path: root/doc/rfc/rfc9444.txt

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                          O. Friel
Request for Comments: 9444                                     R. Barnes
Category: Standards Track                                          Cisco
ISSN: 2070-1721                                             T. Hollebeek
                                                                DigiCert
                                                           M. Richardson
                                                Sandelman Software Works
                                                             August 2023


   Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) for Subdomains

Abstract

   This document specifies how Automated Certificate Management
   Environment (ACME) can be used by a client to obtain a certificate
   for a subdomain identifier from a certification authority.
   Additionally, this document specifies how a client can fulfill a
   challenge against an ancestor domain but may not need to fulfill a
   challenge against the explicit subdomain if certification authority
   policy allows issuance of the subdomain certificate without explicit
   subdomain ownership proof.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9444.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
   Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
   in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
   2.  Terminology
   3.  ACME Workflow and Identifier Requirements
   4.  ACME Issuance of Subdomain Certificates
     4.1.  Authorization Object
     4.2.  Pre-authorization
     4.3.  New Orders
     4.4.  Directory Object Metadata
   5.  Illustrative Call Flow
   6.  IANA Considerations
     6.1.  Authorization Object Fields Registry
     6.2.  Directory Object Metadata Fields Registry
   7.  Security Considerations
     7.1.  Client Account Security
     7.2.  Subdomain Determination
     7.3.  ACME Server Policy Considerations
   8.  References
     8.1.  Normative References
     8.2.  Informative References
   Authors' Addresses

1.  Introduction

   ACME [RFC8555] defines a protocol that a certification authority (CA)
   and an applicant can use to automate the process of domain name
   ownership validation and X.509v3 (PKIX) [RFC5280] certificate
   issuance.  The CA is the ACME server and the applicant is the ACME
   client, and the client uses the ACME protocol to request certificate
   issuance from the server.  This document outlines how ACME can be
   used to issue subdomain certificates without requiring the ACME
   client to explicitly fulfill an ownership challenge against the
   subdomain identifiers -- the ACME client need only fulfill an
   ownership challenge against an ancestor domain identifier.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   The following terms are defined in "DNS Terminology" [RFC8499] and
   are reproduced here:

   Label:
      An ordered list of zero or more octets that makes up a portion of
      a domain name.  Using graph theory, a label identifies one node in
      a portion of the graph of all possible domain names.

   Domain Name:
      An ordered list of one or more labels.

   Fully-Qualified Domain Name (FQDN):
      This is often just a clear way of saying the same thing as "domain
      name of a node", as outlined above.  However, the term is
      ambiguous.  Strictly speaking, a fully-qualified domain name would
      include every label, including the zero-length label of the root:
      such a name would be written www.example.net. (note the
      terminating dot).  But, because every name eventually shares the
      common root, names are often written relative to the root (such as
      www.example.net) and are still called "fully qualified".  This
      term first appeared in [RFC0819].  In this document, names are
      often written relative to the root.

   The following definition for "subdomain" is taken from "DNS
   Terminology" [RFC8499] and reproduced here; however, the definition
   is ambiguous and is further clarified below:

   Subdomain:
      "A domain is a subdomain of another domain if it is contained
      within that domain.  This relationship can be tested by seeing if
      the subdomain's name ends with the containing domain's name."
      (Quoted from Section 3.1 of [RFC1034].)  For example, in the host
      name nnn.mmm.example.com, both mmm.example.com and
      nnn.mmm.example.com are subdomains of example.com.  Note that the
      comparisons here are done on whole labels; that is,
      ooo.example.com is not a subdomain of oo.example.com.

   The definition is ambiguous as it appears to allow a subdomain to
   include the given domain.  That is, mmm.example.com ends with
   mmm.example.com and thus is a subdomain of itself.  This document
   interprets the first sentence of the above definition as meaning "a
   domain is a subdomain of a different domain if it is contained within
   that different domain".  A domain cannot be a subdomain of itself.
   For example, mmm.example.com is not a subdomain of mmm.example.com.

