path: root/doc/rfc/rfc9646.txt

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         K. Watsen
Request for Comments: 9646                               Watsen Networks
Updates: 8572                                                 R. Housley
Category: Standards Track                                 Vigil Security
ISSN: 2070-1721                                                S. Turner
                                                                   sn3rd
                                                            October 2024


  Conveying a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in a Secure Zero-Touch
               Provisioning (SZTP) Bootstrapping Request

Abstract

   This document extends the input to the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC
   defined in RFC 8572 to include an optional certificate signing
   request (CSR), enabling a bootstrapping device to additionally obtain
   an identity certificate (e.g., a Local Device Identifier (LDevID)
   from IEEE 802.1AR) as part of the "onboarding information" response
   provided in the RPC-reply.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9646.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
   Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
   in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
     1.1.  Overview
     1.2.  Terminology
     1.3.  Requirements Language
     1.4.  Conventions
   2.  The "ietf-sztp-csr" Module
     2.1.  Data Model Overview
     2.2.  Example Usage
     2.3.  YANG Module
   3.  The "ietf-ztp-types" Module
     3.1.  Data Model Overview
     3.2.  YANG Module
   4.  Security Considerations
     4.1.  SZTP-Client Considerations
       4.1.1.  Ensuring the Integrity of Asymmetric Private Keys
       4.1.2.  Reuse of a Manufacturer-Generated Private Key
       4.1.3.  Replay Attack Protection
       4.1.4.  Connecting to an Untrusted Bootstrap Server
       4.1.5.  Selecting the Best Origin Authentication Mechanism
       4.1.6.  Clearing the Private Key and Associated Certificate
     4.2.  SZTP-Server Considerations
       4.2.1.  Verifying Proof-of-Possession
       4.2.2.  Verifying Proof-of-Origin
       4.2.3.  Supporting SZTP-Clients That Don't Trust the
               SZTP-Server
     4.3.  Security Considerations for the "ietf-sztp-csr" YANG Module
     4.4.  Security Considerations for the "ietf-ztp-types" YANG
           Module
   5.  IANA Considerations
     5.1.  The IETF XML Registry
     5.2.  The YANG Module Names Registry
   6.  References
     6.1.  Normative References
     6.2.  Informative References
   Acknowledgements
   Contributors
   Authors' Addresses

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Overview

   This document extends the input to the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC
   defined in [RFC8572] to include an optional certificate signing
   request (CSR) [RFC2986], enabling a bootstrapping device to
   additionally obtain an identity certificate (e.g., an LDevID from
   [Std-802.1AR-2018]) as part of the "onboarding information" response
   provided in the RPC-reply.

   The ability to provision an identity certificate that is purpose-
   built for a production environment during the bootstrapping process
   removes reliance on the manufacturer Certification Authority (CA),
   and it also enables the bootstrapped device to join the production
   environment with an appropriate identity and other attributes in its
   identity certificate (e.g., an LDevID).

   Two YANG [RFC7950] modules are defined.  The "ietf-ztp-types" module
   defines three YANG groupings for the various messages defined in this
   document.  The "ietf-sztp-csr" module augments two groupings into the
   "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC and defines a YANG data structure
   [RFC8791] around the third grouping.

1.2.  Terminology

   This document uses the following terms from [RFC8572]:

   *  Bootstrap Server
   *  Bootstrapping Data
   *  Conveyed Information
   *  Device
   *  Manufacturer
   *  Onboarding Information
   *  Signed Data

   This document defines the following new terms:

   SZTP-client:  The term "SZTP-client" refers to a "device" that is
      using a "bootstrap server" as a source of "bootstrapping data".

   SZTP-server:  The term "SZTP-server" is an alternative term for
      "bootstrap server" that is symmetric with the "SZTP-client" term.

1.3.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

1.4.  Conventions

   Various examples in this document use "BASE64VALUE=" as a placeholder
   value for binary data that has been base64 encoded (per Section 9.8
   of [RFC7950]).  This placeholder value is used because real
   base64-encoded structures are often many lines long and hence
   distracting to the example being presented.

   Various examples in this document contain long lines that may be
   folded, as described in [RFC8792].

2.  The "ietf-sztp-csr" Module

   The "ietf-sztp-csr" module is a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module that
   augments the "ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server" module defined in [RFC8572]
   and defines a YANG "structure" that is to be conveyed in the "error-
   info" node defined in Section 7.1 of [RFC8040].

2.1.  Data Model Overview

   The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "ietf-sztp-csr"
   module.

   module: ietf-sztp-csr

     augment /sztp-svr:get-bootstrapping-data/sztp-svr:input:
       +---w (msg-type)?
          +--:(csr-support)
          |  +---w csr-support
          |     +---w key-generation!
          |     |  +---w supported-algorithms
          |     |     +---w algorithm-identifier*   binary
          |     +---w csr-generation
          |        +---w supported-formats
          |           +---w format-identifier*   identityref
          +--:(csr)
             +---w (csr-type)
                +--:(p10-csr)
                |  +---w p10-csr?   ct:csr
                +--:(cmc-csr)
                |  +---w cmc-csr?   binary
                +--:(cmp-csr)
                   +---w cmp-csr?   binary

     structure csr-request:
       +-- key-generation!
       |  +-- selected-algorithm
       |     +-- algorithm-identifier    binary
       +-- csr-generation
       |  +-- selected-format
       |     +-- format-identifier    identityref
       +-- cert-req-info?    ct:csr-info

   The augmentation defines two kinds of parameters that an SZTP-client
   can send to an SZTP-server.  The YANG structure defines one
   collection of parameters that an SZTP-server can send to an SZTP-
   client.

   In the order of their intended use:

   1.  The SZTP-client sends a "csr-support" node, encoded in a first
       "get-bootstrapping-data" request to the SZTP-server, to indicate
       that it supports the ability to generate CSRs.  This input
       parameter conveys if the SZTP-client is able to generate a new
       asymmetric key and, if so, which key algorithms it supports, as
       well as what kinds of CSR structures the SZTP-client is able to
       generate.

