path: root/doc/rfc/rfc5910.txt

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                          J. Gould
Request for Comments: 5910                                 S. Hollenbeck
Obsoletes: 4310                                           VeriSign, Inc.
Category: Standards Track                                       May 2010
ISSN: 2070-1721


          Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions Mapping
             for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)

Abstract

   This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
   extension mapping for the provisioning and management of Domain Name
   System security (DNSSEC) extensions for domain names stored in a
   shared central repository.  Specified in XML, this mapping extends
   the EPP domain name mapping to provide additional features required
   for the provisioning of DNS security extensions.  This document
   obsoletes RFC 4310.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5910.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



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   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Conventions Used in This Document  . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Migrating from RFC 4310  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Object Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  Delegation Signer Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       3.1.1.  Public Key Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.2.  Booleans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.3.  Maximum Signature Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.1.  DS Data Interface  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.2.  Key Data Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.3.  Example DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface . . . . .  8
   5.  EPP Command Mapping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     5.1.  EPP Query Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       5.1.1.  EPP <check> Command  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       5.1.2.  EPP <info> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       5.1.3.  EPP <transfer> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     5.2.  EPP Transform Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       5.2.1.  EPP <create> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       5.2.2.  EPP <delete> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       5.2.3.  EPP <renew> Command  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       5.2.4.  EPP <transfer> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       5.2.5.  EPP <update> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   6.  Formal Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   7.  Internationalization Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
   9.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
   11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
     11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
     11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
   Appendix A.  Changes from RFC 4310 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33





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1.  Introduction

   This document describes an extension mapping for version 1.0 of the
   Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) described in RFC 5730
   [RFC5730].  This mapping, an extension of the domain name mapping
   described in RFC 5731 [RFC5731], is specified using the Extensible
   Markup Language (XML) 1.0 [W3C.REC-xml-20001006] and XML Schema
   notation ([W3C.REC-xmlschema-1-20010502]
   [W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502]).

   The EPP core protocol specification [RFC5730] provides a complete
   description of EPP command and response structures.  A thorough
   understanding of the base protocol specification is necessary to
   understand the mapping described in this document.  Familiarity with
   the Domain Name System (DNS) described in RFC 1034 [RFC1034] and
   RFC 1035 [RFC1035] and with DNS security extensions described in
   RFC 4033 [RFC4033], RFC 4034 [RFC4034], and RFC 4035 [RFC4035] is
   required to understand the DNS security concepts described in this
   document.

   The EPP mapping described in this document specifies a mechanism for
   the provisioning and management of DNS security extensions in a
   shared central repository.  Information exchanged via this mapping
   can be extracted from the repository and used to publish DNSSEC
   Delegation Signer (DS) resource records (RRs) as described in
   RFC 4034 [RFC4034].

   This document obsoletes RFC 4310 [RFC4310]; thus, secDNS-1.1 as
   defined in this document deprecates secDNS-1.0 [RFC4310].  The
   motivation behind obsoleting RFC 4310 [RFC4310] includes:

   -  Addressing the issue with removing DS data based on the non-unique
      <secDNS:keyTag> element.  The client should explicitly specify the
      DS data to be removed, by using all four <secDNS:dsData> elements
      that are guaranteed to be unique.

   -  Adding the ability to add and remove <secDNS:dsData> elements in a
      single command.  This makes it consistent with RFC 5731 [RFC5731].

   -  Clarifying and correcting the usage of the <secDNS:chg> element.
      RFC 4310 [RFC4310] defined the <secDNS:chg> element as a
      replacement for the DS data.  This is inconsistent with RFC 5731
      [RFC5731], where a <domain:chg> element is used to change the
      values of the domain attributes.

   -  Adding support for the Key Data Interface described in Section 4.2
      for "thick" DNSSEC servers that accept only key data and generate
      the associated DS data.



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1.1.  Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119
   [RFC2119].

   In examples, "C:" represents lines sent by a protocol client, and
   "S:" represents lines returned by a protocol server. "////" is used
   to note element values that have been shortened to better fit page
   boundaries.  Indentation and white space in examples is provided only
   to illustrate element relationships and is not a mandatory feature of
   this protocol.

   XML is case sensitive.  Unless stated otherwise, XML specifications
   and examples provided in this document MUST be interpreted in the
   character case presented in order to develop a conforming
   implementation.

   secDNS-1.0 is used as an abbreviation for
   urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0, and secDNS-1.1 is used as an
   abbreviation for urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1.

2.  Migrating from RFC 4310

   This section includes implementation recommendations for clients and
   servers to use in migrating from secDNS-1.0 [RFC4310] to secDNS-1.1.

   As this document deprecates RFC 4310 [RFC4310], if a server announces
   support for both secDNS-1.0 [RFC4310] and secDNS-1.1 in the EPP
   greeting, clients supporting both versions SHOULD prefer secDNS-1.1.

   A server SHOULD do the following to help clients migrate from
   secDNS-1.0 [RFC4310] to secDNS-1.1 as defined in this document.

   1.  A server migrating from secDNS-1.0 [RFC4310] to secDNS-1.1 SHOULD
       support both versions (i.e., secDNS-1.0 and secDNS-1.1) for a
       reasonable migration period.

   2.  The version of the <secDNS:infData> element to be returned by the
       server in the response to a <domain:info> response SHOULD depend
       on the <extURI> elements (indicating the secDNS extension) the
       client included in the EPP <login> command using the following
       mapping:

       -  Return version secDNS-1.1 of the <secDNS:infData> element if
          urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1 was included as an <extURI>
          element in the EPP <login> command, independent of whether



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          urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0 is also included as an
          <extURI> element in the EPP <login> command.

       -  Return version secDNS-1.0 of the <secDNS:infData> element if
          urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0 but not
          urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1 was included as an <extURI>
          element in the EPP <login> command.

       -  Don't return the <secDNS:infData> element if neither
          urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0 nor
          urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1 was included as an <extURI>
          element in the EPP <login> command.

