path: root/doc/rfc/rfc9065.txt

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                      G. Fairhurst
Request for Comments: 9065                        University of Aberdeen
Category: Informational                                       C. Perkins
ISSN: 2070-1721                                    University of Glasgow
                                                               July 2021


    Considerations around Transport Header Confidentiality, Network
     Operations, and the Evolution of Internet Transport Protocols

Abstract

   To protect user data and privacy, Internet transport protocols have
   supported payload encryption and authentication for some time.  Such
   encryption and authentication are now also starting to be applied to
   the transport protocol headers.  This helps avoid transport protocol
   ossification by middleboxes, mitigate attacks against the transport
   protocol, and protect metadata about the communication.  Current
   operational practice in some networks inspect transport header
   information within the network, but this is no longer possible when
   those transport headers are encrypted.

   This document discusses the possible impact when network traffic uses
   a protocol with an encrypted transport header.  It suggests issues to
   consider when designing new transport protocols or features.

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for informational purposes.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents
   approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of Internet
   Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9065.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
   2.  Current Uses of Transport Headers within the Network
     2.1.  To Separate Flows in Network Devices
     2.2.  To Identify Transport Protocols and Flows
     2.3.  To Understand Transport Protocol Performance
     2.4.  To Support Network Operations
     2.5.  To Mitigate the Effects of Constrained Networks
     2.6.  To Verify SLA Compliance
   3.  Research, Development, and Deployment
     3.1.  Independent Measurement
     3.2.  Measurable Transport Protocols
     3.3.  Other Sources of Information
   4.  Encryption and Authentication of Transport Headers
   5.  Intentionally Exposing Transport Information to the Network
     5.1.  Exposing Transport Information in Extension Headers
     5.2.  Common Exposed Transport Information
     5.3.  Considerations for Exposing Transport Information
   6.  Addition of Transport OAM Information to Network-Layer Headers
     6.1.  Use of OAM within a Maintenance Domain
     6.2.  Use of OAM across Multiple Maintenance Domains
   7.  Conclusions
   8.  Security Considerations
   9.  IANA Considerations
   10. Informative References
   Acknowledgements
   Authors' Addresses

1.  Introduction

   The transport layer supports the end-to-end flow of data across a
   network path, providing features such as connection establishment,
   reliability, framing, ordering, congestion control, flow control,
   etc., as needed to support applications.  One of the core functions
   of an Internet transport is to discover and adapt to the
   characteristics of the network path that is currently being used.

   For some years, it has been common for the transport-layer payload to
   be protected by encryption and authentication but for the transport-
   layer headers to be sent unprotected.  Examples of protocols that
   behave in this manner include Transport Layer Security (TLS) over TCP
   [RFC8446], Datagram TLS [RFC6347] [DTLS], the Secure Real-time
   Transport Protocol [RFC3711], and tcpcrypt [RFC8548].  The use of
   unencrypted transport headers has led some network operators,
   researchers, and others to develop tools and processes that rely on
   observations of transport headers both in aggregate and at the flow
   level to infer details of the network's behaviour and inform
   operational practice.

   Transport protocols are now being developed that encrypt some or all
   of the transport headers, in addition to the transport payload data.
   The QUIC transport protocol [RFC9000] is an example of such a
   protocol.  Such transport header encryption makes it difficult to
   observe transport protocol behaviour from the vantage point of the
   network.  This document discusses some implications of transport
   header encryption for network operators and researchers that have
   previously observed transport headers, and it highlights some issues
   to consider for transport protocol designers.

   As discussed in [RFC7258], the IETF has concluded that Pervasive
   Monitoring (PM) is a technical attack that needs to be mitigated in
   the design of IETF protocols.  This document supports that
   conclusion.  It also recognises that [RFC7258] states, "Making
   networks unmanageable to mitigate PM is not an acceptable outcome,
   but ignoring PM would go against the consensus documented here.  An
   appropriate balance will emerge over time as real instances of this
   tension are considered."  This document is written to provide input
   to the discussion around what is an appropriate balance by
   highlighting some implications of transport header encryption.

   Current uses of transport header information by network devices on
   the Internet path are explained.  These uses can be beneficial or
   malicious.  This is written to provide input to the discussion around
   what is an appropriate balance by highlighting some implications of
   transport header encryption.

2.  Current Uses of Transport Headers within the Network

   In response to pervasive surveillance [RFC7624] revelations and the
   IETF consensus that "Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack" [RFC7258],
   efforts are underway to increase encryption of Internet traffic.
   Applying confidentiality to transport header fields can improve
   privacy and can help to mitigate certain attacks or manipulation of
   packets by devices on the network path, but it can also affect
   network operations and measurement [RFC8404].

   When considering what parts of the transport headers should be
   encrypted to provide confidentiality and what parts should be visible
   to network devices (including unencrypted but authenticated headers),
   it is necessary to consider both the impact on network operations and
   management and the implications for ossification and user privacy
   [Measurement].  Different parties will view the relative importance
   of these concerns differently.  For some, the benefits of encrypting
   all the transport headers outweigh the impact of doing so; others
   might analyse the security, privacy, and ossification impacts and
   arrive at a different trade-off.

   This section reviews examples of the observation of transport-layer
   headers within the network by using devices on the network path or by
   using information exported by an on-path device.  Unencrypted
   transport headers provide information that can support network
   operations and management, and this section notes some ways in which
   this has been done.  Unencrypted transport header information also
   contributes metadata that can be exploited for purposes unrelated to
   network transport measurement, diagnostics, or troubleshooting (e.g.,
   to block or to throttle traffic from a specific content provider),
   and this section also notes some threats relating to unencrypted
   transport headers.

   Exposed transport information also provides a source of information
   that contributes to linked data sets, which could be exploited to
   deduce private information, e.g., user patterns, user location,
   tracking behaviour, etc.  This might reveal information the parties
   did not intend to be revealed.  [RFC6973] aims to make designers,
   implementers, and users of Internet protocols aware of privacy-
   related design choices in IETF protocols.

   This section does not consider intentional modification of transport
   headers by middleboxes, such as devices performing Network Address
   Translation (NAT) or firewalls.

2.1.  To Separate Flows in Network Devices

   Some network-layer mechanisms separate network traffic by flow
   without resorting to identifying the type of traffic: hash-based load
   sharing across paths (e.g., Equal-Cost Multipath (ECMP)); sharing
   across a group of links (e.g., using a Link Aggregation Group (LAG));
   ensuring equal access to link capacity (e.g., Fair Queuing (FQ)); or
   distributing traffic to servers (e.g., load balancing).  To prevent
   packet reordering, forwarding engines can consistently forward the
   same transport flows along the same forwarding path, often achieved
   by calculating a hash using an n-tuple gleaned from a combination of
   link header information through to transport header information.
   This n-tuple can use the Media Access Control (MAC) address and IP
   addresses and can include observable transport header information.

   When transport header information cannot be observed, there can be
   less information to separate flows at equipment along the path.  Flow
   separation might not be possible when a transport forms traffic into
   an encrypted aggregate.  For IPv6, the Flow Label [RFC6437] can be
   used even when all transport information is encrypted, enabling Flow
   Label-based ECMP [RFC6438] and load sharing [RFC7098].

2.2.  To Identify Transport Protocols and Flows

   Information in exposed transport-layer headers can be used by the
   network to identify transport protocols and flows [RFC8558].  The
   ability to identify transport protocols, flows, and sessions is a
   common function performed, for example, by measurement activities,
   Quality of Service (QoS) classifiers, and firewalls.  These functions
   can be beneficial and performed with the consent of, and in support
   of, the end user.  Alternatively, the same mechanisms could be used
   to support practises that might be adversarial to the end user,
   including blocking, deprioritising, and monitoring traffic without
   consent.

   Observable transport header information, together with information in
   the network header, has been used to identify flows and their
   connection state, together with the set of protocol options being
   used.  Transport protocols, such as TCP [RFC7414] and the Stream
   Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [RFC4960], specify a standard
   base header that includes sequence number information and other data.
   They also have the possibility to negotiate additional headers at
   connection setup, identified by an option number in the transport
   header.

   In some uses, an assigned transport port (e.g., 0..49151) can
   identify the upper-layer protocol or service [RFC7605].  However,
   port information alone is not sufficient to guarantee identification.
   Applications can use arbitrary ports and do not need to use assigned
   port numbers.  The use of an assigned port number is also not limited
   to the protocol for which the port is intended.  Multiple sessions
   can also be multiplexed on a single port, and ports can be reused by
   subsequent sessions.

   Some flows can be identified by observing signalling data (e.g., see
   [RFC3261] and [RFC8837]) or through the use of magic numbers placed
   in the first byte(s) of a datagram payload [RFC7983].

   When transport header information cannot be observed, this removes
   information that could have been used to classify flows by passive
   observers along the path.  More ambitious ways could be used to
   collect, estimate, or infer flow information, including heuristics
   based on the analysis of traffic patterns, such as classification of
   flows relying on timing, volumes of information, and correlation
   between multiple flows.  For example, an operator that cannot access
   the Session Description Protocol (SDP) session descriptions [RFC8866]
   to classify a flow as audio traffic might instead use (possibly less-
   reliable) heuristics to infer that short UDP packets with regular
   spacing carry audio traffic.  Operational practises aimed at
   inferring transport parameters are out of scope for this document,
   and are only mentioned here to recognise that encryption does not
   prevent operators from attempting to apply practises that were used
   with unencrypted transport headers.

   The IAB [RFC8546] has provided a summary of expected implications of
   increased encryption on network functions that use the observable
   headers and describe the expected benefits of designs that explicitly
   declare protocol-invariant header information that can be used for
   this purpose.

2.3.  To Understand Transport Protocol Performance

   This subsection describes use by the network of exposed transport-
   layer headers to understand transport protocol performance and
   behaviour.

2.3.1.  Using Information Derived from Transport-Layer Headers

   Observable transport headers enable explicit measurement and analysis
   of protocol performance and detection of network anomalies at any
   point along the Internet path.  Some operators use passive monitoring
   to manage their portion of the Internet by characterising the
   performance of link/network segments.  Inferences from transport
   headers are used to derive performance metrics:

   Traffic Rate and Volume:
      Per-application traffic rate and volume measures can be used to
      characterise the traffic that uses a network segment or the
      pattern of network usage.  Observing the protocol sequence number
      and packet size offers one way to measure this (e.g., measurements
      observing counters in periodic reports, such as RTCP [RFC3550]
      [RFC3711] [RFC4585], or measurements observing protocol sequence
      numbers in statistical samples of packet flows or specific control
      packets, such as those observed at the start and end of a flow).

      Measurements can be per endpoint or for an endpoint aggregate.
      These could be used to assess usage or for subscriber billing.

