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|
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Housley
Request for Comments: 7191 Vigil Security
Category: Standards Track April 2014
ISSN: 2070-1721
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Key Package Receipt and Error Content Types
Abstract
This document defines the syntax for two Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) content types: one for key package receipts and another for key
package errors. The key package receipt content type is used to
confirm receipt of an identified key package or collection of key
packages. The key package error content type is used to indicate an
error occurred during the processing of a key package. CMS can be
used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt these
content types.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7191.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Housley Standards Track [Page 1]
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................2
1.1. Requirements Terminology ...................................2
1.2. ASN.1 Syntax Notation ......................................2
1.3. Processing Key Package Receipt Requests ....................3
1.4. Processing Key Packages with Errors ........................3
2. SIR Entity Name .................................................3
3. Key Package Identifier and Receipt Request Attribute ............4
4. Key Package Receipt CMS Content Type ............................6
5. Key Package Error CMS Content Type ..............................8
6. Protecting the KeyPackageReceipt and KeyPackageError ...........17
7. Using the application/cms Media Type ...........................17
8. IANA Considerations ............................................17
9. Security Considerations ........................................17
10. Acknowledgements ..............................................18
11. References ....................................................18
11.1. Normative References .....................................18
11.2. Informative References ...................................20
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module ..........................................21
1. Introduction
This document defines the syntax for two Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) [RFC5652] content types: one for key package receipts and
another for key package errors. The key package receipt content type
is used to confirm receipt of an identified key package or collection
of key packages. The key package error content type is used to
indicate an error occurred during the processing of a key package.
CMS can be used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt
these content types.
1.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.2. ASN.1 Syntax Notation
The content types defined herein use ASN.1 ([X.680], [X.681],
[X.682], and [X.683]).
The CONTENT-TYPE definition was updated to the 2008 version of ASN.1
by [RFC6268]; however, none of the new 2008 ASN.1 tokens are used in
this specification, which allows compilers that only support the 2002
version of ASN.1 to compile the module in Appendix A.
Housley Standards Track [Page 2]
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
1.3. Processing Key Package Receipt Requests
The key package or collection of key packages [RFC4073] [RFC5958]
[RFC6031] [RFC6032] for which the receipt is being generated MUST be
signed, and the key package MUST include the key-package-identifier-
and-receipt-request attribute specified in Section 3.
1.4. Processing Key Packages with Errors
The key package or collection of key packages [RFC4073] [RFC5958]
[RFC6031] [RFC6032] for which the error is being generated might be
signed. The key package can be identified by a key-package-
identifier-and-receipt-request attribute specified in Section 3.
2. SIR Entity Name
Within a key distribution system, the source, intermediary, and
receiver entities are identified by a Source Intermediary Recipient
(SIR) entity name. The syntax for the SIR entity name does not
impose any particular structure, and it accommodates straightforward
registration of additional SIR entity name types.
The inclusion of the nameType object identifier ensures that two
identifiers of different types that happen to contain the same values
are not interpreted as equivalent. Additional SIR entity name types
are expected to be registered that represent different granularities.
For example, one SIR entity name type might represent the receiver
organization, and at a finer granularity, another SIR entity name
type might identify a specific device, perhaps using a manufacturer
identifier and serial number. The use of an object identifier avoids
the need for a central registry of SIR entity name types.
The nameValue is an OCTET STRING, which allows the canonical form of
any name to be carried. Two names of the same type are considered
equal if the octet strings are the same length and contain the same
string of octets.
Housley Standards Track [Page 3]
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
SIREntityNames and SIREntityName have the following syntax:
SIREntityNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SIREntityName
SIR-ENTITY-NAME ::= CLASS {
&sIRENType OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&SIRENValue
} WITH SYNTAX {
SYNTAX &SIRENValue IDENTIFIED BY &sIRENType }
SIREntityName ::= SEQUENCE {
sirenType SIR-ENTITY-NAME.&sIRENType({SIREntityNameTypes}),
sirenValue OCTET STRING (CONTAINING
SIR-ENTITY-NAME.&SIRENValue(
{SIREntityNameTypes}{@sirenType}) ) }
This document defines one SIR entity name type: the DN type. The DN
type uses a nameType of id-dn and a nameValue of a Distinguished Name
(DN). The nameValue OCTET STRING carries an ASN.1 encoded Name as
specified in [RFC5280]. Note that other documents may define
additional types.