   The following additional terms are used in this document:

   Certification Authority (CA):
      An organization that is responsible for the creation, issuance,
      revocation, and management of Certificates.  The term applies
      equally to both root CAs and subordinate CAs.  Refer to [RFC5280]
      for detailed information on Certification Authorities.

   CSR:
      Certificate Signing Request, as defined in [RFC2986].

   Ancestor Domain:
      A domain is an ancestor domain of a subdomain if it contains that
      subdomain and has fewer labels than that subdomain.  A domain
      cannot be an ancestor domain of itself.  For example, for the host
      name nnn.mmm.example.com, both mmm.example.com and example.com are
      ancestor domains of nnn.mmm.example.com.  However,
      nnn.mmm.example.com is not an ancestor domain of
      nnn.mmm.example.com.  Note that the comparisons here are done on
      whole labels; that is, oo.example.com is not an ancestor domain of
      ooo.example.com.

   [RFC8555] defines the following object types that are used in this
   document:

   Order Object:  An ACME order object represents a client's request for
      a certificate and is used to track the progress of that order
      through to issuance.

   Authorization Object:  An ACME authorization object represents a
      server's authorization for an account to represent an identifier.

   Challenge Object:  An ACME challenge object represents a server's
      offer to validate a client's possession of an identifier in a
      specific way.

   ACME [RFC8555], Section 6.3 introduces the following term which is
   used in this document:

   POST-as-GET Request:
      When a client wishes to fetch a resource from the server, then it
      MUST send a POST request with a signed JSON Web Signature (JWS)
      body, where the JWS body is specified in ACME [RFC8555],
      Section 6.2.  ACME refers to these as "POST-as-GET" requests.

3.  ACME Workflow and Identifier Requirements

   A typical ACME workflow for issuance of certificates is as follows:

   1.  Client POSTs a newOrder request that contains a set of identifier
       objects in the identifiers field of the ACME order object.

   2.  Server replies with an order object that contains a set of links
       to authorization object(s) and a finalize URI.

   3.  Client sends POST-as-GET request(s) to retrieve the authorization
       object(s), with the downloaded authorization object(s) containing
       the identifier that the client must prove that they control, and
       a set of links to associated challenge objects, one of which the
       client must fulfill.

   4.  Client proves control over the identifier in the authorization
       object by completing one of the specified challenges, for
       example, by publishing a DNS TXT record.

   5.  Client POSTs a CSR to the finalize API.

   6.  Server replies with an updated order object that includes a
       certificate URI.

   7.  Client sends a POST-as-GET request to the certificate URI to
       download the certificate.

   ACME places the following restrictions on identifiers:

   *  [RFC8555], Section 7.1.3: "The authorizations required are
      dictated by server policy; there may not be a 1:1 relationship
      between the order identifiers and the authorizations required."

   *  [RFC8555], Section 7.1.4: The only type of identifier defined by
      the ACME specification is an FQDN: "The only type of identifier
      defined by this specification is a fully qualified domain name
      (type: "dns").  The domain name MUST be encoded in the form in
      which it would appear in a certificate."

   *  [RFC8555], Section 7.4: The identifier in the CSR request must
      match the identifier in the newOrder request: "The CSR MUST
      indicate the exact same set of requested identifiers as the
      initial newOrder request."

   *  [RFC8555], Section 8.3: The identifier, or FQDN, in the
      authorization object must be used when fulfilling challenges via
      HTTP: "Construct a URL by populating the URL template ... where
      the domain field is set to the domain name being verified."

   *  [RFC8555], Section 8.4: The identifier, or FQDN, in the
      authorization object must be used when fulfilling challenges via
      DNS: "The client constructs the validation domain name by
      prepending the label "_acme-challenge" to the domain name being
      validated."

   ACME does not mandate that the identifier in a newOrder request
   matches the identifier in authorization objects.