      Such measurements can be used to trigger traffic shaping and to
      associate QoS support within the network and lower layers.  This
      can be done with consent and in support of an end user to improve
      quality of service or could be used by the network to deprioritise
      certain flows without user consent.

      The traffic rate and volume can be determined, providing that the
      packets belonging to individual flows can be identified, but there
      might be no additional information about a flow when the transport
      headers cannot be observed.

   Loss Rate and Loss Pattern:
      Flow loss rate can be derived (e.g., from transport sequence
      numbers or inferred from observing transport protocol
      interactions) and has been used as a metric for performance
      assessment and to characterise transport behaviour.  Network
      operators have used the variation in patterns to detect changes in
      the offered service.  Understanding the location and root cause of
      loss can help an operator determine whether this requires
      corrective action.

      There are various causes of loss, including: corruption of link
      frames (e.g., due to interference on a radio link); buffering loss
      (e.g., overflow due to congestion, Active Queue Management (AQM)
      [RFC7567], or inadequate provision following traffic preemption),
      and policing (e.g., traffic management [RFC2475]).  Understanding
      flow loss rates requires maintaining the per-flow state (flow
      identification often requires transport-layer information) and
      either observing the increase in sequence numbers in the network
      or transport headers or comparing a per-flow packet counter with
      the number of packets that the flow actually sent.  Per-hop loss
      can also sometimes be monitored at the interface level by devices
      on the network path or by using in-situ methods operating over a
      network segment (see Section 3.3).

      The pattern of loss can provide insight into the cause of loss.
      Losses can often occur as bursts, randomly timed events, etc.  It
      can also be valuable to understand the conditions under which loss
      occurs.  This usually requires relating loss to the traffic
      flowing at a network node or segment at the time of loss.
      Transport header information can help identify cases where loss
      could have been wrongly identified or where the transport did not
      require retransmission of a lost packet.

   Throughput and Goodput:
      Throughput is the amount of payload data sent by a flow per time
      interval.  Goodput (the subset of throughput consisting of useful
      traffic; see Section 2.5 of [RFC7928] and [RFC5166]) is a measure
      of useful data exchanged.  The throughput of a flow can be
      determined in the absence of transport header information,
      providing that the individual flow can be identified, and the
      overhead known.  Goodput requires the ability to differentiate
      loss and retransmission of packets, for example, by observing
      packet sequence numbers in the TCP or RTP headers [RFC3550].

   Latency:
      Latency is a key performance metric that impacts application and
      user-perceived response times.  It often indirectly impacts
      throughput and flow completion time.  This determines the reaction
      time of the transport protocol itself, impacting flow setup,
      congestion control, loss recovery, and other transport mechanisms.
      The observed latency can have many components [Latency].  Of
      these, unnecessary/unwanted queueing in buffers of the network
      devices on the path has often been observed as a significant
      factor [bufferbloat].  Once the cause of unwanted latency has been
      identified, this can often be eliminated.

      To measure latency across a part of a path, an observation point
      [RFC7799] can measure the experienced round-trip time (RTT) by
      using packet sequence numbers and acknowledgements or by observing
      header timestamp information.  Such information allows an
      observation point on the network path to determine not only the
      path RTT but also allows measurement of the upstream and
      downstream contribution to the RTT.  This could be used to locate
      a source of latency, e.g., by observing cases where the median RTT
      is much greater than the minimum RTT for a part of a path.

      The service offered by network operators can benefit from latency
      information to understand the impact of configuration changes and
      to tune deployed services.  Latency metrics are key to evaluating
      and deploying AQM [RFC7567], Diffserv [RFC2474], and Explicit
      Congestion Notification (ECN) [RFC3168] [RFC8087].  Measurements
      could identify excessively large buffers, indicating where to
      deploy or configure AQM.  An AQM method is often deployed in
      combination with other techniques, such as scheduling [RFC7567]
      [RFC8290], and although parameter-less methods are desired
      [RFC7567], current methods often require tuning [RFC8290]
      [RFC8289] [RFC8033] because they cannot scale across all possible
      deployment scenarios.

      Latency and round-trip time information can potentially expose
      some information useful for approximate geolocation, as discussed
      in [PAM-RTT].

   Variation in Delay:
      Some network applications are sensitive to (small) changes in
      packet timing (jitter).  Short- and long-term delay variation can
      impact the latency of a flow and hence the perceived quality of
      applications using a network path.  For example, jitter metrics
      are often cited when characterising paths supporting real-time
      traffic.  The expected performance of such applications can be
      inferred from a measure of the variation in delay observed along a
      portion of the path [RFC3393] [RFC5481].  The requirements
      resemble those for the measurement of latency.

   Flow Reordering:
      Significant packet reordering within a flow can impact time-
      critical applications and can be interpreted as loss by reliable
      transports.  Many transport protocol techniques are impacted by
      reordering (e.g., triggering TCP retransmission or rebuffering of
      real-time applications).  Packet reordering can occur for many
      reasons, e.g., from equipment design to misconfiguration of
      forwarding rules.  Flow identification is often required to avoid
      significant packet misordering (e.g., when using ECMP, or LAG).
      Network tools can detect and measure unwanted/excessive reordering
      and the impact on transport performance.

      There have been initiatives in the IETF transport area to reduce
      the impact of reordering within a transport flow, possibly leading
      to a reduction in the requirements for preserving ordering.  These
      have potential to simplify network equipment design as well as the
      potential to improve robustness of the transport service.
      Measurements of reordering can help understand the present level
      of reordering and inform decisions about how to progress new
      mechanisms.

      Techniques for measuring reordering typically observe packet
      sequence numbers.  Metrics have been defined that evaluate whether
      a network path has maintained packet order on a packet-by-packet
      basis [RFC4737] [RFC5236].  Some protocols provide in-built
      monitoring and reporting functions.  Transport fields in the RTP
      header [RFC3550] [RFC4585] can be observed to derive traffic
      volume measurements and provide information on the progress and
      quality of a session using RTP.  Metadata assists in understanding
      the context under which the data was collected, including the
      time, observation point [RFC7799], and way in which metrics were
      accumulated.  The RTCP protocol directly reports some of this
      information in a form that can be directly visible by devices on
      the network path.

   In some cases, measurements could involve active injection of test
   traffic to perform a measurement (see Section 3.4 of [RFC7799]).
   However, most operators do not have access to user equipment;
   therefore, the point of test is normally different from the transport
   endpoint.  Injection of test traffic can incur an additional cost in
   running such tests (e.g., the implications of capacity tests in a
   mobile network segment are obvious).  Some active measurements
   [RFC7799] (e.g., response under load or particular workloads) perturb
   other traffic and could require dedicated access to the network
   segment.

   Passive measurements (see Section 3.6 of [RFC7799]) can have
   advantages in terms of eliminating unproductive test traffic,
   reducing the influence of test traffic on the overall traffic mix,
   and having the ability to choose the point of observation (see
   Section 2.4.1).  Measurements can rely on observing packet headers,
   which is not possible if those headers are encrypted, but could
   utilise information about traffic volumes or patterns of interaction
   to deduce metrics.

   Passive packet sampling techniques are also often used to scale the
   processing involved in observing packets on high-rate links.  This
   exports only the packet header information of (randomly) selected
   packets.  Interpretation of the exported information relies on
   understanding of the header information.  The utility of these
   measurements depends on the type of network segment/link and number
   of mechanisms used by the network devices.  Simple routers are
   relatively easy to manage, but a device with more complexity demands
   understanding of the choice of many system parameters.

2.3.2.  Using Information Derived from Network-Layer Header Fields

   Information from the transport header can be used by a multi-field
   (MF) classifier as a part of policy framework.  Policies are commonly
   used for management of the QoS or Quality of Experience (QoE) in
   resource-constrained networks or by firewalls to implement access
   rules (see also Section 2.2.2 of [RFC8404]).  Policies can support
   user applications/services or protect against unwanted or lower-
   priority traffic (Section 2.4.4).

   Transport-layer information can also be explicitly carried in
   network-layer header fields that are not encrypted, serving as a
   replacement/addition to the exposed transport header information
   [RFC8558].  This information can enable a different forwarding
   treatment by the devices forming the network path, even when a
   transport employs encryption to protect other header information.

   On the one hand, the user of a transport that multiplexes multiple
   subflows might want to obscure the presence and characteristics of
   these subflows.  On the other hand, an encrypted transport could set
   the network-layer information to indicate the presence of subflows
   and to reflect the service requirements of individual subflows.
   There are several ways this could be done:

   IP Address:
      Applications normally expose the endpoint addresses used in the
      forwarding decisions in network devices.  Address and other
      protocol information can be used by an MF classifier to determine
      how traffic is treated [RFC2475] and hence affects the quality of
      experience for a flow.  Common issues concerning IP address
      sharing are described in [RFC6269].

   Using the IPv6 Network-Layer Flow Label:
      A number of Standards Track and Best Current Practice RFCs (e.g.,
      [RFC8085], [RFC6437], and [RFC6438]) encourage endpoints to set
      the IPv6 Flow Label field of the network-layer header.  As per
      [RFC6437], IPv6 source nodes "SHOULD assign each unrelated
      transport connection and application data stream to a new flow."
      A multiplexing transport could choose to use multiple flow labels
      to allow the network to independently forward subflows.  [RFC6437]
      provides further guidance on choosing a flow label value, stating
      these "should be chosen such that their bits exhibit a high degree
      of variability" and chosen so that "third parties should be
      unlikely to be able to guess the next value that a source of flow
      labels will choose."

      Once set, a flow label can provide information that can help
      inform network-layer queueing and forwarding, including use with
      IPsec [RFC6294], Equal-Cost Multipath routing, and Link
      Aggregation [RFC6438].

      The choice of how to assign a flow label needs to avoid
      introducing linkages between flows that a network device could not
      otherwise observe.  Inappropriate use by the transport can have
      privacy implications (e.g., assigning the same label to two
      independent flows that ought not to be classified similarly).

   Using the Network-Layer Differentiated Services Code Point:
      Applications can expose their delivery expectations to network
      devices by setting the Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP)
      field of IPv4 and IPv6 packets [RFC2474].  For example, WebRTC
      applications identify different forwarding treatments for
      individual subflows (audio vs. video) based on the value of the
      DSCP field [RFC8837]).  This provides explicit information to
      inform network-layer queueing and forwarding, rather than an
      operator inferring traffic requirements from transport and
      application headers via a multi-field classifier.  Inappropriate
      use by the transport can have privacy implications (e.g.,
      assigning a different DSCP to a subflow could assist in a network
      device discovering the traffic pattern used by an application).
      The field is mutable, i.e., some network devices can be expected
      to change this field.  Since the DSCP value can impact the quality
      of experience for a flow, observations of service performance have
      to consider this field when a network path supports differentiated
      service treatment.