   2.  The SZTP-server responds with an error, containing the "csr-
       request" structure, to request the SZTP-client to generate a CSR.
       This structure is used to select the key algorithm the SZTP-
       client should use to generate a new asymmetric key (if
       supported), the kind of CSR structure the SZTP-client should
       generate, and optionally the content for the CSR itself.

   3.  The SZTP-client sends one of the "*-csr" nodes, encoded in a
       second "get-bootstrapping-data" request to the SZTP-server.  This
       node encodes the server-requested CSR.

   4.  The SZTP-server responds with onboarding information to
       communicate the signed certificate to the SZTP-client.  How to do
       this is discussed in Section 2.2.

   To further illustrate how the augmentation and structure defined by
   the "ietf-sztp-csr" module are used, below are two additional tree
   diagrams showing these nodes placed where they are used.

   The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates SZTP's "get-
   bootstrapping-data" RPC with the augmentation in place.

   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

   module: ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server

     rpcs:
       +---x get-bootstrapping-data
          +---w input
          |  +---w signed-data-preferred?          empty
          |  +---w hw-model?                       string
          |  +---w os-name?                        string
          |  +---w os-version?                     string
          |  +---w nonce?                          binary
          |  +---w (sztp-csr:msg-type)?
          |     +--:(sztp-csr:csr-support)
          |     |  +---w sztp-csr:csr-support
          |     |     +---w sztp-csr:key-generation!
          |     |     |  +---w sztp-csr:supported-algorithms
          |     |     |     +---w sztp-csr:algorithm-identifier*   bina\
   ry
          |     |     +---w sztp-csr:csr-generation
          |     |        +---w sztp-csr:supported-formats
          |     |           +---w sztp-csr:format-identifier*   identit\
   yref
          |     +--:(sztp-csr:csr)
          |        +---w (sztp-csr:csr-type)
          |           +--:(sztp-csr:p10-csr)
          |           |  +---w sztp-csr:p10-csr?   ct:csr
          |           +--:(sztp-csr:cmc-csr)
          |           |  +---w sztp-csr:cmc-csr?   binary
          |           +--:(sztp-csr:cmp-csr)
          |              +---w sztp-csr:cmp-csr?   binary
          +--ro output
             +--ro reporting-level?    enumeration {onboarding-server}?
             +--ro conveyed-information    cms
             +--ro owner-certificate?      cms
             +--ro ownership-voucher?      cms

   The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates RESTCONF's "errors"
   RPC-reply message with the "csr-request" structure in place.

   module: ietf-restconf
     +--ro errors
        +--ro error* []
           +--ro error-type       enumeration
           +--ro error-tag        string
           +--ro error-app-tag?   string
           +--ro error-path?      instance-identifier
           +--ro error-message?   string
           +--ro error-info
              +--ro sztp-csr:csr-request
                 +--ro sztp-csr:key-generation!
                 |  +--ro sztp-csr:selected-algorithm
                 |     +--ro sztp-csr:algorithm-identifier    binary
                 +--ro sztp-csr:csr-generation
                 |  +--ro sztp-csr:selected-format
                 |     +--ro sztp-csr:format-identifier    identityref
                 +--ro sztp-csr:cert-req-info?    ct:csr-info

2.2.  Example Usage

      |  NOTE: The examples below are encoded using JSON, but they could
      |  equally well be encoded using XML, as is supported by SZTP.

   An SZTP-client implementing this specification would signal to the
   bootstrap server its willingness to generate a CSR by including the
   "csr-support" node in its "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC.  In the
   example below, the SZTP-client additionally indicates that it is able
   to generate keys and provides a list of key algorithms it supports,
   as well as provide a list of certificate formats it supports.

   REQUEST

   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

   POST /restconf/operations/ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server:get-bootstrappi\
   ng-data HTTP/1.1
   HOST: example.com
   Content-Type: application/yang-data+json

   {
     "ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server:input" : {
       "hw-model": "model-x",
       "os-name": "vendor-os",
       "os-version": "17.3R2.1",
       "nonce": "extralongbase64encodedvalue=",
       "ietf-sztp-csr:csr-support": {
         "key-generation": {
           "supported-algorithms": {
             "algorithm-identifier": [
               "BASE64VALUE1",
               "BASE64VALUE2",
               "BASE64VALUE3"
             ]
           }
         },
         "csr-generation": {
           "supported-formats": {
             "format-identifier": [
               "ietf-ztp-types:p10-csr",
               "ietf-ztp-types:cmc-csr",
               "ietf-ztp-types:cmp-csr"
             ]
           }
         }
       }
     }
   }

   Assuming the SZTP-server wishes to prompt the SZTP-client to provide
   a CSR, then it would respond with an HTTP 400 Bad Request error code.
   In the example below, the SZTP-server specifies that it wishes the
   SZTP-client to generate a key using a specific algorithm and generate
   a PKCS#10-based CSR containing specific content.

   RESPONSE

   HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
   Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2021 17:02:40 GMT
   Server: example-server
   Content-Type: application/yang-data+json

   {
     "ietf-restconf:errors" : {
       "error" : [
         {
           "error-type": "application",
           "error-tag": "missing-attribute",
           "error-message": "Missing input parameter",
           "error-info": {
             "ietf-sztp-csr:csr-request": {
               "key-generation": {
                 "selected-algorithm": {
                   "algorithm-identifier": "BASE64VALUE="
                 }
               },
               "csr-generation": {
                 "selected-format": {
                   "format-identifier": "ietf-ztp-types:p10-csr"
                 }
               },
               "cert-req-info": "BASE64VALUE="
             }
           }
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   Upon being prompted to provide a CSR, the SZTP-client would POST
   another "get-bootstrapping-data" request but this time including one
   of the "csr" nodes to convey its CSR to the SZTP-server:

   REQUEST

   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

   POST /restconf/operations/ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server:get-bootstrappi\
   ng-data HTTP/1.1
   HOST: example.com
   Content-Type: application/yang-data+json

   {
     "ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server:input" : {
       "hw-model": "model-x",
       "os-name": "vendor-os",
       "os-version": "17.3R2.1",
       "nonce": "extralongbase64encodedvalue=",
       "ietf-sztp-csr:p10-csr": "BASE64VALUE="
     }
   }

   At this point, it is expected that the SZTP-server, perhaps in
   conjunction with other systems, such as a backend CA or registration
   authority (RA), will validate the CSR's origin and proof-of-
   possession and, assuming the CSR is approved, issue a signed
   certificate for the bootstrapping device.