   The ACME base document [RFC8555] only specifies the "dns" identifier
   type.  Additional identifiers may be defined and registered in the
   IANA [ACME-Identifier-Types] registry.  For example, [RFC8738]
   specifies the "ip" identifier type.  This document is only relevant
   for the "dns" identifier type.

   Note that ACME supports multiple different validation methods that
   can be used to fulfill challenges and prove ownership of identifiers.
   Validation methods are registered in the IANA
   [ACME-Validation-Methods] registry.  This document does not mandate
   use of any particular validation method or methods.  ACME server
   policy dictates which validation methods are supported.  See
   Section 7.3 for more information on ACME server policy.

4.  ACME Issuance of Subdomain Certificates

   As noted in the previous section, ACME [RFC8555] does not mandate
   that the identifier in a newOrder request matches the identifier in
   authorization objects.  This means that the ACME specification does
   not preclude an ACME server processing newOrder requests and issuing
   certificates for a subdomain without requiring a challenge to be
   fulfilled against that explicit subdomain.

   ACME server policy could allow issuance of certificates for a
   subdomain to a client where the client only has to fulfill an
   authorization challenge for an ancestor domain of that subdomain.
   For example, this allows for a flow where a client proves ownership
   of example.org and then successfully obtains a certificate for
   sub.example.org.

   ACME server policy is out of scope of this document; however, some
   commentary is provided in Section 7.3.

   Clients need a mechanism to instruct the ACME server that they are
   requesting authorization for all subdomains subordinate to the
   specified domain, as opposed to just requesting authorization for an
   explicit domain identifier.  Clients need a mechanism to do this in
   both newAuthz and newOrder requests.  ACME servers need a mechanism
   to indicate to clients that authorization objects are valid for all
   subdomains under the specified domain.  These are described in this
   section.

4.1.  Authorization Object

   ACME ([RFC8555], Section 7.1.4) defines the authorization object.
   This document defines a new subdomainAuthAllowed field for the
   authorization object.  When ACME server policy allows authorization
   for subdomains subordinate to a domain, the server indicates this by
   including the new subdomainAuthAllowed field in the authorization
   object for that domain identifier:

   subdomainAuthAllowed (optional, boolean):  If present, this field
      MUST be true for authorizations where ACME server policy allows
      certificates to be issued for any subdomain subordinate to the
      domain specified in the identifier field of the authorization
      object.

   The following example shows an authorization object for the domain
   example.org, where the authorization covers the subdomains
   subordinate to example.org.

   {
     "status": "valid",
     "expires": "2023-09-01T14:09:07.99Z",

     "identifier": {
       "type": "dns",
       "value": "example.org"
     },

     "challenges": [
       {
         "url": "https://example.com/acme/chall/prV_B7yEyA4",
         "type": "http-01",
         "status": "valid",
         "token": "DGyRejmCefe7v4NfDGDKfA",
         "validated": "2014-12-01T12:05:58.16Z"
       }
     ],

     "subdomainAuthAllowed": true
   }

   If the subdomainAuthAllowed field is not included, then the assumed
   default value is false.

   If ACME server policy allows issuance of certificates containing
   wildcard identifiers under that authorization object, then the server
   SHOULD include the wildcard field with a value of true, as per
   [RFC8555], Section 7.1.4.

4.2.  Pre-authorization

   The basic ACME workflow has authorization objects created reactively
   in response to a certificate order.  ACME also allows for pre-
   authorization, where clients obtain authorization for an identifier
   proactively, outside of the context of a specific issuance.  With the
   ACME pre-authorization flow, a client can pre-authorize for a domain
   once and then issue multiple newOrder requests for certificates with
   identifiers in the subdomains subordinate to that domain.

