIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
  ocspResponderID    ResponderID,
                    -- as in OCSP response data
  producedAt      GeneralizedTime
                    -- as in OCSP response data
}

OtherRevRefs ::= SEQUENCE {
   otherRevRefType         OtherRevRefType,
   otherRevRefs            ANY DEFINED BY otherRevRefType
}

OtherRevRefType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

-- Certificate Values

id-aa-ets-certValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 23}

CertificateValues ::=  SEQUENCE OF Certificate

-- Certificate Revocation Values

id-aa-ets-revocationValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-
    body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
    id-aa(2) 24}

RevocationValues ::=  SEQUENCE {
   crlVals          [0] SEQUENCE OF CertificateList     OPTIONAL,
   ocspVals         [1] SEQUENCE OF BasicOCSPResponse   OPTIONAL,
   otherRevVals     [2] OtherRevVals
}

OtherRevVals ::= SEQUENCE {
   otherRevValType  OtherRevValType,
  otherRevVals      ANY DEFINED BY otherRevValType
}

OtherRevValType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

-- ES-C Time-Stamp



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 56]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


id-aa-ets-escTimeStamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 25}

ESCTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken

-- Time-Stamped Certificates and CRLs

id-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-
    body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
    id-aa(2) 26}

TimestampedCertsCRLs ::= TimeStampToken

-- Archive Time-Stamp

id-aa-ets-archiveTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-
    body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
    id-aa(2) 27}

ArchiveTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken

END -- ETS-ElectronicSignatureFormats-88syntax --

A.2  Definitions Using X.680 1997 ASN.1 Syntax

NOTE:  The ASN.1 module defined in clause A.1 has precedence over that
defined in clause A.2 in the case of any conflict.

      ETS-ElectronicSignatureFormats-97Syntax { iso(1) member-body(2)
      us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-mod(0) 6}

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN

-- EXPORTS All -

IMPORTS

-- Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS): RFC 2630

  ContentInfo, ContentType, id-data, id-signedData, SignedData,
  EncapsulatedContentInfo, SignerInfo, id-contentType,
  id-messageDigest, MessageDigest, id-signingTime,
  SigningTime, id-countersignature, Countersignature

   FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax
    { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 57]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


    smime(16) modules(0) cms(1) }


-- ESS Defined attributes: RFC 2634 (Enhanced Security Services
-- for S/MIME)

   id-aa-signingCertificate, SigningCertificate, IssuerSerial,
   id-aa-contentReference, ContentReference,
   id-aa-contentIdentifier, ContentIdentifier

  FROM ExtendedSecurityServices
    { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
       pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) ess(2) }

-- Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
- - Certificate and CRL Profile:RFC 2459

   Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier, CertificateList, Name,
   GeneralNames, GeneralName, DirectoryString, Attribute,
   AttributeTypeAndValue, AttributeType, AttributeValue,
   PolicyInformation.


  FROM PKIX1Explicit93
    {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
     security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
     id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)}

-- X.509 '97 Authentication Framework

        AttributeCertificate

        FROM AuthenticationFramework
        {joint-iso-ccitt ds(5) module(1) authenticationFramework(7) 3}

-- OCSP 2560

      BasicOCSPResponse, ResponderID

  FROM OCSP

--  { OID not assigned }

-- Time Stamp Protocol Work in Progress TimeStampToken

  FROM PKIXTSP
  {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
   security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-tsp(13)}



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 58]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


-- S/MIME Object Identifier arcs used in this document
-- ===================================================

-- S/MIME  OID arc used in this document
-- id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
--             us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 16 }

-- S/MIME Arcs
-- id-mod  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 0 }
-- modules
-- id-ct   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }
-- content types
-- id-aa   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 2 }
-- attributes
-- id-spq  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 5 }
-- signature policy qualifier
-- id-cti  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 6 }
-- commitment type identifier

-- Definitions of Object Identifier arcs used in this document
-- ===========================================================

-- The allocation of OIDs to specific objects are given below with the
-- associated ASN.1 syntax definition

-- OID used referencing electronic signature mechanisms based on this
-- standard for use with the IDUP API (see annex D)

id-etsi-es-IDUP-Mechanism-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0)
   electronic-signature-standard (1733) part1 (1)
   idupMechanism (4)etsiESv1(1) }

-- CMS Attributes Defined in this document
-- =======================================

-- Mandatory Electronic Signature Attributes
-- OtherSigningCertificate

id-aa-ets-otherSigCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
    smime(16) id-aa(2) 19 }

OtherSigningCertificate ::=  SEQUENCE {
    certs        SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID,
    policies     SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
                 -- NOT USED IN THIS DOCUMENT
}



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 59]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


OtherCertID ::= SEQUENCE {
     otherCertHash            OtherHash,
     issuerSerial             IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
}

OtherHash ::= CHOICE {
    sha1Hash OtherHashValue,  -- This contains a SHA-1 hash
    otherHash OtherHashAlgAndValue
}

OtherHashValue ::= OCTET STRING

OtherHashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
  hashAlgorithm  AlgorithmIdentifier,
  hashValue    OtherHashValue
}

-- Signature Policy Identifier

id-aa-ets-sigPolicyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
    smime(16) id-aa(2) 15 }

"SignaturePolicy CHOICE {
         SignaturePolicyId          SignaturePolicyId,
         SignaturePolicyImplied     SignaturePolicyImplied
}