   The SZTP-server responds with conveyed information (the "conveyed-
   information" node shown below) that encodes "onboarding-information"
   (inside the base64 value) containing a signed identity certificate
   for the CSR provided by the SZTP-client:

   RESPONSE

   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2021 17:02:40 GMT
   Server: example-server
   Content-Type: application/yang-data+json

   {
     "ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server:output" : {
       "reporting-level": "verbose",
       "conveyed-information": "BASE64VALUE="
     }
   }

   How the signed certificate is conveyed inside the onboarding
   information is outside the scope of this document.  Some
   implementations may choose to convey it inside a script (e.g., SZTP's
   "pre-configuration-script"), while other implementations may choose
   to convey it inside the SZTP "configuration" node.  SZTP onboarding
   information is described in Section 2.2 of [RFC8572].

   Below are two examples of conveying the signed certificate inside the
   "configuration" node.  Both examples assume that the SZTP-client
   understands the "ietf-keystore" module defined in [RFC9642].

   This first example illustrates the case where the signed certificate
   is for the same asymmetric key used by the SZTP-client's
   manufacturer-generated identity certificate (e.g., an Initial Device
   Identifier (IDevID) from [Std-802.1AR-2018]).  As such, the
   configuration needs to associate the newly signed certificate with
   the existing asymmetric key:

   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

   {
     "ietf-keystore:keystore": {
       "asymmetric-keys": {
         "asymmetric-key": [
           {
             "name": "Manufacturer-Generated Hidden Key",
             "public-key-format": "ietf-crypto-types:subject-public-key\
   -info-format",
             "public-key": "BASE64VALUE=",
             "hidden-private-key": [null],
             "certificates": {
               "certificate": [
                 {
                   "name": "Manufacturer-Generated IDevID Cert",
                   "cert-data": "BASE64VALUE="
                 },
                 {
                   "name": "Newly-Generated LDevID Cert",
                   "cert-data": "BASE64VALUE="
                 }
               ]
             }
           }
         ]
       }
     }
   }

   This second example illustrates the case where the signed certificate
   is for a newly generated asymmetric key.  As such, the configuration
   needs to associate the newly signed certificate with the newly
   generated asymmetric key:

   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

   {
     "ietf-keystore:keystore": {
       "asymmetric-keys": {
         "asymmetric-key": [
           {
             "name": "Manufacturer-Generated Hidden Key",
             "public-key-format": "ietf-crypto-types:subject-public-key\
   -info-format",
             "public-key": "BASE64VALUE=",
             "hidden-private-key": [null],
             "certificates": {
               "certificate": [
                 {
                   "name": "Manufacturer-Generated IDevID Cert",
                   "cert-data": "BASE64VALUE="
                 }
               ]
             }
           },
           {
             "name": "Newly-Generated Hidden Key",
             "public-key-format": "ietf-crypto-types:subject-public-key\
   -info-format",
             "public-key": "BASE64VALUE=",
             "hidden-private-key": [null],
             "certificates": {
               "certificate": [
                 {
                   "name": "Newly-Generated LDevID Cert",
                   "cert-data": "BASE64VALUE="
                 }
               ]
             }
           }
         ]
       }
     }
   }

   In addition to configuring the signed certificate, it is often
   necessary to also configure the issuer's signing certificate so that
   the device (i.e., STZP-client) can authenticate certificates
   presented by peer devices signed by the same issuer as its own.
   While outside the scope of this document, one way to do this would be
   to use the "ietf-truststore" module defined in [RFC9641].

2.3.  YANG Module

   This module augments an RPC defined in [RFC8572].  The module uses
   data types and groupings defined in [RFC8572], [RFC8791], and
   [RFC9640].  The module also has an informative reference to
   [Std-802.1AR-2018].

   <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-sztp-csr@2024-10-10.yang"
   module ietf-sztp-csr {
     yang-version 1.1;
     namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-sztp-csr";
     prefix sztp-csr;

     import ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server {
       prefix sztp-svr;
       reference
         "RFC 8572: Secure Zero Touch Provisioning (SZTP)";
     }

     import ietf-yang-structure-ext {
       prefix sx;
       reference
         "RFC 8791: YANG Data Structure Extensions";
     }

     import ietf-ztp-types {
       prefix zt;
       reference
         "RFC 9646: Conveying a Certificate Signing Request (CSR)
                    in a Secure Zero-Touch Provisioning (SZTP)
                    Bootstrapping Request";
     }

     organization
       "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

     contact
       "WG Web:   https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf
        WG List:  NETCONF WG list <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
        Authors:  Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
                  Russ Housley <mailto:housley@vigilsec.com>
                  Sean Turner <mailto:sean@sn3rd.com>";

     description
       "This module augments the 'get-bootstrapping-data' RPC,
        defined in the 'ietf-sztp-bootstrap-server' module from
        SZTP (RFC 8572), enabling the SZTP-client to obtain a
        signed identity certificate (e.g., an LDevID from IEEE
        802.1AR) as part of the SZTP onboarding information
        response.

        The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
        'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
        'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
        document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14
        (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear
        in all capitals, as shown here.

        Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
        authors of the code.  All rights reserved.

        Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
        without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
        the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set
        forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
        Relating to IETF Documents
        (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

        This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9646
        (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9646); see the
        RFC itself for full legal notices.";

     revision 2024-10-10 {
       description
         "Initial version.";
       reference
         "RFC 9646: Conveying a Certificate Signing Request (CSR)
                    in a Secure Zero-Touch Provisioning (SZTP)
                    Bootstrapping Request";
     }

     // Protocol-accessible nodes

     augment "/sztp-svr:get-bootstrapping-data/sztp-svr:input" {
       description
         "This augmentation adds the 'csr-support' and 'csr' nodes to
          the SZTP (RFC 8572) 'get-bootstrapping-data' request message,
          enabling the SZTP-client to obtain an identity certificate
          (e.g., an LDevID from IEEE 802.1AR) as part of the onboarding
          information response provided by the SZTP-server.