   ACME ([RFC8555], Section 7.4.1) defines the identifier object for
   newAuthz requests.  This document defines a new subdomainAuthAllowed
   field for the identifier object:

   subdomainAuthAllowed (optional, boolean):  An ACME client sets this
      flag to indicate to the server that it is requesting an
      authorization for the subdomains subordinate to the specified
      domain identifier value.

   Clients include the new subdomainAuthAllowed field in the identifier
   object of newAuthz requests to indicate that they are requesting a
   subdomain authorization.  In the following example of a newAuthz
   payload, the client is requesting pre-authorization for the
   subdomains subordinate to example.org.

   "payload": base64url({
     "identifier": {
       "type": "dns",
       "value": "example.org",
       "subdomainAuthAllowed": true
     }
   })

   If the server is willing to allow a single authorization for the
   subdomains and there is not an existing authorization object for the
   identifier, then it will create an authorization object and include
   the subdomainAuthAllowed flag with a value of true.

   If the server policy does not allow creation of subdomain
   authorizations subordinate to that domain, the server can create an
   authorization object for the indicated identifier and MAY include the
   subdomainAuthAllowed flag with a value of false.  If the server
   creates an authorization object and does not include the
   subdomainAuthAllowed flag, then the assumed value is false.

   In both scenarios, handling of the pre-authorization follows the
   process documented in ACME [RFC8555], Section 7.4.1.

4.3.  New Orders

   Clients need a mechanism to optionally indicate to servers whether or
   not they are authorized to fulfill challenges against an ancestor
   domain for a given identifier.  For example, if a client places an
   order for an identifier foo.bar.example.org and is authorized to
   fulfill a challenge against the ancestor domains bar.example.org or
   example.org, then the client needs a mechanism to indicate control
   over the ancestor domains to the ACME server.

   In order to accomplish this, this document defines a new
   ancestorDomain field for the identifier that is included in order
   objects.

   ancestorDomain (optional, string):  This is an ancestor domain of the
      requested identifier.  The client MUST be able to fulfill a
      challenge against the ancestor domain.

   This field specifies an ancestor domain of the identifier that the
   client has DNS control over and is capable of fulfilling challenges
   against.  Based on server policy, the server can choose to issue a
   challenge against any ancestor domain of the identifier up to and
   including the specified ancestorDomain and create a corresponding
   authorization object against the chosen identifier.

   In the following example of a newOrder payload, the client requests a
   certificate for identifier foo.bar.example.org and indicates that it
   can fulfill a challenge against the ancestor domain bar.example.org.
   The server can then choose to issue a challenge against either
   foo.bar.example.org or bar.example.org identifiers.

   "payload": base64url({
          "identifiers": [
            { "type": "dns",
              "value": "foo.bar.example.org",
              "ancestorDomain": "bar.example.org"  }
          ],
          "notBefore": "2023-09-01T00:04:00+04:00",
          "notAfter": "2023-09-08T00:04:00+04:00"
        })

   In the following example of a newOrder payload, the client requests a
   certificate for identifier foo.bar.example.org and indicates that it
   can fulfill a challenge against the ancestor domain example.org.  The
   server can then choose to issue a challenge against any one of
   foo.bar.example.org, bar.example.org, or example.org identifiers.

   "payload": base64url({
          "identifiers": [
            { "type": "dns",
              "value": "foo.bar.example.org",
              "ancestorDomain": "example.org"  }
          ],
          "notBefore": "2023-09-01T00:04:00+04:00",
          "notAfter": "2023-09-08T00:04:00+04:00"
        })

   If the client is unable to fulfill authorizations against an ancestor
   domain, the client should not include the ancestorDomain field.

   Server newOrder handling generally follows the process documented in
   ACME (Section 7.4 of [RFC8555]).  If the server is willing to allow
   subdomain authorizations for the domain specified in ancestorDomain,
   then it creates an authorization object against that ancestor domain
   and includes the subdomainAuthAllowed flag with a value of true.