SignaturePolicyId ::= SEQUENCE {
        sigPolicyIdentifier   SigPolicyId,
        sigPolicyHash         SigPolicyHash,
        sigPolicyQualifiers   SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                SigPolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL
}

SignaturePolicyImplied ::= NULL

SigPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

SigPolicyHash ::= OtherHashAlgAndValue

SigPolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        sigPolicyQualifierId    SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER.&id
                                 ({SupportedSigPolicyQualifiers}),
        qualifier               SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER.&Qualifier
                                ({SupportedSigPolicyQualifiers}
                                 {@sigPolicyQualifierId})OPTIONAL }




Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 60]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


SupportedSigPolicyQualifiers SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::=
                           { noticeToUser | pointerToSigPolSpec }

SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::= CLASS {
        &id             OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
        &Qualifier      OPTIONAL }

WITH SYNTAX {
        SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER-ID     &id
        [SIG-QUALIFIER-TYPE &Qualifier] }

noticeToUser SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::= {
      SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER-ID id-sqt-unotice SIG-QUALIFIER-TYPE
                                            SPUserNotice
                                                        }

pointerToSigPolSpec SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::= {
      SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER-ID id-sqt-uri SIG-QUALIFIER-TYPE SPuri }

    id-spq-ets-uri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
    smime(16) id-spq(5) 1 }

   SPuri ::= IA5String

  id-spq-ets-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
    smime(16) id-spq(5) 2 }

   SPUserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {
        noticeRef        NoticeReference OPTIONAL,
        explicitText     DisplayText OPTIONAL
}

   NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
        organization     DisplayText,
        noticeNumbers    SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
}

   DisplayText ::= CHOICE {
        visibleString    VisibleString  (SIZE (1..200)),
        bmpString        BMPString      (SIZE (1..200)),
        utf8String       UTF8String     (SIZE (1..200))
}

-- Optional Electronic Signature Attributes

-- Commitment Type



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 61]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


id-aa-ets-commitmentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 16}

CommitmentTypeIndication ::= SEQUENCE {
  commitmentTypeId CommitmentTypeIdentifier,
  commitmentTypeQualifier SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                           CommitmentTypeQualifier
                                           OPTIONAL}

CommitmentTypeIdentifier ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

CommitmentTypeQualifier ::= SEQUENCE {
        commitmentQualifierId       COMMITMENT-QUALIFIER.&id,
        qualifier                   COMMITMENT-QUALIFIER.&Qualifier
                                                  OPTIONAL }

COMMITMENT-QUALIFIER ::= CLASS {
                    &id             OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
                    &Qualifier      OPTIONAL }
WITH SYNTAX {
         COMMITMENT-QUALIFIER-ID     &id
                        [COMMITMENT-TYPE &Qualifier] }

  id-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
      member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
      smime(16) cti(6) 1}

  id-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
      member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
      smime(16) cti(6) 2}

  id-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
      member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
      smime(16) cti(6) 3}

  id-cti-ets-proofOfSender OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
      member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
      smime(16) cti(6) 4}

  id-cti-ets-proofOfApproval OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
      member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
      smime(16) cti(6) 5}

  id-cti-ets-proofOfCreation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
      member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
      smime(16) cti(6) 6}

-- Signer Location



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 62]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


id-aa-ets-signerLocation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 17}

SignerLocation ::= SEQUENCE {
                       -- at least one of the following must be present
      countryName [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
        -- As used to name a Country in X.500
      localityName [1] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
         -- As used to name a locality in X.500
      postalAdddress [2] PostalAddress OPTIONAL }

  PostalAddress ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..6) OF DirectoryString

-- Signer Attributes

id-aa-ets-signerAttr OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 18}

SignerAttribute ::= SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
      claimedAttributes  [0] ClaimedAttributes,
      certifiedAttributes [1] CertifiedAttributes }

ClaimedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE OF Attribute

CertifiedAttributes ::= AttributeCertificate
-- As defined in X.509 : see section 10.3

-- Content Time-Stamp

id-aa-ets-contentTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
      member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
      smime(16) id-aa(2) 20}

ContentTimestamp::= TimeStampToken

-- Validation Data

-- Signature Time-Stamp

id-aa-signatureTimeStampToken OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
     member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
     smime(16) id-aa(2) 14}

SignatureTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken

-- Complete Certificate Refs.

id-aa-ets-certificateRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 63]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 21}

CompleteCertificateRefs ::=  SEQUENCE OF OTHERCertID

-- Complete Revocation Refs

id-aa-ets-revocationRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 22}

CompleteRevocationRefs ::=  SEQUENCE OF CrlOcspRef

CrlOcspRef ::= SEQUENCE {
    crlids           [0] CRLListID   OPTIONAL,
    ocspids          [1] OcspListID  OPTIONAL,
  otherRev     [2] OtherRevRefs OPTIONAL
                                          }

CRLListID ::=  SEQUENCE {
    crls        SEQUENCE OF CrlValidatedID}

CrlValidatedID ::=  SEQUENCE {
     crlHash                   OtherHash,
     crlIdentifier             CrlIdentifier OPTIONAL}

CrlIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
    crlissuer                 Name,
    crlIssuedTime             UTCTime,
    crlNumber                 INTEGER OPTIONAL
                                            }

OcspListID ::=  SEQUENCE {
    ocspResponses        SEQUENCE OF OcspResponsesID}

OcspResponsesID ::=  SEQUENCE {
    ocspIdentifier              OcspIdentifier,
    ocspRepHash                 OtherHash    OPTIONAL
                                            }

OcspIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
  ocspResponderID    ResponderID,
                        -- As in OCSP response data
  producedAt      GeneralizedTime
                        -- As in OCSP response data
                                             }

OtherRevRefs ::= SEQUENCE {
   otherRevRefType  OTHER-REVOCATION-REF.&id,
  otherRevRefs  OTHER-REVOCATION-REF.&Type



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 64]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


                                              }

OTHER-REVOCATION-REF ::= CLASS {
    &Type,
    &id  OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE }
  WITH SYNTAX {
    &Type ID &id }

-- Certificate Values

id-aa-ets-certValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 23}

CertificateValues ::=  SEQUENCE OF Certificate

-- Certificate Revocation Values

id-aa-ets-revocationValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
     member-body(2)us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
     smime(16) id-aa(2) 24}

RevocationValues ::=  SEQUENCE {
   crlVals          [0] SEQUENCE OF CertificateList OPTIONAL,
   ocspVals         [1] SEQUENCE OF BasicOCSPResponse OPTIONAL,
   otherRevVals      [2] OtherRevVals }

OtherRevVals ::= SEQUENCE {
   otherRevValType  OTHER-REVOCATION-VAL.&id,
  otherRevVals  OTHER-REVOCATION-VAL.&Type
                                               }

OTHER-REVOCATION-VAL ::= CLASS {
    &Type,
    &id  OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE }
  WITH SYNTAX {
    &Type ID &id }

-- ES-C Time-Stamp

id-aa-ets-escTimeStamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
     member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
     smime(16) id-aa(2) 25}

ESCTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken

-- Time-Stamped Certificates and CRLs

id-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 65]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


    member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
    smime(16) id-aa(2) 26}

TimestampedCertsCRLs ::= TimeStampToken

-- Archive Time-Stamp

id-aa-ets-archiveTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
   member-body(2)us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
   smime(16) id-aa(2) 27}

ArchiveTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken

END                -- ETS-ElectronicSignatureFormats-97Syntax

Annex B (informative): General Description

   This annex captures the concepts that apply to this document and the
   rational for the elements of the specification defined using ASN.1 in
   the main text of this document.

   The specification below includes a description why the component is
   needed, with a brief description of the vulnerabilities and threats
   and the manner by which they are countered.

B.1  The Signature Policy

   The signature policy is a set of rules for the creation and
   validation of an electronic signature, under which the signature can
   be determined to be valid.  A given legal/contractual context may
   recognize a particular signature policy as meeting its requirements.
   A signature policy may be issued, for example, by a party relying on
   the electronic signatures and selected by the signer for use with
   that relying party.  Alternatively, a signature policy may be
   established through an electronic trading association for use amongst
   its members. Both the signer and verifier use the same signature
   policy.

   The signature policy may be explicitly identified or may be implied
   by the semantics of the data being signed and other external data
   like a contract being referenced which itself refers to a signature
   policy.

   An explicit signature policy has a globally unique reference, which
   is bound to an electronic signature by the signer as part of the
   signature calculation.





Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 66]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   The signature policy needs to be available in human readable form so
   that it can be assessed to meet the requirements of the legal and
   contractual context in which it is being applied.  To facilitate the
   automatic processing of an electronic signature the parts of the
   signature policy which specify the electronic rules for the creation
   and validation of the electronic signature also needs to be in a
   computer processable form.

   The signature policy thus includes the following:

      *  Information about the signature policy that can be displayed to
         the signer or the verifiers.
      *  Rules, which apply to functionality, covered by this document
         (referred to as the Signature Validation Policy).
      *  Rules which may be implied through adoption of Certificate
         Policies that apply to the electronic signature (e.g., rules
         for ensuring the secrecy of the private signing key).
      *  Rules, which relate to the environment used by the signer,
         e.g., the use of an agreed CAD (Card Accepting Device) used in
         conjunction with a smart card.

   An explicit Signature Validation Policy may be structured so that it
   can be computer processable.  Any format of the signature validation
   policy is allowed by this document.  However, for a given explicit
   signature policy there must be one definitive form that has a unique
   binary encoded value.

   The Signature Validation Policy includes rules regarding use of TSPs
   (CA, Attribute Authorities, Time Stamping Authorities) as well as
   rules defining the components of the electronic signature that must
   be provided by the signer with data required by the verifier to
   provide long term proof.

B.2  Signed Information

   The information being signed may be defined as a MIME-encapsulated
   message which can be used to signal the format of the content in
   order to select the right display or application.  It can be composed
   of formatted text (e.g., EDIFACT), free text or of fields from an
   electronic form (e-form).  For example, the Adobe(tm) format "pdf"
   may be used or the eXtensible Mark up Language (XML).










Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 67]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


B.3  Components of an Electronic Signature

B.3.1  Reference to the Signature Policy

   The definition of electronic signature includes: "a commitment has
   been explicitly endorsed under a "Signature policy", at a given time,
   by a signer under an identifier, e.g., a name or a pseudonym, and
   optionally a role".

   When two independent parties want to evaluate an electronic
   signature, it is fundamental that they get the same result.  To meet
   this requirement same signature policy must be used by the signer and
   verifier.

   The signature policy may be explicitly identified or may be implied
   by the semantics of the data being signed and other external data
   which designate the signature policy to be used.

   By signing over the signature policy identifier the signer explicitly
   indicates that he or she has applied the signature policy in creating
   the signature.  Thus, undertakes any explicit or implied commitments.