3.  Object Attributes

   This extension adds additional elements to the EPP domain name
   mapping [RFC5731].  Only those new elements are described here.

3.1.  Delegation Signer Information

   Delegation Signer (DS) information is published by a DNS server to
   indicate that a child zone is digitally signed and that the parent
   zone recognizes the indicated key as a valid zone key for the child
   zone.  A DS resource record (RR) contains four fields: a key tag
   field, a key algorithm number octet, an octet identifying a digest
   algorithm, and a digest field.  See RFC 4034 [RFC4034] for specific
   field formats.

3.1.1.  Public Key Information

   Public key information provided by a client maps to the DNSKEY RR
   presentation field formats described in Section 2.2 of RFC 4034
   [RFC4034].  A DNSKEY RR contains four fields: flags, a protocol
   octet, an algorithm number octet, and a public key.

3.2.  Booleans

   Boolean values MUST be represented in the XML Schema format described
   in Part 2 of the W3C XML Schema recommendation
   [W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502].

3.3.  Maximum Signature Lifetime

   Maximum signature lifetime (maxSigLife) is an OPTIONAL child
   preference for the number of seconds after signature generation when
   the parent's signature on the DS information provided by the child
   will expire.  The maxSigLife value applies to the RRSIG resource




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   record (RR) over the DS RRset.  See Section 3 of RFC 4034 [RFC4034]
   for information on the RRSIG resource record (RR).

   The maximum signature lifetime is represented using the <secDNS:
   maxSigLife> element.  The maxSigLife value MUST be represented in
   seconds, using an extended XML Schema "int" format.  The base "int"
   format, which allows negative numbers, is described in Part 2 of the
   W3C XML Schema recommendation [W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502].  This
   format is further restricted to enforce a minimum value of 1.

   If maxSigLife is not provided by the client, or if the server does
   not support the client-specified maxSigLife value, the default
   signature expiration policy of the server operator (as determined
   using an out-of-band mechanism) applies.

4.  DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface

   This document describes operational scenarios in which a client can
   create, add, and remove Delegation Signer (DS) information or key
   data information for a domain name.  There are two different forms of
   interfaces that a server can support.  The first is called the "DS
   Data Interface", where the client is responsible for the creation of
   the DS information and is required to pass DS information when
   performing adds and removes.  The server is required to pass DS
   information for <domain:info> responses.  The second is the "Key Data
   Interface," where the client is responsible for passing the key data
   information when performing adds and removes.  The server is
   responsible for passing key data information for <domain:info>
   responses.

   The server MUST support one form of interface within a single command
   or response, where <secDNS:dsData> and <secDNS:keyData> MUST NOT be
   mixed, except for when <secDNS:keyData> is a child element of
   <secDNS:dsData> for server validation.  The server MUST support the
   use of only one form of interface across all <secDNS:create>,
   <secDNS:update>, and <secDNS:infData> elements, except during a
   transition period, during which the server MAY support both.  For
   instance, during a transition period, the server MAY support either
   the DS Data Interface or the Key Data Interface on a per-domain basis
   and allow the client to migrate to the target interface.  The client
   can replace the interface used by utilizing the <secDNS:rem><secDNS:
   all>true</secDNS:all></secDNS:rem> element to remove all data of the
   old interface, and by utilizing the <secDNS:add> to add data using
   the new interface (<secDNS:dsData> for the DS Data Interface and
   <secDNS:keyData> for the Key Data Interface).  The server MUST return
   an EPP error result code of 2306 if the server receives a command
   using an unsupported interface.




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4.1.  DS Data Interface

   The DS Data Interface relies on the use of the <secDNS:dsData>
   element for creates, adds, removes, and <domain:info> responses.  The
   key data associated with the DS information MAY be provided by the
   client, but the server is not obligated to use the key data.  The
   server operator MAY also issue out-of-band DNS queries to retrieve
   the key data from the registered domain's apex in order to evaluate
   the received DS information.  It is RECOMMENDED that the child zone
   operator have this key data online in the DNS tree to allow the
   parent zone administrator to validate the data as necessary.  The key
   data SHOULD have the Secure Entry Point (SEP) bit set as described in
   RFC 3757 [RFC3757] and RFC 4034 [RFC4034].

   The <secDNS:dsData> element contains the following child elements:

   -  A <secDNS:keyTag> element that contains a key tag value as
      described in Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4034 [RFC4034].  The <secDNS:
      keyTag> element is represented as an unsignedShort
      [W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502].

   -  A <secDNS:alg> element that contains an algorithm value as
      described in Section 5.1.2 of RFC 4034 [RFC4034].

   -  A <secDNS:digestType> element that contains a digest type value as
      described in Section 5.1.3 of RFC 4034 [RFC4034].

   -  A <secDNS:digest> element that contains a digest value as
      described in Section 5.1.4 of RFC 4034 [RFC4034].  The <secDNS:
      digest> element is represented as a hexBinary
      [W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502].

   -  An OPTIONAL <secDNS:keyData> element that describes the key data
      used as input in the DS hash calculation for use in server
      validation.  The <secDNS:keyData> element contains the child
      elements defined in Section 4.2.

4.2.  Key Data Interface

   The Key Data Interface relies on the use of the <secDNS:keyData>
   element for creates, adds, removes, and <domain:info> responses.  The
   DS information is not provided by the client but is generated by the
   server.  The attributes used for DS generation are based on server
   policy, where only key data is passed between the client and the
   server.






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   The <secDNS:keyData> element contains the following child elements:

   -  A <secDNS:flags> element that contains a flags field value as
      described in Section 2.1.1 of RFC 4034 [RFC4034].

   -  A <secDNS:protocol> element that contains a protocol field value
      as described in Section 2.1.2 of RFC 4034 [RFC4034].

   -  A <secDNS:alg> element that contains an algorithm number field
      value as described in Section 2.1.3 of RFC 4034 [RFC4034].

   -  A <secDNS:pubKey> element that contains an encoded public key
      field value as described in Section 2.1.4 of RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
      The <secDNS:pubKey> element is represented as a base64Binary
      [W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502] with a minimum length of 1.