          The 'csr-support' node enables the SZTP-client to indicate
          that it supports generating certificate signing requests
          (CSRs) and to provide details around the CSRs it is able
          to generate.

          The 'csr' node enables the SZTP-client to relay a CSR to
          the SZTP-server.";
       reference
         "IEEE 802.1AR: IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan
                        Area Networks - Secure Device Identity
          RFC 8572: Secure Zero Touch Provisioning (SZTP)";
       choice msg-type {
         description
           "Messages are mutually exclusive.";
         case csr-support {
           description
             "Indicates how the SZTP-client supports generating CSRs.

              If present and a SZTP-server wishes to request the
              SZTP-client generate a CSR, the SZTP-server MUST
              respond with an HTTP 400 Bad Request error code with an
              'ietf-restconf:errors' message having the 'error-tag'
              value 'missing-attribute' and the 'error-info' node
              containing the 'csr-request' structure described
              in this module.";
           uses zt:csr-support-grouping;
         }
         case csr {
           description
             "Provides the CSR generated by the SZTP-client.

              When present, the SZTP-server SHOULD respond with
              an SZTP onboarding information message containing
              a signed certificate for the conveyed CSR.  The
              SZTP-server MAY alternatively respond with another
              HTTP error containing another 'csr-request'; in
              which case, the SZTP-client MUST delete any key
              generated for the previously generated CSR.";
           uses zt:csr-grouping;
         }
       }
     }

     sx:structure csr-request {
       description
         "A YANG data structure, per RFC 8791, that specifies
          details for the CSR that the ZTP-client is to generate.";
       reference
         "RFC 8791: YANG Data Structure Extensions";
       uses zt:csr-request-grouping;
     }

   }
   <CODE ENDS>

3.  The "ietf-ztp-types" Module

   This section defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module that defines three
   YANG groupings, one for each message sent between a ZTP-client and
   ZTP-server.  This module is defined independently of the "ietf-sztp-
   csr" module so that its groupings may be used by bootstrapping
   protocols other than SZTP [RFC8572].

3.1.  Data Model Overview

   The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the three groupings
   defined in the "ietf-ztp-types" module.

   module: ietf-ztp-types

     grouping csr-support-grouping
       +-- csr-support
          +-- key-generation!
          |  +-- supported-algorithms
          |     +-- algorithm-identifier*   binary
          +-- csr-generation
             +-- supported-formats
                +-- format-identifier*   identityref
     grouping csr-request-grouping
       +-- key-generation!
       |  +-- selected-algorithm
       |     +-- algorithm-identifier    binary
       +-- csr-generation
       |  +-- selected-format
       |     +-- format-identifier    identityref
       +-- cert-req-info?    ct:csr-info
     grouping csr-grouping
       +-- (csr-type)
          +--:(p10-csr)
          |  +-- p10-csr?   ct:csr
          +--:(cmc-csr)
          |  +-- cmc-csr?   binary
          +--:(cmp-csr)
             +-- cmp-csr?   binary

3.2.  YANG Module

   This module uses data types and groupings defined in [RFC8791] and
   [RFC9640].  The module has additional normative references to
   [RFC2986], [RFC4210], [RFC5272], and [ITU.X690.2021] and an
   informative reference to [Std-802.1AR-2018].

   <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-ztp-types@2024-10-10.yang"
   module ietf-ztp-types {
     yang-version 1.1;
     namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ztp-types";
     prefix zt;

     import ietf-crypto-types {
       prefix ct;
       reference
         "RFC 9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
     }

     organization
       "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

     contact
       "WG Web:   https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf
        WG List:  NETCONF WG list <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
        Authors:  Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
                  Russ Housley <mailto:housley@vigilsec.com>
                  Sean Turner <mailto:sean@sn3rd.com>";

     description
       "This module defines three groupings that enable
        bootstrapping devices to 1) indicate if and how they
        support generating CSRs, 2) obtain a request to
        generate a CSR, and 3) communicate the requested CSR.

        The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
        'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
        'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
        document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14
        (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear
        in all capitals, as shown here.

        Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
        authors of the code.  All rights reserved.

        Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
        without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
        the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set
        forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
        Relating to IETF Documents
        (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

        This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9646
        (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9646); see the
        RFC itself for full legal notices.";

     revision 2024-10-10 {
       description
         "Initial version.";
       reference
         "RFC 9646: Conveying a Certificate Signing Request (CSR)
                    in a Secure Zero-Touch Provisioning (SZTP)
                    Bootstrapping Request";
     }

     identity certificate-request-format {
       description
         "A base identity for the request formats supported
          by the ZTP-client.

          Additional derived identities MAY be defined by
          future efforts.";
     }

     identity p10-csr {
       base certificate-request-format;
       description
         "Indicates that the ZTP-client supports generating
          requests using the 'CertificationRequest' structure
          defined in RFC 2986.";
       reference
         "RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
                    Specification Version 1.7";
     }

     identity cmp-csr {
       base certificate-request-format;
       description
         "Indicates that the ZTP-client supports generating
          requests using a profiled version of the PKIMessage
          that MUST contain a PKIHeader followed by a PKIBody
          containing only the ir, cr, kur, or p10cr structures
          defined in RFC 4210.";
       reference
         "RFC 4210: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
                    Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)";
     }

     identity cmc-csr {
       base certificate-request-format;
       description
         "Indicates that the ZTP-client supports generating
          requests using a profiled version of the 'Full
          PKI Request' structure defined in RFC 5272.";
       reference
         "RFC 5272: Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)";
     }

     // Protocol-accessible nodes

     grouping csr-support-grouping {
       description
         "A grouping enabling use by other efforts.";
       container csr-support {
         description
           "Enables a ZTP-client to indicate that it supports
            generating certificate signing requests (CSRs) and
            provides details about the CSRs it is able to
            generate.";
         container key-generation {
           presence "Indicates that the ZTP-client is capable of
                     generating a new asymmetric key pair.