   In order to unambiguously identify an explicit signature policy that
   is to be used to verify the signature an identifier and hash of the
   "Signature policy" shall be part of the signed data.  Additional
   information about the explicit policy (e.g., web reference to the
   document) may be carried as "qualifiers" to the signature policy
   identifier.

   When the signature policy not explicitly identified, but is implied
   by the semantics of the data being signed, then the signature will
   include a signature policy identifier that indicates that the
   signature policy is implied.  In this case the verification rules
   must be determined by using other external data which will designate
   the signature policy to be used.  If it may be determined from the
   context that all the documents to be verified refer to the same
   signature policy, then that policy may be predetermined or fixed
   within the application.

   In order to identify unambiguously the "Signature Validation Policy"
   to be used to verify the signature an identifier and hash of the
   "Signature policy" must be part of the signed data.  Additional
   information about the policy (e.g., web reference to the document)
   may be carried as "qualifiers" to the signature policy identifier.







Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 68]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


B.3.2  Commitment Type Indication

   The definition of electronic signature includes: "a commitment has
   been explicitly endorsed under a signature policy, at a given time,
   by a signer under an identifier, e.g., a name or a pseudonym, and
   optionally a role".

   The commitment type can be indicated in the electronic signature
   either:

      *  explicitly using a "commitment type indication" in the
         electronic signature;

      *  implicitly or explicitly from the semantics of the signed data.

   If the indicated commitment type is explicit using a "commitment type
   indication" in the electronic signature, acceptance of a verified
   signature implies acceptance of the semantics of that commitment
   type. The semantics of explicit commitment types indications must be
   specified either as part of the signature policy or may be registered
   for generic use across multiple policies.

   If a signature includes a commitment type indication other than one
   of those recognized under the signature policy the signature must be
   treated as invalid.

   How commitment is indicated using the semantics of the data being
   signed is outside the scope of this document.

   NOTE:  Examples of commitment indicated through the semantics of the
   data being signed, are:

      *  An explicit commitment made by the signer indicated by the type
         of data being signed over.  Thus, the data structure being
         signed can have an explicit commitment within the context of
         the application (e.g., EDIFACT purchase order).

      *  An implicit commitment which is a commitment made by the signer
         because the data being signed over has specific semantics
         (meaning) which is only interpretable by humans, (i.e., free
         text).

B.3.3  Certificate Identifier from the Signer

   The definition of the ETSI electronic signature includes: "a
   commitment has been explicitly endorsed under a signature policy, at
   a given time, by a signer under an identifier, e.g., a name or a
   pseudonym, and optionally a role."



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 69]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   In many real life environments users will be able to get from
   different CAs or even from the same CA, different certificates
   containing the same public key for different names.  The prime
   advantage is that a user can use the same private key for different
   purposes.  Multiple use of the private key is an advantage when a
   smart card is used to protect the private key, since the storage of a
   smart card is always limited.  When several CAs are involved, each
   different certificate may contain a different identity, e.g., as a
   national or as an employee from a company.  Thus when a private key
   is used for various purposes, the certificate is needed to clarify
   the context in which the private key was used when generating the
   signature.  Where there is the possibility of multiple use of private
   keys it is necessary for the signer to indicate to the verifier the
   precise certificate to be used.

   Many current schemes simply add the certificate after the signed data
   and thus are subject to various substitution attacks.  An example of
   a substitution attack is a "bad" CA that would issue a certificate to
   someone with the public key of someone else.  If the certificate from
   the signer was simply appended to the signature and thus not
   protected by the signature, any one could substitute one certificate
   by another and the message would appear to be signed by some one
   else.

   In order to counter this kind of attack, the identifier of the signer
   has to be protected by the digital signature from the signer.

   Although it does not provide the same advantages as the previous
   technique, another technique to counter that threat has been
   identified.  It requires all CAs to perform a Proof Of Possession of
   the private key at the time of registration.  The problem with that
   technique is that it does not provide any guarantee at the time of
   verification and only some proof "after the event" may be obtained,
   if and only if the CA keeps the Proof Of Possession in audit trail.

   In order to identify unambiguously the certificate to be used for the
   verification of the signature an identifier of the certificate from
   the signer must be part of the signed data.

B.3.4  Role Attributes

   The definition of electronic signature includes: "a commitment has
   been explicitly endorsed under a non repudiation security policy, at
   a given time, by a signer under an identifier, e.g., a name or a
   pseudonym, and optionally a role."






Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 70]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   While the name of the signer is important, the position of the signer
   within a company or an organization can be even more important.  Some
   contracts may only be valid if signed by a user in a particular role,
   e.g., a Sales Director.  In many cases whom the sales Director really
   is, is not that important but being sure that the signer is empowered
   by his company to be the Sales Director is fundamental.

   This document defines two different ways for providing this feature:

      *  by placing a claimed role name in the CMS signed attributes
         field;

      *  by placing a attribute certificate containing a certified role
         name in the CMS signed attributes field.

   NOTE:  Another possible approach would have been to use additional
   attributes containing the roles name(s) in the signer's certificate.
   However, it was decided not to follow this approach as it breaks the
   basic philosophy of the certificate being issued for one primary
   purpose.  Also, by using separate certificates for management of the
   signer's identity certificate and management of additional roles can
   simplify the management, as new identity keys need not be issued if a
   use of role is to be changed.

B.3.4.1  Claimed Role

   The signer may be trusted to state his own role without any
   certificate to corroborate this claim.  In which case the claimed
   role can be added to the signature as a signed attribute.