   If the server policy does not allow creation of subdomain
   authorizations against that ancestor domain, then it can create an
   authorization object for the indicated identifier value and SHOULD
   NOT include the subdomainAuthAllowed flag.  As the client requested a
   subdomain authorization for the ancestor domain and not for the
   indicated identifier, there is no need for the server to include the
   subdomainAuthAllowed flag in the authorization object for the
   indicated identifier.

4.4.  Directory Object Metadata

   This document defines a new subdomainAuthAllowed ACME directory
   metadata field.  An ACME server can advertise support for
   authorization of subdomains by including the subdomainAuthAllowed
   boolean flag in its "ACME Directory Metadata Fields" registry:

   subdomainAuthAllowed (optional, bool):  Indicates if an ACME server
      supports authorization of subdomains.

   If not specified, then the assumed default value is false.  If an
   ACME server supports authorization of subdomains, it can indicate
   this by including this field with a value of "true".

5.  Illustrative Call Flow

   The call flow illustrated here uses the ACME pre-authorization flow
   using DNS-based proof of ownership.

   +--------+                   +------+     +-----+
   | Client |                   | ACME |     | DNS |
   +--------+                   +------+     +-----+
       |                            |           |
    Step 1: Pre-authorization of ancestor domain.
       |                            |           |
       | POST /newAuthz             |           |
       | "example.org"              |           |
       |--------------------------->|           |
       |                            |           |
       | 201 authorizations         |           |
       |<---------------------------|           |
       |                            |           |
       | Publish DNS TXT            |           |
       | "example.org"              |           |
       |--------------------------------------->|
       |                            |           |
       | POST /challenge            |           |
       |--------------------------->|           |
       |                            | Verify    |
       |                            |---------->|
       | 200 status=valid           |           |
       |<---------------------------|           |
       |                            |           |
       | Delete DNS TXT             |           |
       | "example.org"              |           |
       |--------------------------------------->|
       |                            |           |
    Step 2: Place order for sub1.example.org.
       |                            |           |
       | POST /newOrder             |           |
       | "sub1.example.org"         |           |
       |--------------------------->|           |
       |                            |           |
       | 201 status=ready           |           |
       |<---------------------------|           |
       |                            |           |
       | POST /finalize             |           |
       | CSR SAN "sub1.example.org" |           |
       |--------------------------->|           |
       |                            |           |
       | 200 OK status=valid        |           |
       |<---------------------------|           |
       |                            |           |
       | POST /certificate          |           |
       |--------------------------->|           |
       |                            |           |
       | 200 OK                     |           |
       | PEM SAN "sub1.example.org" |           |
       |<---------------------------|           |
       |                            |           |
    Step 3: Place order for sub2.example.org.
       |                            |           |
       | POST /newOrder             |           |
       | "sub2.example.org"         |           |
       |--------------------------->|           |
       |                            |           |
       | 201 status=ready           |           |
       |<---------------------------|           |
       |                            |           |
       | POST /finalize             |           |
       | CSR SAN "sub2.example.org" |           |
       |--------------------------->|           |
       |                            |           |
       | 200 OK status=valid        |           |
       |<---------------------------|           |
       |                            |           |
       | POST /certificate          |           |
       |--------------------------->|           |
       |                            |           |
       | 200 OK                     |           |
       | PEM SAN "sub2.example.org" |           |
       |<---------------------------|           |

   *  Step 1: Pre-authorization of ancestor domain.

      The client sends a newAuthz request for the ancestor domain and
      includes the subdomainAuthAllowed flag in the identifier object.

      POST /acme/new-authz HTTP/1.1
      Host: example.com
      Content-Type: application/jose+json

      {
        "protected": base64url({
          "alg": "ES256",
          "kid": "https://example.com/acme/acct/evOfKhNU60wg",
          "nonce": "uQpSjlRb4vQVCjVYAyyUWg",
          "url": "https://example.com/acme/new-authz"
        }),
        "payload": base64url({
          "identifier": {
            "type": "dns",
            "value": "example.org",
            "subdomainAuthAllowed": true
          }
        }),
        "signature": "nuSDISbWG8mMgE7H...QyVUL68yzf3Zawps"
      }

      The server creates and returns an authorization object for the
      identifier that includes the subdomainAuthAllowed flag.  The
      object is initially in "pending" state.