                     If this node is not present, the ZTP-server MAY
                     request a CSR using the asymmetric key associated
                     with the device's existing identity certificate
                     (e.g., an IDevID from IEEE 802.1AR).";
           description
             "Specifies details for the ZTP-client's ability to
              generate a new asymmetric key pair.";
           container supported-algorithms {
             description
               "A list of public key algorithms supported by the
                ZTP-client for generating a new asymmetric key.";
             leaf-list algorithm-identifier {
               type binary;
               min-elements 1;
               description
                 "An AlgorithmIdentifier, as defined in RFC 2986,
                  encoded using ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Rules
                  (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
               reference
                 "RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
                            Specification Version 1.7
                  ITU-T X.690:
                    Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
                    Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
                    Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
                    Encoding Rules (DER)";
             }
           }
         }
         container csr-generation {
           description
             "Specifies details for the ZTP-client's ability to
              generate certificate signing requests.";
           container supported-formats {
             description
               "A list of certificate request formats supported
                by the ZTP-client for generating a new key.";
             leaf-list format-identifier {
               type identityref {
                 base zt:certificate-request-format;
               }
               min-elements 1;
               description
                 "A certificate request format supported by the
                  ZTP-client.";
             }
           }
         }
       }
     }

     grouping csr-request-grouping {
       description
         "A grouping enabling use by other efforts.";
       container key-generation {
         presence "Provided by a ZTP-server to indicate that it wishes
                   the ZTP-client to generate a new asymmetric key.

                   This statement is present so the mandatory
                   descendant nodes do not imply that this node must
                   be configured.";
         description
           "The key generation parameters selected by the ZTP-server.

            This leaf MUST only appear if the ZTP-client's
            'csr-support' included the 'key-generation' node.";
         container selected-algorithm {
           description
             "The key algorithm selected by the ZTP-server.  The
              algorithm MUST be one of the algorithms specified by
              the 'supported-algorithms' node in the ZTP-client's
              message containing the 'csr-support' structure.";
           leaf algorithm-identifier {
             type binary;
             mandatory true;
             description
               "An AlgorithmIdentifier, as defined in RFC 2986,
                encoded using ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Rules
                (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
             reference
               "RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
                          Specification Version 1.7
                ITU-T X.690:
                  Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
                  Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
                  Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
                  Encoding Rules (DER)";
           }
         }
       }
       container csr-generation {
         description
           "Specifies details for the CSR that the ZTP-client
            is to generate.";
         container selected-format {
           description
             "The CSR format selected by the ZTP-server.  The
              format MUST be one of the formats specified by
              the 'supported-formats' node in the ZTP-client's
              request message.";
           leaf format-identifier {
             type identityref {
               base zt:certificate-request-format;
             }
             mandatory true;
             description
               "A certificate request format to be used by the
                ZTP-client.";
           }
         }
       }
       leaf cert-req-info {
         type ct:csr-info;
         description
           "A CertificationRequestInfo structure, as defined in
            RFC 2986, and modeled via a 'typedef' statement by
            RFC 9640.

            Enables the ZTP-server to provide a fully populated
            CertificationRequestInfo structure that the ZTP-client
            only needs to sign in order to generate the complete
            'CertificationRequest' structure to send to the ZTP-server
            in its next 'get-bootstrapping-data' request message.

            When provided, the ZTP-client MUST use this structure
            to generate its CSR; failure to do so will result in a
            400 Bad Request response containing another 'csr-request'
            structure.

            When not provided, the ZTP-client SHOULD generate a CSR
            using the same structure defined in its existing identity
            certificate (e.g., an IDevID from IEEE 802.1AR).

            If the 'AlgorithmIdentifier' field contained inside the
            certificate 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo' field does not match
            the algorithm identified by the 'selected-algorithm' node,
            then the client MUST reject the certificate and raise an
            error.";

         reference
           "RFC 2986:
              PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
              Version 1.7
            RFC 9640:
              YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
       }
     }

     grouping csr-grouping {
       description
         "Enables a ZTP-client to convey a certificate signing
          request, using the encoding format selected by a
          ZTP-server's 'csr-request' response to the ZTP-client's
          previously sent request containing the 'csr-support'
          node.";
       choice csr-type {
         mandatory true;
         description
           "A choice amongst certificate signing request formats.

            Additional formats MAY be augmented into this 'choice'
            statement by future efforts.";
         case p10-csr {
           leaf p10-csr {
             type ct:p10-csr;
             description
               "A CertificationRequest structure, per RFC 2986.
                Encoding details are defined in the 'ct:csr'
                typedef defined in RFC 9640.

                A raw P10 does not support origin authentication in
                the CSR structure.  External origin authentication
                may be provided via the ZTP-client's authentication
                to the ZTP-server at the transport layer (e.g., TLS).";
             reference
               "RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
                          Specification Version 1.7
                RFC 9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for
                          Cryptography";
           }
         }
         case cmc-csr {
           leaf cmc-csr {
             type binary;
             description
               "A profiled version of the 'Full PKI Request'
                message defined in RFC 5272, encoded using ASN.1
                Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER), as specified
                in ITU-T X.690.

                For asymmetric-key-based origin authentication of a
                CSR based on the initial device identity certificate's
                private key for the associated identity certificate's
                public key, the PKIData contains one reqSequence
                element and no cmsSequence or otherMsgSequence
                elements.  The reqSequence is the TaggedRequest,
                and it is the tcr CHOICE branch.  The tcr is the
                TaggedCertificationRequest, and it is the bodyPartID
                and the certificateRequest elements.  The
                certificateRequest is signed with the initial device
                identity certificate's private key.  The initial device
                identity certificate, and optionally its certificate
                chain is included in the SignedData certificates that
                encapsulate the PKIData.