   Using Explicit Congestion Notification:
      Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) [RFC3168] is a transport
      mechanism that uses the ECN field in the network-layer header.
      Use of ECN explicitly informs the network layer that a transport
      is ECN capable and requests ECN treatment of the flow.  An ECN-
      capable transport can offer benefits when used over a path with
      equipment that implements an AQM method with Congestion
      Experienced (CE) marking of IP packets [RFC8087], since it can
      react to congestion without also having to recover from lost
      packets.

      ECN exposes the presence of congestion.  The reception of CE-
      marked packets can be used to estimate the level of incipient
      congestion on the upstream portion of the path from the point of
      observation (Section 2.5 of [RFC8087]).  Interpreting the marking
      behaviour (i.e., assessing congestion and diagnosing faults)
      requires context from the transport layer, such as path RTT.

      AQM and ECN offer a range of algorithms and configuration options.
      Tools therefore have to be available to network operators and
      researchers to understand the implication of configuration choices
      and transport behaviour as the use of ECN increases and new
      methods emerge [RFC7567].

   Network-Layer Options:
      Network protocols can carry optional headers (see Section 5.1).
      These can explicitly expose transport header information to on-
      path devices operating at the network layer (as discussed further
      in Section 6).

      IPv4 [RFC0791] has provisions for optional header fields.  IP
      routers can examine these headers and are required to ignore IPv4
      options that they do not recognise.  Many current paths include
      network devices that forward packets that carry options on a
      slower processing path.  Some network devices (e.g., firewalls)
      can be (and are) configured to drop these packets [RFC7126].  BCP
      186 [RFC7126] provides guidance on how operators should treat IPv4
      packets that specify options.

      IPv6 can encode optional network-layer information in separate
      headers that may be placed between the IPv6 header and the upper-
      layer header [RFC8200] (e.g., the IPv6 Alternate Marking Method
      [IPV6-ALT-MARK], which can be used to measure packet loss and
      delay metrics).  The Hop-by-Hop Options header, when present,
      immediately follows the IPv6 header.  IPv6 permits this header to
      be examined by any node along the path if explicitly configured
      [RFC8200].

   Careful use of the network-layer features (e.g., extension headers
   can; see Section 5) help provide similar information in the case
   where the network is unable to inspect transport protocol headers.

2.4.  To Support Network Operations

   Some network operators make use of on-path observations of transport
   headers to analyse the service offered to the users of a network
   segment and inform operational practice and can help detect and
   locate network problems.  [RFC8517] gives an operator's perspective
   about such use.

   When observable transport header information is not available, those
   seeking an understanding of transport behaviour and dynamics might
   learn to work without that information.  Alternatively, they might
   use more limited measurements combined with pattern inference and
   other heuristics to infer network behaviour (see Section 2.1.1 of
   [RFC8404]).  Operational practises aimed at inferring transport
   parameters are out of scope for this document and are only mentioned
   here to recognise that encryption does not necessarily stop operators
   from attempting to apply practises that have been used with
   unencrypted transport headers.

   This section discusses topics concerning observation of transport
   flows, with a focus on transport measurement.

2.4.1.  Problem Location

   Observations of transport header information can be used to locate
   the source of problems or to assess the performance of a network
   segment.  Often issues can only be understood in the context of the
   other flows that share a particular path, particular device
   configuration, interface port, etc.  A simple example is monitoring
   of a network device that uses a scheduler or active queue management
   technique [RFC7567], where it could be desirable to understand
   whether the algorithms are correctly controlling latency or if
   overload protection is working.  This implies knowledge of how
   traffic is assigned to any subqueues used for flow scheduling but can
   require information about how the traffic dynamics impact active
   queue management, starvation prevention mechanisms, and circuit
   breakers.

   Sometimes correlating observations of headers at multiple points
   along the path (e.g., at the ingress and egress of a network segment)
   allows an observer to determine the contribution of a portion of the
   path to an observed metric (e.g., to locate a source of delay,
   jitter, loss, reordering, or congestion marking).

2.4.2.  Network Planning and Provisioning

   Traffic rate and volume measurements are used to help plan deployment
   of new equipment and configuration in networks.  Data is also
   valuable to equipment vendors who want to understand traffic trends
   and patterns of usage as inputs to decisions about planning products
   and provisioning for new deployments.

   Trends in aggregate traffic can be observed and can be related to the
   endpoint addresses being used, but when transport header information
   is not observable, it might be impossible to correlate patterns in
   measurements with changes in transport protocols.  This increases the
   dependency on other indirect sources of information to inform
   planning and provisioning.

2.4.3.  Compliance with Congestion Control

   The traffic that can be observed by on-path network devices (the
   "wire image") is a function of transport protocol design/options,
   network use, applications, and user characteristics.  In general,
   when only a small proportion of the traffic has a specific
   (different) characteristic, such traffic seldom leads to operational
   concern, although the ability to measure and monitor it is lower.
   The desire to understand the traffic and protocol interactions
   typically grows as the proportion of traffic increases.  The
   challenges increase when multiple instances of an evolving protocol
   contribute to the traffic that share network capacity.

   Operators can manage traffic load (e.g., when the network is severely
   overloaded) by deploying rate limiters, traffic shaping, or network
   transport circuit breakers [RFC8084].  The information provided by
   observing transport headers is a source of data that can help to
   inform such mechanisms.

   Congestion Control Compliance of Traffic:
      Congestion control is a key transport function [RFC2914].  Many
      network operators implicitly accept that TCP traffic complies with
      a behaviour that is acceptable for the shared Internet.  TCP
      algorithms have been continuously improved over decades and have
      reached a level of efficiency and correctness that is difficult to
      match in custom application-layer mechanisms [RFC8085].

      A standards-compliant TCP stack provides congestion control that
      is judged safe for use across the Internet.  Applications
      developed on top of well-designed transports can be expected to
      appropriately control their network usage, reacting when the
      network experiences congestion, by backing off and reducing the
      load placed on the network.  This is the normal expected behaviour
      for IETF-specified transports (e.g., TCP and SCTP).

   Congestion Control Compliance for UDP Traffic:
      UDP provides a minimal message-passing datagram transport that has
      no inherent congestion control mechanisms.  Because congestion
      control is critical to the stable operation of the Internet,
      applications and other protocols that choose to use UDP as a
      transport have to employ mechanisms to prevent collapse, avoid
      unacceptable contributions to jitter/latency, and establish an
      acceptable share of capacity with concurrent traffic [RFC8085].

      UDP flows that expose a well-known header can be observed to gain
      understanding of the dynamics of a flow and its congestion control
      behaviour.  For example, tools exist to monitor various aspects of
      RTP header information and RTCP reports for real-time flows (see
      Section 2.3).  The Secure RTP and RTCP extensions [RFC3711] were
      explicitly designed to expose some header information to enable
      such observation while protecting the payload data.

      A network operator can observe the headers of transport protocols
      layered above UDP to understand if the datagram flows comply with
      congestion control expectations.  This can help inform a decision
      on whether it might be appropriate to deploy methods, such as rate
      limiters, to enforce acceptable usage.  The available information
      determines the level of precision with which flows can be
      classified and the design space for conditioning mechanisms (e.g.,
      rate-limiting, circuit breaker techniques [RFC8084], or blocking
      uncharacterised traffic) [RFC5218].

   When anomalies are detected, tools can interpret the transport header
   information to help understand the impact of specific transport
   protocols (or protocol mechanisms) on the other traffic that shares a
   network.  An observer on the network path can gain an understanding
   of the dynamics of a flow and its congestion control behaviour.
   Analysing observed flows can help to build confidence that an
   application flow backs off its share of the network load under
   persistent congestion and hence to understand whether the behaviour
   is appropriate for sharing limited network capacity.  For example, it
   is common to visualise plots of TCP sequence numbers versus time for
   a flow to understand how a flow shares available capacity, deduce its
   dynamics in response to congestion, etc.

   The ability to identify sources and flows that contribute to
   persistent congestion is important to the safe operation of network
   infrastructure and can inform configuration of network devices to
   complement the endpoint congestion avoidance mechanisms [RFC7567]
   [RFC8084] to avoid a portion of the network being driven into
   congestion collapse [RFC2914].

2.4.4.  To Characterise "Unknown" Network Traffic

   The patterns and types of traffic that share Internet capacity change
   over time as networked applications, usage patterns, and protocols
   continue to evolve.

   Encryption can increase the volume of "unknown" or "uncharacterised"
   traffic seen by the network.  If these traffic patterns form a small
   part of the traffic aggregate passing through a network device or
   segment of the network path, the dynamics of the uncharacterised
   traffic might not have a significant collateral impact on the
   performance of other traffic that shares this network segment.  Once
   the proportion of this traffic increases, monitoring the traffic can
   determine if appropriate safety measures have to be put in place.

   Tracking the impact of new mechanisms and protocols requires traffic
   volume to be measured and new transport behaviours to be identified.
   This is especially true of protocols operating over a UDP substrate.
   The level and style of encryption needs to be considered in
   determining how this activity is performed.

   Traffic that cannot be classified typically receives a default
   treatment.  Some networks block or rate-limit traffic that cannot be
   classified.

2.4.5.  To Support Network Security Functions

   On-path observation of the transport headers of packets can be used
   for various security functions.  For example, Denial of Service (DoS)
   and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks against the infrastructure or
   against an endpoint can be detected and mitigated by characterising
   anomalous traffic (see Section 2.4.4) on a shorter timescale.  Other
   uses include support for security audits (e.g., verifying the
   compliance with cipher suites), client and application fingerprinting
   for inventory, and alerts provided for network intrusion detection
   and other next generation firewall functions.

   When using an encrypted transport, endpoints can directly provide
   information to support these security functions.  Another method, if
   the endpoints do not provide this information, is to use an on-path
   network device that relies on pattern inferences in the traffic and
   heuristics or machine learning instead of processing observed header
   information.  An endpoint could also explicitly cooperate with an on-
   path device (e.g., a QUIC endpoint could share information about
   current uses of connection IDs).

2.4.6.  Network Diagnostics and Troubleshooting

   Operators monitor the health of a network segment to support a
   variety of operational tasks [RFC8404], including procedures to
   provide early warning and trigger action, e.g., to diagnose network
   problems, to manage security threats (including DoS), to evaluate
   equipment or protocol performance, or to respond to user performance
   questions.  Information about transport flows can assist in setting
   buffer sizes and help identify whether link/network tuning is
   effective.  Information can also support debugging and diagnosis of
   the root causes of faults that concern a particular user's traffic
   and can support postmortem investigation after an anomaly.  Sections
   3.1.2 and 5 of [RFC8404] provide further examples.