B.3.4.2  Certified Role

   Unlike public key certificates that bind an identifier to a public
   key, Attribute Certificates bind the identifier of a certificate to
   some attributes, like a role.  An Attribute Certificate is NOT issued
   by a CA but by an Attribute Authority (AA).  The Attribute Authority
   will be most of the time under the control of an organization or a
   company that is best placed to know which attributes are relevant for
   which individual.

   The Attribute Authority may use or point to public key certificates
   issued by any CA, provided that the appropriate trust may be placed
   in that CA.  Attribute Certificates may have various periods of
   validity.  That period may be quite short, e.g., one day.  While this
   requires that a new Attribute Certificate is obtained every day,
   valid for that day, this can be advantageous since revocation of such
   certificates may not be needed.  When signing, the signer will have
   to specify which Attribute Certificate it selects.  In order to do



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 71]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   so, a reference to the Attribute Certificate will have to be included
   in the signed data in order to be protected by the digital signature
   from the signer.

   In order to identify unambiguously the attribute certificate(s) to be
   used for the verification of the signature an identifier of the
   attribute certificate(s) from the signer must be part of the signed
   data.

B.3.5  Signer Location

   In some transactions the purported location of the signer at the time
   he or she applies his signature may need to be indicated.  For this
   reason an optional location indicator must be able to be included.

   In order to provide indication of the location of the signer at the
   time he or she applied his signature a  location attribute may be
   included in the signature.

B.3.6  Signing Time

   The definition of electronic signature includes: "a commitment has
   been explicitly endorsed under a signature policy, at a given time,
   by a signer under an identifier, e.g., a name or a pseudonym, and
   optionally a role."

   There are several ways to address this problem.  The solution adopted
   in this document is to sign over a time which the signer claims is
   the signing time (i.e., claimed signing time) and to require a
   trusted time stamp to be obtained when building a ES with Time-Stamp.
   When a verifier accepts a signature, the two times must be within
   acceptable limits.

   The solution that is adopted in this document offers the major
   advantage that electronic signatures can be generated without any
   on-line connection to a trusted time source (i.e., they may be
   generated off-line).

   Thus two dates and two signatures are required:

      *  a signing time indicated by the signer and which is part of the
         data signed by the signer (i.e., part of the basic electronic
         signature);

      *  a time indicated by a Time-Stamping Authority (TSA) which is
         signed over the digital signature value of the basic electronic
         signature.  The signer, verifier or both may obtain the TSA
         time-stamp.



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 72]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   In order for an electronic signature to be valid under a signature
   policy, it must be time-stamped by a TSA where the signing time as
   indicated by the signer and the time of time stamping as indicated by
   a TSA must be "close enough" to meet the requirements of the
   signature validation policy.

   "Close enough" means a few minutes, hours or even days according to
   the "Signature Validation Policy".

   NOTE:  The need for Time-Stamping is further explained in clause
   B.4.5.  A further optional attribute is defined in this document to
   time-stamp the content, to provide proof of the existence of the
   content, at the time indicated by the time-stamp.

   Using this optional attribute a trusted secure time may be obtained
   before the document is signed and included under the digital
   signature.  This solution requires an on-line connection to a trusted
   time-stamping service before generating the signature and may not
   represent the precise signing time, since it can be obtained in
   advance.  However, this optional attribute may be used by the signer
   to prove that the signed object existed before the date included in
   the time-stamp (see 3.12.3, Content Time-Stamp).

   Also, the signing time should be between the time indicated by this
   time-stamp and time indicated by the ES-T time-stamp.

B.3.7  Content Format

   When presenting signed data to a human user it may be important that
   there is no ambiguity as to the presentation of the signed
   information to the relying party.  In order for the appropriate
   representation (text, sound or video) to be selected by the relying
   party a content hint may be indicated by the signer.  If a relying
   party system does not use the format specified in the content hints
   to present the data to the relying party, the electronic signature
   may not be valid.

B.4  Components of Validation Data

B.4.1  Revocation Status Information

   A verifier will have to prove that the certificate of the signer was
   valid at the time of the signature.  This can be done by either:

      *  using Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs);

      *  using responses from an on-line certificate status server (for
         example; obtained through the OCSP protocol).



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 73]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


B.4.2  CRL Information

   When using CRLs to get revocation information, a verifier will have
   to make sure that he or she gets at the time of the first
   verification the appropriate certificate revocation information from
   the signer's CA. This should be done as soon as possible to minimize
   the time delay between the generation and verification of the
   signature.  This involves checking that the signer certificate serial
   number is not included in the CRL.  The signer, the verifier or any
   other third party may obtain either this CRL.  If obtained by the
   signer, then it must be conveyed to the verifier.  It may be
   convenient to archive the CRL for ease of subsequent verification or
   arbitration.

   Alternatively, provided the CRL is archived elsewhere which is
   accessible for the purpose of arbitration, then the serial number of
   the CRL used may be archived together with the verified electronic
   signature.

   It may happen that the certificate serial number appears in the CRL
   but with the status "suspended" (i.e., on hold).  In such a case, the
   electronic signature is not yet valid, since it is not possible to
   know whether the certificate will or will not be revoked at the end
   of the suspension period.  If a decision has to be taken immediately
   then the signature has to be considered as invalid.  If a decision
   can wait until the end of the suspension period, then two cases are
   possible:

      *  the certificate serial number has disappeared from the list and
         thus the certificate can be considered as valid and that CRL
         must be captured and archived either by the verifier or
         elsewhere and be kept accessible for the purpose of
         arbitration.