                For asymmetric-key-based origin authentication based on
                the initial device identity certificate's private key
                that signs the encapsulated CSR signed by the local
                device identity certificate's private key, the
                PKIData contains one cmsSequence element and no
                reqSequence or otherMsgSequence
                elements.  The cmsSequence is the TaggedContentInfo,
                and it includes a bodyPartID element and a contentInfo.
                The contentInfo is a SignedData encapsulating a PKIData
                with one reqSequence element and no cmsSequence or
                otherMsgSequence elements.  The reqSequence is the
                TaggedRequest, and it is the tcr CHOICE.  The tcr is the
                TaggedCertificationRequest, and it is the bodyPartID and
                the certificateRequest elements.  PKIData contains one
                cmsSequence element and no controlSequence, reqSequence,
                or otherMsgSequence elements.  The certificateRequest
                is signed with the local device identity certificate's
                private key.  The initial device identity certificate
                and optionally its certificate chain is included in
                the SignedData certificates that encapsulate the
                PKIData.

                For shared-secret-based origin authentication of a
                CSR signed by the local device identity certificate's
                private key, the PKIData contains one cmsSequence
                element and no reqSequence or otherMsgSequence
                elements.  The cmsSequence is the TaggedContentInfo,
                and it includes a bodyPartID element and a contentInfo.
                The contentInfo is an AuthenticatedData encapsulating
                a PKIData with one reqSequence element and no
                cmsSequences or otherMsgSequence elements.  The
                reqSequence is the TaggedRequest, and it is the tcr
                CHOICE.  The tcr is the TaggedCertificationRequest,
                and it is the bodyPartID and the certificateRequest
                elements.  The certificateRequest is signed with the
                local device identity certificate's private key.  The
                initial device identity certificate and optionally its
                certificate chain is included in the SignedData
                certificates that encapsulate the PKIData.";
             reference
               "RFC 5272: Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
                ITU-T X.690:
                  Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
                  Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
                  Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
                  Encoding Rules (DER)";
           }
         }
         case cmp-csr {
           leaf cmp-csr {
             type binary;
             description
               "A PKIMessage structure, as defined in RFC 4210,
                encoded using ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Rules
                (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.

                For asymmetric-key-based origin authentication of a
                CSR based on the initial device identity certificate's
                private key for the associated initial device identity
                certificate's public key, PKIMessages contain one
                PKIMessage with the header and body elements, do not
                contain a protection element, and SHOULD contain the
                extraCerts element.  The header element contains the
                pvno, sender, and recipient elements.  The pvno contains
                cmp2000, and the sender contains the subject of the
                initial device identity certificate. The body element
                contains an ir, cr, kur, or p10cr CHOICE of type
                CertificationRequest.  It is signed with the initial
                device identity certificate's private key.  The
                extraCerts element contains the initial device identity
                certificate, optionally followed by its certificate
                chain excluding the trust anchor.

                For asymmetric-key-based origin authentication based
                on the initial device identity certificate's private
                key that signs the encapsulated CSR signed by the local
                device identity certificate's private key, PKIMessages
                contain one PKIMessage with the header, body, and
                protection elements and SHOULD contain the extraCerts
                element.  The header element contains the pvno, sender,
                recipient, protectionAlg, and optionally senderKID
                elements.  The pvno contains cmp2000, the sender
                contains the subject of the initial device identity
                certificate, the protectionAlg contains the
                AlgorithmIdentifier of the used signature algorithm,
                and the senderKID contains the subject key identifier
                of the initial device identity certificate. The body
                element contains an ir, cr, kur, or p10cr CHOICE of
                type CertificationRequest.  It is signed with the local
                device identity certificate's private key.  The
                protection element contains the digital signature
                generated with the initial device identity
                certificate's private key.  The extraCerts element
                contains the initial device identity certificate,
                optionally followed by its certificate chain excluding
                the trust anchor.

                For shared-secret-based origin authentication of a
                CSR signed by the local device identity certificate's
                private key, PKIMessages contain one PKIMessage with
                the header, body, and protection element and no
                extraCerts element.  The header element contains the
                pvno, sender, recipient, protectionAlg, and senderKID
                elements.  The pvno contains cmp2000, the protectionAlg
                contains the AlgorithmIdentifier of the used Message
                Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm, and the senderKID
                contains a reference the recipient can use to identify
                the shared secret.  The body element contains an ir, cr,
                kur, or p10cr CHOICE of type CertificationRequest.  It
                is signed with the local device identity certificate's
                private key.  The protection element contains the MAC
                value generated with the shared secret.";
             reference
               "RFC 4210:
                  Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
                  Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
                ITU-T X.690:
                  Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
                  Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
                  Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
                  Encoding Rules (DER)";
           }
         }
       }
     }

   }
   <CODE ENDS>

4.  Security Considerations

   This document builds on top of the solution presented in [RFC8572],
   and therefore all the security considerations discussed in [RFC8572]
   apply here as well.

   For the various CSR formats, when using PKCS#10, the security
   considerations in [RFC2986] apply; when using CMP, the security
   considerations in [RFC4210] apply; and when using CMC, the security
   considerations in [RFC5272] apply.

   For the various authentication mechanisms, when using TLS-level
   authentication, the security considerations in [RFC8446] apply, and
   when using HTTP-level authentication, the security considerations in
   [RFC9110] apply.

4.1.  SZTP-Client Considerations

4.1.1.  Ensuring the Integrity of Asymmetric Private Keys

   The private key the SZTP-client uses for the dynamically generated
   identity certificate MUST be protected from inadvertent disclosure in
   order to prevent identity fraud.

   The security of this private key is essential in order to ensure the
   associated identity certificate can be used to authenticate the
   device it is issued to.

   It is RECOMMENDED that devices are manufactured with a hardware
   security module (HSM), such as a trusted platform module (TPM), to
   generate and contain the private key within the security perimeter of
   the HSM.  In such cases, the private key and its associated
   certificates MAY have long validity periods.

   In cases where the SZTP-client does not possess an HSM or is unable
   to use an HSM to protect the private key, it is RECOMMENDED to
   periodically reset the private key (and associated identity
   certificates) in order to minimize the lifetime of unprotected
   private keys.  For instance, a Network Management System (NMS)
   controller/orchestrator application could periodically prompt the
   SZTP-client to generate a new private key and provide a certificate
   signing request (CSR) or, alternatively, push both the key and an
   identity certificate to the SZTP-client using, e.g., a PKCS#12
   message [RFC7292].  In another example, the SZTP-client could be
   configured to periodically reset the configuration to its factory
   default, thus causing removal of the private key and associated
   identity certificates and re-execution of the SZTP protocol.