   Network segments vary in their complexity.  The design trade-offs for
   radio networks are often very different from those of wired networks
   [RFC8462].  A radio-based network (e.g., cellular mobile, enterprise
   Wireless LAN (WLAN), satellite access/backhaul, point-to-point radio)
   adds a subsystem that performs radio resource management, with impact
   on the available capacity and potentially loss/reordering of packets.
   This impact can differ by traffic type and can be correlated with
   link propagation and interference.  These can impact the cost and
   performance of a provided service and is expected to increase in
   importance as operators bring together heterogeneous types of network
   equipment and deploy opportunistic methods to access a shared radio
   spectrum.

2.4.7.  Tooling and Network Operations

   A variety of open source and proprietary tools have been deployed
   that use the transport header information observable with widely used
   protocols, such as TCP or RTP/UDP/IP.  Tools that dissect network
   traffic flows can alert to potential problems that are hard to derive
   from volume measurements, link statistics, or device measurements
   alone.

   Any introduction of a new transport protocol, protocol feature, or
   application might require changes to such tools and could impact
   operational practice and policies.  Such changes have associated
   costs that are incurred by the network operators that need to update
   their tooling or develop alternative practises that work without
   access to the changed/removed information.

   The use of encryption has the desirable effect of preventing
   unintended observation of the payload data, and these tools seldom
   seek to observe the payload or other application details.  A flow
   that hides its transport header information could imply "don't touch"
   to some operators.  This might limit a trouble-shooting response to
   "can't help, no trouble found".

   An alternative that does not require access to an observable
   transport headers is to access endpoint diagnostic tools or to
   include user involvement in diagnosing and troubleshooting unusual
   use cases or to troubleshoot nontrivial problems.  Another approach
   is to use traffic pattern analysis.  Such tools can provide useful
   information during network anomalies (e.g., detecting significant
   reordering, high or intermittent loss); however, indirect
   measurements need to be carefully designed to provide information for
   diagnostics and troubleshooting.

   If new protocols, or protocol extensions, are made to closely
   resemble or match existing mechanisms, then the changes to tooling
   and the associated costs can be small.  Equally, more extensive
   changes to the transport tend to require more extensive, and more
   expensive, changes to tooling and operational practice.  Protocol
   designers can mitigate these costs by explicitly choosing to expose
   selected information as invariants that are guaranteed not to change
   for a particular protocol (e.g., the header invariants and the spin
   bit in QUIC [RFC9000]).  Specification of common log formats and
   development of alternative approaches can also help mitigate the
   costs of transport changes.

2.5.  To Mitigate the Effects of Constrained Networks

   Some link and network segments are constrained by the capacity they
   can offer by the time it takes to access capacity (e.g., due to
   underlying radio resource management methods) or by asymmetries in
   the design (e.g., many link are designed so that the capacity
   available is different in the forward and return directions; some
   radio technologies have different access methods in the forward and
   return directions resulting from differences in the power budget).

   The impact of path constraints can be mitigated using a proxy
   operating at or above the transport layer to use an alternate
   transport protocol.

   In many cases, one or both endpoints are unaware of the
   characteristics of the constraining link or network segment, and
   mitigations are applied below the transport layer.  Packet
   classification and QoS methods (described in various sections) can be
   beneficial in differentially prioritising certain traffic when there
   is a capacity constraint or additional delay in scheduling link
   transmissions.  Another common mitigation is to apply header
   compression over the specific link or subnetwork (see Section 2.5.1).

2.5.1.  To Provide Header Compression

   Header compression saves link capacity by compressing network and
   transport protocol headers on a per-hop basis.  This has been widely
   used with low bandwidth dial-up access links and still finds
   application on wireless links that are subject to capacity
   constraints.  These methods are effective for bit-congestive links
   sending small packets (e.g., reducing the cost for sending control
   packets or small data packets over radio links).

   Examples of header compression include use with TCP/IP and RTP/UDP/IP
   flows [RFC2507] [RFC6846] [RFC2508] [RFC5795] [RFC8724].  Successful
   compression depends on observing the transport headers and
   understanding the way fields change between packets and is hence
   incompatible with header encryption.  Devices that compress transport
   headers are dependent on a stable header format, implying
   ossification of that format.

   Introducing a new transport protocol, or changing the format of the
   transport header information, will limit the effectiveness of header
   compression until the network devices are updated.  Encrypting the
   transport protocol headers will tend to cause the header compression
   to fall back to compressing only the network-layer headers, with a
   significant reduction in efficiency.  This can limit connectivity if
   the resulting flow exceeds the link capacity or if the packets are
   dropped because they exceed the link Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU).

   The Secure RTP (SRTP) extensions [RFC3711] were explicitly designed
   to leave the transport protocol headers unencrypted, but
   authenticated, since support for header compression was considered
   important.

2.6.  To Verify SLA Compliance

   Observable transport headers coupled with published transport
   specifications allow operators and regulators to explore and verify
   compliance with Service Level Agreements (SLAs).  It can also be used
   to understand whether a service is providing differential treatment
   to certain flows.

   When transport header information cannot be observed, other methods
   have to be found to confirm that the traffic produced conforms to the
   expectations of the operator or developer.

   Independently verifiable performance metrics can be utilised to
   demonstrate regulatory compliance in some jurisdictions and as a
   basis for informing design decisions.  This can bring assurance to
   those operating networks, often avoiding deployment of complex
   techniques that routinely monitor and manage Internet traffic flows
   (e.g., avoiding the capital and operational costs of deploying flow
   rate-limiting and network circuit breaker methods [RFC8084]).

3.  Research, Development, and Deployment

   Research and development of new protocols and mechanisms need to be
   informed by measurement data (as described in the previous section).
   Data can also help promote acceptance of proposed standards
   specifications by the wider community (e.g., as a method to judge the
   safety for Internet deployment).

   Observed data is important to ensure the health of the research and
   development communities and provides data needed to evaluate new
   proposals for standardisation.  Open standards motivate a desire to
   include independent observation and evaluation of performance and
   deployment data.  Independent data helps compare different methods,
   judge the level of deployment, and ensure the wider applicability of
   the results.  This is important when considering when a protocol or
   mechanism should be standardised for use in the general Internet.
   This, in turn, demands control/understanding about where and when
   measurement samples are collected.  This requires consideration of
   the methods used to observe information and the appropriate balance
   between encrypting all and no transport header information.

   There can be performance and operational trade-offs in exposing
   selected information to network tools.  This section explores key
   implications of tools and procedures that observe transport protocols
   but does not endorse or condemn any specific practises.

3.1.  Independent Measurement

   Encrypting transport header information has implications on the way
   network data is collected and analysed.  Independent observations by
   multiple actors is currently used by the transport community to
   maintain an accurate understanding of the network within transport
   area working groups, IRTF research groups, and the broader research
   community.  This is important to be able to provide accountability
   and demonstrate that protocols behave as intended; although, when
   providing or using such information, it is important to consider the
   privacy of the user and their incentive for providing accurate and
   detailed information.

   Protocols that expose the state of the transport protocol in their
   header (e.g., timestamps used to calculate the RTT, packet numbers
   used to assess congestion, and requests for retransmission) provide
   an incentive for a sending endpoint to provide consistent
   information, because a protocol will not work otherwise.  An on-path
   observer can have confidence that well-known (and ossified) transport
   header information represents the actual state of the endpoints when
   this information is necessary for the protocol's correct operation.

   Encryption of transport header information could reduce the range of
   actors that can observe useful data.  This would limit the
   information sources available to the Internet community to understand
   the operation of new transport protocols, reducing information to
   inform design decisions and standardisation of the new protocols and
   related operational practises.  The cooperating dependence of
   network, application, and host to provide communication performance
   on the Internet is uncertain when only endpoints (i.e., at user
   devices and within service platforms) can observe performance and
   when performance cannot be independently verified by all parties.

3.2.  Measurable Transport Protocols

   Transport protocol evolution and the ability to measure and
   understand the impact of protocol changes have to proceed hand-in-
   hand.  A transport protocol that provides observable headers can be
   used to provide open and verifiable measurement data.  Observation of
   pathologies has a critical role in the design of transport protocol
   mechanisms and development of new mechanisms and protocols and aides
   in understanding the interactions between cooperating protocols and
   network mechanisms, the implications of sharing capacity with other
   traffic, and the impact of different patterns of usage.  The ability
   of other stakeholders to review transport header traces helps develop
   insight into the performance and the traffic contribution of specific
   variants of a protocol.

   Development of new transport protocol mechanisms has to consider the
   scale of deployment and the range of environments in which the
   transport is used.  Experience has shown that it is often difficult
   to correctly implement new mechanisms [RFC8085] and that mechanisms
   often evolve as a protocol matures or in response to changes in
   network conditions, in network traffic, or to application usage.
   Analysis is especially valuable when based on the behaviour
   experienced across a range of topologies, vendor equipment, and
   traffic patterns.

   Encryption enables a transport protocol to choose which internal
   state to reveal to devices on the network path, what information to
   encrypt, and what fields to grease [RFC8701].  A new design can
   provide summary information regarding its performance, congestion
   control state, etc., or make explicit measurement information
   available.  For example, [RFC9000] specifies a way for a QUIC
   endpoint to optionally set the spin bit to explicitly reveal the RTT
   of an encrypted transport session to the on-path network devices.
   There is a choice of what information to expose.  For some
   operational uses, the information has to contain sufficient detail to
   understand, and possibly reconstruct, the network traffic pattern for
   further testing.  The interpretation of the information needs to
   consider whether this information reflects the actual transport state
   of the endpoints.  This might require the trust of transport protocol
   implementers to correctly reveal the desired information.

   New transport protocol formats are expected to facilitate an
   increased pace of transport evolution and with it the possibility to
   experiment with and deploy a wide range of protocol mechanisms.  At
   the time of writing, there has been interest in a wide range of new
   transport methods, e.g., larger initial window, Proportional Rate
   Reduction (PRR), congestion control methods based on measuring
   bottleneck bandwidth and round-trip propagation time, the
   introduction of AQM techniques, and new forms of ECN response (e.g.,
   Data Centre TCP, DCTCP, and methods proposed for Low Latency Low Loss
   Scalable throughput (L4S)).  The growth and diversity of applications
   and protocols using the Internet also continues to expand.  For each
   new method or application, it is desirable to build a body of data
   reflecting its behaviour under a wide range of deployment scenarios,
   traffic load, and interactions with other deployed/candidate methods.

3.3.  Other Sources of Information

   Some measurements that traditionally rely on observable transport
   information could be completed by utilising endpoint-based logging
   (e.g., based on QUIC trace [Quic-Trace] and qlog [QLOG]).  Such
   information has a diversity of uses, including developers wishing to
   debug/understand the transport/application protocols with which they
   work, researchers seeking to spot trends and anomalies, and to
   characterise variants of protocols.  A standard format for endpoint
   logging could allow these to be shared (after appropriate
   anonymisation) to understand performance and pathologies.