      {
        "status": "pending",
        "expires": "2023-09-01T14:09:07.99Z",

        "identifier": {
          "type": "dns",
          "value": "example.org"
        },

        "challenges": [
          {
            "url": "https://example.com/acme/chall/prV_B7yEyA4",
            "type": "dns-01",
            "status": "pending",
            "token": "DGyRejmCefe7v4NfDGDKfA",
            "validated": "2023-08-01T12:05:58.16Z"
          }
        ],

        "subdomainAuthAllowed": true
      }

      The example illustrates the client completing a DNS challenge by
      publishing a DNS TXT record.  The client then posts to the
      challenge resource to inform the server that it can validate the
      challenge.

      Once the server validates the challenge by checking the DNS TXT
      record, the server will transition the authorization object and
      associated challenge object status to "valid".

      The call flow above illustrates the ACME server replying to the
      client's challenge with status of "valid" after the ACME server
      has validated the DNS challenge.  However, the validation flow may
      take some time.  If this is the case, the ACME server may reply to
      the client's challenge immediately with a status of "processing"
      and the client will then need to poll the authorization resource
      to see when it is finalized.  Refer to Section 7.5.1 of [RFC8555]
      for more details.

   *  Step 2: The client places a newOrder for sub1.example.org.

      The client sends a newOrder request to the server and includes the
      subdomain identifier.  Note that the identifier is a subdomain of
      the ancestor domain that has been pre-authorized in Step 1.  The
      client does not need to include the subdomainAuthAllowed field in
      the identifier object, as it has already pre-authorized the
      ancestor domain.

      POST /acme/new-order HTTP/1.1
      Host: example.com
      Content-Type: application/jose+json

      {
        "protected": base64url({
          "alg": "ES256",
          "kid": "https://example.com/acme/acct/evOfKhNU60wg",
          "nonce": "5XJ1L3lEkMG7tR6pA00clA",
          "url": "https://example.com/acme/new-order"
        }),
        "payload": base64url({
          "identifiers": [
            { "type": "dns", "value": "sub1.example.org" }
          ],
          "notBefore": "2023-09-01T00:04:00+04:00",
          "notAfter": "2023-09-08T00:04:00+04:00"
        }),
        "signature": "H6ZXtGjTZyUnPeKn...wEA4TklBdh3e454g"
      }

      As an authorization object already exists for the ancestor domain,
      the server replies with an order object with a status of "ready"
      that includes a link to the existing "valid" authorization object.

      HTTP/1.1 201 Created
      Replay-Nonce: MYAuvOpaoIiywTezizk5vw
      Link: <https://example.com/acme/directory>;rel="index"
      Location: https://example.com/acme/order/TOlocE8rfgo

      {
        "status": "ready",
        "expires": "2023-09-01T14:09:07.99Z",

        "notBefore": "2023-09-01T00:00:00Z",
        "notAfter": "2023-09-08T00:00:00Z",

        "identifiers": [
          { "type": "dns", "value": "sub1.example.org" }
        ],

        "authorizations": [
          "https://example.com/acme/authz/PAniVnsZcis"
        ],

        "finalize": "https://example.com/acme/order/TOlocrfgo/finalize"
      }

      The client can proceed to finalize the order by posting a CSR to
      the finalize resource.  The client can then download the
      certificate for sub1.example.org.

   *  Step 3: The client places a newOrder for sub2.example.org.

      The client sends a newOrder request to the server and includes the
      subdomain identifier.  Note that the identifier is a subdomain of
      the ancestor domain that has been pre-authorized in Step 1.  The
      client does not need to include the subdomainAuthAllowed field in
      the identifier object, as it has already pre-authorized the
      ancestor domain.