4.3.  Example DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface

   Example use of the secDNS-1.1 DS Data Interface for a create:

   <secDNS:dsData>
     <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
     <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
     <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
     <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
   </secDNS:dsData>

   Example use of secDNS-1.1 DS Data Interface with option key data for
   a create:

   <secDNS:dsData>
     <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
     <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
     <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
     <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
     <secDNS:keyData>
       <secDNS:flags>257</secDNS:flags>
       <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
       <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
       <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
     </secDNS:keyData>
    </secDNS:dsData>









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   Example use of the secDNS-1.1 Key Data Interface for a create:

    <secDNS:keyData>
      <secDNS:flags>257</secDNS:flags>
      <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
      <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
      <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
    </secDNS:keyData>

5.  EPP Command Mapping

   A detailed description of the EPP syntax and semantics can be found
   in the EPP core protocol specification [RFC5730].  The command
   mappings described here are specifically for use in provisioning and
   managing DNS security extensions via EPP.

5.1.  EPP Query Commands

   EPP provides three commands to retrieve object information: <check>
   to determine if an object is known to the server, <info> to retrieve
   detailed information associated with an object, and <transfer> to
   retrieve object transfer status information.

5.1.1.  EPP <check> Command

   This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <check> command
   or <check> response described in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731].

5.1.2.  EPP <info> Command

   This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <info> command
   described in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731].  However, additional
   elements are defined for the <info> response.

   When an <info> command has been processed successfully, the EPP
   <resData> element MUST contain child elements as described in the EPP
   domain mapping [RFC5731].  In addition, the EPP <extension> element
   SHOULD contain a child <secDNS:infData> element that identifies the
   extension namespace if the domain object has data associated with
   this extension and based on server policy.  The <secDNS:infData>
   element contains the following child elements:

   -  An OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> element that indicates a child's
      preference for the number of seconds after signature generation
      when the parent's signature on the DS information provided by the
      child will expire. maxSigLife is described in Section 3.3.





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   -  One or more <secDNS:dsData> elements or <secDNS:keyData> elements,
      but not both, as defined in Section 4.  The <secDNS:dsData>
      elements describe the Delegation Signer (DS) data provided by the
      client for the domain.  The <secDNS:keyData> elements describe the
      key data provided by the client for the domain.  Child elements of
      the <secDNS:dsData> element are described in Section 4.1.  Child
      elements of the <secDNS:keyData> element are described in
      Section 4.2.

   Example <info> Response for a Secure Delegation
                 Using the DS Data Interface:

   S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
   S:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
   S:  <response>
   S:    <result code="1000">
   S:      <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
   S:    </result>
   S:    <resData>
   S:      <domain:infData
   S:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   S:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
   S:        <domain:roid>EXAMPLE1-REP</domain:roid>
   S:        <domain:status s="ok"/>
   S:        <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
   S:        <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
   S:        <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
   S:        <domain:ns>
   S:          <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
   S:          <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
   S:        </domain:ns>
   S:        <domain:host>ns1.example.com</domain:host>
   S:        <domain:host>ns2.example.com</domain:host>
   S:        <domain:clID>ClientX</domain:clID>
   S:        <domain:crID>ClientY</domain:crID>
   S:        <domain:crDate>1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:crDate>
   S:        <domain:upID>ClientX</domain:upID>
   S:        <domain:upDate>1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z</domain:upDate>
   S:        <domain:exDate>2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:exDate>
   S:        <domain:trDate>2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z</domain:trDate>
   S:        <domain:authInfo>
   S:          <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
   S:        </domain:authInfo>
   S:      </domain:infData>
   S:    </resData>
   S:    <extension>
   S:      <secDNS:infData



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   S:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
   S:        <secDNS:dsData>
   S:          <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
   S:          <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
   S:          <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
   S:          <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
   S:        </secDNS:dsData>
   S:      </secDNS:infData>
   S:    </extension>
   S:    <trID>
   S:      <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   S:      <svTRID>54322-XYZ</svTRID>
   S:    </trID>
   S:  </response>
   S:</epp>

   Example <info> Response for a Secure Delegation
                 Using the DS Data Interface with OPTIONAL Key Data:

   S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
   S:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
   S:  <response>
   S:    <result code="1000">
   S:      <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
   S:    </result>
   S:    <resData>
   S:      <domain:infData
   S:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   S:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
   S:        <domain:roid>EXAMPLE1-REP</domain:roid>
   S:        <domain:status s="ok"/>
   S:        <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
   S:        <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
   S:        <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
   S:        <domain:ns>
   S:          <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
   S:          <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
   S:        </domain:ns>
   S:        <domain:host>ns1.example.com</domain:host>
   S:        <domain:host>ns2.example.com</domain:host>
   S:        <domain:clID>ClientX</domain:clID>
   S:        <domain:crID>ClientY</domain:crID>
   S:        <domain:crDate>1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:crDate>
   S:        <domain:upID>ClientX</domain:upID>
   S:        <domain:upDate>1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z</domain:upDate>
   S:        <domain:exDate>2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:exDate>
   S:        <domain:trDate>2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z</domain:trDate>



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   S:        <domain:authInfo>
   S:          <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
   S:        </domain:authInfo>
   S:      </domain:infData>
   S:    </resData>
   S:    <extension>
   S:      <secDNS:infData
   S:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
   S:        <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
   S:        <secDNS:dsData>
   S:          <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
   S:          <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
   S:          <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
   S:          <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
   S:          <secDNS:keyData>
   S:            <secDNS:flags>257</secDNS:flags>
   S:            <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
   S:            <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
   S:            <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
   S:          </secDNS:keyData>
   S:        </secDNS:dsData>
   S:      </secDNS:infData>
   S:    </extension>
   S:    <trID>
   S:      <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   S:      <svTRID>54322-XYZ</svTRID>
   S:    </trID>
   S:  </response>
   S:</epp>

   Example <info> Response for a Secure Delegation
                 Using the Key Data Interface:

   S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
   S:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
   S:  <response>
   S:    <result code="1000">
   S:      <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
   S:    </result>
   S:    <resData>
   S:      <domain:infData
   S:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   S:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
   S:        <domain:roid>EXAMPLE1-REP</domain:roid>
   S:        <domain:status s="ok"/>
   S:        <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
   S:        <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>



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   S:        <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
   S:        <domain:ns>
   S:          <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
   S:          <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
   S:        </domain:ns>
   S:        <domain:host>ns1.example.com</domain:host>
   S:        <domain:host>ns2.example.com</domain:host>
   S:        <domain:clID>ClientX</domain:clID>
   S:        <domain:crID>ClientY</domain:crID>
   S:        <domain:crDate>1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:crDate>
   S:        <domain:upID>ClientX</domain:upID>
   S:        <domain:upDate>1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z</domain:upDate>
   S:        <domain:exDate>2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:exDate>
   S:        <domain:trDate>2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z</domain:trDate>
   S:        <domain:authInfo>
   S:          <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
   S:        </domain:authInfo>
   S:      </domain:infData>
   S:    </resData>
   S:    <extension>
   S:      <secDNS:infData
   S:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
   S:        <secDNS:keyData>
   S:          <secDNS:flags>257</secDNS:flags>
   S:          <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
   S:          <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
   S:          <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
   S:        </secDNS:keyData>
   S:      </secDNS:infData>
   S:    </extension>
   S:    <trID>
   S:      <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   S:      <svTRID>54322-XYZ</svTRID>
   S:    </trID>
   S:  </response>
   S:</epp>

   An EPP error response MUST be returned if an <info> command cannot be
   processed for any reason.

5.1.3.  EPP <transfer> Command

   This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <transfer>
   command or <transfer> response described in the EPP domain mapping
   [RFC5731].






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5.2.  EPP Transform Commands

   EPP provides five commands to transform objects: <create> to create
   an instance of an object, <delete> to delete an instance of an
   object, <renew> to extend the validity period of an object,
   <transfer> to manage object sponsorship changes, and <update> to
   change information associated with an object.

5.2.1.  EPP <create> Command

   This extension defines additional elements for the EPP <create>
   command described in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731].  No additional
   elements are defined for the EPP <create> response.

   The EPP <create> command provides a transform operation that allows a
   client to create a domain object.  In addition to the EPP command
   elements described in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731], the command
   MUST contain an <extension> element, and the <extension> element MUST
   contain a child <secDNS:create> element that identifies the extension
   namespace if the client wants to associate data defined in this
   extension to the domain object.  The <secDNS:create> element contains
   the following child elements:

   -  An OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> element that indicates a child's
      preference for the number of seconds after signature generation
      when the parent's signature on the DS information provided by the
      child will expire. maxSigLife is described in Section 3.3.  If the
      server does not support the <secDNS:maxSigLife> element, a 2102
      error MUST be returned.

   -  Zero or more <secDNS:dsData> elements or <secDNS:keyData>
      elements, but not both, as defined in Section 4.  Child elements
      of the <secDNS:dsData> element are described in Section 4.1.
      Child elements of the <secDNS:keyData> element are described in
      Section 4.2.
















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   Example <create> Command for a Secure Delegation
                 Using the DS Data Interface:

   C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
   C:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
   C:  <command>
   C:    <create>
   C:      <domain:create
   C:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
   C:        <domain:period unit="y">2</domain:period>
   C:        <domain:ns>
   C:          <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
   C:          <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
   C:        </domain:ns>
   C:        <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
   C:        <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
   C:        <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
   C:        <domain:authInfo>
   C:          <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
   C:        </domain:authInfo>
   C:      </domain:create>
   C:    </create>
   C:    <extension>
   C:      <secDNS:create
   C:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
   C:        <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
   C:        <secDNS:dsData>
   C:          <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
   C:          <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
   C:          <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
   C:          <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
   C:        </secDNS:dsData>
   C:      </secDNS:create>
   C:    </extension>
   C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   C:  </command>
   C:</epp>












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   Example <create> Command for a Secure Delegation
                 Using the DS Data Interface with OPTIONAL Key Data:

   C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
   C:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
   C:  <command>
   C:    <create>
   C:      <domain:create
   C:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
   C:        <domain:period unit="y">2</domain:period>
   C:        <domain:ns>
   C:          <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
   C:          <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
   C:        </domain:ns>
   C:        <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
   C:        <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
   C:        <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
   C:        <domain:authInfo>
   C:          <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
   C:        </domain:authInfo>
   C:      </domain:create>
   C:    </create>
   C:    <extension>
   C:      <secDNS:create
   C:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
   C:        <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
   C:        <secDNS:dsData>
   C:          <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
   C:          <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
   C:          <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
   C:          <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
   C:          <secDNS:keyData>
   C:            <secDNS:flags>257</secDNS:flags>
   C:            <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
   C:            <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
   C:            <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
   C:          </secDNS:keyData>
   C:        </secDNS:dsData>
   C:      </secDNS:create>
   C:    </extension>
   C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   C:  </command>
   C:</epp>






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   Example <create> Command for a Secure Delegation
                 Using the Key Data Interface:

   C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
   C:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
   C:  <command>
   C:    <create>
   C:      <domain:create
   C:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
   C:        <domain:period unit="y">2</domain:period>
   C:        <domain:ns>
   C:          <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
   C:          <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
   C:        </domain:ns>
   C:        <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
   C:        <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
   C:        <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
   C:        <domain:authInfo>
   C:          <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
   C:        </domain:authInfo>
   C:      </domain:create>
   C:    </create>
   C:    <extension>
   C:      <secDNS:create
   C:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
   C:        <secDNS:keyData>
   C:          <secDNS:flags>257</secDNS:flags>
   C:          <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
   C:          <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
   C:          <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
   C:        </secDNS:keyData>
   C:      </secDNS:create>
   C:    </extension>
   C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   C:  </command>
   C:</epp>

   When a <create> command has been processed successfully, the EPP
   response is as described in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731].