      *  the certificate serial number has been maintained on the list
         with the status definitively revoked and thus the electronic
         signature must be considered as invalid and discarded.

   At this point the verifier may be convinced that he or she got a
   valid signature, but is not yet in a position to prove at a later
   time that the signature was verified as valid.  Before addressing
   this point, an alternative to CRL is to use OCSP responses.

B.4.3  OCSP Information

   When using OCSP to get revocation information , a verifier will have
   to make sure that he or she gets at the time of the first
   verification an OCSP response that contains the status "valid".  This



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 74]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   should be done as soon as possible after the generation of the
   signature.  The signer, the verifier or any other third party may
   fetch this OCSP response. Since OSCP responses are transient and thus
   are not archived by any TSP including CA, it is the responsibility of
   every verifier to make sure that it is stored in a safe place.  The
   simplest way is to store them associated with the electronic
   signature.  An alternative would be to store them in some storage so
   that they can then be easily retrieved.

   In the same way as for the case of the CRL, it may happen that the
   certificate is declared as invalid but with the secondary status
   "suspended".

   In such a case, the electronic signature is not yet valid, since it
   is not possible to know whether the certificate will or will not be
   revoked at the end of the suspension period.  If a decision has to be
   taken immediately then the electronic signature has to be considered
   as invalid.  If a decision can wait until the end of the suspension
   period, then two cases are possible:

      *  An OCSP response with a valid status is obtained at a later
         date and thus the certificate can be considered as valid and
         that OCSP response must be captured.

      *  An OCSP response with an invalid status is obtained with a
         secondary status indicating that the certificate is
         definitively revoked and thus the electronic signature must be
         considered as invalid and discarded.

   As in the CRL case, at this point, the verifier may be convinced that
   he or she got a valid signature, but is not yet in a position to
   prove at a later time that the signature was verified as valid.

B.4.4  Certification Path

   A verifier will have to prove that the certification path was valid,
   at the time of the signature, up to a trust point according to the
   naming constraints and the certificate policy constraints from the
   "Signature Validation Policy".  It will be necessary to capture all
   the certificates from the certification path, starting with those
   from the signer and ending up with those of the self-signed
   certificate from one trusted root of the "Signature Validation
   Policy".  In addition, it will be necessary to capture the Authority
   Revocation Lists (ARLs) to prove than none of the CAs from the chain
   was revoked at the time of the signature.






Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 75]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   As in the OCSP case, at this point, the verifier may be convinced
   that he or she got a valid signature, but is not yet in a position to
   prove at a later time that the signature was verified as valid.

B.4.5  Time-Stamping for Long Life of Signature

   An important property for long standing signatures is that a
   signature, having been found once to be valid, must continue to be so
   months or years later.

   A signer, verifier or both may be required to provide on request,
   proof that a digital signature was created or verified during the
   validity period of the all the certificates that make up the
   certificate path.  In this case, the signer, verifier or both will
   also be required to provide proof that all the user and CA
   certificates used were not revoked when the signature was created or
   verified.

   It would be quite unacceptable, to consider a signature as invalid
   even if the keys or certificates were later compromised.  Thus there
   is a need to be able to demonstrate that the signature keys was valid
   around the time that the signature was created to provide long term
   evidence of the validity of a signature.

   It could be the case that a certificate was valid at the time of the
   signature but revoked some time later.  In this event, evidence must
   be provided that the document was signed before the signing key was
   revoked.

   Time-Stamping by a Time Stamping Authority (TSA) can provide such
   evidence.  A time stamp is obtained by sending the hash value of the
   given data to the TSA.  The returned "time-stamp" is a signed
   document that contains the hash value, the identity of the TSA, and
   the time of stamping.  This proves that the given data existed before
   the time of stamping.  Time-Stamping a digital signature (by sending
   a hash of the signature to the TSA) before the revocation of the
   signer's private key, provides evidence that the signature has been
   created before the key was revoked.

   If a recipient wants to hold a valid electronic signature he will
   have to ensure that he has obtained a valid time stamp for it, before
   that key (and any key involved in the validation) is revoked.  The
   sooner the time-stamp is obtained after the signing time, the better.

   It is important to note that signatures may be generated "off-line"
   and time-stamped at a later time by anyone, for example by the signer
   or any recipient interested in the value of the signature.  The time
   stamp can thus be provided by the signer together with the signed



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 76]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   document, or obtained by the recipient following receipt of the
   signed document.

   The time stamp is NOT a component of the Electronic Signature, but
   the essential component of the ES with Time-Stamp.

   It is required in this document that signer's digital signature value
   is time-stamped by a trusted source, known as a Time-Stamping
   Authority.

   This document requires that the signer's digital signature value is
   time-stamped by a trusted source before the electronic signature can
   become a ES with Complete validation data (ES-C).  The acceptable
   TSAs are specified in the Signature Validation Policy.

   Should both the signer and verifier be required to time-stamp the
   signature value to meet the requirements of the signature policy, the
   signature policy MAY specify a permitted time delay between the two
   time stamps.

B.4.6  Time-Stamping before CA Key Compromises

   Time-Stamped extended electronic signatures are needed when there is
   a requirement to safeguard against the possibility of a CA key in the
   certificate chain ever being compromised.  A verifier may be required
   to provide on request, proof that the certification path and the
   revocation information used a the time of the signature were valid,
   even in the case where one of the issuing keys or OCSP responder keys
   is later compromised.