      POST /acme/new-order HTTP/1.1
      Host: example.com
      Content-Type: application/jose+json

      {
        "protected": base64url({
          "alg": "ES256",
          "kid": "https://example.com/acme/acct/evOfKhNU60wg",
          "nonce": "5XJ1L3lEkMG7tR6pA00clA",
          "url": "https://example.com/acme/new-order"
        }),
        "payload": base64url({
          "identifiers": [
            { "type": "dns", "value": "sub2.example.org" }
          ],
          "notBefore": "2023-09-01T00:04:00+04:00",
          "notAfter": "2023-09-08T00:04:00+04:00"
        }),
        "signature": "H6ZXtGjTZyUnPeKn...wEA4TklBdh3e454g"
      }

      As an authorization object already exists for the ancestor domain,
      the server replies with an order object with a status of "ready"
      that includes a link to the existing "valid" authorization object.

      HTTP/1.1 201 Created
      Replay-Nonce: MYAuvOpaoIiywTezizk5vw
      Link: <https://example.com/acme/directory>;rel="index"
      Location: https://example.com/acme/order/TOlocE8rfgo

      {
        "status": "ready",
        "expires": "2023-09-01T14:09:07.99Z",

        "notBefore": "2023-09-01T00:00:00Z",
        "notAfter": "2023-09-08T00:00:00Z",

        "identifiers": [
          { "type": "dns", "value": "sub2.example.org" }
        ],

        "authorizations": [
          "https://example.com/acme/authz/PAniVnsZcis"
        ],

        "finalize": "https://example.com/acme/order/ROni7rdde/finalize"
      }

      The client can proceed to finalize the order by posting a CSR to
      the finalize resource.  The client can then download the
      certificate for sub2.example.org.

6.  IANA Considerations

6.1.  Authorization Object Fields Registry

   The following field has been added to the "ACME Authorization Object
   Fields" registry defined in ACME [RFC8555].

     +======================+============+==============+===========+
     | Field Name           | Field Type | Configurable | Reference |
     +======================+============+==============+===========+
     | subdomainAuthAllowed | boolean    | false        | RFC 9444  |
     +----------------------+------------+--------------+-----------+

                                 Table 1

6.2.  Directory Object Metadata Fields Registry

   The following field has been added to the "ACME Directory Metadata
   Fields" registry defined in [RFC8555].

             +======================+============+===========+
             | Field Name           | Field Type | Reference |
             +======================+============+===========+
             | subdomainAuthAllowed | boolean    | RFC 9444  |
             +----------------------+------------+-----------+

                                  Table 2

7.  Security Considerations

   This document specifies enhancements to ACME [RFC8555] that optimize
   the protocol flows for issuance of certificates for subdomains.  The
   underlying goal of ACME for Subdomains remains the same as that of
   ACME: managing certificates that attest to identifier/key bindings
   for these subdomains.  Thus, ACME for Subdomains has the same two
   security goals as ACME:

   (1)  Only an entity that controls an identifier can get an
        authorization for that identifier.

   (2)  Once authorized, an account key's authorizations cannot be
        improperly used by another account.

   ACME for Subdomains makes no changes to:

   *  account or account key management

   *  ACME channel establishment, security mechanisms, or threat model

   *  validation channel establishment, security mechanisms, or threat
      model

   Therefore, all Security Considerations in ACME in the following areas
   are equally applicable to ACME for Subdomains:

   *  Threat Model

   *  Integrity of Authorizations

   *  Denial-of-Service Considerations

   *  Server-Side Request Forgery

   *  CA Policy Considerations

   The only exception is that in order to satisfy goal (1) above, this
   document assumes that control over a domain may imply control over a
   subdomain; therefore, authorization for certificate issuance for the
   former may imply authorization for certificate issuance for the
   latter.  In many ecosystems, this is a safe assumption, especially
   because control over the domain can often be leveraged to
   successfully demonstrate control over subdomains anyway, for example,
   by temporarily modifying DNS for the subdomain to point to a server
   the ancestor domain owner controls, rendering the distinction moot.
   For example, the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements may consider
   control of an ancestor domain sufficient for issuance of certificates
   for subdomains, but only if specific processes and procedures are
   used for validating ownership of the ancestor domain.