5.2.2.  EPP <delete> Command

   This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <delete> command
   or <delete> response described in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731].





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5.2.3.  EPP <renew> Command

   This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <renew> command
   or <renew> response described in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731].

5.2.4.  EPP <transfer> Command

   This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <transfer>
   command or <transfer> response described in the EPP domain mapping
   [RFC5731].

5.2.5.  EPP <update> Command

   This extension defines additional elements for the EPP <update>
   command described in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731].  No additional
   elements are defined for the EPP <update> response.

   The EPP <update> command provides a transform operation that allows a
   client to modify the attributes of a domain object.  In addition to
   the EPP command elements described in the EPP domain mapping, the
   command MUST contain an <extension> element, and the <extension>
   element MUST contain a child <secDNS:update> element that identifies
   the extension namespace if the client wants to update the domain
   object with data defined in this extension.  The <secDNS:update>
   element contains a <secDNS:add> element to add security information
   to a delegation, a <secDNS:rem> element to remove security
   information from a delegation, or a <secDNS:chg> element to change
   existing security information.  At least one <secDNS:add>, <secDNS:
   rem>, or <secDNS:chg> element MUST be provided.  The order of the
   <secDNS:rem> and <secDNS:add> elements is significant, where the
   server MUST first remove the existing elements prior to adding the
   new elements.

   The <secDNS:update> element also contains an OPTIONAL "urgent"
   attribute that a client can use to ask the server operator to
   complete and implement the update request with high priority.  This
   attribute accepts boolean values as described in Section 3.2; the
   default value is boolean false.  "High priority" is relative to
   standard server operator policies that are determined using an out-
   of-band mechanism.  A server MUST return an EPP error result code of
   2102 if the "urgent" attribute is specified with a value of boolean
   true and the server does not support it.  A server MUST return an EPP
   error result code of 2306 if the server supports the "urgent"
   attribute and an urgent update (noted with an "urgent" attribute
   value of boolean true) cannot be completed with high priority.






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   The <secDNS:update> element contains the following child elements:

   -  An OPTIONAL <secDNS:rem> element that contains a <secDNS:all>
      element, or one or more <secDNS:dsData> or <secDNS:keyData>
      elements that are used to remove security data from a delegation.

      The <secDNS:all> element is used to remove all DS and key data
      with a value of boolean true.  A value of boolean false will do
      nothing.  Removing all DS information can remove the ability of
      the parent to secure the delegation to the child zone.

      The <secDNS:dsData> element is part of the DS Data Interface and
      is used to uniquely define the DS record to be removed, by using
      all four elements -- <secDNS:keyTag>, <secDNS:alg>, <secDNS:
      digestType>, and <secDNS:digest> -- that are guaranteed to be
      unique.

      The <secDNS:keyData> element is part of the Key Data Interface and
      is used to uniquely define the key data to be removed, by using
      all four elements -- <secDNS:flags>, <secDNS:protocol>, <secDNS:
      alg>, and <secDNS:pubKey> -- that are guaranteed to be unique.
      There can be more than one DS record created for each key, so
      removing a key could remove more than one DS record.

   -  An OPTIONAL <secDNS:add> element that is used to add security
      information to an existing set.  The <secDNS:add> element MUST
      contain one or more <secDNS:dsData> or <secDNS:keyData> elements.
      Child elements of the <secDNS:dsData> element are described in
      Section 4.1.  Child elements of the <secDNS:keyData> element are
      described in Section 4.2.

   -  An OPTIONAL <secDNS:chg> element that contains security
      information to be changed.  A <secDNS:chg> element contains the
      following child elements:

      -  An OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> element that indicates a
         child's preference for the number of seconds after signature
         generation when the parent's signature on the DS information
         provided by the child will expire. maxSigLife is described in
         Section 3.3.  If the server does not support the <secDNS:
         maxSigLife> element, a 2102 error MUST be returned.










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   Example <update> Command, Adding and Removing DS
                 Data Using the DS Data Interface:

   C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
   C:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
   C:  <command>
   C:    <update>
   C:      <domain:update
   C:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
   C:      </domain:update>
   C:    </update>
   C:    <extension>
   C:      <secDNS:update
   C:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
   C:        <secDNS:rem>
   C:          <secDNS:dsData>
   C:            <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
   C:            <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
   C:            <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
   C:            <secDNS:digest>38EC35D5B3A34B33C99B</secDNS:digest>
   C:          </secDNS:dsData>
   C:        </secDNS:rem>
   C:        <secDNS:add>
   C:          <secDNS:dsData>
   C:            <secDNS:keyTag>12346</secDNS:keyTag>
   C:            <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
   C:            <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
   C:            <secDNS:digest>38EC35D5B3A34B44C39B</secDNS:digest>
   C:          </secDNS:dsData>
   C:        </secDNS:add>
   C:      </secDNS:update>
   C:    </extension>
   C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   C:  </command>
   C:</epp>














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   Example <update> Command,
                 Updating the maxSigLife:

   C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
   C:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
   C:  <command>
   C:    <update>
   C:      <domain:update
   C:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
   C:      </domain:update>
   C:    </update>
   C:    <extension>
   C:      <secDNS:update
   C:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
   C:        <secDNS:chg>
   C:          <secDNS:maxSigLife>605900</secDNS:maxSigLife>
   C:        </secDNS:chg>
   C:      </secDNS:update>
   C:    </extension>
   C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   C:  </command>
   C:</epp>



























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   Example <update> Command, Adding and
                 Removing Key Data Using the Key Data Interface, and
                 Setting maxSigLife:

   C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
   C:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
   C:  <command>
   C:    <update>
   C:      <domain:update
   C:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
   C:      </domain:update>
   C:    </update>
   C:    <extension>
   C:      <secDNS:update
   C:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
   C:        <secDNS:rem>
   C:          <secDNS:keyData>
   C:            <secDNS:flags>257</secDNS:flags>
   C:            <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
   C:            <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
   C:            <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4QQQ</secDNS:pubKey>
   C:          </secDNS:keyData>
   C:        </secDNS:rem>
   C:        <secDNS:add>
   C:          <secDNS:keyData>
   C:            <secDNS:flags>257</secDNS:flags>
   C:            <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
   C:            <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
   C:            <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
   C:          </secDNS:keyData>
   C:        </secDNS:add>
   C:        <secDNS:chg>
   C:          <secDNS:maxSigLife>605900</secDNS:maxSigLife>
   C:        </secDNS:chg>
   C:      </secDNS:update>
   C:    </extension>
   C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   C:  </command>
   C:</epp>










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   Example <update> Command, Removing DS Data with
                  <secDNS:dsData> Using the DS Data Interface:

   C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
   C:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
   C:  <command>
   C:    <update>
   C:      <domain:update
   C:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
   C:      </domain:update>
   C:    </update>
   C:    <extension>
   C:      <secDNS:update
   C:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
   C:        <secDNS:rem>
   C:          <secDNS:dsData>
   C:            <secDNS:keyTag>12346</secDNS:keyTag>
   C:            <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
   C:            <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
   C:            <secDNS:digest>38EC35D5B3A34B44C39B</secDNS:digest>
   C:          </secDNS:dsData>
   C:        </secDNS:rem>
   C:      </secDNS:update>
   C:    </extension>
   C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   C:  </command>
   C:</epp>






















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   Example <update> Command,
                 Removing all DS and Key Data Using <secDNS:rem>
                 with <secDNS:all>:

   C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
   C:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
   C:  <command>
   C:    <update>
   C:      <domain:update
   C:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
   C:      </domain:update>
   C:    </update>
   C:    <extension>
   C:      <secDNS:update urgent="true"
   C:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0">
   C:        <secDNS:rem>
   C:          <secDNS:all>true</secDNS:all>
   C:        </secDNS:rem>
   C:      </secDNS:update>
   C:    </extension>
   C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   C:  </command>
   C:</epp>


























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   Example Urgent <update> Command,
                 Replacing all DS Data Using the DS Data Interface:

   C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
   C:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
   C:  <command>
   C:    <update>
   C:      <domain:update
   C:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
   C:      </domain:update>
   C:    </update>
   C:    <extension>
   C:      <secDNS:update urgent="true"
   C:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1">
   C:        <secDNS:rem>
   C:          <secDNS:all>true</secDNS:all>
   C:        </secDNS:rem>
   C:        <secDNS:add>
   C:          <secDNS:dsData>
   C:            <secDNS:keyTag>12346</secDNS:keyTag>
   C:            <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
   C:            <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
   C:            <secDNS:digest>38EC35D5B3A34B44C39B</secDNS:digest>
   C:          </secDNS:dsData>
   C:        </secDNS:add>
   C:      </secDNS:update>
   C:    </extension>
   C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   C:  </command>
   C:</epp>

   When an extended <update> command has been processed successfully,
   the EPP response is as described in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731].

6.  Formal Syntax

   An EPP object mapping is specified in XML Schema notation.  The
   formal syntax presented here is a complete schema representation of
   the object mapping suitable for automated validation of EPP XML
   instances.  The BEGIN and END tags are not part of the schema; they
   are used to note the beginning and ending of the schema for URI
   registration purposes.

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors
   of the code.  All rights reserved.




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   Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
   are met:

   -  Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.

   -  Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
      the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
      distribution.

   -  Neither the name of Internet Society, IETF or IETF Trust, nor the
      names of specific contributors, may be used to endorse or promote
      products derived from this software without specific prior written
      permission.

   THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
   "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
   LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
   A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
   OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
   SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
   LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
   DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
   THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
   (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
   OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

   BEGIN
   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
   <schema
     targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
     xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
     xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
     elementFormDefault="qualified">

     <annotation>
       <documentation>
         Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0
         domain name extension schema
         for provisioning DNS security (DNSSEC) extensions.
       </documentation>
     </annotation>

     <!--
     Child elements found in EPP commands.
     -->



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     <element name="create" type="secDNS:dsOrKeyType"/>
     <element name="update" type="secDNS:updateType"/>

     <!--
     Child elements supporting either the
     dsData or the keyData interface.
     -->
     <complexType name="dsOrKeyType">
       <sequence>
         <element name="maxSigLife" type="secDNS:maxSigLifeType"
         minOccurs="0"/>
         <choice>
           <element name="dsData" type="secDNS:dsDataType"
           maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
           <element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType"
           maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
         </choice>
           </sequence>
     </complexType>

     <!--
     Definition for the maximum signature lifetime (maxSigLife)
     -->
     <simpleType name="maxSigLifeType">
       <restriction base="int">
         <minInclusive value="1"/>
       </restriction>
     </simpleType>

     <!--
     Child elements of dsData used for dsData interface
     -->
     <complexType name="dsDataType">
       <sequence>
         <element name="keyTag" type="unsignedShort"/>
         <element name="alg" type="unsignedByte"/>
         <element name="digestType" type="unsignedByte"/>
         <element name="digest" type="hexBinary"/>
         <element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType"
         minOccurs="0"/>
       </sequence>
     </complexType>

     <!--
     Child elements of keyData used for keyData interface
     and optionally with dsData interface
     -->
     <complexType name="keyDataType">



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       <sequence>
         <element name="flags" type="unsignedShort"/>
         <element name="protocol" type="unsignedByte"/>
         <element name="alg" type="unsignedByte"/>
         <element name="pubKey" type="secDNS:keyType"/>
       </sequence>
     </complexType>

     <!--
     Definition for the public key
     -->
     <simpleType name="keyType">
       <restriction base="base64Binary">
         <minLength value="1"/>
       </restriction>
     </simpleType>

     <!--
     Child elements of the <update> element.
     -->
     <complexType name="updateType">
       <sequence>
             <element name="rem" type="secDNS:remType"
             minOccurs="0"/>
             <element name="add" type="secDNS:dsOrKeyType"
             minOccurs="0"/>
             <element name="chg" type="secDNS:chgType"
             minOccurs="0"/>
           </sequence>
       <attribute name="urgent" type="boolean" default="false"/>
     </complexType>