   The current document defines two ways of using time-stamps to protect
   against this compromise:

      *  Time-Stamp the ES with Complete validation data, when an OCSP
         response is used to get the status of the certificate from the
         signer.

      *  Time-Stamp only the certification path and revocation
         information references when a CRL is used to get the status of
         the certificate from the signer.

   NOTE:  the signer, verifier or both may obtain the time-stamp.

B.4.6.1  Time-Stamping the ES with Complete validation data

   When an OCSP response is used, it is necessary to time stamp in
   particular that response in the case the key from the responder would
   be compromised.  Since the information contained in the OCSP response



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 77]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   is user specific and time specific, an individual time stamp is
   needed for every signature received.  Instead of placing the time
   stamp only over the certification path references and the revocation
   information references, which include the OCSP response, the time
   stamp is placed on the ES-C.  Since the certification path and
   revocation information references are included in the ES with
   Complete validation data they are also protected.  For the same
   cryptographic price, this provides an integrity mechanism over the ES
   with Complete validation data.  Any modification can be immediately
   detected.  It should be noticed that other means of
   protecting/detecting the integrity of the ES with Complete Validation
   Data exist and could be used.

   Although the technique requires a time stamp for every signature, it
   is well suited for individual users wishing to have an integrity
   protected copy of all the validated signatures they have received.

   By time-stamping the complete electronic signature, including the
   digital signature as well as the references to the certificates and
   revocation status information used to support validation of that
   signature, the time-stamp ensures that there is no ambiguity in the
   means of validating that signature.

   This technique is referred to as ES with eXtended validation data
   (ES-X), type 1 Time-Stamped in this document.

   NOTE:  Trust is achieved in the references by including a hash of the
   data being referenced.

   If it is desired for any reason to keep a copy of the additional data
   being referenced, the additional data may be attached to the
   electronic signature, in which case the electronic signature becomes
   a ES-X Long as defined by this document.

   A ES-X Long Time-Stamped is simply the concatenation of a ES-X Time-
   Stamped with a copy of the additional data being referenced.

B.4.6.2  Time-Stamping Certificates and Revocation Information

   References Time-Stamping each ES with Complete validation data as
   defined above may not be efficient, particularly when the same set of
   CA certificates and CRL information is used to validate many
   signatures.

   Time-Stamping CA certificates will stop any attacker from issuing
   bogus CA certificates that could be claimed to existing before the CA
   key was compromised.  Any bogus time-stamped CA certificates will
   show that the certificate was created after the legitimate CA key was



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 78]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   compromised.  In the same way, time-stamping CA CRLs, will stop any
   attacker from issuing bogus CA CRLs which could be claimed to
   existing before the CA key was compromised.

   Time-Stamping of commonly used certificates and CRLs can be done
   centrally, e.g., inside a company or by a service provider.  This
   method reduces the amount of data the verifier has to time-stamp, for
   example it could reduce to just one time stamp per day (i.e., in the
   case were all the signers use the same CA and the CRL applies for the
   whole day).  The information that needs to be time stamped is not the
   actual certificates and CRLs but the unambiguous references to those
   certificates and CRLs.

   To comply with extended validation data, type 2 Time-stamped, this
   document requires the following:

      *  All the CA certificates references and revocation information
         references (i.e., CRLs) used in validating the ES-C are covered
         by one or more time-stamp.

   Thus a ES-C with a time-stamp signature value at time T1, can be
   proved valid if all the CA and CRL references are time-stamped at
   time T1+.

B.4.7  Time-Stamping for Long Life of Signature

   Advances in computing increase the probability of being able to break
   algorithms and compromise keys.  There is therefore a requirement to
   be able to protect electronic signatures against this probability.

   Over a period of time weaknesses may occur in the cryptographic
   algorithms used to create an electronic signature (e.g., due to the
   time available for cryptoanalysis, or improvements in
   cryptoanalytical techniques).  Before this such weaknesses become
   likely, a verifier should take extra measures to maintain the
   validity of the electronic signature.  Several techniques could be
   used to achieve this goal depending on the nature of the weakened
   cryptography.  In order to simplify, a single technique, called
   Archive validation data, covering all the cases is being used in this
   document.

   Archive validation data consists of the Complete validation data and
   the complete certificate and revocation data, time stamped together
   with the electronic signature.  The Archive validation data is
   necessary if the hash function and the crypto algorithms that were
   used to create the signature are no longer secure.  Also, if it





Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 79]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   cannot be assumed that the hash function used by the Time Stamping
   Authority is secure, then nested time-stamps of Archived Electronic
   Signature are required.

   The potential for Trusted Service Provider (TSP) key compromise
   should be significantly lower than user keys, because TSP(s) are
   expected to use stronger cryptography and better key protection.  It
   can be expected that new algorithms (or old ones with greater key
   lengths) will be used.  In such a case, a sequence of time-stamps
   will protect against forgery.  Each time-stamp needs to be affixed
   before either the compromise of the signing key or of the cracking of
   the algorithms used by the TSA.  TSAs (Time-Stamping Authorities)
   should have long keys (e.g., which at the time of drafting this
   document was 2048 bits for the signing RSA algorithm) and/or a "good"
   or different algorithm.

   Nested time-stamps will also protect the verifier against key
   compromise or cracking the algorithm on the old electronic
   signatures.

   The process will need to be performed and iterated before the
   cryptographic algorithms used for generating the previous time stamp
   are no longer secure.  Archive validation data may thus bear multiple
   embedded time stamps.