   When measurement datasets are made available by servers or client
   endpoints, additional metadata, such as the state of the network and
   conditions in which the system was observed, is often necessary to
   interpret this data to answer questions about network performance or
   understand a pathology.  Collecting and coordinating such metadata is
   more difficult when the observation point is at a different location
   to the bottleneck or device under evaluation [RFC7799].

   Despite being applicable in some scenarios, endpoint logs do not
   provide equivalent information to on-path measurements made by
   devices in the network.  In particular, endpoint logs contain only a
   part of the information to understand the operation of network
   devices and identify issues, such as link performance or capacity
   sharing between multiple flows.  An analysis can require coordination
   between actors at different layers to successfully characterise flows
   and correlate the performance or behaviour of a specific mechanism
   with an equipment configuration and traffic using operational
   equipment along a network path (e.g., combining transport and network
   measurements to explore congestion control dynamics to understand the
   implications of traffic on designs for active queue management or
   circuit breakers).

   Another source of information could arise from Operations,
   Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) (see Section 6).  Information
   data records could be embedded into header information at different
   layers to support functions, such as performance evaluation, path
   tracing, path verification information, classification, and a
   diversity of other uses.

   In-situ OAM (IOAM) data fields [IOAM-DATA] can be encapsulated into a
   variety of protocols to record operational and telemetry information
   in an existing packet while that packet traverses a part of the path
   between two points in a network (e.g., within a particular IOAM
   management domain).  IOAM-Data-Fields are independent from the
   protocols into which IOAM-Data-Fields are encapsulated.  For example,
   IOAM can provide proof that a traffic flow takes a predefined path,
   SLA verification for the live data traffic, and statistics relating
   to traffic distribution.

4.  Encryption and Authentication of Transport Headers

   There are several motivations for transport header encryption.

   One motive to encrypt transport headers is to prevent network
   ossification from network devices that inspect well-known transport
   headers.  Once a network device observes a transport header and
   becomes reliant upon using it, the overall use of that field can
   become ossified, preventing new versions of the protocol and
   mechanisms from being deployed.  Examples include:

   *  During the development of TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], the design needed to
      function in the presence of deployed middleboxes that relied on
      the presence of certain header fields exposed in TLS 1.2
      [RFC5426].

   *  The design of Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [RFC8684] had to account for
      middleboxes (known as "TCP Normalizers") that monitor the
      evolution of the window advertised in the TCP header and then
      reset connections when the window did not grow as expected.

   *  TCP Fast Open [RFC7413] can experience problems due to middleboxes
      that modify the transport header of packets by removing "unknown"
      TCP options.  Segments with unrecognised TCP options can be
      dropped, segments that contain data and set the SYN bit can be
      dropped, and some middleboxes that disrupt connections can send
      data before completion of the three-way handshake.

   *  Other examples of TCP ossification have included middleboxes that
      modify transport headers by rewriting TCP sequence and
      acknowledgement numbers but are unaware of the (newer) TCP
      selective acknowledgement (SACK) option and therefore fail to
      correctly rewrite the SACK information to match the changes made
      to the fixed TCP header, preventing correct SACK operation.

   In all these cases, middleboxes with a hard-coded, but incomplete,
   understanding of a specific transport behaviour (i.e., TCP)
   interacted poorly with transport protocols after the transport
   behaviour was changed.  In some cases, the middleboxes modified or
   replaced information in the transport protocol header.

   Transport header encryption prevents an on-path device from observing
   the transport headers and therefore stops ossified mechanisms being
   used that directly rely on or infer semantics of the transport header
   information.  This encryption is normally combined with
   authentication of the protected information.  [RFC8546] summarises
   this approach, stating that "[t]he wire image, not the protocol's
   specification, determines how third parties on the network paths
   among protocol participants will interact with that protocol"
   (Section 1 of [RFC8546]), and it can be expected that header
   information that is not encrypted will become ossified.

   Encryption does not itself prevent ossification of the network
   service.  People seeking to understand or classify network traffic
   could still come to rely on pattern inferences and other heuristics
   or machine learning to derive measurement data and as the basis for
   network forwarding decisions [RFC8546].  This can also create
   dependencies on the transport protocol or the patterns of traffic it
   can generate, also resulting in ossification of the service.

   Another motivation for using transport header encryption is to
   improve privacy and to decrease opportunities for surveillance.
   Users value the ability to protect their identity and location and
   defend against analysis of the traffic.  Revelations about the use of
   pervasive surveillance [RFC7624] have, to some extent, eroded trust
   in the service offered by network operators and have led to an
   increased use of encryption.  Concerns have also been voiced about
   the addition of metadata to packets by third parties to provide
   analytics, customisation, advertising, cross-site tracking of users,
   customer billing, or selectively allowing or blocking content.

   Whatever the reasons, the IETF is designing protocols that include
   transport header encryption (e.g., QUIC [RFC9000]) to supplement the
   already widespread payload encryption and to further limit exposure
   of transport metadata to the network.

   If a transport protocol uses header encryption, the designers have to
   decide whether to encrypt all or a part of the transport-layer
   information.  Section 4 of [RFC8558] states, "Anything exposed to the
   path should be done with the intent that it be used by the network
   elements on the path."

   Certain transport header fields can be made observable to on-path
   network devices or can define new fields designed to explicitly
   expose observable transport-layer information to the network.  Where
   exposed fields are intended to be immutable (i.e., can be observed
   but not modified by a network device), the endpoints are encouraged
   to use authentication to provide a cryptographic integrity check that
   can detect if these immutable fields have been modified by network
   devices.  Authentication can help to prevent attacks that rely on
   sending packets that fake exposed control signals in transport
   headers (e.g., TCP RST spoofing).  Making a part of a transport
   header observable or exposing new header fields can lead to
   ossification of that part of a header as network devices come to rely
   on observations of the exposed fields.

   The use of transport header authentication and encryption therefore
   exposes a tussle between middlebox vendors, operators, researchers,
   applications developers, and end users:

   *  On the one hand, future Internet protocols that support transport
      header encryption assist in the restoration of the end-to-end
      nature of the Internet by returning complex processing to the
      endpoints.  Since middleboxes cannot modify what they cannot see,
      the use of transport header encryption can improve application and
      end-user privacy by reducing leakage of transport metadata to
      operators that deploy middleboxes.

   *  On the other hand, encryption of transport-layer information has
      implications for network operators and researchers seeking to
      understand the dynamics of protocols and traffic patterns, since
      it reduces the information that is available to them.

   The following briefly reviews some security design options for
   transport protocols.  "A Survey of the Interaction between Security
   Protocols and Transport Services" [RFC8922] provides more details
   concerning commonly used encryption methods at the transport layer.

   Security work typically employs a design technique that seeks to
   expose only what is needed [RFC3552].  This approach provides
   incentives to not reveal any information that is not necessary for
   the end-to-end communication.  The IETF has provided guidelines for
   writing security considerations for IETF specifications [RFC3552].

   Endpoint design choices impacting privacy also need to be considered
   as a part of the design process [RFC6973].  The IAB has provided
   guidance for analysing and documenting privacy considerations within
   IETF specifications [RFC6973].

   Authenticating the Transport Protocol Header:
      Transport-layer header information can be authenticated.  An
      example transport authentication mechanism is TCP Authentication
      Option (TCP-AO) [RFC5925].  This TCP option authenticates the IP
      pseudo-header, TCP header, and TCP data.  TCP-AO protects the
      transport layer, preventing attacks from disabling the TCP
      connection itself and provides replay protection.  Such
      authentication might interact with middleboxes, depending on their
      behaviour [RFC3234].

      The IPsec Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] was designed to
      work at the network layer and authenticate the IP payload.  This
      approach authenticates all transport headers and verifies their
      integrity at the receiver, preventing modification by network
      devices on the path.  The IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload
      (ESP) [RFC4303] can also provide authentication and integrity
      without confidentiality using the NULL encryption algorithm
      [RFC2410].  SRTP [RFC3711] is another example of a transport
      protocol that allows header authentication.

   Integrity Check:
      Transport protocols usually employ integrity checks on the
      transport header information.  Security methods usually employ
      stronger checks and can combine this with authentication.  An
      integrity check that protects the immutable transport header
      fields, but can still expose the transport header information in
      the clear, allows on-path network devices to observe these fields.
      An integrity check is not able to prevent modification by network
      devices on the path but can prevent a receiving endpoint from
      accepting changes and avoid impact on the transport protocol
      operation, including some types of attack.

   Selectively Encrypting Transport Headers and Payload:
      A transport protocol design that encrypts selected header fields
      allows specific transport header fields to be made observable by
      network devices on the path.  This information is explicitly
      exposed either in a transport header field or lower layer protocol
      header.  A design that only exposes immutable fields can also
      perform end-to-end authentication of these fields across the path
      to prevent undetected modification of the immutable transport
      headers.

      Mutable fields in the transport header provide opportunities where
      on-path network devices can modify the transport behaviour (e.g.,
      the extended headers described in [PLUS-ABSTRACT-MECH]).  An
      example of a method that encrypts some, but not all, transport
      header information is GRE-in-UDP [RFC8086] when used with GRE
      encryption.

   Optional Encryption of Header Information:
      There are implications to the use of optional header encryption in
      the design of a transport protocol, where support of optional
      mechanisms can increase the complexity of the protocol and its
      implementation and in the management decisions that have to be
      made to use variable format fields.  Instead, fields of a specific
      type ought to be sent with the same level of confidentiality or
      integrity protection.

   Greasing:
      Protocols often provide extensibility features, reserving fields
      or values for use by future versions of a specification.  The
      specification of receivers has traditionally ignored unspecified
      values; however, on-path network devices have emerged that ossify
      to require a certain value in a field or reuse a field for another
      purpose.  When the specification is later updated, it is
      impossible to deploy the new use of the field and forwarding of
      the protocol could even become conditional on a specific header
      field value.

      A protocol can intentionally vary the value, format, and/or
      presence of observable transport header fields at random
      [RFC8701].  This prevents a network device ossifying the use of a
      specific observable field and can ease future deployment of new
      uses of the value or code point.  This is not a security
      mechanism, although the use can be combined with an authentication
      mechanism.

   Different transports use encryption to protect their header
   information to varying degrees.  The trend is towards increased
   protection.

5.  Intentionally Exposing Transport Information to the Network

   A transport protocol can choose to expose certain transport
   information to on-path devices operating at the network layer by
   sending observable fields.  One approach is to make an explicit
   choice not to encrypt certain transport header fields, making this
   transport information observable by an on-path network device.
   Another approach is to expose transport information in a network-
   layer extension header (see Section 5.1).  Both are examples of
   explicit information intended to be used by network devices on the
   path [RFC8558].

   Whatever the mechanism used to expose the information, a decision to
   expose only specific information places the transport endpoint in
   control of what to expose outside of the encrypted transport header.
   This decision can then be made independently of the transport
   protocol functionality.  This can be done by exposing part of the
   transport header or as a network-layer option/extension.

5.1.  Exposing Transport Information in Extension Headers

   At the network layer, packets can carry optional headers that
   explicitly expose transport header information to the on-path devices
   operating at the network layer (Section 2.3.2).  For example, an
   endpoint that sends an IPv6 hop-by-hop option [RFC8200] can provide
   explicit transport-layer information that can be observed and used by
   network devices on the path.  New hop-by-hop options are not
   recommended in [RFC8200] "because nodes may be configured to ignore
   the Hop-by-Hop Options header, drop packets containing a Hop-by-Hop
   Options header, or assign packets containing a Hop-by-Hop Options
   header to a slow processing path.  Designers considering defining new
   hop-by-hop options need to be aware of this likely behavior."

   Network-layer optional headers explicitly indicate the information
   that is exposed, whereas use of exposed transport header information
   first requires an observer to identify the transport protocol and its
   format.  See Section 2.2.

   An arbitrary path can include one or more network devices that drop
   packets that include a specific header or option used for this
   purpose (see [RFC7872]).  This could impact the proper functioning of
   the protocols using the path.  Protocol methods can be designed to
   probe to discover whether the specific option(s) can be used along
   the current path, enabling use on arbitrary paths.

5.2.  Common Exposed Transport Information

   There are opportunities for multiple transport protocols to
   consistently supply common observable information [RFC8558].  A
   common approach can result in an open definition of the observable
   fields.  This has the potential that the same information can be
   utilised across a range of operational and analysis tools.

5.3.  Considerations for Exposing Transport Information

   Considerations concerning what information, if any, it is appropriate
   to expose include:

   *  On the one hand, explicitly exposing derived fields containing
      relevant transport information (e.g., metrics for loss, latency,
      etc.) can avoid network devices needing to derive this information
      from other header fields.  This could result in development and
      evolution of transport-independent tools around a common
      observable header and permit transport protocols to also evolve
      independently of this ossified header [RFC8558].

   *  On the other hand, protocols and implementations might be designed
      to avoid consistently exposing external information that
      corresponds to the actual internal information used by the
      protocol itself.  An endpoint/protocol could choose to expose
      transport header information to optimise the benefit it gets from
      the network [RFC8558].  The value of this information for
      analysing operation of the transport layer would be enhanced if
      the exposed information could be verified to match the transport
      protocol's observed behavior.

   The motivation to include actual transport header information and the
   implications of network devices using this information has to be
   considered when proposing such a method.  [RFC8558] summarises this
   as:

   |  When signals from endpoints to the path are independent from the
   |  signals used by endpoints to manage the flow's state mechanics,
   |  they may be falsified by an endpoint without affecting the peer's
   |  understanding of the flow's state.  For encrypted flows, this
   |  divergence is not detectable by on-path devices.

6.  Addition of Transport OAM Information to Network-Layer Headers

   Even when the transport headers are encrypted, on-path devices can
   make measurements by utilising additional protocol headers carrying
   OAM information in an additional packet header.  OAM information can
   be included with packets to perform functions, such as identification
   of transport protocols and flows, to aide understanding of network or
   transport performance or to support network operations or mitigate
   the effects of specific network segments.

   Using network-layer approaches to reveal information has the
   potential that the same method (and hence same observation and
   analysis tools) can be consistently used by multiple transport
   protocols.  This approach also could be applied to methods beyond OAM
   (see Section 5).  There can also be less desirable implications from
   separating the operation of the transport protocol from the
   measurement framework.

6.1.  Use of OAM within a Maintenance Domain

   OAM information can be restricted to a maintenance domain, typically
   owned and operated by a single entity.  OAM information can be added
   at the ingress to the maintenance domain (e.g., an Ethernet protocol
   header with timestamps and sequence number information using a method
   such as 802.11ag or in-situ OAM [IOAM-DATA] or as a part of the
   encapsulation protocol).  This additional header information is not
   delivered to the endpoints and is typically removed at the egress of
   the maintenance domain.

   Although some types of measurements are supported, this approach does
   not cover the entire range of measurements described in this
   document.  In some cases, it can be difficult to position measurement
   tools at the appropriate segments/nodes, and there can be challenges
   in correlating the downstream/upstream information when in-band OAM
   data is inserted by an on-path device.

6.2.  Use of OAM across Multiple Maintenance Domains

   OAM information can also be added at the network layer by the sender
   as an IPv6 extension header or an IPv4 option or in an encapsulation/
   tunnel header that also includes an extension header or option.  This
   information can be used across multiple network segments or between
   the transport endpoints.

   One example is the IPv6 Performance and Diagnostic Metrics (PDM)
   destination option [RFC8250].  This allows a sender to optionally
   include a destination option that carries header fields that can be
   used to observe timestamps and packet sequence numbers.  This
   information could be authenticated by a receiving transport endpoint
   when the information is added at the sender and visible at the
   receiving endpoint, although methods to do this have not currently
   been proposed.  This needs to be explicitly enabled at the sender.

7.  Conclusions

   Header authentication and encryption and strong integrity checks are
   being incorporated into new transport protocols and have important
   benefits.  The pace of the development of transports using the WebRTC
   data channel and the rapid deployment of the QUIC transport protocol
   can both be attributed to using the combination of UDP as a substrate
   while providing confidentiality and authentication of the
   encapsulated transport headers and payload.

   This document has described some current practises, and the
   implications for some stakeholders, when transport-layer header
   encryption is used.  It does not judge whether these practises are
   necessary or endorse the use of any specific practise.  Rather, the
   intent is to highlight operational tools and practises to consider
   when designing and modifying transport protocols, so protocol
   designers can make informed choices about what transport header
   fields to encrypt and whether it might be beneficial to make an
   explicit choice to expose certain fields to devices on the network
   path.  In making such a decision, it is important to balance:

   User Privacy:
      The less transport header information that is exposed to the
      network, the lower the risk of leaking metadata that might have
      user privacy implications.  Transports that chose to expose some
      header fields need to make a privacy assessment to understand the
      privacy cost versus benefit trade-off in making that information
      available.  The design of the QUIC spin bit to the network is an
      example of such considered analysis.

   Transport Ossification:
      Unencrypted transport header fields are likely to ossify rapidly,
      as network devices come to rely on their presence, making it
      difficult to change the transport in future.  This argues that the
      choice to expose information to the network is made deliberately
      and with care, since it is essentially defining a stable interface
      between the transport and the network.  Some protocols will want
      to make that interface as limited as possible; other protocols
      might find value in exposing certain information to signal to the
      network or in allowing the network to change certain header fields
      as signals to the transport.  The visible wire image of a protocol
      should be explicitly designed.

   Network Ossification:
      While encryption can reduce ossification of the transport
      protocol, it does not itself prevent ossification of the network
      service.  People seeking to understand network traffic could still
      come to rely on pattern inferences and other heuristics or machine
      learning to derive measurement data and as the basis for network
      forwarding decisions [RFC8546].  This creates dependencies on the
      transport protocol or the patterns of traffic it can generate,
      resulting in ossification of the service.

   Impact on Operational Practice:
      The network operations community has long relied on being able to
      understand Internet traffic patterns, both in aggregate and at the
      flow level, to support network management, traffic engineering,
      and troubleshooting.  Operational practice has developed based on
      the information available from unencrypted transport headers.  The
      IETF has supported this practice by developing operations and
      management specifications, interface specifications, and
      associated Best Current Practices.  Widespread deployment of
      transport protocols that encrypt their information will impact
      network operations unless operators can develop alternative
      practises that work without access to the transport header.

   Pace of Evolution:
      Removing obstacles to change can enable an increased pace of
      evolution.  If a protocol changes its transport header format
      (wire image) or its transport behaviour, this can result in the
      currently deployed tools and methods becoming no longer relevant.
      Where this needs to be accompanied by development of appropriate
      operational support functions and procedures, it can incur a cost
      in new tooling to catch up with each change.  Protocols that
      consistently expose observable data do not require such
      development but can suffer from ossification and need to consider
      if the exposed protocol metadata has privacy implications.  There
      is no single deployment context; therefore, designers need to
      consider the diversity of operational networks (ISPs, enterprises,
      DDoS mitigation and firewall maintainers, etc.).

   Supporting Common Specifications:
      Common, open, transport specifications can stimulate engagement by
      developers, users, researchers, and the broader community.
      Increased protocol diversity can be beneficial in meeting new
      requirements, but the ability to innovate without public scrutiny
      risks point solutions that optimise for specific cases and that
      can accidentally disrupt operations of/in different parts of the
      network.  The social contract that maintains the stability of the
      Internet relies on accepting common transport specifications and
      on it being possible to detect violations.  The existence of
      independent measurements, transparency, and public scrutiny of
      transport protocol behaviour helps the community to enforce the
      social norm that protocol implementations behave fairly and
      conform (at least mostly) to the specifications.  It is important
      to find new ways of maintaining that community trust as increased
      use of transport header encryption limits visibility into
      transport behaviour (see also Section 5.3).

   Impact on Benchmarking and Understanding Feature Interactions:
      An appropriate vantage point for observation, coupled with timing
      information about traffic flows, provides a valuable tool for
      benchmarking network devices, endpoint stacks, and/or
      configurations.  This can help understand complex feature
      interactions.  An inability to observe transport header
      information can make it harder to diagnose and explore
      interactions between features at different protocol layers, a side
      effect of not allowing a choice of vantage point from which this
      information is observed.  New approaches might have to be
      developed.

   Impact on Research and Development:
      Hiding transport header information can impede independent
      research into new mechanisms, measurements of behaviour, and
      development initiatives.  Experience shows that transport
      protocols are complicated to design and complex to deploy and that
      individual mechanisms have to be evaluated while considering other
      mechanisms across a broad range of network topologies and with
      attention to the impact on traffic sharing the capacity.  If
      increased use of transport header encryption results in reduced
      availability of open data, it could eliminate the independent
      checks to the standardisation process that have previously been in
      place from research and academic contributors (e.g., the role of
      the IRTF Internet Congestion Control Research Group (ICCRG) and
      research publications in reviewing new transport mechanisms and
      assessing the impact of their deployment).

   Observable transport header information might be useful to various
   stakeholders.  Other sets of stakeholders have incentives to limit
   what can be observed.  This document does not make recommendations
   about what information ought to be exposed, to whom it ought to be
   observable, or how this will be achieved.  There are also design
   choices about where observable fields are placed.  For example, one
   location could be a part of the transport header outside of the
   encryption envelope; another alternative is to carry the information
   in a network-layer option or extension header.  New transport
   protocol designs ought to explicitly identify any fields that are
   intended to be observed, consider if there are alternative ways of
   providing the information, and reflect on the implications of
   observable fields being used by on-path network devices and how this
   might impact user privacy and protocol evolution when these fields
   become ossified.