     <!--
     Child elements of the <rem> command.
     -->
     <complexType name="remType">
           <choice>
             <element name="all" type="boolean"/>
             <element name="dsData" type="secDNS:dsDataType"
             maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
             <element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType"
             maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
           </choice>
     </complexType>

     <!--
     Child elements supporting the <chg> element.
     -->



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     <complexType name="chgType">
       <sequence>
         <element name="maxSigLife" type="secDNS:maxSigLifeType"
         minOccurs="0"/>
       </sequence>
     </complexType>

     <!--
     Child response elements.
     -->
     <element name="infData" type="secDNS:dsOrKeyType"/>

   </schema>
   END

7.  Internationalization Considerations

   EPP is represented in XML, which provides native support for encoding
   information using the Unicode character set and its more compact
   representations including UTF-8 [RFC3629].  Conformant XML processors
   recognize both UTF-8 and UTF-16 [RFC2781].  Though XML includes
   provisions to identify and use other character encodings through use
   of an "encoding" attribute in an <?xml?> declaration, use of UTF-8 is
   RECOMMENDED in environments where parser encoding support
   incompatibility exists.

   As an extension of the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731], the
   internationalization requirements in the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731]
   are followed by this extension.  This extension does not override any
   of the EPP domain mapping [RFC5731] internationalization features.

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas
   conforming to a registry mechanism described in RFC 3688 [RFC3688].
   Two URI assignments have been completed by the IANA.

   Registration request for the extension namespace:

   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1

   Registrant Contact: IESG

   XML: None.  Namespace URIs do not represent an XML specification.

   Registration request for the extension XML schema:

   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:secDNS-1.1



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   Registrant Contact: IESG

   XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.

9.  Security Considerations

   The mapping extensions described in this document do not provide any
   security services beyond those described by EPP [RFC5730], the EPP
   domain name mapping [RFC5731], and protocol layers used by EPP.  The
   security considerations described in these other specifications apply
   to this specification as well.

   As with other domain object transforms, the EPP transform operations
   described in this document MUST be restricted to the sponsoring
   client as authenticated using the mechanisms described in
   Sections 2.9.1.1 and 7 of RFC 5730 [RFC5730].  Any attempt to perform
   a transform operation on a domain object by any client other than the
   sponsoring client MUST be rejected with an appropriate EPP
   authorization error.

   The provisioning service described in this document involves the
   exchange of information that can have an operational impact on the
   DNS.  A trust relationship MUST exist between the EPP client and
   server, and provisioning of public key information MUST only be done
   after the identities of both parties have been confirmed using a
   strong authentication mechanism.

   An EPP client might be acting as an agent for a zone administrator
   who wants to send delegation information to be signed and published
   by the server operator.  Man-in-the-middle attacks are thus possible
   as a result of direct client activity or inadvertent client data
   manipulation.

   Acceptance of a false key by a server operator can produce
   significant operational consequences.  The child and parent zones
   MUST be consistent to secure the delegation properly.  In the absence
   of consistent signatures, the delegation will not appear in the
   secure namespace, yielding untrustworthy query responses.  If a key
   is compromised, a client can either remove the compromised
   information or update the delegation information via EPP commands
   using the "urgent" attribute.

   Operational scenarios requiring quick removal of a secure domain
   delegation can be implemented using a two-step process.  First,
   security credentials can be removed using an "urgent" update as just
   described.  The domain can then be removed from the parent zone by
   changing the status of the domain to either of the EPP "clientHold"
   or "serverHold" domain status values.  The domain can also be removed



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   from the zone using the EPP <delete> command, but this is a more
   drastic step that needs to be considered carefully before use.

   Data validity checking and Delegation Signer record creation at the
   server require computational resources.  A purposeful or inadvertent
   denial-of-service attack is possible if a client requests some number
   of update operations that exceed a server's processing capabilities.
   Server operators SHOULD take steps to manage command load and command
   processing requirements to minimize the risk of a denial-of-service
   attack.

   The signature lifetime values provided by clients are requests that
   can be rejected.  Blind acceptance by a server operator can have an
   adverse impact on a server's processing capabilities.  Server
   operators SHOULD seriously consider adopting implementation rules to
   limit the range of acceptable signature lifetime values to counter
   potential adverse situations.

10.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank the following people who have
   provided significant contributions to the development of this
   document:

   David Blacka, Howard Eland, Patrik Faltstrom, Olafur Gudmundsson,
   Bernie Hoeneisen, Ed Lewis, Klaus Malorny, Alexander Mayrhofer,
   Patrick Mevzek, David Smith, Andrew Sullivan, and
   Srikanth Veeramachaneni.

   This document replaces RFC 4310 [RFC4310].  Please see the
   Acknowledgements section in that RFC for additional acknowledgements.

   This document incorporates feedback from early implementers on the
   PROVREG mailing list and users.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3688]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
              January 2004.

   [RFC3757]  Kolkman, O., Schlyter, J., and E. Lewis, "Domain Name
              System KEY (DNSKEY) Resource Record (RR) Secure Entry
              Point (SEP) Flag", RFC 3757, April 2004.



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   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, March 2005.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.

   [RFC5730]  Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
              STD 69, RFC 5730, August 2009.

   [RFC5731]  Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
              Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731, August 2009.

   [W3C.REC-xml-20001006]
              Maler, E., Sperberg-McQueen, C., Bray, T., and J. Paoli,
              "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Second Edition)",
              World Wide Web Consortium FirstEdition REC-xml-20001006,
              October 2000,
              <http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/REC-xml-20001006>.

   [W3C.REC-xmlschema-1-20010502]
              Beech, D., Thompson, H., Mendelsohn, N., and M. Maloney,
              "XML Schema Part 1: Structures", World Wide Web Consortium
              FirstEdition REC-xmlschema-1-20010502, May 2001,
              <http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xmlschema-1-20010502>.