4.1.2.  Reuse of a Manufacturer-Generated Private Key

   It is RECOMMENDED that a new private key is generated for each CSR
   described in this document.

   Implementations must randomly generate nonces and private keys.  The
   use of inadequate pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) to generate
   cryptographic keys can result in little or no security.  An attacker
   may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that
   produced the keys, searching the resulting small set of
   possibilities, rather than brute force searching the whole key space.
   As an example of predictable random numbers, see CVE-2008-0166
   [CVE-2008-0166], and some consequences of low-entropy random numbers
   are discussed in "Mining Your Ps and Qs" [MiningPsQs].  The
   generation of quality random numbers is difficult.  [ISO.20543-2019],
   [NIST.SP.800-90Ar1], BSI AIS 31 [AIS31], BCP 106 [RFC4086], and
   others offer valuable guidance in this area.

   This private key SHOULD be protected as well as the built-in private
   key associated with the SZTP-client's initial device identity
   certificate (e.g., the IDevID from [Std-802.1AR-2018]).

   In cases where it is not possible to generate a new private key that
   is protected as well as the built-in private key, it is RECOMMENDED
   to reuse the built-in private key rather than generate a new private
   key that is not as well protected.

4.1.3.  Replay Attack Protection

   This RFC enables an SZTP-client to announce an ability to generate a
   new key to use for its CSR.

   When the SZTP-server responds with a request for the SZTP-client to
   generate a new key, it is essential that the SZTP-client actually
   generates a new key.

   Generating a new key each time enables the random bytes used to
   create the key to also serve the dual-purpose of acting like a
   "nonce" used in other mechanisms to detect replay attacks.

   When a fresh public/private key pair is generated for the request,
   confirmation to the SZTP-client that the response has not been
   replayed is enabled by the SZTP-client's fresh public key appearing
   in the signed certificate provided by the SZTP-server.

   When a public/private key pair associated with the manufacturer-
   generated identity certificate (e.g., IDevID) is used for the
   request, there may not be confirmation to the SZTP-client that the
   response has not been replayed; however, the worst case result is a
   lost certificate that is associated to the private key known only to
   the SZTP-client.  Protection of the private-key information is vital
   to public-key cryptography.  Disclosure of the private-key material
   to another entity can lead to masquerades.

4.1.4.  Connecting to an Untrusted Bootstrap Server

   [RFC8572] allows SZTP-clients to connect to untrusted SZTP-servers by
   blindly authenticating the SZTP-server's TLS end-entity certificate.

   As is discussed in Section 9.5 of [RFC8572], in such cases, the SZTP-
   client MUST assert that the bootstrapping data returned is signed if
   the SZTP-client is to trust it.

   However, the HTTP error message used in this document cannot be
   signed data, as described in [RFC8572].

   Therefore, the solution presented in this document cannot be used
   when the SZTP-client connects to an untrusted SZTP-server.

   Consistent with the recommendation presented in Section 9.6 of
   [RFC8572], SZTP-clients SHOULD NOT pass the "csr-support" input
   parameter to an untrusted SZTP-server.  SZTP-clients SHOULD instead
   pass the "signed-data-preferred" input parameter, as discussed in
   Appendix B of [RFC8572].

4.1.5.  Selecting the Best Origin Authentication Mechanism

   The origin of the CSR must be verified before a certificate is
   issued.

   When generating a new key, it is important that the SZTP-client be
   able to provide additional proof that it was the entity that
   generated the key.

   The CMP and CMC certificate request formats defined in this document
   support origin authentication.  A raw PKCS#10 CSR does not support
   origin authentication.

   The CMP and CMC request formats support origin authentication using
   both PKI and a shared secret.

   Typically, only one possible origin authentication mechanism can
   possibly be used, but in the case that the SZTP-client authenticates
   itself using both TLS-level (e.g., IDevID) and HTTP-level credentials
   (e.g., Basic), as is allowed by Section 5.3 of [RFC8572], then the
   SZTP-client may need to choose between the two options.

   In the case that the SZTP-client must choose between an asymmetric
   key option versus a shared secret for origin authentication, it is
   RECOMMENDED that the SZTP-client choose using the asymmetric key.

4.1.6.  Clearing the Private Key and Associated Certificate

   Unlike a manufacturer-generated identity certificate (e.g., IDevID),
   the deployment-generated identity certificate (e.g., LDevID) and the
   associated private key (assuming a new private key was generated for
   the purpose) are considered user data and SHOULD be cleared whenever
   the SZTP-client is reset to its factory default state, such as by the
   "factory-reset" RPC defined in [RFC8808].

4.2.  SZTP-Server Considerations

4.2.1.  Verifying Proof-of-Possession

   Regardless, if using a new asymmetric key or the bootstrapping
   device's manufacturer-generated key (e.g., the IDevID key), the
   public key is placed in the CSR and the CSR is signed by that private
   key.  Proof-of-possession of the private key is verified by ensuring
   the signature over the CSR using the public key placed in the CSR.

4.2.2.  Verifying Proof-of-Origin

   When the bootstrapping device's manufacturer-generated private key
   (e.g., the IDevID key) is reused for the CSR, proof-of-origin is
   verified by validating the IDevID-issuer cert and ensuring that the
   CSR uses the same key pair.

   When the bootstrapping device's manufacturer-generated private key
   (e.g., an IDevID key from IEEE 802.1AR) is reused for the CSR, proof-
   of-origin is verified by validating the IDevID certification path and
   ensuring that the CSR uses the same key pair.

   When a fresh asymmetric key is used with the CMP or CMC formats, the
   authentication is part of the protocols, which could employ either
   the manufacturer-generated private key or a shared secret.  In
   addition, CMP and CMC support processing by an RA before the request
   is passed to the CA, which allows for more robust handling of errors.

4.2.3.  Supporting SZTP-Clients That Don't Trust the SZTP-Server

   [RFC8572] allows SZTP-clients to connect to untrusted SZTP-servers by
   blindly authenticating the SZTP-server's TLS end-entity certificate.

