path: root/doc/rfc/rfc5489.txt

Network Working Group                                           M. Badra
Request for Comments: 5489                         CNRS/LIMOS Laboratory
Category: Informational                                        I. Hajjeh
                                                              INEOVATION
                                                              March 2009


       ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)

Status of This Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
   memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
   publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.

Abstract

   This document extends RFC 4279, RFC 4492, and RFC 4785 and specifies
   a set of cipher suites that use a pre-shared key (PSK) to
   authenticate an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman exchange with Ephemeral
   keys (ECDHE).  These cipher suites provide Perfect Forward Secrecy
   (PFS).






Badra & Hajjeh               Informational                      [Page 1]
^L
RFC 5489            ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for TLS           March 2009


Table of Contents

   1. Introduction ....................................................2
      1.1. Applicability Statement ....................................3
      1.2. Conventions Used in This Document ..........................3
   2. ECDHE_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm ................................3
   3. ECDHE_PSK-Based Cipher Suites ...................................4
      3.1. ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites Using the SHA-1 Hash ...............4
      3.2. ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites Using SHA-2 Hashes .................4
   4. ECDHE_PSK-Based Cipher Suites with NULL Encryption ..............5
      4.1. ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suite Using the SHA-1 Hash with
           NULL Encryption ............................................5
      4.2. ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites Using SHA-2 Hashes with
           NULL Encryption ............................................5
   5. Security Considerations .........................................5
   6. IANA Considerations .............................................6
   7. Acknowledgments .................................................6
   8. Normative References ............................................6

1.  Introduction

   RFC 4279 specifies cipher suites for supporting TLS using pre-shared
   symmetric keys that (a) use only symmetric key operations for
   authentication, (b) use a Diffie-Hellman exchange authenticated with
   a pre-shared key (PSK), or (c) combine public key authentication of
   the server with pre-shared key authentication of the client.

   RFC 4785 specifies authentication-only cipher suites (with no
   encryption).  These cipher suites are useful when authentication and
   integrity protection is desired, but confidentiality is not needed or
   not permitted.

   RFC 4492 defines a set of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)-based
   cipher suites for TLS and describes the use of ECC certificates for
   client authentication.  In particular, it specifies the use of
   Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement in a TLS handshake
   and the use of the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
   as a new authentication mechanism.

   This document specifies a set of cipher suites that use a PSK to
   authenticate an ECDH exchange.  These cipher suites provide Perfect
   Forward Secrecy.  Some of these cipher suites provide authentication
   only.

   The reader is expected to become familiar with RFC 4279, RFC 4492,
   and RFC 4785 prior to studying this document.





Badra & Hajjeh               Informational                      [Page 2]
^L
RFC 5489            ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for TLS           March 2009


1.1.  Applicability Statement

   The cipher suites defined in this document can be negotiated,
   whatever the negotiated TLS version is.

   The applicability statement in [RFC4279] applies to this document as
   well.

1.2.  Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  ECDHE_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm

   The cipher suites described in this document make use of the elliptic
   curve (EC) parameter negotiation mechanism defined in RFC 4492.  When
   the cipher suites defined in this document are used, the
   'ec_diffie_hellman_psk' case inside the ServerKeyExchange and
   ClientKeyExchange structure MUST be used instead of the 'psk' case
   defined in [RFC4279] (i.e., the ServerKeyExchange and
   ClientKeyExchange messages include the EC Diffie-Hellman parameters
   in the form specified in Sections 5.4 and 5.7 of [RFC4492]).  The PSK
   identity and identity hint fields have the same meaning and encoding
   as specified in [RFC4279] (note that the ServerKeyExchange message is
   always sent, even if no PSK identity hint is provided).

   The format of the ServerKeyExchange and ClientKeyExchange messages is
   shown below.

      struct {
          select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
              /* other cases for rsa, diffie_hellman, etc. */
              case ec_diffie_hellman_psk:  /* NEW */
                  opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>;
                  ServerECDHParams params;
          };
      } ServerKeyExchange;

      struct {
          select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
              /* other cases for rsa, diffie_hellman, etc. */
              case ec_diffie_hellman_psk:   /* NEW */
                  opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
                  ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public;
          } exchange_keys;
      } ClientKeyExchange;



Badra & Hajjeh               Informational                      [Page 3]
^L
RFC 5489            ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for TLS           March 2009


   The premaster secret is formed as follows.  First, perform the ECDH
   computation as described in Section 5.10 of [RFC4492].  Let Z be the
   octet string produced by this computation.  Next, concatenate a
   uint16 containing the length of Z (in octets), Z itself, a uint16
   containing the length of the PSK (in octets), and the PSK itself.