   [W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502]
              Malhotra, A. and P. Biron, "XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes",
              World Wide Web Consortium FirstEdition REC-xmlschema-2-
              20010502, May 2001,
              <http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xmlschema-2-20010502>.

11.2.  Informative References

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [RFC2781]  Hoffman, P. and F. Yergeau, "UTF-16, an encoding of ISO
              10646", RFC 2781, February 2000.

   [RFC3629]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
              10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.





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   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, March 2005.

   [RFC4310]  Hollenbeck, S., "Domain Name System (DNS) Security
              Extensions Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning
              Protocol (EPP)", RFC 4310, December 2005.












































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Appendix A.  Changes from RFC 4310

   1.   Added the motivation in obsoleting RFC 4310 [RFC4310] to
        Section 1.

   2.   Updated Section 1 to add an explicit statement about deprecation
        of RFC 4310.

   3.   Added secDNS-1.0 and secDNS-1.1 abbreviation definitions in
        Section 1.1.

   4.   Updated "Data validity checking at the server..." to "Data
        validity checking and Delegation Signer record creation at the
        server..." in Section 9.

   5.   Added Section 2.

   6.   Updated the second paragraph of Section 7 to clarify that the
        internationalization features of [RFC5731] are followed.

   7.   Moved <secDNS:rem> prior to <secDNS:add> to conform to the EPP
        order semantics for supporting <secDNS:all> with <secDNS:rem> to
        remove all data, and for supporting the replace semantics
        previously supported by <secDNS:chg>.

   8.   Added support for the use of the <secDNS:all> boolean element
        under <secDNS:rem> to remove all DS or key data in place of
        using <secDNS:chg/>.

   9.   Updated <secDNS:add>, <secDNS:rem>, and <secDNS:chg> to function
        in a consistent way to the other EPP RFCs.

   10.  Removed support for <secDNS:rem> using just <secDNS:keyTag>.

   11.  Moved the <secDNS:maxSigLife> element out of the <secDNS:dsData>
        and <secDNS:keyData> elements and directly under the <secDNS:
        create> element, under the <secDNS:chg> element of the <secDNS:
        update> element, and under the <secDNS:infData> element.
        Section 3.3 element was updated to better describe the <secDNS:
        maxSigLife> element, and references to the <secDNS:maxSigLife>
        element were updated throughout the document.

   12.  Replaced references to urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:secDNS-1.0
        with urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:secDNS-1.1, and replaced "Two
        URI assignments have been completed by the IANA" with "Two URI
        assignments have been completed by the IANA" in Section 8.





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   13.  Added "The <secDNS:keyTag> element is represented as an
        unsignedShort [W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502]" in Section 4.1.

   14.  Added "The <secDNS:digest> element is represented as a hexBinary
        [W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502]" in Section 4.1.

   15.  Added "The <secDNS:pubKey> element is represented as a
        base64Binary [W3C.REC-xmlschema-2-20010502] with a minimum
        length of 1" in Section 4.2.

   16.  Combined "the command MUST contain an <extension> element" with
        the following sentence in Section 5.2.1 and Section 5.2.5.

   17.  Added sentence "If the server does not support the <secDNS:
        maxSigLife> element, a 2102 error MUST be returned" to
        Section 5.2.1 and Section 5.2.5.

   18.  Added sentence "This document replaces RFC 4310.  Please see the
        Acknowledgements section in that RFC for additional
        acknowledgements" in Section 10.

   19.  Added "This document incorporates feedback from implementers on
        the PROVREG mail list and users" as well as "This document
        obsoletes RFC 4310" in the Abstract.

   20.  Removed all references to xsi:schemaLocation to be consistent
        with the other EPP RFCs.

   21.  Added the "DS Data Interface and Key Data Interface" section.

   22.  Moved the "create, add, remove, and replace Delegation Signer
        (DS) information" paragraph from the "Object Attributes" section
        to the "DS Data Interface" section.

   23.  Replaced the element descriptions in the "EPP <info> Command"
        section with a reference to the <secDNS:dsData> and <secDNS:
        keyData> elements described in the "DS Data Interface" and "Key
        Data Interface" sections, respectively.

   24.  Updated the "EPP <info> Command" section examples to include
        both the DS Data Interface and the Key Data Interface.

   25.  Updated the "EPP <create> Command" section to refer to both the
        use of <secDNS:dsData> and <secDNS:keyData> described in the "DS
        Data Interface" and "Key Data Interface" sections, respectively.

   26.  Updated the "EPP <create> Command" section examples to include
        both the DS Data Interface and the Key Data Interface.



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   27.  Updated the "EPP <update> Command" section to describe the use
        of <secDNS:add>, <secDNS:rem>, and <secDNS:chg> together.

   28.  Updated the "EPP <update> Command" section examples to include
        both the DS Data Interface and the Key Data Interface.  Also
        included additional examples of adding and removing DS data or
        key data.

   29.  Updated the "Formal Syntax" section with the updated XML schema.

   30.  Updated the Acknowledgements section with a new list of
        contributors.

   31.  Replaced references to RFC 3730 with references to RFC 5730.

   32.  Replaced references to RFC 3731 with references to RFC 5731.

   33.  Added clarification on when the extension MUST be included for
        each of the commands and responses (<secDNS:create>, <secDNS:
        update>, <secDNS:infData>).

   34.  Changed "In addition, the EPP <extension> element MUST contain a
        child <secDNS:infData> element" to "In addition, the EPP
        <extension> element SHOULD contain a child <secDNS:infData>
        element" and added "and based on server policy".

Authors' Addresses

   James Gould
   VeriSign, Inc.
   21345 Ridgetop Circle
   Dulles, VA  20166-6503
   US

   EMail: jgould@verisign.com


   Scott Hollenbeck
   VeriSign, Inc.
   21345 Ridgetop Circle
   Dulles, VA  20166-6503
   US

   EMail: shollenbeck@verisign.com







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