   As is recommended in Section 4.1.4 of this document, in such cases,
   SZTP-clients SHOULD pass the "signed-data-preferred" input parameter.

   The reciprocal of this statement is that SZTP-servers, wanting to
   support SZTP-clients that don't trust them, SHOULD support the
   "signed-data-preferred" input parameter, as discussed in Appendix B
   of [RFC8572].

4.3.  Security Considerations for the "ietf-sztp-csr" YANG Module

   The recommended format for documenting the security considerations
   for YANG modules is described in Section 3.7 of [RFC8407].  However,
   this module only augments two input parameters into the "get-
   bootstrapping-data" RPC in [RFC8572] and therefore only needs to
   point to the relevant Security Considerations sections in that RFC.

   *  Security considerations for the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC are
      described in Section 9.16 of [RFC8572].

   *  Security considerations for the "input" parameters passed inside
      the "get-bootstrapping-data" RPC are described in Section 9.6 of
      [RFC8572].

4.4.  Security Considerations for the "ietf-ztp-types" YANG Module

   The recommended format for documenting the security considerations
   for YANG modules is described in Section 3.7 of [RFC8407].  However,
   this module does not define any protocol-accessible nodes (it only
   defines "identity" and "grouping" statements), and therefore there
   are no security considerations to report.

5.  IANA Considerations

5.1.  The IETF XML Registry

   IANA has registered two URIs in the "ns" registry of the "IETF XML
   Registry" [RFC3688] maintained at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/
   xml-registry/>.

   URI:  urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-sztp-csr
   Registrant Contact:  The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
   XML:  N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

   URI:  urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ztp-types
   Registrant Contact:  The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
   XML:  N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

5.2.  The YANG Module Names Registry

   IANA has registered two YANG modules in the "YANG Module Names"
   registry [RFC6020] maintained at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/
   yang-parameters/>.

   Name:  ietf-sztp-csr
   Namespace:  urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-sztp-csr
   Prefix:  sztp-csr
   Reference:  RFC 9646

   Name:  ietf-ztp-types
   Namespace:  urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ztp-types
   Prefix:  ztp-types
   Reference:  RFC 9646

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [ITU.X690.2021]
              ITU, "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
              (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1,
              February 2021, <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690/>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.

   [RFC3688]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.

   [RFC4210]  Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
              "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.

   [RFC5272]  Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
              (CMC)", RFC 5272, DOI 10.17487/RFC5272, June 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5272>.

   [RFC6020]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
              the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.

   [RFC7950]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
              RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.

   [RFC8040]  Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
              Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [RFC8572]  Watsen, K., Farrer, I., and M. Abrahamsson, "Secure Zero
              Touch Provisioning (SZTP)", RFC 8572,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8572, April 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8572>.

   [RFC8791]  Bierman, A., Björklund, M., and K. Watsen, "YANG Data
              Structure Extensions", RFC 8791, DOI 10.17487/RFC8791,
              June 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8791>.

   [RFC9110]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
              Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.

   [RFC9640]  Watsen, K., "YANG Data Types and Groupings for
              Cryptography", RFC 9640, DOI 10.17487/RFC9640, October
              2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9640>.

6.2.  Informative References

   [AIS31]    Killmann, W. and W. Schindler, "A proposal for:
              Functionality classes for random number generators -
              Version 2.0", September 2011,
              <https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/
              Zertifizierung/Interpretationen/AIS_31_Functionality_class
              es_for_random_number_generators_e.pdf>.

   [CVE-2008-0166]
              National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST),
              "National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2008-0166 Detail",
              May 2008,
              <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0166>.

   [ISO.20543-2019]
              International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
              "Information technology -- Security techniques -- Test and
              analysis methods for random bit generators within ISO/IEC
              19790 and ISO/IEC 15408", ISO/IEC 20543:2019, October
              2019.

   [MiningPsQs]
              Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E., and J.
              Halderman, "Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread
              Weak Keys in Network Devices", Security'12: Proceedings of
              the 21st USENIX Conference on Security Symposium, August
              2012, <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity12/
              technical-sessions/presentation/heninger>.

   [NIST.SP.800-90Ar1]
              Barker, E. and J. Kelsey, "Recommendation for Random
              Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
              Generators", DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1, NIST
              SP 800-90Ar1, June 2015,
              <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
              NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.

   [RFC7292]  Moriarty, K., Ed., Nystrom, M., Parkinson, S., Rusch, A.,
              and M. Scott, "PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange
              Syntax v1.1", RFC 7292, DOI 10.17487/RFC7292, July 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7292>.

   [RFC8340]  Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
              BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.

   [RFC8407]  Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of
              Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>.

   [RFC8792]  Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu,
              "Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and
              RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8792>.

   [RFC8808]  Wu, Q., Lengyel, B., and Y. Niu, "A YANG Data Model for
              Factory Default Settings", RFC 8808, DOI 10.17487/RFC8808,
              August 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8808>.

   [RFC9641]  Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Truststore",
              RFC 9641, DOI 10.17487/RFC9641, October 2024,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9641>.

   [RFC9642]  Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore", RFC 9642,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9642, October 2024,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9642>.

   [Std-802.1AR-2018]
              IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area
              Networks - Secure Device Identity", August 2018,
              <https://standards.ieee.org/ieee/802.1AR/6995/>.

Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions
   on list and in the halls (ordered by first name): Benjamin Kaduk, Dan
   Romascanu, David von Oheimb, Éric Vyncke, Guy Fedorkow, Hendrik
   Brockhaus, Joe Clarke, Meral Shirazipour, Murray Kucherawy, Rich
   Salz, Rob Wilton, Roman Danyliw, Qin Wu, Yaron Sheffer, and
   Zaheduzzaman Sarkar.

Contributors

   Special thanks go to David von Oheimb and Hendrik Brockhaus for
   helping with the descriptions for the "cmc-csr" and "cmp-csr" nodes.

Authors' Addresses

   Kent Watsen
   Watsen Networks
   Email: kent+ietf@watsen.net


   Russ Housley
   Vigil Security, LLC
   Email: housley@vigilsec.com


   Sean Turner
   sn3rd
   Email: sean@sn3rd.com