   As [RFC7258] notes, "Making networks unmanageable to mitigate PM is
   not an acceptable outcome, but ignoring PM would go against the
   consensus documented here."  Providing explicit information can help
   avoid traffic being inappropriately classified, impacting application
   performance.  An appropriate balance will emerge over time as real
   instances of this tension are analysed [RFC7258].  This balance
   between information exposed and information hidden ought to be
   carefully considered when specifying new transport protocols.

8.  Security Considerations

   This document is about design and deployment considerations for
   transport protocols.  Issues relating to security are discussed
   throughout this document.

   Authentication, confidentiality protection, and integrity protection
   are identified as transport features by [RFC8095].  As currently
   deployed in the Internet, these features are generally provided by a
   protocol or layer on top of the transport protocol [RFC8922].

   Confidentiality and strong integrity checks have properties that can
   also be incorporated into the design of a transport protocol or to
   modify an existing transport.  Integrity checks can protect an
   endpoint from undetected modification of protocol fields by on-path
   network devices, whereas encryption and obfuscation or greasing can
   further prevent these headers being utilised by network devices
   [RFC8701].  Preventing observation of headers provides an opportunity
   for greater freedom to update the protocols and can ease
   experimentation with new techniques and their final deployment in
   endpoints.  A protocol specification needs to weigh the costs of
   ossifying common headers versus the potential benefits of exposing
   specific information that could be observed along the network path to
   provide tools to manage new variants of protocols.

   Header encryption can provide confidentiality of some or all of the
   transport header information.  This prevents an on-path device from
   gaining knowledge of the header field.  It therefore prevents
   mechanisms being built that directly rely on the information or seeks
   to infer semantics of an exposed header field.  Reduced visibility
   into transport metadata can limit the ability to measure and
   characterise traffic and conversely can provide privacy benefits.

   Extending the transport payload security context to also include the
   transport protocol header protects both types of information with the
   same key.  A privacy concern would arise if this key was shared with
   a third party, e.g., providing access to transport header information
   to debug a performance issue would also result in exposing the
   transport payload data to the same third party.  Such risks would be
   mitigated using a layered security design that provides one domain of
   protection and associated keys for the transport payload and
   encrypted transport headers and a separate domain of protection and
   associated keys for any observable transport header fields.

   Exposed transport headers are sometimes utilised as a part of the
   information to detect anomalies in network traffic.  As stated in
   [RFC7258], "While PM is an attack, other forms of monitoring that
   might fit the definition of PM can be beneficial and not part of any
   attack, e.g., network management functions monitor packets or flows
   and anti-spam mechanisms need to see mail message content."  This can
   be used as the first line of defence to identify potential threats
   from DoS or malware and redirect suspect traffic to dedicated nodes
   responsible for DoS analysis, for malware detection, or to perform
   packet "scrubbing" (the normalisation of packets so that there are no
   ambiguities in interpretation by the ultimate destination of the
   packet).  These techniques are currently used by some operators to
   also defend from distributed DoS attacks.

   Exposed transport header fields can also form a part of the
   information used by the receiver of a transport protocol to protect
   the transport layer from data injection by an attacker.  In
   evaluating this use of exposed header information, it is important to
   consider whether it introduces a significant DoS threat.  For
   example, an attacker could construct a DoS attack by sending packets
   with a sequence number that falls within the currently accepted range
   of sequence numbers at the receiving endpoint.  This would then
   introduce additional work at the receiving endpoint, even though the
   data in the attacking packet might not finally be delivered by the
   transport layer.  This is sometimes known as a "shadowing attack".
   An attack can, for example, disrupt receiver processing, trigger loss
   and retransmission, or make a receiving endpoint perform unproductive
   decryption of packets that cannot be successfully decrypted (forcing
   a receiver to commit decryption resources, or to update and then
   restore protocol state).

   One mitigation to off-path attacks is to deny knowledge of what
   header information is accepted by a receiver or obfuscate the
   accepted header information, e.g., setting a nonpredictable initial
   value for a sequence number during a protocol handshake, as in
   [RFC3550] and [RFC6056], or a port value that cannot be predicted
   (see Section 5.1 of [RFC8085]).  A receiver could also require
   additional information to be used as a part of a validation check
   before accepting packets at the transport layer, e.g., utilising a
   part of the sequence number space that is encrypted or by verifying
   an encrypted token not visible to an attacker.  This would also
   mitigate against on-path attacks.  An additional processing cost can
   be incurred when decryption is attempted before a receiver discards
   an injected packet.

   The existence of open transport protocol standards and a research and
   operations community with a history of independent observation and
   evaluation of performance data encourage fairness and conformance to
   those standards.  This suggests careful consideration will be made
   over where, and when, measurement samples are collected.  An
   appropriate balance between encrypting some or all of the transport
   header information needs to be considered.  Open data and
   accessibility to tools that can help understand trends in application
   deployment, network traffic, and usage patterns can all contribute to
   understanding security challenges.

   The security and privacy considerations in "A Framework for Large-
   Scale Measurement of Broadband Performance (LMAP)" [RFC7594] contain
   considerations for Active and Passive measurement techniques and
   supporting material on measurement context.

   Addition of observable transport information to the path increases
   the information available to an observer and may, when this
   information can be linked to a node or user, reduce the privacy of
   the user.  See the security considerations of [RFC8558].

9.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

10.  Informative References

   [bufferbloat]
              Gettys, J. and K. Nichols, "Bufferbloat: Dark Buffers in
              the Internet", Communications of the ACM, Vol. 55, no. 1,
              pp. 57-65, DOI 10.1145/2063176.2063196, January 2012,
              <https://doi.org/10.1145/2063176.2063196>.

   [DTLS]     Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
              Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
              1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-
              dtls13-43, 30 April 2021,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
              dtls13-43>.

   [IOAM-DATA]
              Brockners, F., Bhandari, S., and T. Mizrahi, "Data Fields
              for In-situ OAM", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-ippm-ioam-data-12, 21 February 2021,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ippm-
              ioam-data-12>.

   [IPV6-ALT-MARK]
              Fioccola, G., Zhou, T., Cociglio, M., Qin, F., and R.
              Pang, "IPv6 Application of the Alternate Marking Method",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-6man-ipv6-
              alt-mark-06, 31 May 2021,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-6man-
              ipv6-alt-mark-06>.

   [Latency]  Briscoe, B., Brunstrom, A., Petlund, A., Hayes, D., Ros,
              D., Tsang, I., Gjessing, S., Fairhurst, G., Griwodz, C.,
              and M. Welzl, "Reducing Internet Latency: A Survey of
              Techniques and Their Merits", IEEE Communications Surveys
              & Tutorials, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 2149-2196, thirdquarter
              2016, DOI 10.1109/COMST.2014.2375213, November 2014,
              <https://doi.org/10.1109/COMST.2014.2375213>.

   [Measurement]
              Fairhurst, G., Kuehlewind, M., and D. Lopez, "Measurement-
              based Protocol Design", European Conference on Networks
              and Communications, Oulu, Finland., June 2017.

   [PAM-RTT]  Trammell, B. and M. Kuehlewind, "Revisiting the Privacy
              Implications of Two-Way Internet Latency Data", Passive
              and Active Measurement, March 2018.

   [PLUS-ABSTRACT-MECH]
              Trammell, B., "Abstract Mechanisms for a Cooperative Path
              Layer under Endpoint Control", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-trammell-plus-abstract-mech-00, 28 September
              2016, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
              trammell-plus-abstract-mech-00>.

   [QLOG]     Marx, R., Niccolini, L., and M. Seemann, "Main logging
              schema for qlog", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-quic-qlog-main-schema-00, 10 June 2021,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-quic-
              qlog-main-schema-00>.

   [Quic-Trace]
              "QUIC trace utilities", Commit 413c3a4,
              <https://github.com/google/quic-trace>.

   [RFC0791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.

   [RFC2410]  Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm and
              Its Use With IPsec", RFC 2410, DOI 10.17487/RFC2410,
              November 1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2410>.

   [RFC2474]  Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black,
              "Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS
              Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2474, December 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2474>.

   [RFC2475]  Blake, S., Black, D., Carlson, M., Davies, E., Wang, Z.,
              and W. Weiss, "An Architecture for Differentiated
              Services", RFC 2475, DOI 10.17487/RFC2475, December 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2475>.

   [RFC2507]  Degermark, M., Nordgren, B., and S. Pink, "IP Header
              Compression", RFC 2507, DOI 10.17487/RFC2507, February
              1999, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2507>.

   [RFC2508]  Casner, S. and V. Jacobson, "Compressing IP/UDP/RTP
              Headers for Low-Speed Serial Links", RFC 2508,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2508, February 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2508>.

   [RFC2914]  Floyd, S., "Congestion Control Principles", BCP 41,
              RFC 2914, DOI 10.17487/RFC2914, September 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2914>.

   [RFC3168]  Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition
              of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP",
              RFC 3168, DOI 10.17487/RFC3168, September 2001,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3168>.

   [RFC3234]  Carpenter, B. and S. Brim, "Middleboxes: Taxonomy and
              Issues", RFC 3234, DOI 10.17487/RFC3234, February 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3234>.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.

   [RFC3393]  Demichelis, C. and P. Chimento, "IP Packet Delay Variation
              Metric for IP Performance Metrics (IPPM)", RFC 3393,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3393, November 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3393>.

   [RFC3550]  Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
              Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
              Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, DOI 10.17487/RFC3550,
              July 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3550>.

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.

   [RFC3711]  Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
              Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
              RFC 3711, DOI 10.17487/RFC3711, March 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3711>.

   [RFC4302]  Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4302>.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.

   [RFC4585]  Ott, J., Wenger, S., Sato, N., Burmeister, C., and J. Rey,
              "Extended RTP Profile for Real-time Transport Control
              Protocol (RTCP)-Based Feedback (RTP/AVPF)", RFC 4585,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4585, July 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4585>.

   [RFC4737]  Morton, A., Ciavattone, L., Ramachandran, G., Shalunov,
              S., and J. Perser, "Packet Reordering Metrics", RFC 4737,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4737, November 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4737>.

   [RFC4960]  Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
              RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>.

   [RFC5166]  Floyd, S., Ed., "Metrics for the Evaluation of Congestion
              Control Mechanisms", RFC 5166, DOI 10.17487/RFC5166, March
              2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5166>.

   [RFC5218]  Thaler, D. and B. Aboba, "What Makes for a Successful
              Protocol?", RFC 5218, DOI 10.17487/RFC5218, July 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5218>.

   [RFC5236]  Jayasumana, A., Piratla, N., Banka, T., Bare, A., and R.
              Whitner, "Improved Packet Reordering Metrics", RFC 5236,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5236, June 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5236>.

   [RFC5426]  Okmianski, A., "Transmission of Syslog Messages over UDP",
              RFC 5426, DOI 10.17487/RFC5426, March 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5426>.

   [RFC5481]  Morton, A. and B. Claise, "Packet Delay Variation
              Applicability Statement", RFC 5481, DOI 10.17487/RFC5481,
              March 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5481>.

   [RFC5795]  Sandlund, K., Pelletier, G., and L-E. Jonsson, "The RObust
              Header Compression (ROHC) Framework", RFC 5795,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5795, March 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5795>.

   [RFC5925]  Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
              Authentication Option", RFC 5925, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925,
              June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5925>.

   [RFC6056]  Larsen, M. and F. Gont, "Recommendations for Transport-
              Protocol Port Randomization", BCP 156, RFC 6056,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6056, January 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6056>.

   [RFC6269]  Ford, M., Ed., Boucadair, M., Durand, A., Levis, P., and
              P. Roberts, "Issues with IP Address Sharing", RFC 6269,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6269, June 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6269>.

   [RFC6294]  Hu, Q. and B. Carpenter, "Survey of Proposed Use Cases for
              the IPv6 Flow Label", RFC 6294, DOI 10.17487/RFC6294, June
              2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6294>.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
              January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

   [RFC6437]  Amante, S., Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and J. Rajahalme,
              "IPv6 Flow Label Specification", RFC 6437,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6437, November 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6437>.

   [RFC6438]  Carpenter, B. and S. Amante, "Using the IPv6 Flow Label
              for Equal Cost Multipath Routing and Link Aggregation in
              Tunnels", RFC 6438, DOI 10.17487/RFC6438, November 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6438>.

   [RFC6846]  Pelletier, G., Sandlund, K., Jonsson, L-E., and M. West,
              "RObust Header Compression (ROHC): A Profile for TCP/IP
              (ROHC-TCP)", RFC 6846, DOI 10.17487/RFC6846, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6846>.

   [RFC6973]  Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
              Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
              Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.

   [RFC7098]  Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and W. Tarreau, "Using the IPv6
              Flow Label for Load Balancing in Server Farms", RFC 7098,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7098, January 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7098>.

   [RFC7126]  Gont, F., Atkinson, R., and C. Pignataro, "Recommendations
              on Filtering of IPv4 Packets Containing IPv4 Options",
              BCP 186, RFC 7126, DOI 10.17487/RFC7126, February 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7126>.

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

   [RFC7413]  Cheng, Y., Chu, J., Radhakrishnan, S., and A. Jain, "TCP
              Fast Open", RFC 7413, DOI 10.17487/RFC7413, December 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7413>.

   [RFC7414]  Duke, M., Braden, R., Eddy, W., Blanton, E., and A.
              Zimmermann, "A Roadmap for Transmission Control Protocol
              (TCP) Specification Documents", RFC 7414,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7414, February 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7414>.

   [RFC7567]  Baker, F., Ed. and G. Fairhurst, Ed., "IETF
              Recommendations Regarding Active Queue Management",
              BCP 197, RFC 7567, DOI 10.17487/RFC7567, July 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7567>.

   [RFC7594]  Eardley, P., Morton, A., Bagnulo, M., Burbridge, T.,
              Aitken, P., and A. Akhter, "A Framework for Large-Scale
              Measurement of Broadband Performance (LMAP)", RFC 7594,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7594, September 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7594>.

   [RFC7605]  Touch, J., "Recommendations on Using Assigned Transport
              Port Numbers", BCP 165, RFC 7605, DOI 10.17487/RFC7605,
              August 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7605>.

   [RFC7624]  Barnes, R., Schneier, B., Jennings, C., Hardie, T.,
              Trammell, B., Huitema, C., and D. Borkmann,
              "Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A
              Threat Model and Problem Statement", RFC 7624,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7624, August 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7624>.

   [RFC7799]  Morton, A., "Active and Passive Metrics and Methods (with
              Hybrid Types In-Between)", RFC 7799, DOI 10.17487/RFC7799,
              May 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7799>.

   [RFC7872]  Gont, F., Linkova, J., Chown, T., and W. Liu,
              "Observations on the Dropping of Packets with IPv6
              Extension Headers in the Real World", RFC 7872,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7872, June 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7872>.

   [RFC7928]  Kuhn, N., Ed., Natarajan, P., Ed., Khademi, N., Ed., and
              D. Ros, "Characterization Guidelines for Active Queue
              Management (AQM)", RFC 7928, DOI 10.17487/RFC7928, July
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7928>.

   [RFC7983]  Petit-Huguenin, M. and G. Salgueiro, "Multiplexing Scheme
              Updates for Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)
              Extension for Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)",
              RFC 7983, DOI 10.17487/RFC7983, September 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7983>.

   [RFC8033]  Pan, R., Natarajan, P., Baker, F., and G. White,
              "Proportional Integral Controller Enhanced (PIE): A
              Lightweight Control Scheme to Address the Bufferbloat
              Problem", RFC 8033, DOI 10.17487/RFC8033, February 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8033>.

   [RFC8084]  Fairhurst, G., "Network Transport Circuit Breakers",
              BCP 208, RFC 8084, DOI 10.17487/RFC8084, March 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8084>.

   [RFC8085]  Eggert, L., Fairhurst, G., and G. Shepherd, "UDP Usage
              Guidelines", BCP 145, RFC 8085, DOI 10.17487/RFC8085,
              March 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8085>.

   [RFC8086]  Yong, L., Ed., Crabbe, E., Xu, X., and T. Herbert, "GRE-
              in-UDP Encapsulation", RFC 8086, DOI 10.17487/RFC8086,
              March 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8086>.

   [RFC8087]  Fairhurst, G. and M. Welzl, "The Benefits of Using
              Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN)", RFC 8087,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8087, March 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8087>.

   [RFC8095]  Fairhurst, G., Ed., Trammell, B., Ed., and M. Kuehlewind,
              Ed., "Services Provided by IETF Transport Protocols and
              Congestion Control Mechanisms", RFC 8095,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8095, March 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8095>.

   [RFC8200]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.

   [RFC8250]  Elkins, N., Hamilton, R., and M. Ackermann, "IPv6
              Performance and Diagnostic Metrics (PDM) Destination
              Option", RFC 8250, DOI 10.17487/RFC8250, September 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8250>.

   [RFC8289]  Nichols, K., Jacobson, V., McGregor, A., Ed., and J.
              Iyengar, Ed., "Controlled Delay Active Queue Management",
              RFC 8289, DOI 10.17487/RFC8289, January 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8289>.

   [RFC8290]  Hoeiland-Joergensen, T., McKenney, P., Taht, D., Gettys,
              J., and E. Dumazet, "The Flow Queue CoDel Packet Scheduler
              and Active Queue Management Algorithm", RFC 8290,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8290, January 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8290>.

   [RFC8404]  Moriarty, K., Ed. and A. Morton, Ed., "Effects of
              Pervasive Encryption on Operators", RFC 8404,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8404, July 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8404>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [RFC8462]  Rooney, N. and S. Dawkins, Ed., "Report from the IAB
              Workshop on Managing Radio Networks in an Encrypted World
              (MaRNEW)", RFC 8462, DOI 10.17487/RFC8462, October 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8462>.

   [RFC8517]  Dolson, D., Ed., Snellman, J., Boucadair, M., Ed., and C.
              Jacquenet, "An Inventory of Transport-Centric Functions
              Provided by Middleboxes: An Operator Perspective",
              RFC 8517, DOI 10.17487/RFC8517, February 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8517>.

   [RFC8546]  Trammell, B. and M. Kuehlewind, "The Wire Image of a
              Network Protocol", RFC 8546, DOI 10.17487/RFC8546, April
              2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8546>.

   [RFC8548]  Bittau, A., Giffin, D., Handley, M., Mazieres, D., Slack,
              Q., and E. Smith, "Cryptographic Protection of TCP Streams
              (tcpcrypt)", RFC 8548, DOI 10.17487/RFC8548, May 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8548>.

   [RFC8558]  Hardie, T., Ed., "Transport Protocol Path Signals",
              RFC 8558, DOI 10.17487/RFC8558, April 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8558>.

   [RFC8684]  Ford, A., Raiciu, C., Handley, M., Bonaventure, O., and C.
              Paasch, "TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with
              Multiple Addresses", RFC 8684, DOI 10.17487/RFC8684, March
              2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8684>.

   [RFC8701]  Benjamin, D., "Applying Generate Random Extensions And
              Sustain Extensibility (GREASE) to TLS Extensibility",
              RFC 8701, DOI 10.17487/RFC8701, January 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8701>.

   [RFC8724]  Minaburo, A., Toutain, L., Gomez, C., Barthel, D., and JC.
              Zúñiga, "SCHC: Generic Framework for Static Context Header
              Compression and Fragmentation", RFC 8724,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8724, April 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8724>.

   [RFC8837]  Jones, P., Dhesikan, S., Jennings, C., and D. Druta,
              "Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) Packet Markings
              for WebRTC QoS", RFC 8837, DOI 10.17487/RFC8837, January
              2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8837>.

   [RFC8866]  Begen, A., Kyzivat, P., Perkins, C., and M. Handley, "SDP:
              Session Description Protocol", RFC 8866,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8866, January 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8866>.

   [RFC8922]  Enghardt, T., Pauly, T., Perkins, C., Rose, K., and C.
              Wood, "A Survey of the Interaction between Security
              Protocols and Transport Services", RFC 8922,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8922, October 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8922>.

   [RFC9000]  Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
              Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.

Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Mohamed Boucadair, Spencer Dawkins,
   Tom Herbert, Jana Iyengar, Mirja Kühlewind, Kyle Rose, Kathleen
   Moriarty, Al Morton, Chris Seal, Joe Touch, Brian Trammell, Chris
   Wood, Thomas Fossati, Mohamed Boucadair, Martin Thomson, David Black,
   Martin Duke, Joel Halpern, and members of TSVWG for their comments
   and feedback.

   This work has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020
   research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 688421 and
   the EU Stand ICT Call 4.  The opinions expressed and arguments
   employed reflect only the authors' views.  The European Commission is
   not responsible for any use that might be made of that information.

   This work has received funding from the UK Engineering and Physical
   Sciences Research Council under grant EP/R04144X/1.

Authors' Addresses

   Godred Fairhurst
   University of Aberdeen
   Department of Engineering
   Fraser Noble Building
   Aberdeen, Scotland
   AB24 3UE
   United Kingdom

   Email: gorry@erg.abdn.ac.uk
   URI:   http://www.erg.abdn.ac.uk/


   Colin Perkins
   University of Glasgow
   School of Computing Science
   Glasgow, Scotland
   G12 8QQ
   United Kingdom

   Email: csp@csperkins.org
   URI:   https://csperkins.org/