   This corresponds to the general structure for the premaster secrets
   (see Note 1 in Section 2 of [RFC4279]), with "other_secret"
   containing Z.

      struct {
          opaque other_secret<0..2^16-1>;
          opaque psk<0..2^16-1>;
      };

3.  ECDHE_PSK-Based Cipher Suites

3.1.  ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites Using the SHA-1 Hash

      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA          = {0xC0,0x33};
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA     = {0xC0,0x34};
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA      = {0xC0,0x35};
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA      = {0xC0,0x36};

   The above four cipher suites match the cipher suites defined in
   [RFC4279], except that they use an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
   exchange [RFC4492] authenticated with a PSK, and:

   o  The Message Authentication Code (MAC) is the Hashed Message
      Authentication Code (HMAC) [RFC2104] with SHA-1 as the hash
      function.

   o  When negotiated in a version of TLS prior to 1.2, the Pseudo-
      Random Function (PRF) from that version is used; otherwise, the
      PRF is the TLS PRF [RFC5246] with SHA-256 as the hash function.

3.2.  ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites Using SHA-2 Hashes

      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256   = {0xC0,0x37};
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384   = {0xC0,0x38};

   The above two cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
   Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher suites in Section 3.1
   above, except for the hash and PRF algorithms, which SHALL be as
   follows:






Badra & Hajjeh               Informational                      [Page 4]
^L
RFC 5489            ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for TLS           March 2009


   o  For the cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:

      *  The MAC is HMAC [RFC2104] with SHA-256 as the hash function.

      *  When negotiated in a version of TLS prior to 1.2, the PRF from
         that version is used; otherwise, the PRF is the TLS PRF
         [RFC5246] with SHA-256 as the hash function.

   o  For the cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:

      *  The MAC is HMAC [RFC2104] with SHA-384 as the hash function.

      *  When negotiated in a version of TLS prior to 1.2, the PRF from
         that version is used; otherwise the PRF is the TLS PRF
         [RFC5246] with SHA-384 as the hash function.

4.  ECDHE_PSK-Based Cipher Suites with NULL Encryption

4.1.  ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suite Using the SHA-1 Hash with NULL Encryption

   The following cipher suite matches the cipher suites defined in
   Section 3.1, except that we define a suite with NULL encryption.

      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA             = {0xC0,0x39};

4.2.  ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites Using SHA-2 Hashes with NULL Encryption

   The following two cipher suites are the same as the corresponding
   cipher suites in Section 3.2, but with NULL encryption (instead of
   AES).

      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256          = {0xC0,0x3A};
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384          = {0xC0,0x3B};

5.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations described throughout [RFC5246],
   [RFC4785], [RFC4492], and [RFC4279] apply here as well.  In
   particular, as the authentication-only cipher suites (with no
   encryption) defined here do not support confidentiality, care should
   be taken not to send sensitive information (such as passwords) over
   connections protected with one of the cipher suites with NULL
   encryption defined in Section 4 of this document.








Badra & Hajjeh               Informational                      [Page 5]
^L
RFC 5489            ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for TLS           March 2009


   Implementers and administrators should monitor the general statements
   on recommended cryptographic algorithms (e.g., SHA-1 hash function)
   that are published from time to time by various forums, including the
   IETF, as a base for the portfolio they support and the policies for
   strength of function acceptable for the cipher suites they set.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document defines the following new cipher suites, whose values
   have been assigned from the TLS Cipher Suite registry defined in
   [RFC5246].

      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA          = {0xC0,0x33};
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA     = {0xC0,0x34};
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA      = {0xC0,0x35};
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA      = {0xC0,0x36};
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256   = {0xC0,0x37};
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384   = {0xC0,0x38};
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA             = {0xC0,0x39};
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256          = {0xC0,0x3A};
      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384          = {0xC0,0x3B};

7.  Acknowledgments

   The author appreciates Alfred Hoenes for his detailed review and
   effort on resolving issues in discussion.  The author would like to
   acknowledge Bodo Moeller, Simon Josefsson, Uri Blumenthal, Pasi
   Eronen, Paul Hoffman, Joseph Salowey, Mark Tillinghast, and the TLS
   mailing list members for their comments on the document.

8.  Normative References

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              February 1997.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4279]  Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites
              for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279,
              December 2005.

   [RFC4492]  Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
              Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
              for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, May 2006.





Badra & Hajjeh               Informational                      [Page 6]
^L
RFC 5489            ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for TLS           March 2009


   [RFC4785]  Blumenthal, U. and P. Goel, "Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
              Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 4785, January 2007.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

Authors' Addresses

   Mohamad Badra
   CNRS/LIMOS Laboratory
   Campus de cezeaux, Bat. ISIMA
   Aubiere  63170
   France

   EMail: badra@isima.fr


   Ibrahim Hajjeh
   INEOVATION
   France

   EMail: ibrahim.hajjeh@ineovation.fr




























Badra & Hajjeh               Informational                      [Page 7]
^L