SIREntityNameTypes SIR-ENTITY-NAME ::= {
siren-dn,
... -- Expect additional SIR Entity Name types -- }
siren-dn SIR-ENTITY-NAME ::= {
SYNTAX DistinguishedName
IDENTIFIED BY id-dn }
id-dn OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) sir-name-types(16) 0 }
3. Key Package Identifier and Receipt Request Attribute
The key-package-identifier-and-receipt-request attribute, as its name
implies, allows the originator to identify the key package and,
optionally, request receipts. This attribute can appear as a signed,
authenticated, and content attribute. Signed attributes are carried
in the CMS Signed-data content type described in Section 5 of
[RFC5652]. Authenticated attributes are carried in the CMS
Authenticated-data content type described in Section 9 of [RFC5652]
or in the CMS Authenticated-enveloped-data content type described in
Section 2 of [RFC5083]. Content attributes are carried in the
Content-with-attributes content type described in Section 3 of
[RFC4073].
Housley Standards Track [Page 4]
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
The key-package-identifier-and-receipt-request attribute has the
following syntax:
aa-keyPackageIdentifierAndReceiptRequest ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE KeyPkgIdentifierAndReceiptReq
IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-KP-keyPkgIdAndReceiptReq }
id-aa-KP-keyPkgIdAndReceiptReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) attributes(5) 65 }
KeyPkgIdentifierAndReceiptReq ::= SEQUENCE {
pkgID KeyPkgID,
receiptReq KeyPkgReceiptReq OPTIONAL }
KeyPkgID ::= OCTET STRING
KeyPkgReceiptReq ::= SEQUENCE {
encryptReceipt BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
receiptsFrom [0] SIREntityNames OPTIONAL,
receiptsTo SIREntityNames }
Even though the ATTRIBUTE syntax is defined as a SET OF
AttributeValue, a key-package-identifier-and-receipt-request
attribute MUST have a single attribute value; zero or multiple
instances of AttributeValue are not permitted.
The fields in the key-package-identifier-and-receipt-request
attribute have the following semantics:
o pkgID contains an octet string, and this syntax does not impose
any particular structure on the identifier.
o receiptReq is OPTIONAL, and when it is present, it includes an
encryption receipt flag, an OPTIONAL indication of which
receivers should generate receipts, and an indication of where
the receipts are to be sent.
* The encryption receipt flag indicates whether the key package
originator wants the receipt to be encrypted. If the boolean
is set, then the receipt SHOULD be encrypted.
* The OPTIONAL ReceiptsFrom field provides an indication of
which receivers SHOULD generate receipts. When the
ReceiptsFrom field is absent, all receivers of the key package
are expected to return receipts. When the ReceiptsFrom field
is present, a list of SIR entity names indicates which
receivers of the key package are requested to return receipts.
Housley Standards Track [Page 5]
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
In this case, the receiver SHOULD return a receipt only if
their SIR entity name appears on the list.
* The receipt request does not include any key management
information; however, the list of SIR entity names in the
receiptsTo field can be used to select symmetric or asymmetric
keying material for the receipt receivers.
A receiver SHOULD ignore the nameValue associated with any
unrecognized nameType in either the receiptsFrom field or the
receiptsTo field.
When the key-package-identifier-and-receipt-request attribute appears
in more than one location in the overall key package, each occurrence
is evaluated independently. That is, the receiver may generate more
than one receipt for a single key package. However, the time at
which the receipts are sent will depend on policies that are beyond
the scope of this document.
4. Key Package Receipt CMS Content Type
The key package receipt content type is used to confirm receipt of an
identified key package or collection of key packages. This content
type MUST be encoded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
[X.690].
The key package receipt content type has the following syntax:
ct-key-package-receipt CONTENT-TYPE ::= {
TYPE KeyPackageReceipt
IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-KP-keyPackageReceipt }
id-ct-KP-keyPackageReceipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) formats(2)
key-package-content-types(78) 3 }
KeyPackageReceipt ::= SEQUENCE {
version KeyPkgVersion DEFAULT v2,
receiptOf KeyPkgIdentifier,
receivedBy SIREntityName }
-- Revised definition of KeyPkgVersion from [RFC6031]
KeyPkgVersion ::= INTEGER { v1(1), v2(2) } (1 .. 65535)
KeyPkgIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
pkgID KeyPkgID,
attribute SingleAttribute {{ KeyPkgIdentifiers }} }
Housley Standards Track [Page 6]
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
KeyPkgID ::= OCTET STRING
KeyPkgIdentifiers ATTRIBUTE ::= { ... }
The KeyPackageReceipt fields are used as follows:
o version identifies version of the key package receipt content.
For this version of the specification, the default value, v2,
MUST be used. Note that v1 was defined in an earlier version,
but the use of v1 is deprecated.
o receiptOf offers two alternatives for identifying the key
package for which the receipt is being generated. The first
alternative, pkgID, MUST be supported, and pkgID provides the
key package identifier of the key package or collection of key
packages for which this receipt is being generated. This key
package identifier value MUST exactly match the key package
identifier value of the key-package-identifier-and-receipt-
request attribute in the received key package or collection.
The key-package-identifier-and-receipt-request attribute is
described Section 3. The second alternative allows alternate
attributes to be used to define the identifier.
o receivedBy identifies the entity that received the key package.
The entity is named by an SIR entity name as specified in
Section 2.
Key package receipts MUST be encapsulated in a CMS SignedData content
type to carry the signature of the entity that is confirming receipt
of the identified key package or collection of key packages. Key
package receipts MAY be encrypted by encapsulating them in the CMS
EncryptedData content type, the CMS EnvelopedData content type, or
the AuthEnvelopedData content type. When the key package receipt is
signed and encrypted, it MUST be signed prior to being encrypted.
Note that delivery assurance is the responsibility of the protocol
that is used to transport and track key packages. The key package
receipt content type can be used in conjunction with that protocol as
part of an overall delivery assurance solution.
Because the receipts are signed, all recipients that generate key
package receipts MUST have a private signature key to sign the
receipt as well as store their own certificate or have a means of
obtaining the key identifier of their public key. If memory is a
concern, the public key identifier can be computed from the public
key.
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
If the receipt signer has access to a real-time clock, then the
binary-signing-time [RFC6019] signed attribute SHOULD be included in
the key package receipt to provide the date and time when it was
generated.
5. Key Package Error CMS Content Type
The key package error content type provides an indication of the
reason for rejection of a key package or collection of key packages.
This content type MUST be encoded using the Distinguished Encoding
Rules (DER) [X.690].
The key package error content type has the following syntax:
ct-key-package-error CONTENT-TYPE ::= {
TYPE KeyPackageError IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-KP-keyPackageError }
id-ct-KP-keyPackageError OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) formats(2)
key-package-content-types(78) 6 }
KeyPackageError ::= SEQUENCE {
version KeyPkgVersion DEFAULT v2,
errorOf [0] KeyPkgIdentifier OPTIONAL,
errorBy SIREntityName,
errorCode ErrorCodeChoice }
KeyPkgVersion ::= INTEGER { v1(1), v2(2) } (1 .. 65535)
KeyPkgIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
pkgID KeyPkgID,
attribute SingleAttribute {{ KeyPkgIdentifiers }} }
KeyPkgID ::= OCTET STRING
KeyPkgIdentifiers ATTRIBUTE ::= { ... }
ErrorCodeChoice ::= CHOICE {
enum EnumeratedErrorCode,
oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
EnumeratedErrorCode ::= ENUMERATED {
decodeFailure (1),
badContentInfo (2),
badSignedData (3),
badEncapContent (4),
badCertificate (5),
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
badSignerInfo (6),
badSignedAttrs (7),
badUnsignedAttrs (8),
missingContent (9),
noTrustAnchor (10),
notAuthorized (11),
badDigestAlgorithm (12),
badSignatureAlgorithm (13),
unsupportedKeySize (14),
unsupportedParameters (15),
signatureFailure (16),
insufficientMemory (17),
incorrectTarget (23),
missingSignature (29),
resourcesBusy (30),
versionNumberMismatch (31),
revokedCertificate (33),
-- Error codes with values <= 33 are aligned with [RFC5934]
ambiguousDecrypt (60),
noDecryptKey (61),
badEncryptedData (62),
badEnvelopedData (63),
badAuthenticatedData (64),
badAuthEnvelopedData (65),
badKeyAgreeRecipientInfo (66),
badKEKRecipientInfo (67),
badEncryptContent (68),
badEncryptAlgorithm (69),
missingCiphertext (70),
decryptFailure (71),
badMACAlgorithm (72),
badAuthAttrs (73),
badUnauthAttrs (74),
invalidMAC (75),
mismatchedDigestAlg (76),
missingCertificate (77),
tooManySigners (78),
missingSignedAttributes (79),
derEncodingNotUsed (80),
missingContentHints (81),
invalidAttributeLocation (82),
badMessageDigest (83),
badKeyPackage (84),
badAttributes (85),
attributeComparisonFailure (86),
unsupportedSymmetricKeyPackage (87),
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
unsupportedAsymmetricKeyPackage (88),
constraintViolation (89),
ambiguousDefaultValue (90),
noMatchingRecipientInfo (91),
unsupportedKeyWrapAlgorithm (92),
badKeyTransRecipientInfo (93),
other (127),
... -- Expect additional error codes -- }
The KeyPackageError fields are used as follows:
o version identifies version of the key package error content
structure. For this version of the specification, the default
value, v2, MUST be used. Note that v1 was defined in an earlier
version, but the use of v1 is deprecated.
o errorOf is OPTIONAL, and it provides the identifier of the
keying material for which this error is being generated. This
is omitted if the receiver or intermediary cannot parse the
received data to determine the package identifier. Also,
encryption may prevent an intermediary from obtaining any of the
identifiers. Two alternatives for identifying the keying
material are possible; see KeyPkgIdentifier as described in
Section 4. The value MUST exactly match the value of the key-
package-identifier-and-receipt-request attribute in the received
key package or collection. The key-package-identifier-and-
receipt-request attribute is described in Section 3.
o errorBy identifies the entity that received the key package.
The entity is named by an SIR entity name as specified in
Section 2.
o errorCode contains a code that indicates the reason for the
error. It contains either an enumerated error code from the
list below or an extended error code represented by an object
identifier. The enumerated error code alternative MUST be
supported. The object identifier error code MAY be supported.
* decodeFailure is used to indicate that the key package
intermediary or receiver was unable to successfully decode
the provided package. The specified content type and the
provided content do not match.
* badContentInfo is used to indicate that the ContentInfo
syntax is invalid or that the contentType carried within the
ContentInfo is unknown or unsupported.
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
* badSignedData is used to indicate that the SignedData syntax
is invalid, the version is unknown or unsupported, or more
than one entry is present in digestAlgorithms.
* badEncapContent is used to indicate that the
EncapsulatedContentInfo syntax is invalid within a
SignedData or an AuthenticatedData or the
EncryptedContentInfo syntax is invalid within an
AuthEnvelopedData.
* badCertificate is used to indicate that the syntax for one
or more certificates in CertificateSet or elsewhere is
invalid or unsupported.
* badSignerInfo is used to indicate that the SignerInfo syntax
is invalid or the version is unknown or unsupported.
* badSignedAttrs is used to indicate that the signedAttrs
syntax within SignerInfo is invalid.
* badUnsignedAttrs is used to indicate that the unsignedAttrs
within SignerInfo contains one or more attributes. Since
unrecognized attributes are ignored, this error code is used
when the object identifier for the attribute is recognized,
but the value is malformed or internally inconsistent. In
addition, this error code can be used when policy prohibits
an implementation from supporting unsigned attributes.
* missingContent is used to indicate that the optional
eContent is missing in EncapsulatedContentInfo, which is
required when including an asymmetric key package, a
symmetric key package, and an encrypted key package. This
error can be generated due to problems located in SignedData
or AuthenticatedData.
Note that CMS EncapsulatedContentInfo eContent field is
optional [RFC5652]; however, [RFC5958], [RFC6031], and
[RFC6032] require that the eContent be present.
* noTrustAnchor is used to indicate that the
subjectKeyIdentifier does not identify the public key of a
trust anchor or a certification path that terminates with an
installed trust anchor.
* notAuthorized is used to indicate that the sid within
SignerInfo leads to an installed trust anchor, but that
trust anchor is not an authorized signer for the received
content type.
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
* badDigestAlgorithm is used to indicate that the
digestAlgorithm in either SignerInfo, SignedData, or
AuthenticatedData is unknown or unsupported.
* badSignatureAlgorithm is used to indicate that the
signatureAlgorithm in SignerInfo is unknown or unsupported.
* unsupportedKeySize is used to indicate that the
signatureAlgorithm in SignerInfo is known and supported, but
the digital signature could not be validated because an
unsupported key size was employed by the signer.
Alternatively, the algorithm used in EnvelopedData,
AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData to generate the key-
encryption key is known and supported, but an unsupported
key size was employed by the originator.
* unsupportedParameters is used to indicate that the
signatureAlgorithm in SignerInfo is known, but the digital
signature could not be validated because unsupported
parameters were employed by the signer. Alternatively, the
algorithm used in EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or
AuthEnvelopedData to generate the key-encryption key is
known and supported, but unsupported parameters were
employed by the originator.
* signatureFailure is used to indicate that the
signatureAlgorithm in SignerInfo is known and supported, but
the digital signature in the signature field within
SignerInfo could not be validated.
* insufficientMemory indicates that the key package could not
be processed because the intermediary or receiver did not
have sufficient memory to store the keying material.
* incorrectTarget indicates that a receiver is not the
intended recipient.
* missingSignature indicates that the receiver requires the
key package to be signed or authenticated with a Message
Authentication Code (MAC), but the received key package was
not signed or authenticated.
* resourcesBusy indicates that the resources necessary to
process the key package are not available at the present
time, but the resources might be available at some point in
the future.
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
* versionNumberMismatch indicates that the version number in a
received key package is not acceptable.
* revokedCertificate indicates that one or more of the
certificates needed to properly process the key package has
been revoked.
* ambiguousDecrypt indicates that the EncryptedData content
type was used, and the key package receiver could not
determine the appropriate keying material to perform the
decryption.
* noDecryptKey indicates that the receiver does not have the
key named in the content-decryption-key-identifier attribute
(see [RFC6032]).
* badEncryptedData indicates that the EncryptedData syntax is
invalid or the version is unknown or unsupported.
* badEnvelopedData indicates that the EnvelopedData syntax is
invalid or the version is unknown or unsupported.
* badAuthenticatedData indicates that the AuthenticatedData
syntax is invalid or the version is unknown or unsupported.
* badAuthEnvelopedData indicates that the AuthEnvelopedData
syntax is invalid or the version is unknown or unsupported.
* badKeyAgreeRecipientInfo indicates that the
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo syntax is invalid or the version is
unknown or unsupported.
* badKEKRecipientInfo indicates that the KEKRecipientInfo
syntax is invalid or the version is unknown or unsupported.
* badEncryptContent indicates that the EncryptedContentInfo
syntax is invalid, or that the content type carried within
the contentType is unknown or unsupported.
* badEncryptAlgorithm indicates that the encryption algorithm
identified by contentEncryptionAlgorithm in
EncryptedContentInfo is unknown or unsupported. This can
result from EncryptedData, EnvelopedData, or
AuthEnvelopedData.
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
* missingCiphertext indicates that the optional
encryptedContent is missing in EncryptedContentInfo, which
is required when including an asymmetric key package, a
symmetric key package, and an encrypted key package.
* decryptFailure indicates that the encryptedContent in
EncryptedContentInfo did not decrypt properly.
* badMACAlgorithm indicates that the MAC algorithm identified
by MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm in AuthenticatedData
is unknown or unsupported.
* badAuthAttrs is used to indicate that the authAttrs syntax
within AuthenticatedData or AuthEnvelopedData is invalid.
Since unrecognized attributes are ignored, this error code
is used when the object identifier for the attribute is
recognized, but the value is malformed or internally
inconsistent.
* badUnauthAttrs is used to indicate that the unauthAttrs
syntax within AuthenticatedData or AuthEnvelopedData is
invalid. Since unrecognized attributes are ignored, this
error code is used when the object identifier for the
attribute is recognized, but the value is malformed or
internally inconsistent.
* invalidMAC is used to indicate that the message
authentication code value within AuthenticatedData or
AuthEnvelopedData did not validate properly.
* mismatchedDigestAlg is used to indicate that the digest
algorithm in digestAlgorithms field within SignedData does
not match the digest algorithm used in the signature
algorithm.
* missingCertificate indicates that a signature could not be
verified using a trust anchor or a certificate from the
certificates field within SignedData. Similarly, this error
code can indicate that a needed certificate is missing when
processing EnvelopedData, AuthEnvelopedData, or
AuthenticatedData.
* tooManySigners indicates that a SignedData content contained
more than one SignerInfo for a content type that requires
only one signer.
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
* missingSignedAttributes indicates that a SignedInfo within a
SignedData content did not contain any signed attributes; at
a minimum, the content-type and message-digest must be
present, as per [RFC5652]. Similarly, this error code can
indicate that required authenticated attributes are missing
when processing AuthEnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData.
* derEncodingNotUsed indicates that the content contained BER
encoding, or some other encoding, where DER encoding was
required.
* missingContentHints indicates that a SignedData content
encapsulates a content other than a key package or an
encrypted key package; however, the content-hints attribute
[RFC2634] is not included. Similarly, this error code can
indicate that the content-hints attribute was missing when
processing AuthEnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData.
* invalidAttributeLocation indicates that an attribute
appeared in an unacceptable location.
* badMessageDigest indicates that the value of the message-
digest attribute [RFC5652] did not match the calculated
value.
* badKeyPackage indicates that the SymmetricKeyPackage
[RFC6031] or AsymmetricKeyPackage [RFC5958] syntax is
invalid or that the version is unknown.
* badAttributes indicates that an attribute collection either
contained multiple instances of the same attribute type that
allows only one instance or contained an attribute instance
with multiple values in an attribute that allows only one
value.
* attributeComparisonFailure indicates that multiple instances
of an attribute failed the comparison rules for the type of
attribute.
* unsupportedSymmetricKeyPackage indicates that the
implementation does not support symmetric key packages
[RFC6031].
* unsupportedAsymmetricKeyPackage indicates that the
implementation does not support asymmetric key packages
[RFC5958].
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
* constraintViolation indicates that one or more of the
attributes has a value that is not in the authorized set of
values for the signer [RFC6010]. That is, the value is in
conflict with the constraints imposed on the signer.
* ambiguousDefaultValue indicates that one or more of the
attributes that is part of the signer's constraints is
omitted from the key package, and the constraint permits
more than one value; therefore, the appropriate default
value for that attribute or attribute cannot be determined.
* noMatchingRecipientInfo indicates that a recipientInfo could
not be found for the recipient. This can result from a ktri
or kari found in EncryptedData, EnvelopedData, or
AuthEnvelopedData.
* unsupportedKeyWrapAlgorithm indicates that the key wrap
algorithm is not supported.
* badKeyTransRecipientInfo indicates that the
KeyTransRecipientInfo syntax is invalid or the version is
unknown or unsupported.
* other indicates that the key package could not be processed,
but the reason is not covered by any of the assigned status
codes. Use of this status code SHOULD be avoided.
The key package error content type MUST be signed if the entity
generating it is capable of signing it. For example, a device will
be incapable of signing when it is in early stages of deployment and
it has not been configured with a private signing key or a device has
an internal error that prevents use of its private signing key. When
it is signed, the key package error MUST be encapsulated in a CMS
SignedData content type to carry the signature of the party that is
indicating an error. When it is encrypted, the key package error
MUST be encapsulated in a CMS EnvelopedData content type, a CMS
EncryptedData content type, or a CMS AuthEnvelopedData content type.
When a key package error is signed and encrypted, it MUST be signed
prior to being encrypted.
All devices that generate signed key package error reports MUST store
their own certificate or have a means of obtaining the key identifier
of their public key. If memory is a concern, the public key
identifier can be computed from the public key.
If the error report signer has access to a real-time clock, then the
binary-signing-time attribute [RFC6019] SHOULD be included in the key
package error to provide the date and time when it was generated.
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
6. Protecting the KeyPackageReceipt and KeyPackageError
CMS protecting content types, [RFC5652] and [RFC5083], can be used to
provide security to the KeyPackageReceipt and KeyPackageError content
types:
o SignedData can be used to apply a digital signature.
o EncryptedData can be used to encrypt the content type with
simple symmetric encryption, where the sender and the receiver
already share the necessary encryption key.
o EnvelopedData can be used to encrypt the content type with
symmetric encryption, where the sender and the receiver do not
already share the necessary encryption key.
o AuthenticatedData can be used to integrity protect the content
type with message authentication algorithms that support
authenticated encryption, where key management information is
handled in a manner similar to EnvelopedData.
o AuthEnvelopedData can be used to protect the content types with
algorithms that support authenticated encryption, where key
management information is handled in a manner similar to
EnvelopedData.
7. Using the application/cms Media Type
The media type and parameters for carrying a key package receipt or a
key package error content type are specified in [RFC7193].
8. IANA Considerations
IANA has updated the reference for the following registration in the
"SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)"
registry:
63 id-mod-keyPkgReceiptAndErrV2 [RFC7191]
9. Security Considerations
The key package receipt and key package error contents are not
necessarily protected. These content types can be combined with a
security protocol to protect the contents of the package.
The KeyPkgReceiptReq structure includes a receiptsFrom list and a
receiptsTo list. Both lists contain SIREntityNames. The syntax does
not specify a limit on the number of SIREntityNames that may be
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
included in either of these lists. In addition, there is
purposefully no requirement that the receiptTo entries have any
relation to the sender of the key package. To avoid these features
being used as part of a denial-of-service amplification, receipts
should only be returned for key packages with a valid signature from
a trusted signer.
If an implementation is willing to accept key packages from more than
one source, then there is a possibility that the same key package
identifier could be used by more than one source. As a result, there
is the potential for a receipt for one key package to be confused
with the receipt for another, potentially leading to confusion about
the keying material that is available to the recipient. In
environments with multiple key sources, a convention for assignment
of key package identifiers can avoid this potential confusion
altogether.
In some situations, returning very detailed error information can
provide an attacker with insight into the security processing. Where
this is a concern, the implementation should return the most generic
error code that is appropriate. However, detailed error codes are
very helpful during development, debugging, and interoperability
testing. For this reason, implementations may want to have a way to
configure the use of a generic error code or a detailed one.
10. Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Radia Perlman, Sean Turner, Jim Schaad, and Carl
Wallace for their insightful review. Thanks to Robert Sparks for
improved wording.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2634] Hoffman, P., Ed., "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME",
RFC 2634, June 1999.
[RFC4073] Housley, R., "Protecting Multiple Contents with the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 4073, May 2005.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, September 2009.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
June 2010.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958, August
2010.
[RFC6010] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS) Content Constraints Extension", RFC
6010, September 2010.
[RFC6019] Housley, R., "BinaryTime: An Alternate Format for
Representing Date and Time in ASN.1", RFC 6019, September
2010.
[RFC6031] Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) Symmetric Key Package Content Type", RFC 6031,
December 2010.
[RFC6032] Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content Type", RFC 6032,
December 2010.
[RFC6268] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules
for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public
Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268, July
2011.
[RFC7193] Turner, S., Housley, R., and J. Schaad, "The
application/cms Media Type", RFC 7193, April 2014.
[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002.
Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One.
[X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.681 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-2:2002.
Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:
Information Object Specification.
[X.682] ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-3:2002.
Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:
Constraint Specification.
[X.683] ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-4:2002.
Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:
Parameterization of ASN.1 Specifications.
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
[X.690] ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825- 1:2002.
Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER).
11.2. Informative References
[RFC5083] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", RFC 5083,
November 2007.
[RFC5934] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
Management Protocol (TAMP)", RFC 5934, August 2010.
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
This annex provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the
structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
[X.680], [X.681], [X.682], and [X.683].
KeyPackageReceiptAndErrorModuleV2
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-keyPkgReceiptAndErrV2(63) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL
IMPORTS
-- FROM New SMIME ASN.1 [RFC6268]
CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) }
-- From New PKIX ASN.1 [RFC5912]
ATTRIBUTE, SingleAttribute {}
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }
DistinguishedName
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}
;
---
--- Key Package Version Number (revised from [RFC6031])
---
KeyPkgVersion ::= INTEGER { v1(1), v2(2) } (1 .. 65535)
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
--
-- SIR Entity Name
--
SIREntityNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SIREntityName
SIREntityNameTypes SIR-ENTITY-NAME ::= {
siren-dn,
... -- Expect additional SIR Entity Name types -- }
SIR-ENTITY-NAME ::= CLASS {
&sIRENType OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&SIRENValue
} WITH SYNTAX {
SYNTAX &SIRENValue IDENTIFIED BY &sIRENType }
SIREntityName ::= SEQUENCE {
sirenType SIR-ENTITY-NAME.&sIRENType({SIREntityNameTypes}),
sirenValue OCTET STRING (CONTAINING
SIR-ENTITY-NAME.&SIRENValue(
{SIREntityNameTypes}{@sirenType}) ) }
siren-dn SIR-ENTITY-NAME ::= {
SYNTAX DistinguishedName
IDENTIFIED BY id-dn }
id-dn OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) sir-name-types(16) 0 }
--
-- Attribute Definitions
--
aa-keyPackageIdentifierAndReceiptRequest ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE KeyPkgIdentifierAndReceiptReq
IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-KP-keyPkgIdAndReceiptReq }
id-aa-KP-keyPkgIdAndReceiptReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) attributes(5) 65 }
KeyPkgIdentifierAndReceiptReq ::= SEQUENCE {
pkgID KeyPkgID,
receiptReq KeyPkgReceiptReq OPTIONAL }
KeyPkgID ::= OCTET STRING
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
KeyPkgReceiptReq ::= SEQUENCE {
encryptReceipt BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
receiptsFrom [0] SIREntityNames OPTIONAL,
receiptsTo SIREntityNames }
--
-- Content Type Definitions
--
KeyPackageContentTypes CONTENT-TYPE ::= {
ct-key-package-receipt |
ct-key-package-error,
... -- Expect additional content types -- }
-- Key Package Receipt CMS Content Type
ct-key-package-receipt CONTENT-TYPE ::= {
TYPE KeyPackageReceipt
IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-KP-keyPackageReceipt }
id-ct-KP-keyPackageReceipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) formats(2)
key-package-content-types(78) 3 }
KeyPackageReceipt ::= SEQUENCE {
version KeyPkgVersion DEFAULT v2,
receiptOf KeyPkgIdentifier,
receivedBy SIREntityName }
KeyPkgIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
pkgID KeyPkgID,
attribute SingleAttribute {{ KeyPkgIdentifiers }} }
KeyPkgIdentifiers ATTRIBUTE ::= { ... }
-- Key Package Receipt CMS Content Type
ct-key-package-error CONTENT-TYPE ::= {
TYPE KeyPackageError IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-KP-keyPackageError }
id-ct-KP-keyPackageError OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) formats(2)
key-package-content-types(78) 6 }
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
KeyPackageError ::= SEQUENCE {
version KeyPkgVersion DEFAULT v2,
errorOf [0] KeyPkgIdentifier OPTIONAL,
errorBy SIREntityName,
errorCode ErrorCodeChoice }
ErrorCodeChoice ::= CHOICE {
enum EnumeratedErrorCode,
oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
EnumeratedErrorCode ::= ENUMERATED {
decodeFailure (1),
badContentInfo (2),
badSignedData (3),
badEncapContent (4),
badCertificate (5),
badSignerInfo (6),
badSignedAttrs (7),
badUnsignedAttrs (8),
missingContent (9),
noTrustAnchor (10),
notAuthorized (11),
badDigestAlgorithm (12),
badSignatureAlgorithm (13),
unsupportedKeySize (14),
unsupportedParameters (15),
signatureFailure (16),
insufficientMemory (17),
incorrectTarget (23),
missingSignature (29),
resourcesBusy (30),
versionNumberMismatch (31),
revokedCertificate (33),
-- Error codes with values <= 33 are aligned with [RFC5934]
ambiguousDecrypt (60),
noDecryptKey (61),
badEncryptedData (62),
badEnvelopedData (63),
badAuthenticatedData (64),
badAuthEnvelopedData (65),
badKeyAgreeRecipientInfo (66),
badKEKRecipientInfo (67),
badEncryptContent (68),
badEncryptAlgorithm (69),
missingCiphertext (70),
decryptFailure (71),
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RFC 7191 Key Package Receipts and Errors April 2014
badMACAlgorithm (72),
badAuthAttrs (73),
badUnauthAttrs (74),
invalidMAC (75),
mismatchedDigestAlg (76),
missingCertificate (77),
tooManySigners (78),
missingSignedAttributes (79),
derEncodingNotUsed (80),
missingContentHints (81),
invalidAttributeLocation (82),
badMessageDigest (83),
badKeyPackage (84),
badAttributes (85),
attributeComparisonFailure (86),
unsupportedSymmetricKeyPackage (87),
unsupportedAsymmetricKeyPackage (88),
constraintViolation (89),
ambiguousDefaultValue (90),
noMatchingRecipientInfo (91),
unsupportedKeyWrapAlgorithm (92),
badKeyTransRecipientInfo (93),
other (127),
... -- Expect additional error codes -- }
END
Author's Address
Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
USA
EMail: housley@vigilsec.com
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