B.4.8  Reference to Additional Data

   Using type 1 or 2 of Time-Stamped extended validation data verifiers
   still needs to keep track of all the components that were used to
   validate the signature, in order to be able to retrieve them again
   later on.  These components may be archived by an external source
   like a trusted service provider, in which case referenced information
   that is provided as part of the ES with Complete validation data
   (ES-C) is adequate.  The actual certificates and CRL information
   reference in the ES-C can be gathered when needed for arbitration.

B.4.9  Time-Stamping for Mutual Recognition

   In some business scenarios both the signer and the verifier need to
   time-stamp their own copy of the signature value.  Ideally the two
   time-stamps should be as close as possible to each other.

   Example: A contract is signed by two parties A and B representing
   their respective organizations, to time-stamp the signer and verifier
   data two approaches are possible:

      *  under the terms of the contract pre-defined common "trusted"
         TSA may be used;



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 80]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


      *  if both organizations run their own time-stamping services, A
         and B can have the transaction time-stamped by these two time-
         stamping services.  In the latter case, the electronic
         signature will only be considered as valid, if both time-stamps
         were obtained in due time (i.e., there should not be a long
         delay between obtaining the two time-stamps).  Thus, neither A
         nor B can repudiate the signing time indicated by their own
         time-stamping service.

   Therefore, A and B do not need to agree on a common "trusted" TSA to
   get a valid transaction.

   It is important to note that signatures may be generated "off-line"
   and time-stamped at a later time by anyone, e.g., by the signer or
   any recipient interested in validating the signature.  The time-stamp
   over the signature from the signer can thus be provided by the signer
   together with the signed document, and /or obtained by the verifier
   following receipt of the signed document.

   The business scenarios may thus dictate that one or more of the
   long-term signature time-stamping methods describe above be used.
   This will need to be part of a mutually agreed the Signature
   Validation Policy with is part of the overall signature policy under
   which digital signature may be used to support the business
   relationship between the two parties.

B.4.10  TSA Key Compromise

   TSA servers should be built in such a way that once the private
   signature key is installed, that there is minimal likelihood of
   compromise over as long as possible period.  Thus the validity period
   for the TSA's keys should be as long as possible.

   Both the ES-T and the ES-C contain at least one time stamp over the
   signer's signature.  In order to protect against the compromise of
   the private signature key used to produce that time-stamp, the
   Archive validation data can be used when a different Time-Stamping
   Authority key is involved to produce the additional time-stamp.  If
   it is believed that the TSA key used in providing an earlier time-
   stamp may ever be compromised (e.g., outside its validity period),
   then the ES-A should be used.  For extremely long periods this may be
   applied repeatedly using new TSA keys.

B.5  Multiple Signatures

   Some electronic signatures may only be valid if they bear more than
   one signature.  This is the case generally when a contract is signed
   between two parties.  The ordering of the signatures may or may not



Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 81]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


   be important, i.e., one may or may not need to be applied before the
   other. Several forms of multiple and counter signatures may need to
   be supported, which fall into two basic categories:

      *  independent signatures;
      *  embedded signatures.

   Independent signatures are parallel signatures where the ordering of
   the signatures is not important.  The capability to have more than
   one independent signature over the same data must be provided.

   Embedded signatures are applied one after the other and are used
   where the order the signatures are applied is important.  The
   capability to sign over signed data must be provided.

   These forms are described in clause 3.13.  All other multiple
   signature schemes, e.g., a signed document with a countersignature,
   double countersignatures or multiple signatures, can be reduced to
   one or more occurrence of the above two cases.

Annex C (informative):  Identifiers and roles

C.1  Signer Name Forms

   The name used by the signer, held as the subject in the signer's
   certificate, must uniquely identify the entity.  The name must be
   allocated and verified on registration with the Certification
   Authority, either directly or indirectly through a Registration
   Authority, before being issued with a Certificate.

   This document places no restrictions on the form of the name.  The
   subject's name may be a distinguished name, as defined in [RFC2459],
   held in the subject field of the certificate, or any other name form
   held in the X.509 subjectAltName certificate extension field.  In the
   case that the subject has no distinguished name, the subject name can
   be an empty sequence and the subjectAltName extension must be
   critical.

C.2  TSP Name Forms

   All TSP name forms (Certification Authorities, Attribute Authorities
   and Time-Stamping Authorities) must be in the form of a distinguished
   name held in the subject field of the certificate.

   The TSP name form must include the legal jurisdiction (i.e., country)
   under which it operates and an identification for the organization
   providing the service.




Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 82]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


C.3  Roles and Signer Attributes

   Where a signer signs as an individual but wishes to also identify
   him/herself as acting on behalf of an organization, it may be
   necessary to provide two independent forms of identification.  The
   first identity, with is directly associated with the signing key
   identifies him/her as an individual.  The second, which is managed
   independently, identifies that person acting as part of the
   organization, possibly with a given role.

   In this case the first identity is carried in the
   subject/subjectAltName field of the signer's certificate as described
   above.

   This document supports the following means of providing a second form
   of identification:

      *  by placing a secondary name field containing a claimed role in
         the CMS signed attributes field;

      *  by placing an attribute certificate containing a certified role
         in the CMS signed attributes field.





























Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 83]
^L
RFC 3126              Electronic Signature Formats        September 2001


Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
   copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
   English.

   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
   BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.



















Pinkas, et al.               Informational                     [Page 84]
^L