   In ecosystems where control of an ancestor domain may not imply
   control over subdomains or authorization for issuance of certificates
   for subdomains, a more complicated threat analysis and server policy
   might be needed.

   Some additional comments on ACME server policy are given later in
   this section.

7.1.  Client Account Security

   There may be scenarios were a client wishes to deactivate an
   authorization object for an ancestor domain or deactivate its account
   completely.  For example, a client may want to do this if an account
   key is compromised or if an authorization object covering domains
   subordinate to an ancestor domain is no longer needed.  The client
   can deactivate an authorization using the mechanism specified in
   [RFC8555], Section 7.5.2 and can deactivate an account using the
   mechanism specified in [RFC8555], Section 7.3.6.

7.2.  Subdomain Determination

   The [RFC8499] definition of a subdomain is reproduced in Section 2.
   When comparing domains to determine if one is a subdomain of the
   other, it is important to compare entire labels and not rely on a
   string prefix match.  Relying on string prefix matches may yield
   incorrect results.

7.3.  ACME Server Policy Considerations

   The ACME for Subdomains and the ACME specifications do not mandate
   any specific ACME server or CA policies, or any specific use cases
   for issuance of certificates.  For example, an ACME server could be
   used:

   *  to issue Web PKI certificates where the ACME server must comply
      with CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements [CAB].

   *  as a Private CA for issuance of certificates within an
      organization.  The organization could enforce whatever policies
      they desire on the ACME server.

   *  for issuance of Internet of Things (IoT) device certificates.
      There are currently no IoT device certificate policies that are
      generally enforced across the industry.  Organizations issuing IoT
      device certificates can enforce whatever policies they desire on
      the ACME server.

   ACME server policy could specify whether:

   *  issuance of subdomain certificates is allowed based on proof of
      ownership of an ancestor domain.

   *  issuance of subdomain certificates is allowed, but only for a
      specific set of ancestor domains.

   *  DNS-based or HTTP-based proof of ownership, or both, are allowed.

   The CA policy considerations listed in [RFC8555], Section 10.5 are
   equally applicable here.  These include, but are not limited to:

   *  Is the claimed identifier syntactically valid?

   *  For domain names:

      -  Is the name on the Public Suffix List?

      -  Is the name a high-value name?

   *  Is the key in the CSR sufficiently strong?

   Refer to [RFC8555], Section 10.5 for more CA policy considerations.

   ACME server policy specification is explicitly out of scope of this
   document.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8499]  Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
              Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499,
              January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>.

   [RFC8555]  Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
              Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
              (ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [ACME-Identifier-Types]
              IANA, "ACME Identifier Types",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/acme/>.

   [ACME-Validation-Methods]
              IANA, "ACME Validation Methods",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/acme/>.

   [CAB]      CA/Browser Forum, "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance
              and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates",
              <https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements-documents/>.

   [RFC0819]  Su, Z. and J. Postel, "The Domain Naming Convention for
              Internet User Applications", RFC 819,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC0819, August 1982,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc819>.

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC8738]  Shoemaker, R.B., "Automated Certificate Management
              Environment (ACME) IP Identifier Validation Extension",
              RFC 8738, DOI 10.17487/RFC8738, February 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8738>.

Authors' Addresses

   Owen Friel
   Cisco
   Email: ofriel@cisco.com


   Richard Barnes
   Cisco
   Email: rlb@ipv.sx


   Tim Hollebeek
   DigiCert
   Email: tim.hollebeek@digicert.com


   Michael Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works
   Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca